•c 

' 


^jU^^         6tHt^4  If^' 


**&*'' 


,       '  "'  I*  - 


'•-'/. 


.  / 


^ 


UUSB   UBRART 


THE  ORIGINS  OF 
CONTEMPORARY   PSYCHOLOGY 


THE    ORIGINS 

OF    CONTEMPORARY 

PSYCHOLOGY 


BY 

CARDINAL   MERCIER 

ARCHBISHOP   OF    MALINES 


TRANSLATED  BY 

W.    H.    MITCHELL,    M.A 


P.    J.    KENEDY    fcf    SONS 

44,    BARCLAY    STREET,    NEW    YORK 
1918 


INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  FIRST 
EDITION 

WE  propose  to  publish  a  series  of  studies  dealing 
with  special  points  of  Psychology  or  Criteriology. 

Our  standpoint  is  that  of  the  Aristotelian  and 
Scholastic  Philosophy;  but,  being  imbued  with  a 
thoroughly  peripatetic  spirit,  we  desire  to  keep  in 
constant  touch  with  contemporary  science  and 
thought.  The  Middle  Ages  excelled  in  reflecting 
upon  general  truths.  Modern  inquirers  are  wonder- 
fully equipped  for  the  work  of  analysis,  and  bring 
thereto  as  much  patience  as  sagacity.  Is  it  not 
evidently  the  proper  task  of  a  time-honoured  philo- 
sophy desirous  of  renewing  its  youth  in  the  world 
of  to-day  to  bring  the  wisdom  of  past  ages  to  bear 
upon  the  latest  triumphs  of  science  and  doctrines 
now  accepted  ?  And  if  this  task  is  faithfully  dis- 
charged, may  not  a  real  advance  be  legitimately 
anticipated  ? 

Among  the  various  reviews  of  what  we  have 
already  published  is  one  which  we  desire  to  quote, 
because  it  bears  witness  to  the  fact  that  the  Neo- 
Thomist  aim  has  been  correctly  appreciated  in  the 
scientific  circles  from  which  it  comes.  It  appeared 
in  M.  Richet's  Revue  scientifique.  "  This  work " 


vi   INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION 

— our  treatise  on  Psychology — "  is  well  worth 
pointing  out  to  those  who  have  given  up  official 
Spiritualism  and  who  are  looking  for  a  philosophy 
which  may  be  reconciled  with  science. 

"  The  Neo-Thomist  school  has  renewed  the  youth 
of  Scholastic  teaching  by  becoming  thoroughly 
imbued  with  the  peripatetic  spirit.  It  abandons 
all  the  doctrines  that  were  founded  upon  a  too 
scanty  knowledge  of  nature,  and  it  takes  full  ad- 
vantage of  modern  discoveries,  studying  them 
according  to  the  method  of  Aristotle . 

"  So  great  is  the  vitality  of  this  philosophy  that 
it  finds  a  place  in  its  scheme  for  the  contemporary 
researches  of  physiology  and  psychophysics  without 
compromising  any  principle,  and  without  ever  mis- 
representing science,  as  is  constantly  done  in  stan- 
dard books.  Far  from  dreading  physiological  in- 
vestigation it  regrets  that  its  studies  on  the  nervous 
system,  mental  localization,  and  the  senses,  have 
not  been  carried  further,  for  in  them  it  recognizes 
indispensable  auxiliaries.  M.  Mercier  congratulates 
the  pioneers  of  physiological  psychology  on  restoring 
traditions  which  had  been  broken  by  an  interval 
of  many  centuries.  .  .  .'51 

The  present  treatise  is  specially  addressed  to 
those  who  are  no  longer  satisfied  with  the  standard 
spiritualism,  and  if  amidst  the  swarm  of  systems  and 
growing  crowd  of  facts  that  are  around  them  they 
are  in  search  of  some  guiding  principle  of  thought, 
they  may  perhaps  be  able  to  take  advantage  of  the 
comparison  we  shall  endeavour  to  make  between 
the  psychology  of  Descartes,  the  chief  founder  of 

1  Revue  scientifique,  t.  li.,  1893,  p.  55. 


INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION    vii 

the  official  spiritualism,  and  the  anthropology  of 
Aristotle  and  the  Middle  Ages. 

Chapter  I  is  devoted  to  an  examination  of  the 
psychology  of  the  great  French  innovator.  In  it 
we  shall  deal  first  with  his  exaggerated  spiritualistic 
theory,  and  then  with  his  mechanical  theory  as 
applied  to  the  study  of  man. 

Chapter  II  aims  at  determining  the  historical 
evolution  of  the  Cartesian  psychology,  and  we  do 
this  according  to  the  scheme  laid  down  in  Chapter  I, 
examining,  first,  the  evolution  of  spiritualism  (Art. 
I),  which  gives  rise  to  Occasionalism,  Spinozism, 
Ontologism  (Sect.  I),  and  Idealism  (Sect.  II);  next, 
the  evolution  of  the  mechanical  theory  (Art.  II). 

We  shall  not  dwell  upon  the  now  abandoned 
theories  of  Occasionalism  and  Ontologism,  but  we 
shall  have  something  to  say  of  Idealism.  We  shall 
inquire  into  its  origin,  pointing  out  the  parts  played 
by  Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume,  and  Kant  in  its  develop- 
ment. 

Then  we  shall  refer  to  the  influence  of  the  sensa- 
tionalist ideas  of  Locke,  Hume,  and  Condillac,  in 
England  and  in  France;  then  we  shall  see  the 
influence  of  Sensationalism  combine  in  the  history 
of  modern  psychology  with  that  of  Mechanism  (the 
mechanical  theory),  and  these  various  factors  result 
in  the  positivist  or  agnostic  character  which  is 
generally  a  feature  of  contemporary  Idealism. 

The  present  state  of  contemporary  psychology  will 
be  the  subject  of  Chapter  III.  In  it  we  shall  try 
to  prove  the  insufficiency  of  positivist  Idealism  for 
the  solution  of  theJundamental  problems  of  psycho- 
logy (Art.  I). 


viii   INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION 

Then  will  follow  a  brief  analysis  of  the  philosophic 
systems  of  contemporary  thinkers,  amongst  whom 
we  have  selected  as  typical  Herbert  Spencer  in 
England,  Alfred  Fouillee  in  France,  and  Wilhelm 
Wundt  in  Germany.  In  these  masters  of  psychology 
we  shall  trace  the  various  influences,  the  origin  of 
which  has  been  sketched  in  the  first  two  chapters. 

These  same  influences  are  to  be  found  on  all  sides 
in  the  teaching,  the  writings,  and  the  questions  of 
to-day.  And  hence  contemporary  psychology  is 
characterized  by  these  three  marks:  first,  by  a 
Cartesian  and  exclusively  spiritualistic  conception  of 
psychology ;  next,  by  the  abandonment  of  meta- 
physics, or  by  Positivism ;  and  this,  owing  to  its 
idealistic  form,  leads  on  to  Phenomenalism,  or  to  a 
sort  of  idealist  and  subjectivist  Monism.  On  the 
other  hand,  experimental  psychology  is  developing 
to  an  extraordinary  extent  (Art.  III). 

In  the  following  chapters  the  ruling  ideas  of  con- 
temporary psychology  will  be  discussed.  It  must  be 
understood  that  we  shall  not  go  into  details  of  system 
or  of  fact,  but  that  we  shall  confine  ourselves  to 
criticizing  systems  in  principle,  our  sole  aim  being 
to  map  out  the  ground  in  which  we  shall  endeavour 
to  investigate  special  questions. 

In  Chapter  IV  the  Cartesian  notion  of  psychology 
will  be  contrasted  with  the  ideas  of  Aristotle  and 
the  Scholastics  on  the  subject  of  human  psychology, 
or  rather  anthropology.  It  is  entitled  Psychology 
and  Anthropology. 

Chapter  V  essays  ^criticism  of  the  idealist  principle. 

Chapter  VI  deals  in  the  same  manner,  in  a  general 
way,  with  the  mechanical  theory. 


INTRODUCTION  TO  THE  FIRST  EDITION    ix 

Chapter  VII  contains  an  examination  of  Posi- 
tivism, or  Agnosticism  in  metaphysics. 

Finally,  Chapter  VIII,  which  is  the  last,  gives  a 
sketch  of  the  Neo-Thomist  movement .  It  insists  on 
the  present  importance  of  criteriological  problems 
and  on  the  role  of  experimental  science  in  psycho- 
logy. It  is  directly  addressed  to  those  who,  accept- 
ing our  point  of  view,  desire  to  take  stock  of  their 
position,  strength,  and  weakness,  and  therefore  of 
their  duties. 

LOUVAIN, 

October,  1897. 


NOTE  ON  THE  SECOND  EDITION 

WHILE  the  general  outlines  remain  unmodified, 
the  references  and  quotations  have  been  brought 
up  to  date. 


1908- 


CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTION 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES     -  -        i 

Art.     I.  Its  exclusively  Spiritualistic  Theory      -         i 
Art.  II.  Its  Mechanical  Theory  as  applied  to  the 
Study  of  Man,  or  to  Anthropology      -  21 

CHAPTER  II 

THE  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY    -       37 
Art.  I.  The   Evolution  of   the  Cartesian  Spirit- 
ualism -       38 
Section  I.  Occasionalism,       Spinozism,       Onto- 

logism  -       38 

Section  II.  Idealism: 

1.  The  Origin  of  Idealism    -  -41 

2.  The  Origin  of  the  Positivist  Character  of 

Idealism  -  -  -49 

Art.  II.  The  Origin  of  Mechanism  (the  Mechani- 
cal Theory)  -  -  53 

CHAPTER  III 

CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY  .      69 

Art.  I.  The  Insufficiency  of  Positivist  Idealism 
fov  the  Solution  of  the  Fundamental  Problems 
of  Psychology  -  69 


xii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY — continued : 

Art.  II.  Masters  of  Contemporary  Psychology    -  79 
Herbert  Spencer      -                                         -79 
Alfred  Fouillee     "  -                                       -  108 
Wilhelm  Wundt       -                                         -  125 
Art.  III.  General  Characteristics  of  the  Psycho- 
logy of  To-day      -  160 
Exclusive  Study  of  the  Facts  of  Conscious- 
ness                                                              -  161 
Abandonment  of  Metaphysics                        -  164 
Experimental  Studies                                     -  207 

CHAPTER  IV 
PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY    -  .216 

CHAPTER  V 
CRITICISM  OF  IDEALIST  PRINCIPLE   -  -247 

CHAPTER  VI 

CRITICISM  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  MECHANISM          -     263 
Mechanism  and  Physical  Science  -     264 

Mechanism  and  the  Doctrine  of  Final  Causes      -     272 

CHAPTER  VII 
CRITICISM  OF  POSITIVIST  PRINCIPLES  -    284 

CHAPTER  VIII 
NEO-THOMISM  .    320 

CONCLUSION  -  -  349 


THE   ORIGINS   OF 
CONTEMPORARY     PSYCHOLOGY 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES 

I 

ITS  EXCLUSIVELY  SPIRITUALISTIC  THEORY 

DESCARTES  appears  in  the  history  of  philosophy  as 
a  great  innovator. 

Read  his  life,  refer  to  the  scholars  and  philosophers 
who  give  a  review  of  his  work,  and  you  will  every- 
where find  the  same  general  estimate :  Descartes 
made  a  revolution  in  the  world  of  thought,  and  he 
is  the  father  of  the  modern  school  of  thinkers. 

But  wherein  does  this  revolution  consist  ?  How 
did  Descartes  bring  it  about  ? 

The  replies  to  these  questions  are  far  from  being 
in  agreement  with  one  another. 

Was  the  writer  of  the  Discours  de  la  methode  the 
first  to  break  with  tradition,  and  to  substitute 
"  free  inquiry "  for  the  principle  of  authority  ? 
Assuming  such  a  work  to  be  commendable,  the 
credit  for  it  would  belong  to  the  founders  of  the 
Reformation  and  to  the  bolder  spirits  of  the  Renais- 
sance, to  Campanella  and  Giordano  Bruno. 


2  CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Was  he  an  originator  in  scien  ce  and  mathematics  ? 
Astronomy  and  the  mathemat  ical  sciences  took  a 
fresh  start,  writes  M.  Liard,  with  Copernicus,  Tycho 
Brahe,  Kepler,  Cardan,  Viete  and  Ne~per ;  while  the 
experimental  method  was  introduced  by  Galileo, 
Rondelet,  Servetus,  Aselli,  Harvey  and  Bacon. 

Was  he  the  creator  of  a  method,  of  method  itself  ? 
Strictly  speaking — No.  The  four  principles  which 
summarize  the  Cartesian  method  finally  come  to 
this :  that  man's  mind  must  begin  by  decomposing 
what  is  complex  into  its  primordial  elements, 
"  trying  to  discover  in  everything  that  which  is 
most  absolute,"  and  forming  clear  and  distinct  ideas 
of  it ;  and  then  it  must  make  use  of  these  absolute 
elements,  resulting  from  analysis,  to  re-form  the 
original  compound.  His  second  principle  is  "to 
subdivide  every  problem  demanding  investigation 
into  as  many  sections  as  possible,  and  as  may  be 
required  the  better  to  solve  it."  The  third  is  "  to 
do  my  thinking  in  an  orderly  way,  beginning  with 
the  subjects  that  are  simplest  and  most  easily 
understood,  and  gradually  rising  step  by  step  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  most  complex."1 

But  this  twofold  process  of  dissection  and  com- 
bination, of  analysis  and  synthesis,  is  that  described 
in  the  Organon  and  faithfully  followed  by  all  the 
disciples  of  the  founder  of  the  Lyceum.2  Hence  it 
was  not  in  the  invention  of  a  method,  which  can 
really  be  called  new,  that  the  genius  of  Descartes 
stands  revealed. 

1  Discours  de  la  mithode,  2e  partie.     Cf.  Liard  on  Des- 
cartes in  the  Grande  Encyclopedic . 

2  See    our    Cours    de    philosophic .     Logique,    4th    ed., 
Ch.  III.,  Art.  3. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES       3 

What,  then,  is  his  distinctive  contribution  to 
thought  ?  The  conception  of  a  science  of  pure 
mathematics  which  would  apply  to  every  kind  of 
research. 

He  was  at  Neuberg  on  the  Danube  in  1619. 
Held  up  by  winter,  and  confined  by  himself  to  a 
little  room,  "  where  he  found  leisure  to  enjoy  the 
company  of  his  own  thoughts,"  Descartes  dreamed 
of  a  science  wider  than  geometry  and  arithmetic 
and  algebra,  of  a  science  of  order  and  proportions 
to  be  called  "  Universal  Mathematics,"  which  would 
perhaps  disclose  to  him  the  secret  of  the  whole  of 
Nature.  This  is  what  we  gather  from  reading  the 
Discours  de  la  methode,  as  M.  Fouillee  justly  remarks ; 
and  this,  too,  is  confirmed  by  the  epitaph  which 
was  written  by  one  of  his  most  intimate  friends, 
Chanut:  "In  his  winter  leisure,  when  measuring 
the  mysteries  of  Nature  on  mathematical  principles, 
he  ventured  to  hope  that  the  same  key  would  unlock 
the  secrets  of  both."1 

Indeed,  Descartes  is  above  all  a  mathematician. 
In  philosophy,  as  in  physics  and  physiology,  he  is 
a  geometrician.  Geometry  is  more  anxious  about 
the  strict  inevitableness  of  its  deductions  than  the 
breadth  and  accuracy  of  its  preliminary  observa- 
tions. It  is  apt  to  be  one-sided,  looking  at  things 
from  a  single  point  of  view. 

We  shall  see  both  the  qualities  and  defects  of  the 
geometrical  spirit  of  Descartes  coming  out  in  his 
studies  concerning  the  soul  and  the  body.  And 
when  at  last  the  inferences  of  his  deductive  psycho- 
logy bring  him  face  to  face  with  the  inevitable 

1  A.  Fouillee,  Descartes,  pp.  n,  12. 


4          CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

opposition  between  the  thinking  mind  and  the 
extended  body,  the  geometrician  shuts  his  eyes  to 
the  consequences  of  his  system;  the  proud  ideal 
edifice  remains,  but  the  anthropological  foundations 
are  left  long  unsettled  by  the  shock.  Let  us  not, 
however,  anticipate. 

What  is  the  starting-point  of  the  Cartesian 
psychology  ? 

Descartes'  philosophy  may  be  condensed  into  his 
famous  formula:  "I  doubt,  I  think:  therefore,  I 
exist." 

To  curtail  the  errors  of  the  human  mind,  to  uproot 
misleading  illusions,  whether  proceeding  from  educa- 
tion, the  senses,  or  from  some  wicked  spirit  which 
rejoices  in  playing  upon  our  credulity;  then,  to  set 
upon  a  solid  and  henceforth  immovable  foundation 
philosophy  reconstructed  on  a  new  plan,  such  is 
the  root -idea  of  the  Cartesian  system. 

Psychology,  indeed,  thus  springs  up  like  a  plant 
from  its  seed. 

Urged  thereto  by  doubt,  says  Descartes,  I  cast 
out  of  my  creed,  first,  the  teaching  of  tradition, 
next,  the  testimony  of  the  senses;  for  I  remember 
how  "  I  have  often  been  misled  by  the  senses,  and 
how  prudence  bids  me  never  to  give  my  full  con- 
fidence to  those  who  have  once  deceived  me." 
Then  I  get  rid  of  the  affirmations  of  the  inner  sense 
which  tells  me,  for  instance,  "  that  I  am  here, 
sitting  by  the  fire  in  my  dressing-gown,  holding 
these  papers  or  suchlike  things  .  .  .  because  I 
remember  how  often  I  have  been  deceived,  when 
asleep,  by  similar  delusions,  and,  dwelling  on  this 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES   5 

thought,  I  see  quite  plainly  that  there  are  no  sure 
signs  to  enable  me  to  distinguish  a  waking  from 
a  sleeping  state,  so  that  I  am  lost  in  wonder;  and 
so  great  is  my  astonishment  as  almost  to  persuade 
me  that  I  am  asleep." 

Lastly,  I  cast  out  of  my  belief  the  subject-matter 
of  the  simplest  and  most  general  cognitions  with 
regard  to  extension,  number,  etc.,  for  I  have  a 
notion  of  a  God  who  can  do  all  things,  and  by 
whom  I  have  been  made  that  which  I  am.  "  But, 
how  can  I  tell  that  He  has  not  acted  in  such  a 
manner  that  there  is  really  no  earth,  no  heaven, 
no  matter  of  an  extended  character,  etc.,  and  that 
nevertheless  I  have  sensations  of  all  these  things  ? 
How  can  I  tell  that  He  has  not  so  acted  that  I  am 
mistaken  whenever  I  add  up  twos  and  threes,  or 
count  the  sides  of  a  square  P"1 

But,  after  having  cast  out  of  my  belief  all  the 
persuasions  that  doubt  has  succeeded  in  unsettling, 
have  I  nothing  left  behind  ? 

There  only  remains  myself.  "  I  "  who  doubt  as 
to  all  these  things,  I  represent  to  myself  all  the 
things  about  which  I  doubt,  videre  videor,  audire, 
calescere2:  "  I  think  I  see,  hear,  get  hot:  it  is  to  no 
purpose  that  I  try  to  imagine  a  very  mighty  and 
crafty  deceiver  who  uses  all  his  ingenuity  in  con- 
stantly deceiving  me."  What  does  it  matter  ? 
"  At  any  rate  there  is  no  doubt  that  '  I  '  exist,  even 
if  he  deceives  me :  let  him  deceive  me  as  much  as  he 
will,  he  will  never  be  able  to  succeed  in  making  me 
nothing,  as  long  as  I  think  that  I  am  something."3 

1  Meditation  irc.  2  Ibid.,  2e, 

3  Ibid. 


6  CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

I  have,  then,  at  least  one  thing  of  which  I  am 
sure:  it  is  that  /  think,  and  that  I,  the  thinker, 
exist. 

This  one  thing  is  certain  and  free  from  doubt, 
but  it  is  the  only  thing  that  is  so. 

"  But  what  did  I  think  that  I  was  hitherto  ? 
Without  hesitation,  I  thought  myself  a  man.  But 
what  is  a  man  ?  Shall  I  reply,  a  rational  animal  ? 
No,  indeed;  for  then  I  must  ask  what  is  meant  by 
'  animal '  and  by  '  rational,'  and  thus  by  one 
question  I  shall  insensibly  be  driven  to  ask  an 
infinite  number  of  others  still  more  difficult  and 
embarrassing.  .  .  .5>1 

"  Ought  I  rather  to  stop  and  consider  the  thoughts 
suggested  to  me  by  my  own  nature  only,  when  I 
set  myself  to  consider  my  being  ?  I  looked  upon 
myself  as  having  a  face,  hands,  arms,  and  so  forth 
...  a  body.  I  considered,  moreover,  that  I  ate 
and  drank,  that  I  walked,  felt,  and  thought ;  and  I 
referred  these  operations  to  the  soul.  But  now, 
supposing  that  some  crafty  genius  is  using  all  his 
wits  to  deceive  me,  can  I  affirm  that  I  have  the 
least  of  all  the  things  which  I  just  now  said  belonged 
to  the  nature  of  the  body  ?  No.  Can  I  admit  that 
in  myself  there  is  any  one  of  the  attributes  which 
I  regarded  as  belonging  to  the  soul  ?  The  first  are 
those  of  eating  and  drinking  and  walking.  But  if 
it  be  true  that  I  have  no  body,  it  is  also  true  that 
I  cannot  walk  or  eat  or  drink.  Feeling  is  another 
attribute,  but  one  cannot  feel  without  a  body, 
quite  apart  from  the  fact  that  I  used  to  think  I 
had  often  felt  things  while  asleep,  which  on 
1  Meditation  2e, 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF   DESCARTES      7 

waking  I  discovered  that   I   had  really  never  felt 
at  all." 

"  Another  attribute  is  that  of  thinking,  and  here 
I  remark  that  thinking  is  an  attribute  that  is  really 
mine:  alone  it  cannot  be  separated  from  me." 
Cogitatio,  haec  sola  a  me  divelli  nequit,  ego  sum,  ego 
existo,  cerium  est.1 

I  am,  therefore,  something  that  thinks,  that  is  all, 
and  fhis  something  that  thinks  I  call  indifferently 
mind,  soul,  intelligence,  reason,  a  number  of  ex- 
pressions the  exact  meaning  of  which  I  had  not 
hitherto  mastered.  Sum  igitur  praecise  tantum  res 
cogitans,  id  est,  mens,  sive  animus,  sive  intellectus, 
sive  ratio,  voces  mi  hi  prius  significations  ignotae  : 
.  .  .  quid  igitur  sum  ?  res  cogitans  :  quid  est  hoc  ? 
nempe  dubitans,  intelligens,  affirmans,  negans,  volens, 
nolens,  imaginans  quoque  et  sentiens. 

Such,  then,  is  the  foundation  of  the  Cartesian 
psychology.  I  am  not  a  rational  animal,  or  at  any 
rate  I  cannot  be  sure  that  I  am  such;  I  cannot 
regard  myself  as  having  a  body  that  feeds  and  walks 
and  feels,  for  all  these  functions  of  vegetative  life, 
of  locomotion,  of  sensibility,  imply  the  possession 
of  a  body,  and  I  am  not  sure  of  having  a  body; 
all  that  upon  reflection  I  can  maintain  as  a  cer- 
tainty is  this,  that  I  am  a  being  who  thinks,  doubts, 
understands,  affirms,  denies,  wills  or  wills  not, 
imagines  and  feels. 

Further,  says  Descartes,  this  certitude  only  lasts 
as  long  as  my  doubt  or  my  thought.  "  I  am,  I 
exist,  that  is  certain :  but  how  long  ?  As  long  as 
I  think;  for  perhaps  it  might  happen  that,  if  I  were 

1  Meditation  2e. 


8  CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

to  cease  thinking  altogether,  I  should  at  the  same 
time  altogether  cease  to  exist."1 

Thus  the  subject-matter  of  psychology  is  clearly 

denned.     It  is  not  man,  body  and  soul,  with  his 

threefold  life,  vegetative,  sensitive,  and  intellectual ; 

it  is  the  mind  and  its  thoughts,  just  that,  and  that 

\only. 

Thought  comprises  all  that  the  mind  can  be 
conscious  of;  all,  therefore,  of  which  it  can  be 
certain  without  any  risk  of  illusion;  it  comprises 
intellectual  cognitions,  voluntary  acts,  and  the 
phenomena  of  imagination  and  sensibility. 

Descartes  denies  certitude  to  the  phenomena  of 
imagination  and  sensibility  so  far  as  they  depend 
upon  the  body,  for  the  existence  of  the  body  finds 
no  sufficient  guarantee  of  certitude  in  the  soul's 
consciousness,  but  he  admits  their  knowableness^so 
far  as  they  depend  upon  the  soul  and  come  within 
the  immediate  grasp  of  thought.2 

So,  then,  we  may  thus  sum  up  the  psychology 
of  Descartes:  a  spirit  endued  with  thought,  and 
that  thought  manifesting  itself  in  three  different 
ways — intellectual,  volitional,  and  sensational. 

As  to  his  method,  plainly  it  can  be  no  other  than 

that  of  consciousness,  for,  as  his  definition  of  the 

subject  implies,  nothing  belongs  to  the  soul  except 

so  far  as  it  falls  within  the  reach  of  consciousness. 

Since   consciousness   belongs   exclusively  to  the 

1  Ego   sum,    ego   existo,    cerium   est.     Quamdiu    autem  ? 
nempe  quamdiu  cogito :  nam  forte  etiam  fieri  posset  si  ces- 
sarem  ab  ab  omni  cogitatione  ut  illico  totus  esse  desinerem. 
— Medit.  2e. 

2  This  consideration  is  strongly  brought  out  by  a  capable 
Cartesian,  M.  1'Abbe  Duquesnoy,  in  his  book,  La  perception 
des  sens,  operation  exclusive  de  I  dme. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES        9 

mind,  animals  without  minds  cannot  have  con- 
sciousness; hence  they  cannot  have  cognitions,  will, 
and  sensibility,  and  they  are  bodies  that  do  not 
differ  by  nature  from  other  bodies,  and  are,  there- 
fore, as  we  shall  presently  see,  merely  aggregates  of 
material  atoms  subject  exclusively  to  mechanical 
laws — in  fact,  they  are  but  machines  and  automata. 

Having  thus  absolutely  determined  the  subject- 
matter  of  psychology,  Descartes  contrasts  it  with 
material  bodies,  the  subject-matter  of  physics. 

Here  we  shall  simply  indicate  this  new  considera- 
tion, for  we  shall  have  to  come  back  to  it  ex  professo 
later  on. 

Methodical  doubt  applied  to  our  judgements  about 
material  things  discovers  errors  constantly  arising 
from  our  attributing  to  bodies  properties  which  really 
belong  only  to  ourselves.  Such,  for  instance,  are  the 
colours  and  tones  that  we  assign  to  external  bodies 
when  they  have  no  reality  except  in  ourselves. 

But  when  we  carefully  eliminate  from  our  judg- 
ments as  to  bodies  all  that  we  can  get  rid  of  without 
doing  away  with  them  altogether,  what  remains  ? 
These  bodies  seem  to  us  to  be  invested  with  some 
outward  shape,  and  to  be  able  to  move:  but  this 
shape  and  motion  are  the  effects  of  extension; 
therefore  it  follows  that  the  bodies  consist  of  ex- 
tended matter.  Now  just  as  the  mind  is  something 
which  only  thinks,  so  is  the  body  something  which 
is  only  extended.  Between  these  two,  thinking 
mind  and  extended  matter,  there  is  a  radical  incom- 
patibility; they  absolutely  exclude  one  another, 


io    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

We  have  seen  what  the  soul  is  in  itself,  i.e., 
"  something  that  thinks  " ;  we  have  contrasted  it 
with  the  body,  especially  with  the  human  body, 
"  something  extended,  governed  by  the  laws  of 
motion."  Before  going  further  into  the  analysis  of 
the  nature  and  content  of  thought,  there  is  a  ques- 
tion to  be  cleared  up :  what  relation  is  there  between 
thought  and  the  thing  that  thinks,  between  the 
conscious  act  and  the  principle  from  which  it 
springs  ? 

Descartes  replies  that  thought  is  an  attribute  of 
the  soul,  and  therefore  that  there  is  no  real  distinc- 
tion to  be  drawn  between  the  two. 

Under  the  term  substance  Descartes  understands 
being  that  has  no  need  of  any  other  thing  in  order 
to  exist. 

Body  and  mind  are  substances  in  the  sense  that 
they  require  only  divine  support  in  order  to  exist.1 

Substance  can  only  be  known  by  its  attributes. 

By  the  word  attribute  Descartes  understands  a 
quality  inseparable  from  its  substance,  thus  differing 
from  the  variable  qualities  called  modes  or  modifica- 
tions. Any  sort  of  attribute  may  help  to  make 
known  the  substance  in  which  it  inheres ;  but  never- 
theless every  substance  has  a  chief  attribute  presup- 
posed by  the  other  qualities :  it  is  this  that  constitutes 
the  nature  or  essence  of  the  thing.  Thus  extension 
in  length,  breadth,  and  depth  constitutes  the  nature 

1  Per  substantiam  nihil  aliud  intelligere  possumus  quam 
rem  quae  ita  existit,  ut  nulla  alia  re  indigeat  ad  existen- 
ditm.  .  .  .  Nomen  substantiae  non  convenit  Deo  et  creaturis 
univoce.  Possunt  autem  substantia  corporea,  et  mens,  sive 
substantial  cogitans,  sub  hoc  communi  conceptu  intelligi  quod 
sint  res  quae  solo  Dei  concursu  egent  ad  existendum. — Princip. 
Philosophiae,  Pars  ia,  §§  51,  52. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES     n 

of  a  bodily  substance,  thought  that  of  a  spiritual 
substance.1 

Between  the  substance  and  its  attribute  there  is 
only  a  rational  distinction.2 

Strictly  speaking,  a  real  distinction  is  only  to  be 
found  between  two  or  more  substances ;  and  we  can 
only  perceive  that  the  two  really  differ  when  we  can 
know  one  clearly  and  distinctly  without  the  other. 

A  modal  distinction  exists  between  a  substance 
and  its  mode,  or  between  two  modes  of  the  same 
substance. 

A  rational  distinction  is  one  which  is  ascertained 
between  a  substance  and  one  of  its  attributes 
without  which  it  cannot  be  conceived,  or  between 
two  attributes  of  the  same  substance.  We  recognize 
such  a  distinction  of  reason  by  the  fact  that  we 

1  Et  quidem  ev  quolibet  attributo  substantia  cognoscitur  : 
scd  una  tamen  est  cujusque  substantiae  praecipua  pro- 
prietas,  quae  ipsius  naturam  essentiamque  constituit  et  ad 
quam  aliae  omnes  referuntur.  Nempe  extensio  in  longum, 
latum  et  profundum,  substantiae  corporeae  naturam  con- 
stituit ;  et  cogitatio  constituit  naturam  substantiae  cogitantis. 
— Princip.  Philosophiae ,  ia,  §  53. 

-  Triplex  est  distinctio,  realis,  modalis  et  rationis. 

Realis  proprie  tantum  est  inter  duas  vel  plures  substantias  : 
et  has  percipimus  a  se  mutuo  realiler  esse  distinctas,  ex  hoc 
solo,  quod  unam  absque  alter  a  dare  et  distincte  intelligere 
possimus.  .  .  . 

Distinctio  modalis  est  duplex,  alia  scilicet  inter  modum 
proprie  dictum,  et  substantiam  cujus  est  modus  ;  alia  inter 
duos  modos  ejusdem  substantiae.  .  .  . 

Denique  distinctio  rationis,  est  inter  substantiam  et 
aliquod  ejus  attributum,  sine  quo  ipsa  intelligi  non  potest 
vel  inter  duo  talia  attributa  ejusdem  alicujus  substantiae. 
Atque  agnoscitur  ex  eo  quod  non  posstimus  claram  et  dis- 
tinctam  istius  substantiae  ideam  for  mare,  si  ab  ea  illud  attri- 
butum excludanius  ;  vel  non  possimus  unius  ex  ejusmodi 
attributis  ideam  dare  percipere,  si  illud  ab  alio  separermts. — 
Ibid.,  §§  60-62. 


12    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

cannot  form  a  clear  and  distinct  idea  of  the  sub- 
stance when  we  shut  out  the  idea  of  its  attribute. 

Here  is  psychology  reduced  to  its  simplest  form. 
It  has  no  need  of  a  number  of  faculties  really  dis- 
tinct from  one  another:  it  has  one  substance,  the 
thing  that  thinks;  its  attribute,  thought;  between 
this  substance  and  its  attribute,  one  rational  dis- 
tinction. 

Thought  or  self-consciousness  has  this  twofold 
characteristic :  it  is  clear  and  distinct. 

A  perception  is  clear,  according  to  Descartes, 
when  its  object  is  present  to  the  mind  without  any 
intermediary.  It  is  distinct,  when  it  represents  to 
me  something  in  its  own  nature,  excluding  any  other 
object.1 

But,  when  I  conceive  myself  as  a  being  able  to 
represent  things  to  itself,  my  thought  is  both  clear 
and  distinct. 

My  thought  is  clear,  for  nothing  is  so  immediately 
present  to  me  as  what  I  perceive  in  my  soul.  My 
thought  is  distinct,  for  the  fact  of  thought  sets  up 
a  radical  distinction  between  my  thinking  spirit 
and  extended  bodies.  Thought,  indeed,  essentially 
excludes  extension  and  properties  dependent  upon 
extension,  i.e.,  divisibility  and  motion. 

The  fact  that  the  characteristics  of  thought,  that 
is  to  say  of  the  act  of  consciousness,  and  of  extension 
are  irreducible  is  to  Cartesians  an  intrinsic  proof  of 

1  Claram  voco  illam  perceptionem,  quae  menti  attendenti 
praesens  et  aperta  est  ;  sicut  ea  dare  a  nobis  videri  dicimus, 
quae  oculo  intuenti  praesentia,  satis  fortiter  et  aperte  ilium 
movent.  .  .  .  Distinctam  autem  voco  illam  quae,  cum  clara 
sit,  ab  omnibus  aliis  ita  sejuncta  est  et  praecisa,  ut  nihil 
plane  aliud,  quam  quod  clarum  est,  in  se  contineat. — Princip. 
Philosophiae,  i«,  §  45. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES   13 

the  immateriality  of  the  soul.  This  proof  is  not 
taken  from  the  characteristics  of  intellectual  cogni- 
tion, considered  as  being  superior  to  sensible  per- 
ception and  to  the  act  of  imagination;  it  arises 
entirely  from  the  characteristics  of  the  act  of 
consciousness. 

Under  the  term,  act  of  consciousness,  the  Cartesian 
psychology  understands  indifferently  the  act  of  the 
inner  sense  and  the  act  of  intellectual  cognition. 

The  immateriality  of  the  soul  is  further  proved 
by  the  assumed  simplicity  or  indivisibility  of  sensa- 
tions or  sensible  desires,  as  well  as  by  the  charac- 
teristics of  intellectual  cognition  and  of  higher 
volition.1 

Hence  we  can  understand  why  Cartesian  psychol- 
ogists, always  influenced  by  the  same  considerations, 
begin  with  laying  down  the  simplicity  of  the  soul 
in  order  to  deduce  therefrom  its  spirituality.  The 
Scholastics,  on  the  contrary,  make  the  simplicity  of 
the  soul  a  corollary  of  its  immateriality. 

We  have  just  seen  what  is  meant  by  thought. 
And  now,  what  does  it  contain  ?  What  are  our 
thoughts,  and  what  have  they  to  tell  us  about 
reality  ? 

In  other  words,  thought  has  been  analyzed  from 
a  subjective  point  of  view,  and  now  Descartes 
passes  to  the  objective,  or  rather  critical,  view- 
point to  study  the  relations  between  the  various 
thoughts  of  the  soul  and  the  objects  they  represent. 

1  See  Duquesnoy,  La  perception  des  sens  ;  P.  Janet,  Le 
maUrialisme  contemporain,  p.  211.  Cf.  D.  Mercier,  Psych- 
ologic, 7e  ed.,  t.  i.,  No.  153,  t.  ii.,  Nos.  252  ff. 

•***•-• 


14    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

These  are  his  own  words:  "  I  must  divide  all  my 
thoughts  into  certain  classes,  and  I  must  consider 
in  which  of  these  classes  there  is  properly  truth  or 
error. 

"  Among  my  thoughts,  some  are  as  it  were 
images  of  things,  and  these  alone  can  be  properly 
called  ideas :  as  when  I  represent  to  myself  a  man, 
or  a  chimera,  or  heaven,  or  an  angel,  or  even  God. 
Others,  in  addition,  take  other  forms  according  to 
my  will  or  fears  or  affirmations  or  denials ;  and  then 
I  well  think  of  anything  as  the  subject  of  an  opera- 
tion of  my  mind,  but  thereby  I  also  add  something 
else  to  the  notion  I  form  of  such  a  thing.  Of  this 
class  of  thoughts  some  are  called  volitions  or  affec- 
tions, others  judgements, 

"  Now,  so  far  as  concerns  ideas,  if  they  are  con- 
sidered only  in  themselves  and  not  referred  to  any- 
thing else,  they  cannot  strictly  speaking  be  untrue ; 
for,  whether  I  imagine  a  goat  or  a  chimera,  I 
imagine  the  one  no  less  truly  than  the  other. 

"  Nor  need  mistakes  be  feared  in  the  affections  or 
volitions  :  for  though  I  may  desire  what  is  bad,  or 
even  what^never  existed,  it  is  nevertheless  just  as 
true  that  I  desire  it. 

"  Hence  there  only  remain  judgements,  in  which 
I  must  take  the  greatest  care  not  to  make  mistakes. 
But  the  chief  and  the  commonest  of  errors  consists 
in  thinking  that  my  internal  ideas  are  like  or  in 
conformity  with  things  outside  me. 

"  But  amongst  these  ideas  some  appear  to  be 
born  with  me,  others  to  be  foreign  to  me  and  to 
come  from  outside  of  me,  and  others  to  be  made 
or  invented  by  myself.  For,  my  possession  of  the 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES     15 

faculty  of  conceiving  whatever  is  generally  called 
a  thing,  or  a  truth,  or  a  thought,  appears  to  be 
mine  solely  owing  to  my  own  nature :  but  if  I  now 
hear  a  sound,  if  I  see  the  sun,  if  I  feel  heat,  hitherto 
I  have  considered  these  notions  arose  from  things 
outside  me.  ...  Now,  what  I  have  chiefly  to  do 
in  this  matter  is  to  consider,  with  regard  to  the 
notions  that  seem  to  come  from  some  external 
things,  what  are  my  reasons  for  thinking  that  they 
resemble  these  things.  .  .  .  But  all  this  makes  it 
pretty  plain  to  me  that  it  is  merely  through  a  blind 
and  hasty  impulse  that  I  came  to  believe  that  there 
were  things  outside  me  which  were  different  from 
my  own  being,  which  by  the  organs  of  the  senses 
or  in  some  other  way  communicated  to  me  their 
notions  or  representations  and  imprinted  their 
likeness  upon  me. 

"  But  there  is  another  way  of  investigating 
whether  among  the  things  the  notions  whereof  exist 
within  me  there  are  any  that  exist  outside  of 
me.  .  .  ."x 

Here  the  criteriological  problem  is  stated:  how 
does  Descartes  solve  it  ? 

We  may  sum  up  his  train  of  reasoning  as  follows : 

My  ideas,  considered  subjectively  as  certain  ways 
of  thinking,  do  not  differ  from  one  another;  but 
viewed  objectively,  they  do  differ  from  each  other. 

First,  there  is  one  that  represents  me  to  myself; 
another  represents  God  to  me;  others  inanimate 
bodies,  others  animals,  others  angels;  and  others 
represent  men  to  me,  men  like  myself. 

1  Meditation  3". 


16    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  objective  reality  belonging  to  my  ideas  must 
have  its  sufficient  reason.  But  this  reason  is  only 
to  be  found  in  a  being  possessing  really  and  actually, 
formally  and  eminently,  whatever  objective  reality 
there  is  in  our  ideas.  Otherwise,  I  shall  be  driven 
to  say  that  there  is  in  the  object  of  my  ideas  some- 
thing that  is  derived  from  nothingness. 

As  to  the  object  of  the  notion  of  myself,  there  is 
no  difficulty  provided  that  I  already  have  the 
certain  knowledge  that  I  myself  am  something  that 
thinks.  As  to  the  ideas  of  other  men,  of  animals 
and  angels,  I  do  not  find  it  hard  to  explain  their 
formation  with  the  help  of  elements  borrowed  from 
ideas  of  corporal  things  and  of  God,  even  if  outside 
of  me  there  were  no  other  men  in  the  world,  nor  any 
animals  or  angels. 

There  remain  the  notions  of  things  corporal  and 
of  God. 

"As  to  the  notions  of  corporal  things,  I  find  in 
them  nothing  of  such  magnitude  and  excellence  that 
it  may  not  be  derived  from  myself.  .  .  . 

"  Consequently,  there  remains  only  the  notion  of 
God,  concerning  which  I  have  to  consider  whether 
there  be  anything  in  it  that  could  not  have  come 
from  myself.  By  the  term  '  God '  I  understand  a 
substance  that  is  infinite,  eternal,  immutable, 
independent,  omniscient,  omnipotent,  whereby  I 
and  all  other  things  that  are  (if  it  be  true  that  any 
really  exist)  have  been  created  and  made.  But 
these  advantages  are  so  great  and  pre-eminent  that 
the  more  attentively  I  consider  them,  the  less  I  am 
persuaded  that  the  notion  I  have  of  them  can  owe 
its  origin  entirely  to  myself.  And  consequently,  I 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES     17 

am  driven  to  infer  from  all  that  I  said  before  that 
God  exists ;  for  although  the  notion  of  substance  is 
in  me  owing  to  the  fact  that  I  am  a  substance, 
nevertheless  I  should  not  have  a  notion  of  an  infinite 
substance,  I  who  am  a  finite  being,  if  it  had  not 
been  implanted  in  me  by  some  substance  that  was 
really  infinite. 

"  And  I  must  not  imagine  that  I  do  not  conceive 
of  the  infinite  by  a  true  notion,  but  only  by  the 
negation  of  the  finite,  in  the  same  way  as  I  under- 
stand rest  and  darkness  by  the  negation  of  motion 
and  light ;  since,  on  the  contrary,  I  see  plainly  that 
there  is  more  reality  to  be  found  in  an  infinite  sub- 
stance than  in  a  finite  substance,  and  consequently 
that  I  have  in  myself  primarily  rather  a  notion  of 
the  infinite  than  of  the  finite — that  is  to  say,  a 
notion  of  God  rather  than  of  myself;  for  how 
could  I  know  that  I  doubt  and  desire — that  is  to 
say,  that  I  am  not  quite  perfect — if  I  had  in  me 
no  idea  of  a  being  more  perfect  than  my  own, 
by  comparison  wherewith  I  perceive  the  defects  of 
my  nature  P"1 

Besides,  I  who  have  this  idea  of  God  could  not 
exist,  if  there  were  no  God.  I  want  to  know,  indeed, 
to  whom  I  owe  my  existence.  Perhaps  to  myself 
or  my  parents,  or  to  some  other  causes  less  perfect 
than  God;  for  one  cannot  conceive  of  anything 
more  perfect  than  He,  or  even  as  good  as  He. 

But,  if  I  were  independent  of  all  others  and 
myself  the  author  of  my  being,  I  should  not  doubt 
about  anything,  I  should  not  have  desires,  and  lastly, 
no  perfection  would  be  lacking  to  me ;  for  I  should 

1  Meditation  3e. 

a 


i8    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

have  given  myself  all  those  of  which  I  have  any 
notion,  and  thus  I  should  be  God.  If  I  assume 
that  my  parents  are  the  cause,  I  only  raise  a  fresh 
difficulty.  If  I  assume  causes  less  perfect  than  God, 
I  assume  an  impossibility,  "  for  there  must  be  at 
least  as  much  reality  in  the  cause  as  in  the  effect." 

Hence,  I  am  driven  to  conclude  that,  from  the 
sole  fact  of  my  existence,  and  from  the  fact  that 
in  me  there  is  an  idea  of  a  supremely  perfect  Being 
— namely,  God — the  existence  of  God  is  very  mani- 
festly proved. 

And  now  there  is  only  one  question  to  be  cleared 
up :  How  did  I  obtain  this  notion  ?  "I  did  not  get 
it  through  the  senses,  nor  is  it  a  pure  fiction  of  the 
mind,  and  consequently  I  can  only  say  that  this 
idea  was  born  and  conceived  along  with  me  from 
the  day  I  was  created,  just  as  was  the  notion  of 
myself.  .  .  . 

"  This  God  has  no  defects,  hence  it  is  pretty 
clear  that  He  cannot  deceive,  since  our  natural  light 
tells  us  that  deceit  necessarily  depends  upon  some 
defect."1 

Therefore  God's  perfection  is  a  pledge  to  us  of 
the  truth  of  our  judgements  upon  external  things ; 
the  only  condition  certitude  requires  of  us  is  that 
we  should  abide  by  what  is  clear  and  distinct  in  our 
ideas. 

Thus  we  have  settled  the  twofold  question  of  the 
nature  and  origin  of  our  ideas.  We  have  two 
innate  ideas  "  springing  up  within  us  from  the 
moment  of  our  creation,"  the  idea  of  myself,  and 
the  idea  of  God. 

1  Meditation    ". 


19 

These  two  ideas  are  clear  and  distinct — that  is  to 
say,  immediate  and  our  own.  By  means  of  these 
two  ideas  we  can  explain  the  formation  of  all  our 
other  ideas  that  are  clear  and  distinct.  The  idea  of 
God  can  only  be  explained  by  the  operation,  and 
therefore  as  depending  upon  the  existence,  of  a 
perfect  Being  who  is  the  author  of  it.  A  perfect 
Being  cannot  deceive  us.  Therefore  our  clear  and 
distinct  perceptions  do  not  deceive  us,  but  are  a 
faithful  expression  of  reality. 

By  way  of  general  conclusion,  let  us  now  sum  up 
the  principal  features  of  this  first  part  of  the 
Cartesian  psychology. 

I  am  a  thinking  substance. 

My  thought  embraces  all  the  facts  perceived  by 
the  inner  sense  or  consciousness,  to  wit,  sensible  or 
affective  facts,  volitional  facts,  and  intellectual  facts 
or  judgements. 

My  nature  is  revealed  by  my  thought;  I  am  a 
spirit,  whose  attribute  is  to  think.  And  hence 
psychological  method  must  go  entirely  by  the  inner 
sense  or  consciousness. 

Moreover,  there  is  no  real  distinction  between  the 
substance  and  its  attribute,  between  my  soul  and 
my  thought.  My  thought  proves  the  immateriality 
or  spirituality  of  my  nature,  for  the  attributes  of 
a  thinking  thing  are  incompatible  with  those  of  a 
corporeal  thing.  Thought  and  extension  exclude 
one  another.  My  clear  and  distinct  ideas  about 
each  of  them  make  me  see  this. 

If  I  am  merely  a  spirit  whose  whole  nature  or 
essence  consists  in  thinking,  the  phenomena  of  the 


20         CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

body,  whether  they  belong  to  the  vegetative  or  to 
animal  life,  have  nothing  to  do  with  psychology, 
and  belong  exclusively  to  physics,  or  rather  to 
mechanics. 

Such  is  thought  under  its  subjective  aspect ;  from 
this  point  of  view  all  our  thoughts  are  the  same. 
But,  from  an  objective  point  of  view,  they  differ 
from  one  another ;  many  of  them  require  borrowed 
elements  to  explain  their  origin;  others,  such  as 
the  idea  of  myself  and  the  idea  of  God,  are  within 
me  from  the  beginning. 

The  idea  of  God  must  owe  its  source  to  God 
Himself.  Therefore  God  exists.  But  God,  the 
perfect  Being,  cannot  deceive  me.  Therefore  I  can 
rest  assured  that  my  ideas,  provided  that  I  keep  to 
such  as  are  clear  and  distinct,  are  a  faithful  ex- 
pression of  reality. 

Thus  the  psychology  of  Descartes,  both  at  its 
starting-point  and  in  its  final  term,  is  bound  up  with 
a  critical  search  for  truth. 

Here  we  shall  not  go  at  length  into  the  critical 
side  of  the  Cartesian  philosophy,  but  confine  our- 
selves to  his  psychology.  We  have  hitherto  regarded 
it  so  far  as  it  proposes  to  devote  itself  entirely  to 
studying  the  soul  that  thinks  by  means  of  con- 
sciousness. So  far  the  Cartesian  psychology  is 
spiritualistic  to  excess.  What  will  it  become  when 
it  has  to  study  the  soul  in  its  relations  with  man's 
bodily  activities  ? 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES     21 


II 

THE  MECHANICAL  THEORY  AS  APPLIED  TO  MAN  OR 
TO  ANTHROPOLOGY 

When  psychology  is  systematically  confined  to 
the  investigation  of  the  thinking  soul,  and  thought 
is  regarded  as  the  distinguishing  attribute  of  mind, 
the  investigation  of  the  soul  plainly  becomes  by 
definition  a  study  of  the  mind,  and  psychology 
exclusively  spiritualistic. 

But  what  is  to  be  said  of  the  manifestations  of 
human  life  which  cannot  be  associated  with  thought  ? 
To  what  principle  shall  we  assign  digestion,  the 
beating  of  the  heart,  the  circulation  of  the  blood, 
the  sense  of  sight,  and  the  sense  of  hearing  ?  How 
are  we  to  treat  such  phenomena  ? 

Descartes  replies  without  hesitation.  Whenever 
a  phenomenon  is  not  an  act  of  consciousness,  it  does 
not  depend  upon  the  soul  which  is  spirit,  but  upon 
the  body. 

The  human  body,  like  all  other  natural  bodies,  is 
only  an  extended  substance  with  a  capacity  for 
motion.  Hence,  all  phenomena  that  are  not  con- 
scious thoughts  attributable  to  the  mind  are  modes 
of  motion.  Physiology,  and  the  part  of  psychology 
which,  along  with  Aristotle,  we  assign  to  the  soul, 
not  so  far  as  it  is  spiritual  or  subjectively  inde- 
pendent of  the  body,  but  so  far  as  it  is  substanti- 
ally united  with  the  body,  form  two  chapters  of 
mechanical  science.  This  is  expressly  acknowledged 
by  Descartes.  He  begins  his  treatise  on  man  as 
follows : 


22    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

"  I  must  first  of  all  describe  to  you  the  body  by 
itself,  and  then  the  soul  by  itself,  and  lastly  I  must 
show  you  how  these  two  natures  must  be  connected 
and  united  together  to  make  men  like  ourselves. 

"  I  suppose  that  the  body  is  merely  a  statue  or 
earthen  machine  made  by  God  on  purpose  to 
resemble  us  as  much  as  possible  ...  so  that  it 
imitates  all  those  of  our  functions  which  can  be 
conceived  as  proceeding  from  matter  and  as  de- 
pending solely  on  the  arrangement  of  our  bodily 
organs.  We  see  clocks,  artificial  fountains,  wind- 
mills and  other  similar  machines,  which  are  only  the 
handiwork  of  man,  and  yet  are  not  without  the 
power  of  going  on  of  their  own  accord  in  various 
ways.  ...  So  you  may  have  seen  in  the  grottoes 
and  fountains  of  our  Kings'  gardens,  that  the  sole 
force  of  running  water  flowing  from  the  spring  is 
enough  to  put  all  kinds  of  contrivances  in  motion, 
and  even  to  make  them  play  some  instruments  or 
utter  a  few  words,  according  to  the  various  arrange- 
ment of  the  pipes  that  convey  it. 

"  And  of  a  truth  one  may  very  well  compare  the 
nerves  of  the  machinery  I  am  now  describing  to  the 
pipes  of  the  contrivances  of  these  fountains;  its 
muscles  and  tendons  to  the  various  engines  and 
springs  that  set  them  in  motion;  its  animal  spirits 
to  the  water  that  impels  them,  the  heart  being  their 
source,  and  the  hollows  of  the  brain  their  peep- 
holes. Further,  breathing  and  such  other  functions 
as  are  natural  and  usual  thereto,  depending  as  they 
do  upon  the  flow  of  these  spirits,  resemble  the 
motions  of  a  clock  or  windmill,  which  the  ordinary 
flow  of  water  may  render  continuous.  The  outward 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES     23 

things  which  by  their  mere  presence  act  upon  the 
organs  of  the  senses  and  thereby  determine  its 
motion  in  various  ways  according  to  the  disposition 
of  various  parts  of  the  brain,  are  like  strangers 
coming  into  one  of  these  grottoes  or  fountains  and 
producing  without  knowing  it  what  is  going  on 
around  them;  for  they  cannot  go  into  it  without 
walking  over  certain  slabs  so  arranged  that  when, 
for  instance,  they  come  near  some  bathing  Diana, 
they  drive  her  to  take  refuge  in  the  rushes,  and  if 
they  go  on  following  her,  they  bring  a  Neptune 
down  upon  them  and  threatening  them  with  his 
trident ;  or,  if  they  turn  some  other  way,  out  comes 
a  sea-monster  spouting  water  in  their  faces,  or 
suchlike  other  things,  according  to  the  fancy  of  the 
engineers  who  planned  them.  And  lastly,  when 
the  rational  soul  has  its  place  in  this  piece  of 
mechanism,  its  centre  will  be  in  the  brain,  and 
there  it  will  stay  like  the  waterman  who  has  to  be 
in  the  man-holes  where  all  the  pipes  in  the  machinery 
meet,  when  he  wishes  to  set  it  going  or  to  stop  it, 
or  to  change  its  operations  in  any  way."1 

Further  on,  Descartes  expresses  himself  very 
nearly  thus : 

'  This  motion  of  the  blood  which  I  have  just 
explained  is  as  much  the  necessary  result  of  the 
parts  you  can  see  in  the  heart,  of  the  heat2  that 
can  be  felt  by  putting  one's  finger  in  it,  and  of  the 
nature  of  the  blood  which  can  be  experimentally 
ascertained,  as  the  motion  of  a  clock  is  the  effect 

1  (Euvres  de  Descartes,  ed.  Cousin,  IV.,  pp.  336,  347-349. 

8  Descartes  was  mistaken,  not  knowing  that  the  circula- 
tion of  the  blood  is  due  to  the  contraction  of  the  walls  of 
the  heart. 


24    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

of  the  strength,  the  position,  and  the  form  of  its 
weight  and  works. 

"  The  animal  spirits  are  like  a  very  subtle  fluid 
or  a  very  pure  and  lively  flame:  the  heart  con- 
tinually begets  them,  and  they  ascend  to  the  brain 
which  acts  as  a  sort  of  reservoir  to  them.  Thence 
they  flow  to  the  nerves  which  distribute  them 
amongst  the  muscles,  and  produce  contraction  and 
slackening  according  to  their  amount. 

"  After  that  I  want  you  to  consider  that  all  the 
functions  which  I  have  attributed  to  this  machine 
(the  human  body),  such  as  the  digestion  of  meat, 
the  pulsation  of  the  heart  and  of  the  arteries,  the 
nourishment  and  growth  of  the  limbs,  breathing, 
waking  and  sleep,  seeing,  hearing,  smell,  taste, 
feeling  hot  and  any  other  properties  of  the  external 
senses ;  the  impression  of  their  ideas  upon  the  organ 
of  the  common  sense  and  of  the  imagination,  and 
the  retention  or  imprinting  of  these  ideas  upon  the 
memory ;  the  internal  movementsof  the  appetites  and 
passions;  and  lastly,  the  external  movements  of  all 
the  members  which  follow  so  opportunely  the  many 
operations  of  the  things  that  are  presented  to  the 
senses  as  well  as  the  passions  and  impressions  that 
are  to  be  found  in  the  memory,  that  they  imitate 
as  closely  as  possible  those  of  a  real  man — I  want 
you,  I  say,  to  consider  that  these  functions  quite 
naturally  follow  in  this  machine  from  the  mere  ar- 
rangement of  the  organs,  neither  more  nor  less  than 
the  movements  of  a  clock  or  other  automaton,  from  its 
weights  and  works,  so  that  so  far  as  they  are  con- 
cerned we  need  not  think  of  any  vegetative  or  sensi- 
tive soul  in  it,  or  of  any  other  principle  of  life  or 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES      25 

motion  than  the  blood  and  the  spirits  continually 
stirred  up  by  the  fire  constantly  burning  in  the 
heart,  a  fire  which  does  not  differ  by  nature  from  any 
other  fires  to  be  found  in  other  inanimate  bodies."1 

Please  to  mark  Descartes'  words:  "  All  these 
functions  (vital  or  sensitive)  naturally  follow  in  this 
machine  from  the  mere  arrangement  of  the  organs, 
neither  more  nor  less  than  do  the  movements  of  a  clock 
or  other  automaton.  ..." 

This  affirmation  implies  a  twofold  thesis:  first, 
that  in  the  functions  of  the  vegetative  and  of  the 
sensitive  life  only  mechanical  forces  come  into  play ; 
next,  that  these  forces  are  only  efficient  causes,  the 
functions  resulting  from  the  mere  arrangements  of 
the  organs,  almost  according  to  the  saying  of 
Lucretius,  Quod  natum  est,  id  procreat  usum. 

And  these  two  theses  are  expressly  affirmed  by 
Descartes.  In  his  Principia  philosophiae  he  formally 
declares  that  Physics  may  be  reduced  to  Mechanics. 
The  essence  of  the  body  is  extension,  and  extension 
explains  the  shape  and  movement  of  extended 
bodies,  and  motion  in  its  turn  accounts  for  all 
further  physical  phenomena. 

"  And  therefore  throughout  the  universe  there  is 
only  one  and  the  same  matter  to  be  found,  and  it 
is  only  to  be  known  by  its  extent.  And  all  the 
properties  that  we  clearly  perceive  in  it  may  be 
reduced  to  this,  that  it  is  divisible  and  mobile  in 
its  parts.  .  .  .  Every  modification  of  it,  and  every 
difference  of  shape  to  be  found  in  it,  depends  upon 
motion. 

1  CEuvres  de  Descartes,  ed.  Cousin,  IV.,  loc.  cit. 


26    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

"  For  I  openly  affirm  that  I  know  of  no  other 
matter  of  things  corporal  than  that  which  is  in 
every  way  divisible,  and  susceptible  of  shape  and 
motion,  that  which  geometricians  call  quantity, 
and  take  as  the  subject-matter  of  their  demon- 
strations; that  in  it  I  observe  nothing  but  such 
divisions,  shapes,  and  movements;  that  I  admit 
nothing  to  be  true  except  that  which  can  be 
proved  to  result  from  such  common  notions  of  truth 
as  are  indubitable.  And  because  in  this  way  all 
the  phenomena  of  nature  may  be  explained,  as  we 
shall  see  later  on,  I  think  we  should  not  admit  any 
other  principle  nor  desire  any  other." 

As  to  the  cause  of  motion,  it  is  twofold :  one  uni- 
versal and  primordial,  the  general  cause  of  the  sum- 
total  of  all  the  motions  in  the  world;  the  other 
particular,  in  virtue  whereof  the  different  parts  of 
matter  acquire  a  motion  which  they  had  not 
previously. 

The  general  cause  of  all  motions  manifestly 
appears  to  Descartes  to  be  God  only,  for  to  create 
motion,  says  he,  the  gulf  between  non-existence  and 
being  had  to  be  crossed;  but  that  presupposed  an 
infinite  power.1  But  it  is  natural  to  an  immutable 
God  to  act  immutably.  Hence  God  must  keep  up 
the  movement.  He  has  made,  and  consequently  the 
quantity  of  movement  in  the  universe  is  invariable. 

Descartes  excluded  from  the  study  of  nature,  just 

as  clearly,  the  search  for  final  causes.     God's  work, 

he  said,  is  far  too  great  for  us  to  understand ;  hence 

it  would  be  presumptuous  on  our  part  to  try  to 

1  Cf.  Lettres  de  M.  Clersetier,  No.  125. 


2? 

determine  the  ends  proposed  to  Himself  by  the 
Creator : 

"  Let  us  take  care  not  to  have  too  high  an  opinion 
of  ourselves.  .  .  .  This  is  what  would  happen,  if 
we  were  to  think  we  could  understand  by  our 
intellectual  power  the  ends  God  set  before  Himself 
when  He  created  the  universe. 

"  Thus,  in  fine,  we  shall  never  get  any  of  the 
motives  underlying  the  things  of  nature  out  of 
the  end  God  or  nature  had  in  view  in  creating  them, 
because  we  ought  not  to  claim  to  enter  into  God's 
designs;  but,  if  we  consider  Him  as  the  end  of  all 
things,  we  shall  see  what  with  the  help  of  the 
natural  light  He  has  given  us  we  ought  to  infer 
from  His  true  attributes,  a  certain  knowledge  of 
which  He  requires  of  us  so  far  as  their  effects  fall 
within  the  scope  of  our  senses." 

Hence,  the  mechanical  interpretation  of  the 
phenomena  of  vegetative  and  sensitive  life,  so  far 
as  they  are  not  identified  with  thought,  was  a 
logical  consequence  of  Descartes'  general  principles 
in  the  interpretation  of  nature. 

From  this  proceeds  the  most  striking  character- 
istic of  the  Cartesian  psychology:  the  opposition  it 
set  up  between  the  soul  and  the  body. 

Descartes,  as  we  have  said,  is  above  all  a  geo- 
metrician, a  man  of  simplifying  and  deductive  mind. 
In  his  study  of  the  soul,  he  reduces  all  its  activity  to 
thought,  and  its  nature  to  its  aptitude  for  thinking. 
In  his  study  of  bodies,  including  that  of  the  human 
body,  he  reduces  all  their  properties  to  extension, 
all  their  activities  to  motion. 


28    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Now,  it  is  of  the  essence  of  thought  to  exclude 
extension  and  motion,  and  it  is  of  the  essence  of 
motion  and  extension  to  have  nothing  in  common 
with  thought.  What,  then,  becomes  of  the  union 
of  soul  and  body  ?  For  there  is,  indeed,  no  doubt 
that  there  is  a  body  which,  unlike  all  bodies  that  are 
foreign  to  me,  I  regard  as  mine  ;  there  is  no  doubt 
that  my  soul  can  act  and  suffer  with  my  body.1 
How  are  these  indisputable  facts  to  be  explained  ? 

"  This  question,"  says  Descartes  to  the  Palatine 
Princess  Elizabeth,  "  appears  to  me  to  be  the  one 
that  may  most  rightly  be  put  to  me,  considering 
my  published  writings.  For  since  there  are  two 
things  in  man's  soul,  and  since  on  these  depends 
all  our  knowledge  of  its  nature,  one  of  them  being 
the  fact  that  it  thinks,  and  the  other  the  fact  that 
it  is  united  to  a  body  and  acts  and  suffers  along 
with  it,  I  have  said  almost  nothing  of  the  latter, 

1  "  There  is  nothing,"  says  Descartes,  "  that  nature 
teaches  me  more  expressly  and  sensibly  than  that  my  body 
is  ill  when  I  feel  pain,  and  that  it  needs  food  and  drink  when 
I  am  hungry  and  thirsty.  .  .  .  And  consequently  I  must 
have  no  doubt  whatever  that  there  is  some  truth  in  all  that. 

"  Nature  also  teaches  me  by  these  feelings  of  pain, 
hunger,  thirst,  etc.,  that  I  not  only  dwell  in  my  body,  like 
a  pilot  on  his  ship,  but  that  further  I  am  very  closely 
bound  up  with  it,  and  so  much  confused  and  mixed  up 
with  it  that  I  make  up  a  single  whole  along  with  it. 
For,  if  it  were  otherwise,  when  my  body  is  wounded,  I 
should  not  therefore  feel  pain,  I  who  am  only  something 
that  thinks;  but  I  should  perceive  the  wound  with  the 
understanding  only,  as  a  pilot  perceives  with  his  eyes  any- 
thing broken  in  his  ship;  and  when  my  body  wants  to  eat 
or  to  drink,  I  should  just  come  to  know  that,  even  without 
being  warned  by  my  feelings  of  hunger  and  thirst:  for  all 
these  feelings  of  hunger,  thirst,  pain,  etc.,  are  only  certain 
dim  ways  of  thinking,  which  proceed  and  result  from  the 
union  and,  as  it  were,  from  the  mingling  of  the  mind  with 
the  body." — Meditation  6e. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES     29 

and  have  only  endeavoured  to  make  the  first  well 
understood,  because  my  main  design  was  to  prove 
the  distinction  there  is  between  soul  and  body. 
To  do  this,  only  the  former  was  of  any  use,  and  the 
other  would  have  been  a  hindrance." 

Thus  Descartes  admits  that  he  has  only  regarded 
human  psychology  from  one  point  of  view;  he  has 
converted  anthropology  into  psychology.  This  is 
the  essential  defect  of  his  method. 

In  fact,  he  emphasized  the  distinction  between  the 
soul  and  the  body  to  the  point  of  setting  up  an 
opposition  between  them;  he  relegated  the  soul  to 
an  infinitesimal  part  of  the  matter  of  the  brain, 
and  was  satisfied  to  connect  it  there  with  the 
animal  spirits  to  obtain  information  as  to  what 
goes  on  in  the  body,  and  to  transmit  orders  by 
means  of  them  to  the  nerves  and  muscles,  and 
thus  to  control  the  movements  of  the  body. 

But  the  more  the  opposition  between  the  soul  and 
the  body  is  emphasized,  the  more  does  the  natural 
possibility  of  their  union  disappear.  But,  just  then, 
the  Palatine  Princess  was  bent  on  pressing  home 
the  question  of  the  union  of  the  soul  with  the  body 
upon  her  eminent  correspondent. 

"  But  as  to  that  which  Your  Highness  so  clearly 
sees,"  writes  Descartes,  "  that  it  is  impossible  to  con- 
ceal anything  from  you,  I  shall  try  now  to  explain 
how  I  conceive  of  the  union  of  the  soul  with  the 
body,  and  how  the  former  is  able  to  move  the  latter." 

Descartes'  explanation  may  be  summed  up  as 
follows:  All  our  knowledge  depends  upon  certain 
primitive  notions  which  nature  has  given  us  in 


30    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

order  to  know  things.  These  primitive  notions  are 
sincere,  and  cannot  deceive  us.  When  we  make 
mistakes,  it  is  because  we  do  not  distinguish  them, 
or  else  because  we  apply  them  to  things  wherewith 
they  have  nothing  to  do. 

Do  we,  then,  want  to  get  a  right  idea  as  to  the 
union  of  the  soul  with  the  body  ?  We  have  to  find 
out  what  is  the  primitive  notion  we  naturally  have 
of  "  the  soul  and  the  body  together." 

According  to  Descartes,  we  have  various  cate- 
gories of  primitive  notions — some  general  and 
adapted  to  everything,  such  as  the  ideas  of  being, 
number,  and  duration ;  as  to  the  body  in  particular, 
we  have  the  notion  of  extension;  as  to  the  soul 
alone,  that  of  thought ;  lastly,  as  to  the  soul  and 
body  taken  together,  we  have  only  the  idea  of 
their  union,  and  on  this  depends  our  idea  of  the 
soul's  power  of  moving  the  body  and  of  the  body's 
action  upon  the  soul. 

How  are  these  notions  of  the  union  of  the  soul 
with  the  body,  and  of  a  power  whereby  the  soul  acts 
upon  the  body  and  the  body  upon  the  soul,  mani- 
fested to  consciousness  ? 

We  are  accustomed  to  attribute  to  supposedly 
real  qualities  of  bodies,  such  as  weight  and  heat, 
the  power  of  acting  upon  other  bodies.  But  when 
we  represent  to  ourselves  weight  as  a  force  that 
can  move  the  body  wherein  it  is  towards  the  centre 
of  the  earth,  we  have  no  difficulty  in  conceiving 
how  this  force  moves  the  body,  nor  how  it  is  joined 
thereto,  and  we  do  not  think  that  it  is  done  by  the 
real  connection  or  contact  of  one  superficies  with 
another.  We  do  not  apply  to  weight  the  notion  of 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES     31 

any  such  action.  For  weight,  as  is  proved  in 
physics,  is  not  a  quality  that  is  really  distinct  from 
any  body.  Hence  it  is  in  order  that  we  may  con- 
ceive of  the  way  in  which  the  soul  moves  the  body 
that  this  particular  notion  has  been  given  us  by 
the  Author  of  our  nature,  and  consequently  this 
notion  ought  to  provide  us  with  the  solution  of  the 
anthropological  problem  of  the  union  of  the  soul 
with  the  body.  Here  Descartes'  words  seem  to  lack 
their  usual  clearness,  and  we  therefore  put  before  our 
reader  the  whole  of  the  rather  lengthy  passage,  which 
we  have  endeavoured  to  reproduce  in  substance. 

"  First  of  all,  I  consider  that  there  are  in  us 
certain  primitive  notions,  which  are  as  it  were  ori- 
ginals, on  the  pattern  of  which  we  form  all  our  other 
cognitions,  and  that  there  are  very  few  of  these 
notions ;  for  after  our  most  general  ideas  as  to  being, 
number,  and  duration,  which  are  adapted  to  all  we 
can  conceive,  we  have  as  to  the  body  in  particular 
only  the  notion  of  extension,  from  which  follow 
the  notions  of  form  and  movement ;  and  as  to  the 
soul  alone  we  have  only  the  notion  of  thought, 
wherein  are  comprised  the  perceptions  of  the 
understanding,  and  the  inclinations  of  the  will; 
lastly,  as  to  the  soul  and  body  taken  together  we 
have  only  the  notion  of  their  union,  whereon  depends 
that  of  the  soul's  power  to  move  the  body  and  the 
body's  to  act  upon  the  soul,  by  causing  its  feelings 
and  passions.  I  further  consider  that  all  the 
knowledge  of  mankind  consists  in  nothing  else 
than  in  well  distinguishing  these  notions  from  each 
other,  and  in  attributing  each  of  them  only  to  the 
things  to  which  they  belong;  for  when  we  desire 


32    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

to  explain  some  difficulty  by  means  of  a  notion 
that  has  nothing  to  do  with  it,  we  cannot  help 
making  mistakes;  just  as  when  we  want  to  explain 
one  of  these  notions  by  means  of  another ;  for  since 
they  are  primary,  each  of  them  can  only  be  under- 
stood by  itself.  And  inasmuch  as  the  use  of  our 
senses  has  made  our  notions  of  extension,  shape, 
and  movement  much  more  familiar  to  us  than  any 
others,  the  principal  cause  of  our  errors  lies  in  this, 
that  we  usually  want  to  make  use  of  these  notions 
to  explain  things  to  which  they  do  not  belong,  as 
when  we  try  to  use  our  imagination  to  form  an  idea 
of  the  nature  of  the  soul,  or  when  we  wish  to  con- 
ceive of  the  way  in  which  the  soul  moves  the  body 
by  the  way  in  which  one  body  is  moved  by  another 
body.  And  this  is  why,  in  the  meditations  which 
Your  Highness  has  condescended  to  read,  I  have 
endeavoured  to  give  a  conception  of  the  notions 
which  belong  to  the  soul  only,  marking  them  off 
from  those  that  belong  to  the  body  only;  the  first 
thing  that  I  have  to  explain  afterwards  is,  how  we 
must  think  of  the  notions  that  belong  to  the  union 
of  the  soul  with  the  body,  apart  from  those  that 
belong  to  the  body  only,  or  to  the  soul  only.  For 
this  purpose,  what  I  wrote  at  the  end  of  my  reply 
to  the  six  objections  may  be  of  some  use;  for  we 
cannot  seek  these  simple  notions  elsewhere  than 
in  the  soul,  which  has  all  of  them  in  itself  by  nature, 
but  does  not  always  sufficiently  distinguish  them 
from  one  another,  or  else  does  not  attribute  them 
to  the  things  to  which  they  should  be  attributed. 
Thus,  I  think  we  have  hitherto  confused  the  notion 
of  the  force  whereby  the  soul  acts  upon  the  body 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES     33 

with  that  whereby  one  body  acts  upon  another; 
and  that  we  have  attributed  the  one  and  the  other, 
not  to  the  soul,  for  we  do  not  yet  know  it,  but  to 
the  different  qualities  of  bodies,  such  as  weight, 
heat,  and  other  qualities,  which  we  have  supposed 
to  be  real — i.e.,  to  have  an  existence  distinct  from 
that  of  the  body,  and  consequently  to  be  substances, 
although  we  have  called  them  qualities.  And  in 
order  to  conceive  of  them,  we  have  sometimes 
made  use  of  notions  which  are  in  us  for  the  know- 
ledge of  the  body,  sometimes  of  those  which  are  in 
us  for  the  knowledge  of  the  soul,  according  as  that 
which  we  attributed  to  them  was  material  or 
immaterial.  For  instance,  in  supposing  that  heavi- 
ness is  a  real  quality  whereof  we  have  no  other 
knowledge  except  that  it  has  the  power  of  moving 
the  body  in  which  it  is  towards  the  centre  of  the 
earth,  we  have  no  difficulty  in  thinking  of  how  it 
moves  such  a  body,  nor  of  how  it  is  united  therewith ; 
and  we  do  not  suppose  that  this  occurs  through 
some  real  connection  or  contact  of  one  superficies 
with  another,  for  our  own  experience  tells  us  that 
we  have  a  particular  notion  for  conceiving  it;  and 
I  believe  we  use  such  a  notion  wrongly  by  applying 
it  to  heaviness,  which  is  really  in  no  way  distin- 
guished from  the  body,  as  I  hope  to  show  in  physics, 
but  that  it  has  been  given  us  that  we  may  conceive 
how  the  soul  moves  the  body."1 

Descartes  finishes  his  explanation  thus:  "  I 
should  be  too  presumptuous,  if  I  dared  to  think  that 
my  reply  would  fully  satisfy  Your  Highness." 

1  Lettres  de  M.  Descartes,  t.  i.,  No.  29,  ed.  Cousin,  1825, 
t.  ix.,  pp.  125  ff. 

3 


34    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

In  fact,  Her  Highness  replied  that  she  was  not 
satisfied,  and  she  asked  for  explanations  on  two 
points:  first,  as  to  the  distinction  between  the  three 
kinds  of  primary  ideas  used  respectively  for  knowing 
the  soul  taken  by  itself,  the  body  taken  by  itself, 
and  the  union  between  the  soul  and  the  body;  next, 
as  to  the  use  of  the  comparison  of  heaviness  for 
making  the  action  of  the  soul  upon  the  body  better 
understood. 

On  the  former  point,  Descartes  replied  that  he 
"  observes  a  great  difference  between  these  three 
kinds  of  notions,  in  that  the  soul  can  only  be  thought 
of  by  the  pure  intelligence ;  the  body — that  is  to  say, 
extension,  form,  and  movement — may  also  be  known 
by  the  intelligence  only,  but  much  better  by  the 
intelligence  aided  by  the  imagination;  and  lastly, 
the  things  pertaining  to  the  union  of  the  soul  with 
the  body  can  only  be  dimly  known  by  the  intelli- 
gence alone,  and  even  by  the  intelligence  aided  by 
the   imagination,   but  they  may  be   very  clearly 
known  by  the  senses;  and  hence  those  who  never 
think  philosophically,  and  who  only  make  use  of 
their  senses,  never  doubt  that  the  soul  moves  the 
body  and  that  the  body  acts  upon  the  soul,  but 
consider  both  to  be  one  thing — that  is  to  say,  they 
think  of  them  as  united;  for  to  think  of  the  union 
between  two  things  is  the  same  as  thinking  of  them 
as  one  thing.     And  metaphysical  thoughts  which 
call  pure  intelligence  into  play  help  to  familiarize  us 
with  the  notion  of  the  soul ;  and  the  study  of  mathe- 
matics, which  chiefly  exercises  the  imagination  in 
the  consideration  of  forms  and  movements,  accus- 
toms us  to  frame  perfectly  distinct  notions  of  bodies. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  DESCARTES     35 

And,  indeed,  it  is  by  simply  making  use  of  ordinary 
life  and  speech,  and  by  abstaining  from  meditating 
upon  and  studying  the  things  that  exercise  the 
imagination,  that  we  learn  to  conceive  of  the  union 
of  the  soul  with  the  body." 

Nevertheless,  the  philosopher  ingenuously  adds 
that  the  union  of  the  soul  with  the  body  is  some- 
thing fundamentally  inconceivable,  and  this  reduces 
all  his  previous  attempts  at  explanation  to  nothing. 
'  I  do  not  think,"  he  says,  "  that  the  mind  of  man 
is  capable  of  forming  a  clear  and  simultaneous  con- 
ception of  the  distinction  between  the  soul  and 
the  body,  and  also  of  their  union;  for,  to  that  end, 
one  must  think  of  them  as  a  single  thing,  and  at  the 
same  time  as  two  things,  which  is  contradictory." 

On  the  second  point,  Descartes'  explanation  goes 
so  far  as  to  attribute  to  the  soul  a  certain  extension, 
which  results  in  the  materialization  of  the  soul 
and  upsets  the  fundamental  psychological  theses  he 
has  hitherto  maintained  as  to  the  incompatibility 
between  thought  and  extension,  between  mind  and 
matter. 

"  Since  Your  Highness  observes,"  he  says  in 
conclusion,  "  that  it  is  easier  to  attribute  matter  and 
extension  to  the  soul  than  to  attribute  to  it  the 
power  of  moving  a  body  or  of  being  moved  thereby, 
if  it  be  immaterial,  I  beg  you  freely  to  attribute 
this  matter  and  extension  to  the  soul,  for  that  is 
only  conceiving  it  as  united  to  the  body;  and  after 
that  has  been  well  conceived  and  experienced  in 
oneself,  it  will  be  easy  to  consider  that  the  matter 
which  you  have  attributed  to  this  thought  is  not 
the  thought  itself,  and  that  the  extension  of  this 


36    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

matter  is  of  another  nature  than  the  extension  of 
this  thought ;  in  that  the  former  is  determined  to  a 
certain  place  from  which  it  excludes  any  other 
extension  of  the  body,  a  thing  which  the  latter  does 
not  do ;  and  thus  Your  Highness  will  easily  return 
to  the  distinction  between  soul  and  body,  notwith- 
standing your  conception  of  their  union."1 

Whereupon  Descartes  slips  off  with  the  excuse 
that  he  has  to  go  to  Utrecht,  whither  he  is  sum- 
moned by  the  magistrate  to  explain  something 
"  that  he  has  written  about  one  of  their  ministers." 
"  This  compels  me  to  end  now,  as  I  have  to  try 
to  find  a  way  of  getting  free  of  their  chicaneries  as 
soon  as  possible." 

Thus  the  anthropological  problem  remains  un- 
solved. All  Descartes'  vain  endeavours  only 
brought  out  its  insolubility  more  plainly.  The 
problem  cannot  be  answered  because  it  is  badly 
stated.  Man  is  not  a  combination  of  two  sub- 
stances, whereof  one  is  the  thinking  soul,  and  the 
other  an  extended  body — he  consists  of  a  single 
compound  substance. 

1  Lettres  de  M.  Descartes,  t.  i.,  No.  30,  ed.  Cousin,  t.  ix., 
p.  127. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  CARTESIAN 
PSYCHOLOGY 

WE  have  seen  how  the  psychology  of  Descartes 
resulted  in  a  hopeless  contradiction. 

This  contradiction  was  bound  to  arise  from  the 
opposition  set  up  between  the  soul  when  reduced 
to  being  a  substance  without  extension  and  the 
body  regarded  as  an  extended  substance  possessing 
nothing  but  mechanical  motion. 

We  shall  now  see  how  the  exclusive  Spiritualism 
and  the  Mechanism  (the  spiritualistic  and  the 
mechanical  theories)  of  the  great  French  innovator 
continued  to  flow  in  different  directions  through 
the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  until  the 
different  streams  converged,  and  by  their  mingling 
gave  rise  to  our  contemporary  psychology. 

The  stream  flowing  from  the  Cartesian  Spiritualism 
divides  at  the  outset  and  originates,  on  the  one  hand, 
Malebranche's  Occasionalism  and  Ontologism  and 
Spinoza's  Pantheism,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
Idealism . 

The  stream  derived  from  Mechanism  broadens 
out  under  the  twofold  influence  of  philosophy  and 
science,  and  impregnates  our  contemporary  Idealism 
with  Positivism. 

37 


38         CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 


I 

EVOLUTION  OF  THE  CARTESIAN  SPIRITUALISTIC 
THEORY 

Section  I. — Occasionalism,  Spinozism,  Ontologism 

Descartes'  psychology  contained  the  germ  of  Male- 
branche's  occasionalist  and  ontologist  philosophy. 

It  is  impossible,  says  Descartes,  to  conceive  of 
any  real  action  of  the  soul  upon  the  body  or  of  the 
body  upon  the  soul,  for  their  two  substances  possess 
contrary  properties  that  make  their  interaction 
incomprehensible.  Is  it  not,  then,  natural  to  deny 
any  such  action  and  to  maintain  that  when  we  feel 
as  if  we  were  controlling  our  members,  the  resultant 
acts  are  really  the  work  of  God,  and  when  we  think 
the  soul  is  being  influenced  by  animal  spirits, 
such  influence  proceeds  from  God  ?  Thus  the 
soul's  volitions  become  an  occasion  for  God's  causal 
operation  upon  the  body,  and  the  movements  of 
the  animal  spirits  become  the  occasion  of  an  opera- 
tion of  God  upon  the  soul,  but  the  soul  and  the  body 
have  no  real  causality  left. 

But  nowhere  is  the  feeling  of  action  more  intense 
than  in  the  commerce  between  soul  and  body.  If, 
then,  even  there  the  feeling  of  action  is  illusory,  it 
seems  a  legitimate  inference  to  say  that  all  the 
actions  of  created  beings  are  but  apparent,  and  that 
real  causation  is  exclusively  the  work  of  the  Creator. 

What  is,  in  reality,  the  action  of  a  created  agent 
upon  the  object  acted  upon,  of  a  mover  upon  the 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  39 

object  moved  ?  You  grant  that  the  mover  has  a 
substance  of  its  own,  and  you  also  give  a  substance 
to  the  object  moved:  how  can  the  first  substance 
really  act  upon  the  second  ? 

Do  you  think  of  some  entity  passing  from  the 
agent  into  the  subject  ?  Clearly  not,  for  during 
the  passage  from  one  term  to  the  other,  where  would 
this  entity  dwell  ?  Would  it  have  an  existence  of 
its  own,  as  being  a  substance  ?  Or  would  it  exist 
as  an  accident,  inhering  in  an  intermediary  sub- 
stance ?  In  either  case  the  difficulty  remains  un- 
diminished,  for  then  an  account  would  have  to  be 
given  of  the  possibility  of  a  real  action  of  this 
intermediary  substance  upon  the  patient,  just  as  at 
first  an  account  had  to  be  given  of  the  action  of  the 
first  agent  upon  a  patient  substantially  different  from 
itself. 

According  to  Malebranche,  this  puzzling  problem 
could  only  be  cleared  up  in  one  way,  that  is,  by 
considering  created  beings  as  present  to  one  another, 
but  without  ascribing  to  them  any  reciprocity  of 
action  upon  each  other,  their  apparent  activity 
being  the  work  of  God  alone,  owing  to  the  occasion 
of  their  mutual  presence. 

Rather,  according  to  Spinoza,  should  we  do  away 
with  the  substantial  distinction  between  creatures, 
and  say  that  there  is  only  one  -substance  endowed 
with  thought  and  extension:  with  thought,  in  order 
to  explain  the  action  whereof  the  soul  is  conscious ; 
with  extension,  to  explain  corporal  movements. 
Thus  we  get  rid  of  the  problem  of  causal  com- 
munication at  a  stroke. 

But  has  it  been  got  rid  of  ?     That  is  the  question. 


40    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

It  matters  little ;  just  now  it  is  enough  to  show  that 
Descartes'  exclusivist  psychology  implied  the  Occa- 
sionalism of  Malebranche  and  the  Pantheism  of 
Spinoza. 

Under  the  influence  of  the  French  innovator's 
same  extravagant  Spiritualism,  Ontologism  was 
bound  to  arise,  and  to  contribute  in  turn  to  the 
birth  of  Pantheism. 

We  aBe  now  on  the  ground  of  ideology  and 
criticism.  Whence  does  the  soul  get  its  ideas  of 
extension,  form,  and  bodily  movements  ?  From 
itself  ?  But  the  attributes  of  the  soul  are  diametri- 
cally opposed  to  those  of  the  body,  and  therefore 
cannot  provide  the  idea  of  it.  Or  from  the 
body  ?  But  the  body  is  independent  of  the  soul. 
What  could  it  have  in  common  with  the  soul  ? 
There  remains  God,  the  last  refuge  of  ideology 
when  at  bay.  The  objects  of  the  notions  of  exten- 
sion, form,  and  movement  are  to  be  found  in  God, 
the  pre-eminent  source  of  all  reality  in  things 
created,  and  there,  in  God,  man's  reason  perceives 
them.  Thus  God  alone  accounts  for  the  origin 
of  our  intellectual  perceptions,  and  He  alone 
accounts  for  their  certainty, 

We  know  already  that,  according  to  Descartes, 
certainty  of  the  existence  of  God  is  involved  in  our 
notion  of  the  perfect  Being.  Hence,  Descartes 
has  in  one  way  or  another  to  assign  to  man's  intelli- 
gence an  intuition  of  the  Supreme  Being.  Further- 
more, if  the  soul  has  no  direct  relationship  with 
corporal  things,  and  if,  in  itself,  it  finds  no  trace 
of  any  action  by  them  upon  itself,  the  certitude  of 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  41 

our  external  experience  must  have  its  basis  in  God 
alone.  Therefore,  from  both  points  of  view,  the 
ideological  and  the  critical,  the  existence  and  nature 
of  our  ideas  of  corporal  things  lead  on  logically  to  the 
affirmation  of  an  immediate  intuition  of  the  Infinite. 

Besides  this,  when  Descartes  wrote  his  Discours 
de  la  methode  and  Meditations,  the  ideological 
theory  of  the  Schoolmen  about  the  abstraction  of 
ideas  had  gone  astray,  and  consequently  the  marks 
of  the  necessity,  universality,  and  eternity  of  the 
object  of  thought,  were  easily  confused  with  the 
divine  attributes.  In  giving  to  Truth,  Goodness, 
and  Beauty  their  metaphysical  characteristics,  they 
imagined  they  caught  sight  of  the  divine  ideas 
immediately  and  plunged  directly  into  the  depths 
of  the  Absolute. 

Ontologism  was  born,  and  it  marked  out  and 
cleared  the  path  for  Pantheism. 

Section  II. — Idealism 

i.  The  Birth  of  Idealism. — Descartes'  psychology 
developed  in  another  direction  in  the  cases  of 
Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume,  and  Kant,  and  it  gave  rise 
to  the  idealist  tendency  that  so  deeply  impregnates 
contemporary  psychology. 

Under  the  name  of  Idealism  we  understand  the 
negation  of  the  knowableness  of  anything  except 
ideas,  or,  to  put  the  same  thing  in  an  affirmative 
way,  the  affirmation  of  the  unknowableness  of 
anything  except  ideas. 

Descartes  is  the  father  of  Idealism. 

We     must,     however,    be    still    more     definite. 


42         CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Descartes'  idealism  was  not  universal,  it  was  con- 
fined to  things  corporal.  The  reality  of  the  thinking 
soul,  the  object  of  consciousness,  the  existence  of 
a  perfect  Being,  the  immediate  principle  of  the 
idea  of  the  perfect,  were  not  in  dispute:  the 
reality  of  the  nature  of  the  body  was  in  question. 

In  fact,  said  Descartes,  if  bodies  are  perceptible 
by  the  soul,  they  must  be  able  to  act  upon  it ;  from 
the  nature  of  the  action  experienced,  the  soul  would 
then  infer  the  nature  of  the  agent :  but  how  was  a 
body,  solely  susceptible  of  motion  and  form,  to  act 
upon  a  spirit,  the  whole  of  the  capacity  whereof 
lay  in  thinking  ? 

Again,  supposing  that  such  action  were  possible, 
of  what  use  would  it  be  ?  For  after  all,  the  body, 
as  it  is  in  nature,  has  extension,  form,  motion, 
and  nothing  else.  But  our  representations  of 
corporal  sensations  are  notions  of  colour,  sound, 
and  affections  of  pleasure  or  of  pain.  What 
have  these  in  common  with  one  another  ? 

Our  soul  is  a  harp  the  strings  of  which  have 
been  cunningly  strung  by  nature.  When  the 
outside  air  strikes  upon  them,  or  the  finger  of 
the  artist  touches  them,  they  vibrate  and  give 
forth  harmonious  tones.  Are  we  to  say  that  the 
breath  of  air  or  the  artist's  finger  are  harmonious  ? 
Plainly,  no. 

In  the  same  way,  the  movements  of  the  animal 
spirits,  which  are  a  sort  of  prolongation  of  the 
outward  movements,  are  to  the  soul  occasions  for 
stirring  it  up  to  think;  but  the  thoughts  them- 
selves, "  the  ideas  of  pain,  colour,  and  sound,  and 
of  all  sorts  of  such  things,"  the  term  of  the  inner 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  43 

sense  or  consciousness,  are  solely  the  work  of  the 
soul.1 

Certainly,  Descartes  was  bound  to  have  a  some- 
thing extertuil,  an  indefinite  something,  that  awak- 
ened the  power  of  the  soul  and  made  it  pass  into 
an  act  of  knowledge,  what  Kant  called  a  noumenon, 
a  thing-in-itself ;  but  since  it  is  admitted  that  the 
body  has  no  real  action  upon  the  mind  that  thinks, 
and  that  there  is  no  more  similarity  between  our 
representations  and  the  movement  that  produces 
them  than  there  is  between  the  harmony  of  an 
instrument  of  music  or  the  finger  or  the  wind  that 

1  "  Whoever  well  understands  how  far  our  senses  reach, 
and  exactly  what  they  bring  to  our  thinking  faculty,  must 
admit  that,  on  the  contrary,  none  of  our  ideas  of  things  are 
represented  by  them  to  us  such  as  we  form  them  mentally; 
so  that  there  is  nothing  in  our  ideas  which  does  not  belong  by 
nature  to  the  mind  or  to  its  faculty  of  thought,  if  only  certain 
circumstances  belonging  solely  to  experience  be  excepted. 
For  instance,  it  is  experience  alone  that  makes  us  consider 
that  such  or  such  ideas  as  are  now  present  to  our  minds  refer 
to  certain  things  which  are  outside  of  us ;  not  that  these  things 
have  been  really  transmitted  to  our  minds  by  the  organs  of 
sense  as  we  feel  them,  but  because  they  have  transmitted 
something  which  has  given  our  mind,  through  its  natural 
faculty,  an  occasion  for  forming  them  just  now  rather  than 
at  any  other  time.     For,    as    our    author  affirms  in  his 
nineteenth  article,  in  conformity  with  what  he  has  learnt 
from  my  Principles,  nothing  can  come  into  our  souls  from 
outward  things  through  the  senses,  unless  it  be  a  few  bodily 
movements;  but  neither  such  movements  themselves,  nor 
the  shapes  that  arise  from  them,  are  ever  conceived  by  us 
to  be  such  as  they  are  in  the  organs  of  sense,  as  I  have 
abundantly  explained  in  my  Dioptrics  ;  whence  it  follows 
that  even  the  ideas  of  movement  and  shape  are  naturally 
within  ourselves.     And,  a  fortiori,  the  ideas  of  pain,  colour, 
sound,  and  so  forth,  must  be  natural  to  us,  so  that  our 
mind,  on  the  occasion  of  certain  bodily  movements  where- 
with they  have  no  likeness,  may  be  able  to  make  representa- 
tions   of   them." — Descartes,    Lettres.     Remarques    sur   un 
certain  placard,  imprime  aux  Pays-Bas  vers  la  fin  de  I'annee 
1647.     CEuvres  de  Descartes,  ed.  Cousin,  t.  x.,  pp.  94-96. 


44    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

makes  it  vibrate,  it  is  logical  to  infer  that  we  only 
know  our  own  ideas.  This  conclusion  is  the  very 
definition  of  idealism . 

One  almost  might  have  been  tempted  to  think 
that  Locke's  empiricism  would  have  indicated  a 
reaction  against  the  idealism  of  Descartes.  Locke, 
indeed,  took  Descartes'  innate  ideas  to  task,  but 
he  did  it  unskilfully.  The  arguments  of  this  English 
philosopher  miss  the  point;  they  were  aimed  at 
the  innate  ideas  as  if  they  were  actual  perceptions. 
But  Descartes  never  maintained  the  innateness  of 
our  actual  ideas,  but  the  innateness  of  our 
power  to  form  them  without  the  effective  assist- 
ance of  any  activity  apart  from  the  soul.  Hence 
Locke's  efforts  to  maintain  the  part  of  sensible 
experience  in  the  formation  of  our  cognitions  were 
bound  to  result  in  a  way  that  their  author  never 
intended,  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  they  rather 
confirmed  than  invalidated  the  position  of  the 
Cartesian  idealist. 

Moreover,  on  the  question  of  the  unknowableness 
of  substances,  there  is  no  essential  difference  between 
Locke  and  Descartes. 

According  to  the  Essay  on  the  Human  Under- 
standing, there  are  two  sources  of  our  ideas,  sensation 
and  reflection  —  the  former  acquainting  us  with 
sensible  qualities,  the  latter  with  the  operations  of 
the  soul  (mind) ;  but  all  mental  activity  is  confined 
to  establishing  between  the  simple  ideas  drawn 
from  these  two  sources,  relations  of  identity  or 
difference,  of  agreement  or  disagreement,  and  the 
human  understanding  cannot  go  beyond  the  per- 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  45 

ception  and  arrangement  of  these  accidents.  "  Our 
specific  ideas  of  corporal  substances  are  nothing 
else  but  a  collection  of  a  certain  number  of  simple 
ideas,  considered  as  united  in  one  thing."1 

Locke  even  improves  upon  the  Cartesian  idealism. 
Descartes,  indeed,  had  not  thought  of  questioning 
the  substantiality  of  the  thinking  "  I."  To  the 
English  philosopher  the  substantial  reality  of  the 
soul  is  as  doubtful  as  that  of  bodily  substances. 
"  For,"  he  writes,  "  putting  together  the  ideas  of 
thinking  and  willing,  or  the  power  of  moving  or  of 
quieting  corporeal  motion,  joined  to  substance,  of 
which  we  have  no  distinct  idea,  we  have  an  idea  of 
an  immaterial  spirit."  But  we  have  no  distinct 
idea  of  a  corporeal  substance  or  of  a  spiritual  sub- 
stance. "  The  one  is  as  clear  and  distinct  an  idea 
as  the  other.  .  .  .  For  our  idea  of  substance  is 
equally  obscure,  or  none  at  all,  in  both;  it  is  but  a 
supposed  I-know-not-what,  to  support  those  ideas  we 
call  'accidents?  "2 

Thus  Locke  reduced  psychology  to  the  following 
terms:  the  sensible  qualities  of  bodies  and  the 
operations  of  the  soul  are  represented  by  ideas, 
some  simple  and  others  compound,  between  which 
the  understanding  establishes  relations;  and  as  the 
substratum  of  both  he  assumes  an  unknown  support 
which  he  calls  substance,  matter,  or  spirit. 

This  unknown  substratum  of  corporeal  qualities 
is  considered  superfluous  by  Berkeley.  This  Irish 
philosopher  does  away  with  the  substance  of  bodies 

1  Essay     on     the     Human     Understanding,     Book    II., 
Ch.  XXIII.,  §  14. 

2  Ibid.,  Book  II.,  Ch.  XXIII.,  §  15. 


46    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

- 

and  leaves  only  spirit  behind.  One  may  contradict 
his  premises,  but  given  his  acceptance  of  the  idealism 
of  Descartes  and  Locke,  one  cannot  dispute  the 
inevitability  of  his  inference.  "  Sensible  qualities," 
he  says,1  "  are  colour,  shape,  movement,  smell, 
taste,  etc.  .  .  .,  i.e.,  ideas  perceived  by  the  senses. 
But  it  is  inconsistent  to  put  the  existence  of  ideas  in 
anything  that  is  not  actually  perfect,  for  to  have  an 
idea  and  to  perceive  are  one  and  the  same  thing. 
Therefore  the  subject  in  which  are  to  be  found 
colour,  form,  and  other  sensible  qualities,  must 
know  them ;  and  hence  it  is  quite  evident  that  there 
can  be  no  unthinking  substance.  Therefore  matter 
or  bodily  substance  does  not  exist :  only  a  thinking 
and  consequently  spiritual  substance  can  exist." 

Hume  is  still  more  radical.  He  does  not  admit 
of  any  kind  of  substance,  going  so  far  as  to  do  away 
with  "  the  unknown  substratum  of  ideas  "  which 
is  called  soul  or  mind,  and  undertakes  to  set  up  a 
"  psychology  without  a  soul." 

What  Locke  calls  "  ideas  "  is  given  by  Hume  the 
name  of  "  impressions."  The  Scotch  thinker  means 
thereby  the  various  states  of  consciousness.  He 
calls  sense-impressions  "  impressions  of  sensation," 
sensations  or  perceptions  and  considered  impressions 
"  impressions  of  reflection,"  inclinations  or  volitions 
"  affections  "  or  "  emotions r"  As  for  "  ideas,"  he 
regards  them  as  weak  reproductions  of  impressions 
or  of  reminiscences  of  former  ideas.2 

1  Berkeley,  The  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge. 

2  "  I  would  fain  ask  those  philosophers,  who  found  so 
much  of  their  reasonings  on  the  distinction  of  substance 
and  accident,  and  imagine  we  have  clear  ideas  of  each, 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  47 

Impressions  and  ideas  possess  attractive  pro- 
perties in  virtue  whereof  associative  relations  are 
set  up  between  them,  and  there  is  no  need  to  assume 
that  this  is  the  result  of  any  activity  independent 
of  them.  The  object  of  psychology  is  to  investigate 
the  progressive  organization  of  impressions  and 
ideas,  and  the  laws  according  to  which  they  become 
associated  to  compose  the  syntheses,  the  sum-total 
of  which  we  call  the  conscious  soul  or  mind. 

In  Hume's  psychology,  idealism  reigns  universally. 
To  him  everything  that  is  not  an  idea  is  unknowable. 
Nevertheless,  the  idealism  of  Hume,  like  that  of  his 
predecessors,  is  regarded  by  him  as  a  fact,  while  to 
Kant  it  is  the  constituent  law  of  the  human  mind. 

Hume  reached  idealism  by  way  of  induction, 
Kant  by  way  of  deduction. 

We  saw  how  Descartes  regarded  bodily  movements 
as  only  exciting.caijses  of  the  soul's  action,  whereas 
he  assigned  to  the  soul  a  natural  capacity  for  taking 
account  of  the  distinctive  characteristics  of  thought. 


whether  the  idea  of  substance  be  derived  from  the  impres- 
sions of  sensations  or  reflection  ?  If  it  be  conveyed  to  us 
by  our  senses,  I  ask,  which  of  them;  and  after  what  manner  ? 
If  it  be  perceived  by  the  eyes,  it  must  be  a  colour;  if  by  the 
ears,  a  sound;  if  by  the  palate,  a  taste;  and  so  of  the  other 
senses.  But  I  believe  none  will  assert,  that  substance  is 
either  a  colour,  sound  or  taste.  The  idea  of  substance  must 
therefore  be  derived  from  an  impression  of  reflection,  if  it 
really  exist.  But  the  impressions  of  reflection  resolve 
themselves  into  our  passions  and  emotions;  none  of  which 
can  possibly  represent  a  substance.  We  have  therefore  no 
idea  of  substance,  distinct  from  that  of  a  collection  of 
particular  qualities,  nor  have  we  any  other  meaning  when 
we  talk  or  reason  concerning  it." — Hume,  Treatise  on  Human 
Nature,  Part  I.,  §  6. 


48    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Kant  took  back  to  its  starting-point  this  idea  of  the 
essential  role  of  the  subject-soul  in  the  production  of 
knowledge. 

When  passive  impressions  on  the  sensibility 
occur,  the  thinking  subject  has,  according  to  him, 
its  own  mode  of  reacting ;  to  the  data  of  experience 
it  brings  its  own  formal  elements  (intuitions,  cate- 
gories, ideas),  and  from  the  synthesis  of  these  forms 
a  priori  with  the  sensible  impressions  results  the 
special  character  of  cognitive  acts.  The  notions  of 
substance  and  of  cause  are  the  effects  of  similar 
syntheses  of  the  categories  of  thought  with  pheno- 
mena; they  are,  then,  fabricamenta  mentis,  mental 
fictions  whereof  we '  cannot  assert  the  reality.  If 
even  corporal  noumena  escape  our  apprehension,  far 
more  do  spiritual  substances  and  the  reality  of  the 
Divine  Being  transcend  it,  being  beyond  the  scope 
of  human  knowledge. 

Thus  is  idealism  inductively  and  deductively 
established  both  by  way  of  analysis  and  by  way  of 
synthesis ;  it  is  both  the  fact  and  the  law  of  human 
knowledge.  Henceforward  it  rules  supreme  in 
philosophic  teaching.  It  is  called  phenomenalism 
in  France,  agnosticism  in  England  and  the  United 
States,  but  underlying  both  names  is  a  fundamen- 
tally negative  doctrine  concerning  the  root-in- 
capacity of  the  human  mind  to  go  beyond  its  sub- 
jective ideas. 

Idealism  appears  in  the  eyes  of  its  professors,  not 
as  a  philosophical  system  which  is  as  good  as  or 
superior  to  any  other,  but  as  the  supreme  conquest 
of  the  mind.  Many  of  our  contemporaries  are  per- 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  49 

suaded  that  Kant  has  set  up  the  columns  of  Hercules 
of  man's  mind.  Moreover,  for  them  metaphysics, 
the  last  word  of  philosophy,  has  lost  its  original 
meaning.  It  no  longer  designates  the  knowledge 
of  that  which,  either  positively  or  negatively, 
transcends  experience,  but  the  science  of  the 
limitations  of  human  knowledge,  according  to  the 
words  of  the  Konigsberg  philosopher:  "The  main 
and  perhaps  the  only  use  of  the  philosophy  of  Pure 
Reason  is,  after  all,  entirely  negative ;  for  it  serves, 
not  as  an  instrument  for  the  increase  of  knowledge, 
but  as  a  discipline  for  establishing  its  boundaries. 
Instead  of  discovering  truths,  it  modestly  confines 
itself  to  the  prevention  of  errors." 

2.  The  Origin  of  the  Positivist  Character  of  Idealism. 
—We  have  just  seen  the  genesis  of  contemporary 
idealism.  It  may  be  summed  up  in  the  statement 
that  the  soul  draws  its  thoughts  on  corporal  things 
from  itself,  on  the  occurrence  of  the  motions  of 
animal  spirits  (Descartes) ;  in  the  statement  that 
the  soul  knows  only  simple  ideas  and  collections 
of  simple  ideas  drawn,  some  from  sensations,  others 
from  reflection  (Locke) ;  in  the  statement  that  all  the 
soul's  cognitions  and  that  the  soul  itself  are  results 
of  associations  of  psychological  elements,  kinds  of 
atoms  of  psychological  chemistry,  according  to  the 
attractive  affinities  of  similarity,  coexistence,  and 
succession  (Hume) ;  lastly,  in  the  denial  of  the  know- 
ableness  of  all  that  goes  beyond  phenomena  (Kant). 

Is  idealism,  thus  understood,  materialistic  or 
spiritualistic  ?  It  is  neither  the  one  nor  the  other, 
of  necessity. 


50    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

In  the  case  of  Descartes,  idealism  is  clearly 
spiritualistic;  it  was  not  materialistic  with  Locke, 
since  he  recognized  two  sources  of  cognitions, 
sensation  and  reflection,  and  mind.  It  was  spirit- 
ualistic to  excess  with  Berkeley.  Lastly,  it  was 
by  no  means  materialistic  with  Kant,  since  he 
inaugurated  a  reaction  against  the  empiricism  of 
Hume  and  defended  the  necessity  and  universality 
of  principles,  especially  of  the  principle  of  causality, 
against  the  Scottish  philosopher. 

How  is  it,  then,  that  idealism,  in  France,  England, 
and  the  United  States  as  well  as  in  Germany,  has 
generally  become  positivist  ?  By  positivism  is 
meant,  according  to  John  Stuart  Mill,  that  system 
of  philosophy  which  only  admits  of  one  way  of 
thinking,  i.e.,  of  knowing;  the  way  of  thinking 
positively,  i.e.,  the  way  of  knowing  by  the  senses. 

Logically,  there  is  no  necessary  connection  between 
idealism  and  positivism.  Assume  that  I  could 
know  nothing  but  my  own  ideas,  there  would  remain 
the  question  of  whence  and  what  these  ideas  may 
be,  whether  they  are  material  or  spiritual,  whether 
they  come  solely  from  the  senses,  or  partly  from 
the  senses,  partly  from  some  suprasensible  source. 

Historically,  we  have  just  seen  that  there  is  no 
filiation  from  idealism  to  positivism.  How  is  it, 
then,  that  idealists  have  generally  given  their 
philosophy  a  positivist  character  ? 

This  truly  curious  phenomenon  arises  from  two 
causes,  one  historical,  the  other  scientific. 

After  Descartes,  a  current  of  sensationalism  ran 
side  by  side  with  idealism,  and  it  logically  ended  in 
materialism.  This  was  the  primary  cause  of  the 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  51 

influx  of  positivism  into  the  psychology  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  With  this  we  shall  deal  first 
of  all. 

Afterwards,  in  Article  II.,  we  shall  consider  the 
development  of  Cartesian  Mechanism,  and  therein 
we  shall  recognize  the  second  cause  of  the  positivist 
character  of  modern  idealism. 

Before  broaching  this  subject  we  will  make  a 
rapid  sketch  of  the  influence  exercised  by  sensa- 
tionalism on  the  positivist  demeanour  of  modern 
psychology. 

By  sensationalism  is  meant  that  ideological  theory 
which  finds  in  sensation  the  one  source  of  all  know- 
ledge. 

Sensationalism  is  not  necessarily  materialistic, 
for  one  may  admit  that  sensation  is  the  one  source 
of  our  cognitions,  and  nevertheless  maintain  that 
an  immaterial  principle  exists,  the  function  of  which 
is  to  draw  from  that  source  the  elements  whose 
elaboration  produces  what  we  know. 

Condillac  teaches,  in  his  Traite  des  sensations 
(p.  n),  that  "  judgement,  reflection,  the  emotions, 
in  a  word  all  the  operations  of  the  soul,  are  only 
different  transformations  of  sensation."  Sensation, 
then,  according  to  him,  is  the  sole  source  of  all  our 
perceptions ;  but  sensation,  if  it  is  to  become  idea, 
must  undergo  a  transformation,  which  the  imma- 
terial nature  of  the  soul  alone  can  effect.  Although 
the  immateriality  of  the  soul  is  not  repudiated,  but 
rather  asserted  by  the  father  of  French  sensational- 
ism, it  is  nevertheless  easy  to  see  that  he  has  gravely 
compromised  it.  In  fact,  if  the  goal  of  knowledge 


52    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

does  not  go  beyond  the  region  of  sensibility,  why 
must  the  knowing  subject  be  more  than  a  purely 
sensible  agent  ? 

Locke,  more  reasonably  and  carefully  than 
Condillac,  reserved  to  the  soul  a  place  that  required 
its  immateriality.  By  the  side  of  sensations,  in 
fact,  he  kept  a  place  for  "  reflection,"  i.e.,  for  the 
knowledge  of  the  operations  of  the  soul,  and  he 
referred  this  knowledge  to  an  immaterial  mind. 
But,  even  in  such  conditions,  the  immateriality  of 
the  soul  was  getting  to  be  doubtful.  Locke's 
emphasis  in  distinguishing  his  position  from  that 
of  Cartesian  spiritualism  and  in  bringing  into  pro- 
minence, for  that  purpose,  the  preponderating  part 
played  by  sensation  in  our  mental  activity ;  his  con- 
fusion between  mental  representation  and  sense  re- 
presentation, either  of  which  he  indifferently  named 
idea  or  tlwught ;  lastly,  the  hypothesis  he  loved  to 
dwell  on  of  a  matter  which  acquired  the  power  of 
thinking:  all  this  singularly  attenuated  the  re- 
spective characteristics  of  sensation  and  thought, 
of  matter  and  mind,  and  facilitated  the  invasion  of 
the  sphere  of  psychology  by  materialism. 

Hume  showed  more  decision.  He  clearly  laid 
down  the  identity  of  the  phenomenon  of  con- 
sciousness, called  an  impression  or  idea,  with  the 
nervous  process  of  the  body.  "If  we  regard  the 
matter  a  priori,"  says  he,  "  we  must  affirm  that 
anything  is  capable  of  anything.  .  .  .  From  the 
fact  that  we  do  not  understand  the  how  of  causal 
operation,  it  does  not  follow  that  we  have  any  right 
to  deny  it.  Do  we  understand  the  law  of  attrac- 
tion ?  Nevertheless,  we  admit  it. 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  53 

"  But,  just  as  one  movement  follows  another,  so 
do  changes  of  thought  always  follow  certain  changes 
in  the  movements  of  matter.  Hence,  we  rightly 
regard  the  material  changes  that  precede  our 
thoughts  as  the  cause  of  thoughts,  for  a  cause  is 
nothing  but  an  antecedent  that  is  constant." 

But  a  fact  that  is  caused  by  a  material  change 
is  of  the  same  material  order  as  the  fact  itself. 
Hence  it  is  natural  to  identify  the  conscious  fact 
or  thought  with  a  nervous  change  which  is  itself 
a  material  form  of  existence. 

Such  was  the  favourable  medium  provided  for 
the  mechanical  theory  of  Descartes  in  England  and 
France. 

On  parallel  lines  with  the  evolution  of  the  ex- 
clusively spiritualistic  theory  the  mechanical  con- 
ception of  nature  will  henceforth  develop  in  turn, 
and  definitely  stamp  idealism  with  a  positivist 
character. 

We  shall  examine  Mechanism  first  of  all  as  a 
philosophical  conception,  and  then  as  a  scientific 
theory. 

In  order  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  union  of  the 
soul  with  the  body  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  com- 
promise the  distinction  which  he  had  set  up  between 
the  two  substances,  Descartes  placed  in  an  in- 
finitesimal part  of  the  nervous  substance  a  spiritual 
soul  which  had  to  set  in  motion,  by  means  of  the 
animal  spirits,  the  nerves  and  muscles  of  the  body, 
and  thus  to  enter  into  relation  with  both  the  body 
and  the  external  world. 

In  reality,  since  the  soul  has  the  power  of  forming 


54         CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

its  own  ideas;  since  it  has  not  to  receive  any  im- 
pression of  them  from  outside,  there  is  no  need  of 
setting  up  a  distinction  between  soul  and  body  and 
of  making  them  meet  together  in  the  pineal  gland 
in  order  to  explain  the  origin  of  our  ideas.  From 
this  point  of  view,  the  union  of  soul  and  body  is 
useless. 

The  only  reason  for  affirming  the  presence  of  an 
immaterial  soul  in  the  pineal  gland  is  the  need  of 
explaining  the  movements  of  the  body  which  we 
are  conscious  that  we  originate.  The  last  strong- 
hold of  the  Cartesian  spiritualism,  when  confronted 
with  the  mechanical  conception  of  nature,  is  here. 

But  is  there  any  real  need  of  an  immaterial  soul 
for  this  purpose  ?  May  it  not  be  possible  to  replace 
the  immaterial  soul  with  the  substance  of  the  brain 
itself,  or,  in  more  general  terms,  by  a  mechanical 
agent  ?  This  hypothesis  of  the  applicability  of 
mechanical  materialism  to  the  control  of  the  move- 
ments of  the  body  has,  apparently,  the  twofold 
advantage  of  unity  and  simplicity. 

The  human  mind  is  naturally  inclined  to  unity. 
Why  should  we  wonder  at  it  ?  Its  function  is  to 
make  abstractions  and  to  generalize.  But  to 
generalize  is  to  perceive  the  applicability  of  one 
predicate  to  an  increasing  number  of  subjects. 

Descartes  had  already  applied  the  predicates 
"  extension,"  "  shape,"  "  movement,"  to  all  created 
beings,  the  soul  only  excepted.  He  had  denied 
that  there  was  any  real  difference  between  the  cor- 
poreal phenomena  of  mineral  substances,  the  vital 
phenomena  of  plants,  and  the  phenomena  of  animal 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  55 

life.  He  had  therefore  affirmed  the  substantial 
identity  of  substances  as  diverse  in  appearance  as  the 
mineral,  vegetable,  and  animal  worlds,  including 
the  human  body.  What,  then,  was  more  natural 
than  to  do  away  with  the  diversity  between  the 
phenomena  of  thought  and  the  other  phenomena 
of  nature,  and  therefore  to  affirm  the  fundamental 
identity  of  bodies  with  the  thinking  soul  ?  Was 
not  this  the  naturally  expected  climax  of  the 
synthesis  of  the  universe  ? 

Why  did  Descartes  "  tack  "  a  soul  on  to  the 
human  body  ?  asks  La  Mettrie,  who  was  quite  ready 
to  label  himself  a  Cartesian.  For  extrinsic  reasons, 
he  replies,  not  to  offend  the  clergy.  For,  if  we  see 
things  as  they  are,  the  affirmation  of  an  immaterial 
human  soul  is  not  justified,  he  says,  in  the  Cartesian 
psychology.  If  we  admit  a  mechanism  of  plants 
and  animals,  why  not  also  a  mechanism  of  man- 
kind ? 

Doubtless  the  induction  made  by  La  Mettrie  is 
not  logical.  There  are  in  favour  of  the  immateriality 
of  the  thinking  soul  reasons  intrinsically  different 
from  those  that  are  on  the  side  of  the  irreducibility 
of  the  plant  or  the  animal  to  simple  pieces  of 
mechanism.  But  it  is  none  the  less  true  that 
Descartes  overturned  all  the  barriers  against  the 
invasion  of  mechanical  materialism  except  one,  and 
thereby  prepared  men's  minds  to  overcome  this  last 
obstacle. 

Its  simplicity  is  a  second  advantage  of  the  mechani- 
cal hypothesis.  The  substitution  of  a  material  agent 
for  the  immaterial  soul  of  Descartes  enables  one  to 


56    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

escape   from  many  of   the  difficulties  which   the 
French  philosopher's  principles  made  unanswerable. 

Descartes  placed  the  immaterial  soul  in  the 
pineal  gland  in  order  to  give  it  thence  control  over 
man's  bodily  movements.  But  the  soul's  mode  of 
existence  in  the  substance  of  the  brain — seeing  that 
the  soul's  nature  is  thinking — is  self-contradictory. 
Thought,  as  such,  is  not  attached  to  any  place, 
hence  a  thinking  substance,  as  such,  cannot  be 
localized.  Thus  it  was  that  Descartes  told  the 
Princess  Elizabeth  that  we  must  think  of  the  soul 
as  endowed  with  a  different  kind  of  extension  from 
that  of  matter,  seeing  that  the  latter  excludes  from 
where  it  is  found  all  other  extended  matter,  whereas 
the  former  does  not  exclude  it  at  all. 

Likewise  the  thinking  soul's  mode  of  operation  for 
the  production  of  bodily  movements  involves  con- 
tradiction. In  fact,  according  to  the  very  principles 
of  Cartesian  mechanics,  movement  alone — so  far  as 
it  is  a  secondary  cause — can  give  rise  to  movement. 
But,  by  definition,  movement  is  a  change  in  the  posi- 
tion of  something  movable  or  in  that  of  its  parts — 
i.e.,  it  is  a  change  of  shape.  But  a  change  of  shape 
is  only  possible  in  an  extended  body.  Hence,  only 
an  extended  body  is  able  to  produce  a  movement, 
and  consequently  the  soul,  whose  attribute  excludes 
extension,  cannot  produce  any  movement . 

Besides,  the  sum  of  movement  in  the  universe 
is  invariable.  But,  of  two  things  one:  either  'the 
setting  in  motion  of  man's  body  by  the  soul  must 
be  due  to  a  production  of  movement  without 
equivalent  loss,  and  then  the  sum  of  movement  in 
the  universe  would  vary;  or  else  the  setting  in 


57 

motion  would  be  due  to  a  production  of  movement 
with  some  equivalent  loss  of  movement  in  the  mover, 
and  then  the  latter — now  assumed  to  be  able  to 
lose  in  movement — could  only  be  material.  There- 
fore, unless  we  overturn  this  fundamental  principle 
of  Descartes'  physics,  the  constancy  of  the  sum  of 
the  world's  movement,  we  must  deny  the  im- 
materiality of  man's  soul. 

Doubtless  attempts  will  be  made  to  escape  from 
this  last  inference.  Clerselier,  who  was  a  Cartesian, 
made  them.  It  is  true,  he  said,  that  a  movement 
must  be  created  in  order  to  set  up  a  bodily  move- 
ment ;  but,  strictly  speaking,  the  soul  has  not  to 
start  bodily  movements,  but  only  to  control  them. 

Even  if  it  be  assumed,  though  it  would  not  be 
correct  to  do  so,  that  the  power  of  the  soul  over 
bodily  movements  were  exclusively  directive,  Cler- 
selier's  answer  would  afford  no  real  way  out.  In 
fact,  in  virtue  of  the  law  of  inertia,  every  moving 
body  inevitably  keeps  moving  in  a  right  line  as 
long  as  no  contrary  force  changes  its  direction. 
Hence,  to  change  the  direction  of  the  thing  moved, 
as  well  as  to  make  it  pass  from  rest  to  motion, 
some  mechanical  act  is  required.  Hence,  the  soul 
can  only  direct  the  movements  of  the  body,  if  it 
can  produce  mechanical  effects.  Therefore  the 
dilemma  returns  anon — either  the  soul  produces 
mechanical  energy  without  consuming  any,  and 
then  the  sum  of  the  world's  energies  increases;  or 
else,  it  consumes  the  same  amount  as  it  produces,  and  . 
then  its  nature  is  not  immaterial,  but  mechanical.1 

1  We  need  not  put  forward  any  solution  of  this  difficulty; 
since,  just  now,  our  sole  aim  is  to  follow  up  the  evolution 
of  Cartesian  ideas. 


Let  us  now  sum  up  this  philosophical  explanation 
of  the  mechanical  theory  in  conclusion : 

Sensationalism  prepared  men's  minds  for  the 
identification  of  the  phenomena  of  the  nervous 
system  with  the  phenomena  of  consciousness. 
Hume  claimed  that  this  identification  presented  no 
impossibilities  in  itself,  but  on  the  contrary  that 
it  was  required  by  the  constant  conjunction  of 
nervous  changes  with  our  thoughts. 

But  now,  on  the  other  hand,  from  the  desire  for 
unity  and  in  order  to  escape  the  difficulties  raised 
by  the  mode  in  which  it  was  present,  and  the  opera- 
tion of  the  immaterial  soul  in  the  pineal  gland, 
arose  a  tendency  to  substitute  for  the  soul  a  sub- 
stance able  to  fill  a  place  and  to  be  a  source  of 
mechanical  energies. 

Thus  the  thinking  soul  gets  lowered  by  nature 
to  material  conditions,  and  becomes  therefore  sub- 
ject to  mechanical  laws.  But  consciousness  protests 
against  the  brutal  negations  of  materialism;  hence 
the  endeavour  to  shroud  in  voluntary  ignorance  the 
problem  of  the  nature  of  thought  and  of  the  soul 
that  thinks.  From  this  endeavour  arises  positivism. 

Hitherto  we  have  considered  the  Mechanism  from 
the  philosophic  point  of  view.  Confined  by  Des- 
cartes to  vegetable  and  animal  substances,  it 
ended  by  being  extended  by  his  followers  to  human 
nature  itself.  Thus  understood,  the  mechanical 
theory  could  cite  in  its  favour  its  unity  of  concep- 
tion; and  by  its  simplicity  it  got  rid  of  insoluble 
difficulties  arising  from  the  influence  over  bodily 
movements  attributed  to  an  immaterial  soul  by 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  50. 

Descartes'  psychology,  but  after  all  it  remained 
merely  a  philosophic  hypothesis. 

Nor  from  the  narrower  point  of  view  of  the  science 
of  physics  did  Cartesian  Mechanism  rise  above  the 
rank  of  mere  hypothesis.  Indeed,  the  reduction 
of  all  the  phenomena  of  material  nature  to  move- 
ment was  hardly  supported  by  Descartes  by  any 
attempt  at  observation.  His  affirmation  of  the 
conservation  of  the  world's  sum-total  of  movement 
was  merely  a  deduction  drawn  from  the  immuta- 
bility of  the  divine  Being. 

Therefore,  philosophically  and  scientifically,  the 
mechanical  theory  until  the  time  of  Descartes  was 
only  an  hypothesis.  It  had  no  experimental 
foundation.  Will  it  not  be  provided  with  this  by 
the  advancement  of  scientific  knowledge  ? 

The  mechanical  theory  may  be  reduced  to  these 
two  propositions:  The  phenomena  of  the  material 
world,  if  not  all  the  phenomena  of  the  universe,  are 
modes  of  motion.  In  nature  there  is  nothing  but 
efficient  causes;  there  are  no  final  causes. 

Now,  these  two  propositions  have  apparently 
found  an  experimental  foundation  in  the  wonderful 
scientific  progress  made  in  the  last  hundred  years. 

First  of  all,  physiology  reduces  the  seemingly  most 
mysterious  phenomena  of  life  to  physico-chemical 
manifestations,  enabling  the  mechanical  interpre- 
tation hitherto  applied  to  things  inorganic  to  be 
extended  to  the  domain  of  life.  Next,  Lavoisier 
demonstrates  experimentally  the  conservation  of 
ponderable  matter  amidst  all  chemical  reactions. 
"  Nothing  is  created,  nothing  perishes."  Thermo- 


60         CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

dynamics  shows  that  heat  is  not  an  indestructible 
and  unchangeable  fluid,  as  Newton  supposed,  but 
that  it  may  be  consumed  in  producing  energy,  and 
generated  by  the  living  power  of  a  body  in  motion. 
One  can  fix  the  amount  of  heat  required  to  produce 
a  given  unit  of  power,  and  inversely,  the  amount  of 
mechanical  energy  to  be  expended  to  produce  a 
given  unit  of  heat,  and  thus  a  ratio  between  heat 
and  mechanical  energy  is  established.  Mayer, 
Clausius,  Joule,  and  Helmholtz  have  found  out 
approximately,  indeed,  the  mechanical  equivalents 
of  heat,  or  the  heat -equivalents  of  power ;  Weber  and 
Helmholtz  the  mechanical  equivalents  of  electricity. 
Thermodynamics  and  electrodynamics,  then,  lead  to 
the  following  general  conclusion :  If  we  mean  by  the 
term  energy,  living  power,  horse-power,  heat,  elec- 
tricity, and,  to  speak  more  generally,  all  the  mechani- 
cal, physical,  and  chemical  forces  of  nature,  we 
are  justified  by  experiment  in  stating  that  all 
corporal  energies  have  a  mechanical  equivalent.  If 
they  replace  one  another,  that  is  done  by  a  law  of 
equivalence.  Therefore,  if  we  look  at  these  energies 
as  a  whole,  abstracting  any  other-force  outside  their 
sphere,  we  may  say  that  the  play  of  nature's  forces 
does  not  impair  the  sum-total  of  energy  of  the  whole 
— in  a  word,  that  the  sum  of  the  world's  energies  is 
invariable.  And  then,  joining  together  Lavoisier's 
principle  with  Mayer's,  we  may  say:  "  The  sum  of 
the  world's  energies  is  invariable,  as  is  the  sum 
of  the  mass  of  the  particles  of  matter  that  com- 
pose it." 

Apparently,  this  is  all  that  is  required  to  convince 
us  that  the  mechanical  theory  rests  upon  an  ex- 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  61 

perimental  basis,  and  that  its  primary  doctrine  has 
been  established  so  far  as  to  be  a  scientific  theory. 
Can  science  also  be  invoked  for  the  negation  of 
final  causes  ? 

Teleology  had  become  discredited  by  the  jibes  of 
Bacon  as  well  as  by  the  physical  doctrines  of 
Descartes.  According  to  the  English  empiricist, 
experiment  is  the  only  way  of  getting  any  knowledge 
of  nature,  and  experiment  reaches  efficient  causes 
only.  The  search  for  final  causes  is,  then,  simply 
idle  play,  quite  unworthy  of  science . 

But,  assuming  that  the  study  of  final  causes 
must  be  excluded  from  physics,  ought  it  not  to  find 
a  place  in  biological  science  ?  Do  not  living 
organisms  and  the  instincts  of  animals  demonstrate 
the  need  of  final  causes  ? 

Charles  Darwin  tried,  as  we  know,  to  vgive  a 
mechanical  explanation  of  the  origin  of  species 
and  of  animal  instinct.  According  to  him,  the 
environment  modifies  the  organs  accidentally;  the 
organ  generates  function,  function  in  turn  reacts 
upon  the  organ  and  upon  the  whole  organism,  so 
that  the  formation  and  transformation  of  all  or- 
ganisms depend  exclusively  upon  accidental  influ- 
ences, due  to  chance. 

Thus,  too,  according  to  Darwin,  action  generates 
habit,  and  habit  instinct,  and  most  naturalists 
came  to  accept  Darwinism. 

Then  the  prestige  belonging  to  the  discoveries 
of  thermodynamics  and  electrodynamics  and  to  the 
original  work  of  Darwin  gave  the  two  essential 
dogmas  of  physical  and  biological  mechanicism  at 
least  an  appearance  of  being  scientific  theory. 


62    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Cartesian  physics  banished  final  causes  from  the 
domain  of  inorganic  matter,  and  reduced  the  study 
of  the  latter  to  a  chapter  in  mechanics.  The  general 
tendency  of  Darwin's  work  was  to  banish  them  from 
the  domain  of  life,  thus  making  it  easy  to  extend 
the  positivist  conception  of  nature  to  the  living 
beings  of  both  kingdoms.  Could  not  this  conception 
then  be  universalized  by  reducing  the  facts  of  history 
and  sociology  to  natural  phenomena  which  would  be 
brought  under  the  general  laws  of  physical  science  ? 

The  universal  positivist  conception  of  nature 
owed  its  origin  to  Auguste  Comte.  Haunted  by 
general  ideas  of  the  progressive  development  of 
mankind,  Saint  Simon's  old  secretary  pictured  the 
history  of  man's  mind  as  a  progress  from  a  theo- 
logical to  a  metaphysical  state,  and  from  the  latter 
to  an  exclusively  scientific  or  positive  state. 

In  the  beginning,  according  to  him,  man  sees 
nothing  but  extranatural  causes  of  phenomena.  At 
a  single  leap  man's  mind  passes  from  the  roughly- 
perceived  fact  to  the  supernatural  cause,  which 
effects  and  controls  it  by  direct  and  continuous 
action.  The  ideal  of  the  theological  system  is  to 
explain  things  by  the  operation  of  a  single  being 
who  is  adorned  with  the  name  of  Providence. 

Then,  by  a  modification  which  is  merely  of  a 
secondary  character,  this  providential  God  is  changed 
into  a  number  of  abstract  powers  capable  of  pro- 
ducing phenomena,  and  thus  we  come  to  the  meta- 
physical stage.  But  metaphysics  no  more  explains 
anything  than  does  theology.  Both  aim  at  the 
knowledge  of  causes  which  are  beyond  our  reach, 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  63 

and  they  replace  the  positive  observations  to  which 
our  nature  bids  us  to  submit,  by  wild  leaps  in  the 
region  of  fiction  or  abstraction. 

"  Lastly,  in  the  positive  stage,  man's  mind  re- 
cognizes that  it  is  impossible  to  obtain  absolute 
ideas,  and  abandons  its  quest  of  the  origin  and  end 
of  the  universe  and  its  desire  to  know  the  inner 
causes  of  phenomena  to  devote  itself  solely  to  the 
discovery  of  their  true  laws,  that  is  to  say,  their 
invariable  relations  of  succession  and  similitude,  by 
the  combined  use  of  reason  and  observation.  The 
explanation  of  facts,  thus  reduced  to  its  true  terms, 
is  henceforward  merely  the  connection  established 
between  particular  phenomena  and  a  few  general 
facts,  the  number  of  which  the  progress  of  science 
tends  constantly  to  reduce."1 

Auguste  Comte  is  persuaded  that  this  law  of 
evolution  which  he  applies  to  history  is  verified  in 
the  life  of  each  individual.  Each  of  us  is  "a 
theologian  in  his  childhood,  a  metaphysician  in  his 
youth,  a  physicist  in  his  manhood."2  Man's  mind 
to-day  has  reached  the  fulness  of  the  positive  stage, 
the  final  one  beyond  which  there  is  nothing  better 
to  be  hoped  for. 

In  fact,  the  theories  of  Laplace  and  Newton  show 
us  the  succession  and  uniformity  of  all  the  pheno- 
mena of  astronomy  and  physics:  "the  Newtonian 
law  of  gravitation  proves  to  us,  on  the  one  hand, 
the  immense  variety  of  astronomical  data  as  being 
one  and  the  same  thing  looked  at  from  various 
points  of  view,  the  constant  tendency  of  all  mole- 

1  Corns  de  philosophic  positive,  premiere  lepcm,  pp.  4,  5. 
•  Ibid.,  p.  7. 


64    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

cules  towards  one  another  in  direct  proportion  to 
their  mass,  and  inversely  as  the  squares  of  their 
distances;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  this  universal 
law  is  presented  to  us  as  the  simple  extension  of 
a  phenomenon  with  which  we  are  thoroughly 
familiar,  and  therefore  regard  as  perfectly  well 
known — i.e.,  the  heaviness  of  bodies  on  the  face 
of  the  earth."1  Furthermore,  one  gets  a  glimpse 
of  the  time  when  chemistry  and  physiology  will 
connect  their  subject-matter  with  the  other 
branches  of  knowledge.  Then  there  will  be  one 
thing  left  to  seek.  After  having  established  celestial 
and  terrestrial  physics,  whether  mechanical  or 
chemical,  and  organic  physics,  whether  vegetable 
or  animal,  there  will  remain  the  establishment  of 
the  physics  of  sociology.  "  This  is  the  only  lacuna 
to  be  filled  in  order  to  put  the  crown  upon  positive 
philosophy."2 

Comte  flatters  himself  with  the  hope  of  filling  up 
this  lacuna,  thus  universalizing  the  positive  con- 
ception of  knowledge.  "Such,"  he  says,  "is  the 
first  object  of  the  course  I  am  inaugurating,  such 
is  its  special  aim."  Mark  well,  however,  that  he 
does  not  think  that  it  is  the  mission  of  positive 
philosophy  to  form  such  a  universal  synthesis  as 
was  afterwards  attempted  by  Herbert  Spencer,  a 
synthesis  in  which  "  all  phenomena  are  regarded  as 
the  effects  of  a  single  principle,  as  subject  to  a 
single  law.  ...  I  believe  that  the  mental  resources 
of  man  are  too  weak,  and  the  universe  too  compli- 
cated for  such  scientific  perfection  achievement  ever 

1  Cours  de  philosophic  positive,  premiere  le<joh,  pp.  14,  15. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  22. 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  65 

to  be  attained  by  us.  ...  In  any  case,  I  think  it 
is  evident  that,  having  regard  to  our  present  state 
of  knowledge,  we  are  far  off  the  time  when  any 
such  attempt  can  be  reasonably  expected."1 

Comte's  ambition  did  not  go  beyond  observed 
facts.  From  this  point  of  view,  his  choice  of  the 
term  positive  philosophy  to  indicate  the  final  end 
of  his  labours  is  not  a  happy  one.  This  word  is  too 
apt  to  suggest  the  thought  of  a  knowledge  other 
than  that  of  positive  science.  But,  according  to 
Comte,  philosophy  is  only  physics  pushed  to  the 
ultimate  extreme  of  its  generalization.  "  If  we  could 
one  day  hope  to  attain  to  this  universal  explana- 
tion " — which  he  has  only  just  characterized  as 
eminently  chimerical — "  it  is  only  to  be  done  by 
bringing  all  natural  phenomena  under  the  most 
general  of  known  positive  laws,  the  law  of  gravita- 
tion, which  already  connects  all  astronomical 
phenomena  with  a  part  of  those  of  terrestrial 
physics."2 

The  first  condition  of  the  formation  of  the  positive 
philosophy  is  the  division  of  labour.  But,  however 
necessary  this  division  may  be,  it  gives  rise  to 
serious  drawbacks  which  must  be  counteracted  as 
far  as  possible.  It  is  to  be  feared  that  man's  mind, 
by  dint  of  specialization,  may  get  lost  in  the  maze 
of  such  labours  in  detail.  Hence  one  must  have 
recourse  to  a  new  order  of  studies  to  prevent  the 
dissipation  of  men's  thoughts.  But  we  cannot 
think  of  reverting  to  the  antiquated  idea  that  each 
human  brain  might  claim  to  embrace  the  sum  of 

1  Cours  de  philosophic  positive,  premiere  le?on,  p.  53. 
Cours  de  philosophic  positive,  p.  54. 

5 


66    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

human  knowledge;  that  would  be  to  make  man's 
mind  take  a  retrograde  step. 

"  The  true  way  to  get  rid  of  the  vexatious 
results  of  extreme  specialization  consists,  on  the 
contrary,  in  perfecting  the  division  of  labour.  It 
will  suffice,  indeed,  to  make  one  more  special  science 
including  the  study  of  scientific  generalization."1 

1  "  Let  there  be  a  new  class  of  scholars,  prepared  by 
suitable  training,  which  without  giving  itself  up  to  the 
cultivation  of  any  one  particular  branch  of  natural  philo- 
sophy, will  devote  itself  entirely,  in  considering  the  different 
positive   sciences    in  their  actual    state,   to    determining 
exactly  the  spirit  of  each  one  of  them  to  the  discovery  of 
their  mutual  relations  and  connections,  and  to  summing  up, 
as  far  as  possible,  all  their  special  principles  under  a  smaller 
number  of  common  principles,  always  in  conformity  with  the 
fundamental  maxims  of  the  positive  method.     At  the  same 
time,  let  there  be  other  scholars  who,  before  undertaking 
their  own  special  studies,  are  fitted  by  training  in  the  sum- 
total  of  positive  sciences,  to  take  immediate  advantage  of 
the   light  shed  by  these  scholars  who  were  devoted   to 
the  study  of  generalizations,  and  mutually  to  correct  one 
another's  conclusions,  a  state  of  things  which  the  scholars 
of  to-day  are  visibly  coming  to  realize  more  and  more. 
These  two  great  conditions  once  fulfilled,  and  it  is  plain  that 
they  can  be,  the  division  of  labour  in  the  sciences  will  be 
pushed  without  risk  as  far  as  the  advance  in  the  various 
branches  of  knowledge  requires.     When  there  is  this  dis- 
tinct class,  incessantly  controlled  by  all  the  others,  having 
as  its  special  and  permanent  function  the  connection  of  each 
new  and   particular  discovery  with  the  general  system, 
there  will  be  no  reason  to  fear  that  a  too  great  attention 
to  detail  may  hinder  a  proper  consideration  of  the  whole. 
In  a  word,  the  modern   organization  of  the  learned  world 
will  then  be  completely  established,  and  will  only  need  to 
advance  indefinitely,  always  retaining  the  same  character. 
"  Thus  to  make  the  study  of  scientific  generalizations  a 
distinct  department  of  the  general  intellectual  work,   is 
simply  an  extension  of  the  application  of  the  same  principle 
of  division  which  has  been  used  to  separate  the  various 
special  departments;  for,  so  long  as  the  different  positive 
sciences  were  but  little  developed,  their  mutual  relations  could 
not  possess  enough  importance  to  give  rise,  at  least  to  any 


CARTESIAN  PSYCHOLOGY  67 

The  new  role  of  philosophy  is  thus  clearly  defined. 
Natural  phenomena  are  accessible  to  man's  mind, 
and  nothing  else  is.  But  natural  phenomena  are 
those  that  depend  on  matter  and  force,  and  we  know 
no  other  sort  of  phenomena.1  Hence  positive 
science  deals  exclusively  with  the  phenomena  of 
matter  and  with  the  laws  that  govern  them.2  And 
positive  philosophy  can  be  nothing  but  the  dis- 
covery of  the  highest  scientific  generalizations. 

Hence  there  can  no  longer  be  any  question  of 
final  or  efficient  causes,  of  the  nature  of  things,  and 
of  their  properties.  "  All  sciences  in  the  positive 

permanent  extent,  to  a  particular  class  of  work,  and  at  the 
same  time  the  need  of  this  new  study  was  much  less  urgent. 
But  to-day,  each  of  the  sciences  has  taken  a  sufficient  range 
of  its  own  for  their  mutual  relations  to  permit  continued 
attention,  at  the  same  time  that  this  new  order  of  studies 
is  becoming  indispensable  to  prevent  the  dissipation  of 
human  thought." — Cours  de  philosophie  positive,  pp.  30,  31. 

1  "  How  are  we  to  define  human  knowledge  ?     As  the 
study  of  forces  belonging  to  matter,  and  of  the  conditions 
or  laws  of  such  forces.     We  know  only  matter  and  its  forces 
or  properties,  we  know  neither  matter  without  forces  or 
properties ;  nor  forces  or  properties  without  matter.     When 
we  have  discovered  a  general  occurrence  in  one  of  these 
forces  or  properties,  we  say  that  we  are  in  possession  of  a 
law,  and  immediately  this  law  becomes  a  mental  power 
and  a  material  power  for  us;  a  mental  power,  because  in 
our  mind  it  becomes  a  logical  instrument;  a  material  power, 
because  in  our  hands  it  becomes  a  means  for  the  control 
of  natural   forces.  ...     In  history,    the   matter   or   sub- 
stratum is  the  human  race,  divided  up  into  societies;  force 
is  represented  by  the  aptitudes   inherent  in  societies,  the 
foundation  of  which  lies  in  this  condition,  that  scientific 
ideas  can  be  accumulated.      So   long   as   that  is  not  ac- 
knowledged, history  does  not  seem  to  be  a  natural  pheno- 
menon ;  its  substratum,  which  is  the  human  race,  is  known, 
but  its   force,   which   causes   it   to   evolve,   is   unknown." 
— Littre,  Auguste,  Comte  et  la  philosophie  positive,  p.   42, 
(Paris,  Hachette,  1864). 

2  Cours  de  philosophie  positive,  p.  43. 


68    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

stage,"  writes  Littre,  "  abandon  the  search  for  the 
essence  of  things  and  their  properties,  first  and  final 
causes — i.e.,  what  metaphysics  terms  the  absolute. 
Positive  philosophy,  which  is  their  daughter, 
abandons  these  things  as  they  do.  The  philosophers 
of  the  past  would  have  regarded  as  a  chimera  any 
philosophy  which  did  not  deal  at  all  with  the  abso- 
lute; to-day,  we  should  regard,  and  we  begin  to 
regard,  as  a  chimera  any  philosophy  that  is  not 
entirely  devoted  to  the  relative.  Such  is  the  im- 
mense mental  revolution  wrought  by  M.  Comte." 

The  sole  means  of  acquiring  knowledge  is,  more- 
over, external  observation.  "  Direct  observation 
of  the  mind  by  itself  is  pure  illusion."1  The  reason 
why  the  subject  cannot  observe  itself  is  that  the 
subject — Comte  postulates  this  a  priori — can  only 
be  an  organ  of  the  body.  But  a  bodily  organ 
cannot  know  itself.  "  The  thinker  cannot  divide 
himself  into  two  parts,  one  of  which  reasons,  while 
the  other  looks  on  at  its  reasoning.  The  observing 
and  the  observed  organ  being,  in  this  case,  identical, 
how  could  observation  take  place  ?"2 

Thus  Comte's  philosophy,  in  all  its  clearness  and 
breadth,  is  plainly  the  positivist  conception  now 
everywhere  prevalent  along  with  idealism  in  con- 
temporary philosophies. 

What  are  these  philosophies  ?  How  do  they  fuse 
together  Idealism,  Mechanism,  and  Positivism  ? 

To  answer  this  question,  let  us  examine  the  works 
of  the  masters  of  contemporary  psychology  and  look 
at  the  present  state  of  philosophical  investigation. 

1  Cours  de  philosophic  positive,  p.  35. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  36. 


CHAPTER  III 
CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

I 

THE  INSUFFICIENCY  OF  POSITIVIST  IDEALISM  FOR 
THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  FUNDAMENTAL  PROBLEMS 
OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

VAIN  are  the  attempts  made  to  persuade  us  that  the 
search  for  the  absolute  is  a  chimera.  Man's  con- 
sciousness invincibly  affirms  the  existence  of  the 
noumenon  beyond  the  phenomenon,  a  mover  prior 
to  the  movement,  of  the  thinking  Ego  beyond  the 
transitory  occurrence  of  thought. 

The  physical  and  the  mental  stand  in  opposition 
to  one  another  beneath  the  mind's  eye.  Vain  are 
the  endeavours  to  identify  them,  and  vain  is  the 
affirmation  that  nerve -change  and  conscious  act 
are  the  two  aspects — one  external,  the  other  in- 
ternal— of  one  and  the  same  phenomenon,  expressible 
in  the  terms  of  mechanics.  Consciousness  refuses 
to  accept  the  strained  identification  and  repudiates 
such  interpretations. 

The  properties  of  movement  are  velocity  and 
direction,  the  property  of  thought  is  being  repre- 
sentative ;  is  there  nothing  in  common  between  the 
former  and  the  latter  ? 

69 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Do  we  not  recognize  the  essentially  irreducible 
character  of  the  facts  of  consciousness  when  we 
make  consciousness  to  be  the  inner  side  of  a 
phenomenon  which,  seen  from  without,  is  a  nerve 
phenomenon  ?  For,  apparently,  it  is  not  a  matter 
of  indifference  whether  a  mechanical  phenomenon, 
either  of  physics  or  of  chemistry,  has  or  has  not  an 
inside  and  an  outside,  an  inner  aspect  and  an  outer 
aspect.  Such  and  such  a  reaction  occurring  in  a 
laboratory  of  biological  chemistry  depends  ex- 
clusively upon  outward  observation;  the  same 
reaction  occurring  in  the  nervous  system  arouses  a 
conscious  representation.  Is  it  not  perfectly  plain 
that  in  the  second  case  there  is  something  of  another 
kind  than  there  was  in  the  first,  a  hyperphysical, 
hypermechanical  property,  which  we  do  well  to 
name  a  conscious,  psychic,  or  mental  element  ? 

But,  it  may  be  asked,  could  one  not  suppose  that 
all  physical  phenomena  have  a  mental  aspect  ? 
Then  the  mental  aspect  would  be  essential  and 
universal,  always  parallel  to  the  physical  aspect, 
as  the  convex  is  always  the  double  of  the  concave. 
Thus,  says  Fouillee,  we  avoid  the  miraculous 
theatrical  effect  whereby  feeling  suddenly  "  ap- 
pears "  amongst  the  results  of  physical  evolution. 

This  is  a  vain  way  out  of  the  difficulty.  The 
arbitrary  assumption  that  the  mental  is  to  be  found 
everywhere  does  not  explain  why  nor  how  it  occurs 
anywhere.  If  the  twofold  aspect  cannot  be  reduced 
to  mechanical  unity  in  the  case  of  animals  and 
men,  still  less  is  it  reducible  to  unity  in  the  whole 
world  of  natural  beings. 

Furthermore,  above  the  general  phenomenon  of 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY    71 

consciousness  common  to  man  and  animals,  which 
is  improperly  called  "  consciousness  "  or  "  thought," 
there  are  consciousness  and  thought  properly  thus 
named  which,  by  reason  of  their  abstract  character, 
dominate  all  concrete  existence,  all  exclusive 
localization  in  space,  all  registration  in  time.  But 
a  mechanical  phenomenon  can  only  be  the  manner 
of  existence  of  some  concrete  thing  moved,  definitely 
belonging  to  a  given  place,  manifesting  itself  at  a 
given  moment  of  time.  Therefore  thought  cannot 
be  identified  with  a  mechanical  phenomenon. 

Physical  events  are  adequately  determined  by 
their  material  antecedents.  But  consciousness 
testifies  that  in  us  there  take  place  acts  the  material 
antecedents  of  which  are  not  the  adequately  deter- 
mining reason.  These  acts  mankind  calls  free. 
Hence  the  free  act  is  not  of  the  same  nature  as  a 
mechanical  phenomenon. 

We  may  recall  Hume's  objection:  that  we  do  not 
understand  how  the  earth's  attraction  causes  the 
fall  of  bodies,  but  the  fact  is  there,  and  we  accept 
it .  Why  should  not  the  body  be  the  cause  of  thought 
as  well  as  of  motion  ? 

Besides,  thought  is  always  accompanied  by  some 
nervous  change,  and  causation  merely  means  con- 
stant conjunction.  Is  it  not,  therefore,  reasonable 
to  think  and  right  to  say  that  nervous  change  is 
the  cause  of  thought  ? 

It  may  be  replied  that  the  inner  nature  of  attrac- 
tion is  doubtless  unknown  to  us,  and  we  cannot 
surely  tell  how  the  earth  attracts  bodies  and  makes 
them  fall.  Newton,  too,  spoke  of  the  phenomenon 
of  the  fall  of  bodies  with  the  circumspection  of  a 


72         CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

scientist  who  is  aware  of  the  limits  of  his  knowledge ; 
bodies  fall,  he  said,  as  if  the  earth  attracted  them. 

Thus,  the  law  of  gravitation  expresses  the  con- 
junction of  two  phenomena,  the  falling  of  bodies 
and  the  presence  of  the  earth's  mass,  and  the  de- 
pendence of  the  first  phenomenon  upon  the  second ; 
it  must  tell  us  no  more  than  that. 

If  we  were  within  the  mass  which  attracts,  and 
were  conscious  of  the  drawing  power,  probably  we 
might  be  able  to  tell  somewhat  more.  The  idea  of 
gravitation  might  be  put  alongside  with  the  idea 
of  the  movement  of  the  attracted  bodies,  and  our 
consciousness  might  decide  whether  they  were  or 
were  not  incompatible. 

But  we  are  at  the  centre  of  the  reality  that  knows, 
thinks,  and  freely  decides ;  we  are  this  very  reality, 
and  observe  our  own  perceptions,  thoughts,  and 
free  decisions.  We  are  then  in  a  position,  and  have 
the  right,  to  ask  ourselves  whether  the  attributes 
of  the  bodily  phenomenon  and  those  of  our  thought 
can  be  identified,  or  if  they  exclude  one  another. 
As  we  see  them  exclude  one  another,  we  should 
misunderstand  the  protestations  of  consciousness, 
if  we  concluded  to  affirm  their  identity. 

The  falling  of  bodies  is  one  fact,  the  \  -esence  of 
the  earth  is  another;  the  observer  asceitiins  the 
dependence  of  the  first  upon  the  second,  and  calls 
this  attraction.  The  mind  sees  no  reason  to  dispute 
the  fact  or  the  name  given  to  it;  it  accepts  them 
both  without  contradiction.  But  when  we  put 
together  the  fact  of  a  thought  and  that  of  a  nervous 
change,  which  is  of  a  mechanical  character,  either 
physically  or  chemically,  and  the  claim  is  made  to 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY    73 

overstep  the  statement  that  the  two  facts  are  in 
each  other's  presence  by  saying  that  the  two  phe- 
nomena are  only  one,  a  thought  with  mechanical 
attributes,  or  a  mechanical  phenomenon  with 
thought-attributes,  the  mind  cannot  but  offer  an 
invincible  resistance,  on  the  ground  of  the  principle 
of  contradiction  and  of  sufficient  reason,  to  this 
identification  which  it  deems  impossible. 

Hume's  vaunted  fact  of  observation  does  not 
justify  his  conclusion.  Yes,  nervous  change  is  in 
constant  connection  with  thought,  but  what  is  the 
nature  of  this  connection  ?  Is  the  nerve-substance 
itself  thought  ?  Is  it  the  formal  cause  of  the 
phenomenon,  or  is  it  merely  a  condition  of  thought  ? 
More  strictly  speaking,  is  it  only  a  partially  efficient 
cause,  insufficient  unless  helped  by  some  higher 
principle  ? 

At  first  sight,  both  explanations  may  appear  to 
be  equally  possible.  But,  on  reflection,  in  thought 
we  discover  characteristics  which  clash  with  the 
former  hypothesis.  Hence  the  second  alone  can 
be  admitted,  because  it  alone  can  be  harmonized 
with  the  whole  of  the  facts. 

We  must  reject  the  identification  which  Hume 
tried  to  establish.  The  essential  distinction  between 
the  phenomena  "  of  consciousness  "  and  corporal 
phenomena  becomes  plainer  and  plainer  in  so  far 
as  Idealism  and  Mechanism  continue  their  parallel 
evolution. 

Moreover,  independent  minds  of  the  highest  class 
in  science  and  philosophy  expressly  assert  the 


74    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

insufficiency    of   the    mechanical    theory    for    the 
solution  of  the  problems  of  psychology. 

There  is  Dubois-Reymond's  famous  address  at  the 
general  Congress  of  Naturalists  at  Leipzig  in  1872 : 

"  No  arrangement,"  he  said,  "  no  imaginable 
movement  of  the  particles  of  matter  can  help  us  to 
understand  the  region  of  consciousness.  .  .  .  What 
connection  could  one  possibly  imagine  between 
determinate  movements  of  determinate  atoms  in 
my  brain  and  facts  as  primary  and  indefinite, 
though  undeniable,  as  the  following:  I  feel  pain  or 
pleasure;  I  taste  sweetness,  I  smell  the  scent  of  a 
rose,  I  hear  the  sound  of  an  organ,  I  see  something 
red  ?  It  is,  however,  absolutely  and  always  un- 
thinkable that  it  should  not  be  a  matter  of  indiffer- 
ence to  atoms  of  carbon,  hydrogen,  nitrogen,  oxygen, 
etc.  .  .  .  whether  they  exist  now,  or  have  existed 
previously,  or  will  exist  in  future,  in  this  or  that 
determinate  condition  of  place  or  of  movement.  .  .  . 
Therefore,  it  is  radically  impossible  to  explain  by  any 
mechanical  combination  whatever  why  a  chord  of 
the  octave  pleases  me,  or  why,  on  the  contrary, 
touching  hot  iron  hurts  me.  No  thinker  could  tell 
me,  in  the  name  of  'astronomical'  science  fore- 
casting the  material  issue  in  these  two  instances, 
which  would  be  the  agreeable  and  which  the  dis- 
agreeable experience.  .  .  .  That  it  is  completely 
impossible  to-day,  and  that  it  will  always  remain 
impossible,  to  understand  mental  processes  by  means 
of  the  mechanical  action  of  the  atoms  of  the 
brain,  is  a  truth  that  requires  no  explanation."1 

The  scientific  and  philosophic  thinkers  of  eminence 

1  Die  Grenzen  des  Naturerkennens,  p.  37  (Leipzig,  1884). 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY    75 

in  France,  England,  and  Germany  to-day,  energetic- 
ally protest  against  identifying  matter  and  thought. 

"  Those  systems  that  desire  to  reduce  everything 
to  a  set  of  quantities,  and  relations  between  such 
quantities,  are  chimerical,"  writes  A.  Fouill6e. 

"  From  a  quantitative  point  of  view,  the  world 
appears  to  be  reducible  to  an  objective  combination 
of  movements ;  from  a  qualitative  point  of  view,  to 
a  subjective  series  of  sensations :  but  quality  cannot 
be  the  result  of  a  mere  difference  in  the  number  and 
position  of  units  quantitatively  equal  or  qualitatively 
null ;  it  cannot  be  a  simple  form  of  quantity ;  rather 
is  it  quantity  itself  that  is  a  kind  of  primary 
quality."1 

Elsewhere,  speaking  of  the  endeavours  of  the 
mechanical  synthesis  of  Herbert  Spencer,  the  same 
writer  remarks : 

"  This  hypothesis  explains  the  course  of  cosmic 
occurrences  in  the  terms  of  matter — atoms,  move- 
ments, forces,  repulsions,  attractions,  etc. — up  to 
the  point  where  materialistic  expressions  fall  short ; 
then  comes  a  mental  terminology  (sensations, 
sentiments,  feelings,  etc.)  which  is  required  for  other 
explanations.  Thus  the  philosopher  is  driven  to 
begin  his  explanations  from  one  point  of  view,  and 
to  finish  with  two.  This  is  what  Spencer  does  in 
his  First  Principles  and  in  his  Biology.  Nature, 
which  is  one  at  the  outset,  becomes  twofold,  and 
takes  two  aspects  on  the  appearance  of  animal  life. 
How  can  the  second  aspect  be  accounted  for  ? 
How  came  the  purely  unconscious  to  acquire  a  ray 

1  L'evolntionnisme  des  idees-forces,  Lib.  II.,  Ch.  III.,  i.  Cf. 
La  libertt  et  \e  dtterminisme,  2e  partie,  Ch.  VII. 


76    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

of  consciousness  ?     Does  this  ray  fall  from  above, 
for  it  throws  light  upon  the  course  of  occurrences 
without  in  any  way  altering  it  ?     And  how  is  it 
that  necessity  has  thus  given  rise  to  something  that 
is  superfluous  ?     The  answer  is  all  the   more   im- 
possible, because  Spencer  regards  consciousness  as 
being  of  quite  a  different  order  and  region  from 
movement.     He  confesses  that  thought  is  not  and 
never  will  be  deduced  from  movement,  and  that 
we  might  know  all  present,  past,  and  future  move- 
ments in  the  world  without  being  able  to  deduce 
1  thought  from  them.     If  this  is  the  case,  the  mental 
cannot  be  involved  in  factors  which,  ex  hypothesi, 
are  entirely  mechanical,  nor  can  it  be  an  effect  of 
causes  from  which  it  cannot  be  proved  to  depend. 
Hence,  when  you  find  feeling  '  appearing '  among 
the  results  of  physical  evolution  which  was  pre- 
viously insensible,  you  are  driven  to  perceive  that 
the  limits  of  your  primary  factors  have  been  ex- 
ceeded.    You   are  forced   to   recognize   something 
more  than  you  supposed  to  be  among  your  original 
factors.     Spencer  put  amongst  his  first  data  nothing 
but    '  molecular    attractions    and   repulsions  ' ;  he 
describes  the  entire  evolution  of  biology  with  the 
sole  help  of  these  terms  of  matter,  and  then,  when 
he  has  once  reached  animal  life  and  man,  he  finds 
something  quite  new — i.e.,  feeling,  or  sensibility. 
Then  he  has  good  reason  to  exclaim,  as  Guthrie 
observes :   '  I   am  better  off  than   I   expected.     I 
thought  I  had  nothing  in  hand  but  movement  and 
matter,  and  here  is  mind  !'  "-1 

1  A.  Fpuill6e,  L'evolutionnisme  des  id6es-forces,  p.  22  and 
pp.  260,  261. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY    77 

Moreover,  Herbert  Spencer  himself  confesses  that 
between  nervous  phenomena  and  psychological 
occurrences  it  is  impossible  to  establish  or  even  to 
conceive  any  community  of  nature.  He  devotes 
the  opening  chapter  of  his  Principles  of  Psychology 
to  a  study  of  nervous  phenomena,  and  when  it  is 
finished,  this  is  how  he  writes : 

'  There  lies  before  us  a  class  of  facts  absolutely 
without  any  perceptible  or  conceivable  community 
of  nature  with  the  facts  that  have  occupied  us. 
The  truths  here  to  be  set  down  are  truths  of  which 
the  very  elements  are  unknown  to  physical  science. 
Objective  observation  and  analysis  fail  us ;  and  sub- 
jective observation  and  analysis  supplement  them."1 

An  original  thinker,  whose  reputation  has  received 
a  tardy  appreciation  from  the  pioneers  of  the 
spiritualistic  renaissance,  M.  Durand  de  Gros,  for 
half  a  century  has  devoted  all  his  scientific  and 
philosophic  energies  to  combating  the  positivist 
materialism  of  French  medical  scientists. 

Must  one  take  sides,  he  writes,  with  the  favourite 
solution  adopted  by  most  scientists  and  medical 
men,  by  regarding  life  as  merely  a  mechanical 
result,  reducing  its  functions  to  the  play  of  its  various 
organs,  thinking  thus  by  successive  identifications 
to  resolve  psychology  into  physiology,  and  the  latter 
into  chemistry  or  physics,  and  these  again  into  simple 
changes  in  space,  into  movement  and  extension  ? 

A  strange  answer  indeed,  for  it  consists  in  mis- 
understanding the  question  at  issue.  Is  it  really 
life  and  mind  which  are  thus  reduced  to  chemical 
1  Principles  of  Psychology,  Part  I.,  Ch.  VI.,  §  41. 


78    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

or  mechanical  phenomena  ?  No,  these  are  never 
any  more  than  the  material  concomitants.  And 
then,  by  a  peculiar  aberration,  one  gets  to  confound 
the  subjective  with  the  objective,  to  overlook  "  a 
principle  which  is  as  clear  as  daylight,  that  every 
sensation  presupposes  a  feeling  subject,  a  form 
of  consciousness."  In  no  way  "  can  the  essential 
agent  of  thought,  the  Ego,  be  identified  with  some 
finite  extension,  some  series  of  points,  with  a  body, 
with  matter."1 

When  W.  Wundt  draws  up  the  general  conclu- 
sions of  his  Physiological  Psychology,  he  passes  this 
severe  sentence  upon  materialism : 

"  Materialism  regards  what  is  psychical  as  a 
function  or  property  of  organized  matter,  just  like  any 
other  physiological  function,  the  contraction  of  a 
muscle,  the  generation  of  heat,  etc.  In  all  of  them 
there  is  nothing  but  the  movements  of  material 
elements. 

"  But  the  starting-point  and  the  conclusions  of  this 
theory  are  equally  defective"2 

We  will  not  follow  out  in  detail  the  consequences 
of  Wundt's  line  of  thought,  but  of  his  criticism,  as  of 
that  of  Dubois-Reymond  and  of  Fouille'e,  we  will 
note  the  conclusion,  that  the  mechanical  materialist 
cannot  supply  any  solution  of  the  essential  problems 
of  psychology. 

Deep  within  them  thinkers  feel  that  we  shall 
have  to  come  back  to  a  philosophy  wide  enough  to 

1  Durand  de  Gros,  Essais  de  physiotogie  philosophique, 
p.  116. 

2  W.    Wundt,    Grundziige    der    physiologischen    Psycho- 
logic,  II.,  p.  532  (Leipzig,  1887). 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY    79 

find  a  place  for  the  soul.     What  is  this  philosophy 
to  be  ? 

This  leads  us  to  speak  of  the  philosophy  of  Herbert 
Spencer,  of  A.  Fouillee,  and  of  W.  Wundt. 


II 

MASTERS  OF  CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Herbert  Spencer 

Herbert  Spencer1  is  an  astounding  man. 

He  assimilated  everything  that  our  time  has 
brought  forth  in  the  domain  of  physical,  chemical, 
biological,  moral,  and  economic  science.  He  knew 
mathematics  and  mechanics.  He  followed  up  the 
genesis  and  development  of  public,  social,  and  re- 
ligious institutions  amongst  the  various  races  of  man- 
kind. He  was  au  courant  with  philology,  literature, 
and  art,  and  took  a  close  interest  in  the  economics 
and  politics  of  his  own  country.  The  knowledge 
accumulated  in  his  First  Principles  (1862),  Principles 
of  Biology  (1864-1867),  Principles  of  Psychology 
(1855),  Principles  of  Sociology  (1876-1896),  Principles 
of  Ethics  (1879-1893),  and  in  the  vasl  collections  of 
Ritual,  Political,  and  Ecclesiastical  Institutions  (1879- 
1885),  published  under  his  editorship,  borders  on 
the  prodigious.  And  when  we  speak  of  "  accumu- 
lated knowledge  "  in  all  the  volumes  that  make  up 
his  System  of  Synthetic  Philosophy,  do  not  suppose 
we  have  any  intention  of  depreciating  him.  The 
scientific  knowledge  of  this  English  man  of  science 
1  Died  at  Brighton,  December  8,  1903,  aged  83. 


8o    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

is  neither  superficial  nor  incoherent ;  it  is  abundant 
and  closely  knit,  but  arranged  in  order  with  steady 
continuity  of  thought,  and  it  provides  the  prolific 
author  at  the  proper  moment  with  unsuspected  com- 
parisons and  striking  analogies. 

Nevertheless,  Spencer  is  not  a  scientist  in  the 
specialist  sense.  His  name  is  linked  with  no  dis- 
covery. He  is  not  a  geologist  like  Lyell,  nor  a 
botanist  or  zoologist  like  Darwin,  nor  a  physiologist 
like  Huxley;  but  he  assimilates  the  knowledge  which 
he  has  acquired  with  extraordinary  facility,  without 
any  anxiety  to  further  its  progress.  He  is  rather 
eclectic  than  original.1 

His  dominating  idea  is  neither  the  fact  nor  the 
idea  considered  apart,  but  their  adaptation  to  a 
system,  their  architectural  arrangement.  In  his 
youth  he  dreamt  of  a  synthesis  of  the  cosmos  fitted 
to  the  present  state  of  scientific  knowledge,  of  a  new 
"  synthetic  philosophy." 

By  nature  he  was  predisposed  for  the  part  he  has 
played  in  science.  By  temperament  he  is  a  man  of 
peace .  The  British  impassiveness  of  his  countenance 
reflects  a  desire  for  unity,  which  calls  forth  the  fol- 
lowing fine  and  benignant  utterance  to  be  found 
on  the  first  page  of  his  First  Principles  :  "  We  too 
often  forget  that  not  only  is  there  '  a  soul  of  goodness 
in  things  evil,'  but  very  generally,  also,  a  soul  of 
truth  in  things  erroneous." 

Herbert  Spencer's  philosophy  is  an  original  co- 

1  After  a  new  examination,  we  think  we  must  maintain 
the  above  estimate  despite  the  observations  to  the  contrary 
addressed  to  us  by  the  English  scientist  in  1898  in  a  letter, 
written  in  a  very  kindly  spirit,  on  the  subject  of  the  first 
edition  of  this  book. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY    81 

ordination  of  all  the  ideas  circulating  in  the  nine- 
teenth century,  from  the  time  of  the  idealism  of 
Hume  and  Kant  down  to  the  pantheism  of  Hegel, 
with  the  mechanical  tendencies  started  by  Descartes, 
the  posit ivist  misgivings  of  Comte,  and  the  evolu- 
tionist aspirations  of  Charles  Darwin. 

Herbert  Spencer  begins  with  the  most  absolute 
idealism. 

'  The  first  step  in  a  metaphysical  argument, 
rightly  carried  on,  must  be  an  examination  of  pro- 
positions for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  what 
character  is  common  to  those  which  we  call  unques- 
tionably true,  and  is  implied  by  asserting  their 
unquestionable  truth.  Further,  to  carry  on  this 
inquiry  legitimately,  we  must  restrict  our  analysis 
rigorously  to  states  of  consciousness  considered  in 
their  relations  to  one  another;  wholly  ignoring  any- 
thing beyond  consciousness  to  which  these  states 
and  their  relations  may  be  supposed  to  refer."1 

To  Spencer,  idealism  is  represented  by  two 
masters  —Hume  and  Kant.  Kant's  idealism  is  based 
upon  subjective  mental  forms,  the  intuitions  of  space 
and  time,  and  the  act  of  cognition  essentially  implies 
a  power  of  reaction  in  the  subject  to  adapt  these 
subjective  forms  to  the  impressions  provided  by  our 
sensations. 

Hume  attributes  to  the  mind  neither  a  priori 
forms  of  thought,  nor  any  kind  of  active  power. 
The  thinking  subject  has  impressions,  and  these  are 
organized  according  to  their  similarities  or  differ- 

1  Essays,  Vol.  II.,  p.  204.  Mill  versus  Hamilton — "  The 
Test  of  Truth." 


82    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

ences,  their  priority  or  succession,  and  the  mind 
itself  is  but  the  result  of  this  progressive  and  auto- 
matic organization. 

No  one  has  demonstrated  the  inanity  of  the 
Kantian  forms  of  space  and  time  better  than  Spencer. 
"  The  proposition  on  which  the  Kantian  doctrine 
proceeds,  that  every  sensation  caused  by  an  object 
is  given  in  an  intuition  which  has  Space  for  its  form, 
is  not  true.  .  .  .  He  (Kant)  says:  '  We  never  can 
imagine  or  make  a  representation  to  ourselves  of 
the  non-existence  of  space,  though  we  may  easily 
enough  think  that  no  objects  are  found  in  it.'  Now 
this  proposition  may  be  disputed.  .  .  . 

"  The  Space  which,  as  he  (Kant)  says,  remains 
after  we  have  conceived  all  things  to  disappear,  is 
the  Space  in  which  they  were  imagined — the  ideal 
Space  in  which  they  were  represented,  and  not  the 
real  Space  in  which  they  were  presented.  The  Space 
said  to  survive  its  contents  is  the  form  in  which 
reintuition  takes  place;  not  the  form  in  which  in- 
tuition takes  place.  Kant  says  that  sensation  (mark 
the  word)  produced  by  an  object  is  the  matter  of 
intuition,  and  that  the  Space  in  which  we  perceive 
this  matter  is  the  form  of  intuition.  To  prove  this 
he  turns  from  the  Space  known  through  our  open 
eyes,  and  in  which  the  said  intuition  occurs,  to  the 
Space  known  when  our  eyes  are  closed,  and  in  which 
the  reintuition  or  imagination  of  things  occurs ;  and, 
having  alleged  that  this  ideal  Space  survives  its 
contents,  and  therefore  must  be  a  form,  leaves  it  to 
be  inferred  that  the  real  Space  has  been  shown  to  be 
a  form  which  survives  its  contents.  The  Space  we 
are  conscious  of  in  actual  perception  stands  on  just 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY    83 

the  same  footing  with  the  objects  perceived :  neither 
of  them  can  be  suppressed  from  consciousness.  So 
that  if  survival  of  its  contents  is  the  test  by  which 
'  a  form  '  is  distinguished,  the  Space  in  which  in- 
tuitions are  given  is  not  a  form. 

"  Still  more  obvious  is  a  parallel  criticism  on  the 
parallel  reason  given  for  asserting  that  Time  is  an 
a  priori  form  of  intuition."1 

According  to  Spencer  the  mental  forms  of  Space 
and  Time  are  not  primary  but  derived  forms.  The 
only  true  "  form,"  either  of  the  intuition,  the  under- 
standing, or  the  reason,  is  the  consciousness  of 
likeness  or  unlikeness;  and  it  is  common  to  all  the 
acts  of  the  intelligence  whatever.  '  The  so-called 
mental  forms,  Time  and  Space,  are  the  B  of  our 
alphabet ;  the  A  of  our  alphabet,  by  which  the  B 
becomes  possible,  is  the  consciousness  of  likeness 
and  unlikeness;  the  C,  D,  E,  F,  etc. — the  intuitions 
and  conceptions  presented  and  represented  in  Time 
and  Space — are  directly  dependent  on  this  con- 
sciousness of  likeness  and  unlikeness,  as  well  as 
indirectly  dependent  on  it,  through  the  derivative 
forms  of  time  and  space."2 

With  Kant,  there  is  a  doubt  as  to  the  nature  of 
the  mental  forms  called  respectively  intuitions, 
categories,  ideas;  the  fact  that  some  are  attributed 
to  the  sensibility,  others  to  the  understanding,  and 
the  last  to  the  reason,  suggests  that  they  belong  re- 
spectively to  the  sensible  and  to  the  suprasensible 
order.  But  with  Spencer,  doubt  is  no  longer  pos- 
sible. The  primary  form  of  likeness  and  unlikeness 
is  common  to  all  mental — i.e.,  cognitive — acts  what- 

1  Principles  of  Psychology,  §  399.  3  Ibid. 


84    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

soever;  so  that,  as  to  the  nature  of  the  psychological 
factor  of  knowledge,  Spencer  joins  hands  with  Hume, 
and  with  the  latter  proclaims  that  the  element  of 
consciousness  belongs  to  the  sensible  order,  and  is 
to  be  identified  with  nervous  phenomena.  To  both 
psychology  is  but  the  reverse  side  of  physiology. 

But  if  Spencer  agrees  with  Hume  as  to  the  nature 
of  acts  of  consciousness,  does  he  also  agree  with  him 
about  their  exclusively  experimental  origin  ?  Does 
he  not  appear  to  admit,  along  with  Kant,  some 
transcendental  element,  an  a  priori  form  of  likeness 
and  unlikeness  ? 

Kant  and  Hume  are  both  right,  and  both  wrong, 
answers  Spencer.  The  elementary  forms  of  con- 
sciousness are  a  priori  to  the  individual,  for  they 
are  given  him  along  with  his  cerebral  structure,  but 
they  are  a  posteriori  to  the  race,  for  the  cerebral 
structure  of  the  individual  of  to-day  is  due  to  the 
experience  of  his  ancestors  and  to  a  long  biological 
evolution.1 

Subjectivist  idealism  and  sensationalist  empiri- 
cism, or,  as  Spencer  would  say,  the  transcendental 
hypothesis  and  the  experimental  hypothesis,  thus 
come  to  be  reconciled  on  the  ground  of  evolution. 

Evolution !  The  word  is  Herbert  Spencer's. 
From  the  year  1852 — that  is  to  say,  seven  years 
before  the  issue  of  the  Origin  of  Species  by  Charles 
Darwin — this  English  philosopher  conceived  his 
"  development  hypothesis,"  according  to  which 
"  vegetable  and  animal  species  arose  from  continual 

1  This  distinction  has  been  clearly  brought  out  by  St. 
George  Mivart,  Essays  and  Criticisms,  II.,  p.  130. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY    85 

changes  arising  from  changes  in  their  circum- 
stances." The  work  of  Darwin  consisted  in  re- 
search for  the  determinate  causes  of  specific  trans- 
formations in  organisms.  We  all  know  the  learned 
naturalist's  appeal  to  the  power  of  "  natural  selec- 
tion." An  unlucky  expression,  writes  Herbert 
Spencer,  for  it  "  connotes  a  conscious  process,  and 
so  involves  a  tacit  personalization  of  nature.  By 
tacitly  personalizing  that  aggregate  of  surrounding 
agencies  which  we  call '  nature,'  it  introduces  vaguely 
the  idea  that  nature  may  select  as  a  human  breeder 
selects — can  select  and  increase  a  particular  quality; 
which  is  true  only  under  certain  conditions.  Further, 
it  raises  the  thought  of  choice — suggests  the  notion 
that  nature  may  or  may  not  operate  in  the  alleged 
way. 

"  It  was  partly  the  consciousness  that  wrong 
ideas  are  called  up  in  these  ways,  which  led  me, 
when  writing  the  Principles  of  Biology,  to  substitute 
the  phrase  '  survival  of  the  fittest.'  'u 

1  "  It  has  become  apparent  that  the  abstract  formula 
expressing  this  transformation  in  all  living  things,  also 
expresses  the  transformation  which  is,  and  has  been,  in 
progress  everywhere.  The  Solar  System  in  passing  from 
its  primitive  state  to  its  present  state  has  exemplified  it; 
and  if  we  accept  Lord  Kelvin's  conclusion  respecting  the 
dissipation  of  its  energy  and  consequent  ultimate  fate,  it 
will  continue  to  exemplify  it.  The  transformation  of  the 
Earth  from  those  early  stages  in  which  its  surface  began  to 
solidify,  down  to  its  present  stage,  has  likewise  conformed 
to  the  general  law.  Among  living  things  it  is  conformed 
to  not  only  in  the  unfolding  of  every  organism,  but  also 
if  we  draw  the  conclusion  pointed  to  above,  by  the  organic 
world  in  general,  considered  as  an  aggregate  of  species. 
The  phenomena  of  mind,  in  rising  from  its  lowest  forms  in 
inferior  creatures  up  to  its  form  in  man,  and  again  in  rising 
from  the  lowest  human  form  to  the  highest,  illustrate  it. 
It  is  again  illustrated  by  the  successive  stages  of  social 


86        CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

In  any  case,  organic  evolution,  whether  it  be 
explained  by  natural  selection  or  by  some  more 
general  formula,  such  as  adaptation  to  environment, 
is  but  an  element  of  the  Spencerian  evolution,  which 
has  for  its  subject-matter  the  entire  cosmic  process, 
from  nebular  condensation  down  to  the  products  of 
social  life  in  civilized  nations. 

The  mechanical  character  of  evolution  as  described 
by  Spencer  is  thus  self-evident.  Not  only  the 
differentiations  of  organic  species  and  animal 
instincts,  but  the  highest  manifestations  of  human 
life,  are  so  many  transitory  stages  in  the  endless 
development  of  cosmic  forces  which  played  upon 
one  another  millions  of  centuries  ago  amidst  the 
earliest  nebulae.  And  this  development  is  inde- 
pendent of  all  internal  finality;  it  is  the  inevitable 
result  of  antecedents  determined  solely  by  "circum- 
stances "—i.e.,  by  chance — in  their  government  and 
activities. 

It    is   the    office    of  this    mechanical   evolution, 


progress,  beginning  with  groups  of  savages  and  ending 
with  civilized  nations.  And  we  see  it  no  less  displayed  in 
all  the  products  of  social  life — in  language,  in  the  industrial 
arts,  in  the  development  of  literature,  in  the  genesis  of 
science.  .  .  . 

"  It  (the  Doctrine  of  Evolution)  has  for  its  subject- 
matter  the  entire  cosmic  process,  from  nebular  condensation 
down  to  the  development  of  picture-records  into  written 
language,  or  the  formation  of  local  dialects ;  and  its  general 
result  is  to  show  that  all  the  minor  transformations  in  their 
infinite  varieties  are  parts  of  one  vast  transformation,  and 
display  throughout  the  same  law  and  cause — that  the 
Infinite  and  Eternal  Energy  has  manifested  itself  every- 
where and  always  in  modes  ever  unlike  in  results  but  ever 
like  in  principle." — Essays,  I.,  pp.  503,  505.  The  quotation 
in  the  text  is  from  Ibid.,  p.  493,  "  Lord  Salisbury  on 
Evolution." 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY    87 

according  to  Spencer,  to  reconcile  the  experimental 
hypothesis  of  Hume  with  the  transcendental  hypo- 
thesis of  Kant  as  to  the  primary  origin  of  the  facts 
of  consciousness. 

Hume  regarded  "  impressions,"  Kant  "  the  passive 
phenomena  of  sensibility,"  as  the  primary  data  for 
the  mind  to  work  on.  Neither  of  them  took  any 
particular  care  to  discover  the  source  of  the  raw 
material  which  they  were  thus  able  to  deal  with. 
Herbert  Spencer,  less  exclusively  introspective  than 
Hume,  less  deductive  than  the  great  German  critic, 
better  trained  than  either  of  them  in  the  observation 
of  nature,  immediately  inquires  into  the  genesis  of 
the  objective  elements  present  in  consciousness, 
and  ascribes  their  origin  to  earlier  phases  of  cosmic 
evolution. 

He  sees  that  man's  mind  was  not  at  the  outset 
a  tabula  rasa,  for  every  individual  inherits  the  ac- 
cumulated experiences  of  his  ancestors,  and  there- 
fore there  is  some  truth  in  the  doctrine  of  Kantian 
idealism  as  to  a  priori  forms,  but  the  cerebral 
structure  of  the  individual  at  birth  is  the  heritage 
of  the  experience  of  the  past.  Hence  there  is 
nothing  in  the  mind  of  the  race  that  is  not  the  result 
of  experience,  and  in  this  sense  the  a  priori  position 
of  the  German  philosopher  is  counterfeited. 

Thus,  too,  it  is  not  correct  to  say  that  man's  mind 
is  originally  undetermined  as  to  the  associations  of 
its  states  of  consciousness,  and  in  this  sense  Kant  is 
quite  right  in  treating  it  as  purely  receptive  ;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  laws  according  to  which  the 
elementary  data  of  consciousness  are  arranged  are 
the  result  of  observations  accumulated  in  the  past, 


88    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

and  in  this  sense  Hume  is  right  in  not  calling  by 
the  name  of  "  soul "  the  active  principle  which  is 
distinguished  from  the  impressions  revealed  by  our 
states  of  consciousness. 

Thus  Herbert  Spencer  makes  no  more  than  a 
provisional  concession,  which  is  more  apparent  than 
real,  to  the  "  transcendental  hypothesis,"  and  his 
ideology  is  fundamentally  the  same  as  Hume's. 
The  Scottish  philosopher  takes  conscious  "  im- 
pressions"  as  his  point  of  departure;  Herbert 
Spencer  finds  their  origin  in  the  factors  of  cosmic 
evolution;  but  to  both  master  and  disciple  conscious 
states,  regarded  in  themselves  as  they  are  found  in 
the  individual  of  to-day,  are  nervous  facts,  auto- 
matically associated  and  organized,  and  man's  mind 
is  the  passive  result  of  their  progressive  organiza- 
tion.1 

Thus  Spencer's  ideology  does  not  differ  funda- 
mentally from  Hume's  "  experimental  hypothesis." 
How  does  he  answer  the  criteriological  problem  ? 
What  value  does  he  assign  to  the  testimony  of 
consciousness  ? 

In  other  words,  what  is,  according  to  Spencer, 
the  objective  bearing  of  our  states  of  conscious- 
ness ?  What  is  the  bearing  of  their  relations  ? 

When  we  make  a  statement,  he  says,  the  terms  of 

1  "  Impossible  as  it  is  to  get  immediate  proof  that  feeling 
and  nervous  action  are  the  inner  and  outer  faces  of  the  same 
change,  yet  the  hypothesis  that  they  are  so  harmonizes 
with  all  the  observed  facts;  and  as  elsewhere  shown  (First 
Principles,  §  40),  no  other  verification  is  possible  for  us 
than  that  which  results  from  the  establishment  of  complete 
congruity  among  our  experiences." — Principles  of  Psy- 
chology, §  51. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY    89 

the  proposition  are  the  translation  of  two  states  of 
consciousness.  The  proposition  itself  either  con- 
nects them  or  disconnects  them. 

The  first  question  to  clear  up,  is  to  find  out  what 
is  the  nature  of  the  relation  established  by  the 
proposition. 

Let  us  start  with  some  facts.  Suppose  the  fol- 
lowing are  the  propositions :  The  bird  was  brown — 
The  ice  was  hot — The  pressure  of  a  body  is  exerted 
in  space — Movement  implies  something  which  moves. 

I  can  easily  associate  the  attribute  brown  with 
the  subject  and  the  group  of  attributes  denoted  by 
bird,  but  I  can  quite  as  easily  dissociate  the  attribute 
brown  from  the  group  of  associations  awakened  by 
the  name  bird  in  my  consciousness.  If  anyone 
were  to  tell  me :  "  The  bird  was  necessarily  brown," 
that  would  be  enough  to  call  up  to  my  consciousness 
an  image  of  a  yellow  or  a  green  bird.  The  connec- 
tion between  the  states  of  consciousness  expressed 
respectively  by  the  attribute  brown  and  by  the 
subject  bird  is  therefore  not  indissoluble. 

But  when  the  statement  is  made  in  my  hearing 
that  "  The  ice  was  hot,"  it  is  difficult,  it  may  even 
seem  impossible,  for  me  to  associate  with  the  group 
represented  by  the  subject  ice  the  attribute  hot. 
The  sensation  of  cold  is  so  strongly  connected  with 
the  perception  of  ice  that  my  first  endeavours  to 
separate  the  two  terms  ice  and  cold  are  in  vain.  If, 
however,  by  an  effort  of  imagination  I  think  of  a 
temperature  which  would  freeze  water  but  yet  be 
higher  than  that  of  the  blood  in  my  body,  I  succeed 
in  breaking  up  the  association  of  the  states  of  con- 
sciousness denoted  by  the  words  ice,  cold ;  in  re- 


placing  it  by  the  new  association,  ice,  hot.  My 
inability  to  think  "  The  ice  was  hot  "  was,  indeed, 
real  at  the  outset,  but  it  was  only  relative. 

On  the  contrary,  in  stating  the  propositions: 
'  The  pressure  of  a  body  is  exerted  in  space,  move- 
ment implies  something  which  moves,"  the  necessity 
I  experience  is  absolute,  and  it  is  proved  by  my 
inability  to  break  up  the  association  of  my  conscious 
states,  which  are  represented  by  the  terms  of  these 
two  propositions,  for  my  endeavour  produces  no 
result  at  all.  Therefore  the  contradictory  of  these 
two  propositions  is  unthinkable. 

Now,  says  Spencer,  a  proposition  is  certain,  when 
there  is  an  indissoluble  connection  between  the 
states  of  consciousness  expressed  by  its  two  terms. 
The  means  of  finding  out  the  indissolubility  of  the 
connection  between  several  states  of  consciousness, 
is  to  endeavour  to  break  up  the  connection  found 
in  consciousness  and  to  substitute  the  contradic- 
tory connection.  The  unavoidable  checking  of  such 
efforts  is  the  touchstone  of  certitude. 

Hence  Spencer  concludes  that  the  criterion  of  the 
truth  of  a  proposition  is  the  inconceivability  of  its 
contradictory. 

It  has  often  been  said  that  Spencer's  criterion 
is  entirely  subjective.  And,  indeed,  in  the  Principles 
of  Psychology  there  is  more  than  one  passage  that 
justifies  such  a  criticism,  but  it  is  certainly  not  in 
accord  with  the  ultimate  mind  of  the  writer.  In 
reply  to  John  Stuart  Mill,  Spencer  formulated  his 
criteriological  system  more  exactly.  He  openly 
repudiated  subjectivism,  and  declared  expressly 
that  he  regarded  the  inconceivability  of  the  contra- 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY         9! 

dictory  not  to  be  merely  an  expression  of  a  purely 
subjective  inability,  but  the  result  of  experience. 

I  conceive  without  difficulty  and  believe  without 
effort  that  one  bird  is  brown,  and  another  yellow, 
because  it  has  been  my  experience  to  see  sometimes 
brown  birds,  sometimes  yellow  birds.  I  do  not  say 
that  the  proposition,  "  The  ice  was  hot,"  is  incon- 
ceivable, because  experience  provides  me  with  means 
for  imagining  the  freezing  of  water  at  a  higher  tem- 
perature than  that  of  my  body,  but  I  call  the  prop- 
osition incredible,  because  it  is  not  in  accord  with 
usual  experience,  and  therefore  necessitates  an 
extraordinary  mental  effort  on  my  part. 

On  the  contrary,  the  proposition,  "  One  side  of 
a  triangle  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  two  other  sides," 
is  not  only  incredible,  but  also  inconceivable.  As 
for  the  cause  of  the  inconceivability  of  this  proposi- 
tion, it  is  only  to  be  found  in  its  being  in  disaccord 
with  all  our  own  observations  and  with  the  uniform 
and  permanent  results  stored  up  by  the  experiences 
of  the  past  in  our  cerebral  structure. 

If  we  reply  with  Mill,  that  the  ancient  Greeks 
thought  the  existence  of  the  Antipodes  was  incon- 
ceivable, while  we  not  only  conceive  but  admit  it, 
Spencer  answers  that  inconceivability  of  the  contra- 
dictory is  not  a  critical  rule  beyond  which  there  is 
no  appeal.  And  who  is  to  hear  this  appeal  ?  He 
alone  who  is  able  to  read  his  own  consciousness,  and 
to  reduce  its  data  to  their  simplest  elements.1 

In    these    conditions,    Spencer's    critical    theory 

1  "  In  alleging  that  if  a  belief  is  said  by  some  to  be  neces- 
sary, but  by  others  to  be  not  necessary,  the  test  of  necessity 
is  thereby  shown  to  be  no  test,  Mr.  Mill  tacitly  assumes 
that  all  men  have  powers  of  introspection  enabling  them 


92         CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

comes  back  to  the  classical  thesis  of  the  evidence  of 
the  objectivity  of  truth. 

Doubtless  sensible  experience  does  not  contain 
the  only  manifestation  of  the  true.  As  to  the 
ideological  question  of  the  origin  of  our  states  of 
consciousness,  we  part  company  with  the  English 
psychologist,  but  when  the  question  is  one  of 
criteriology,  when  together  with  him  we  ask  what 
is  the  value  of  the  connection  between  our  states 
of  consciousness  and  whence  they  arise,  our  answer 
may  be  given  in  a  form  that  does  not  differ  essenti- 
ally from  the  Spencerian  theory:  The  facts  of  con- 
sciousness, when  complex,  should  be  reduced  to 
their  elements,  and  when  these  are  absolutely  simple, 
they  need  only  be  brought  together  to  observe 
relations,  some  contingent,  some  necessary,  arise 
between  them;  the  evident  manifestation  of  a  rela- 
tion of  identity  or  of  non-identity  between  two 
elementary  facts  of  consciousness — i.e.,  between  two 
indecomposable  concepts — being  the  ultimate  ele- 
ment of  sure  science,  the  supremely  controlling  law 
of  certitude. 

Hence  Spencer  is  no  subjectivist.  The  connec- 
tion which  a  proposition  establishes  between  the 
states  of  consciousness  represented  by  its  terms 
depends  objectively  upon  experience. 

We  then  have  to  discover  what  is  the  significance 
of  the  terms  connected  together  by  the  proposition. 

in  all  cases  to  say  what  consciousness  testifies;  whereas  a 
great  proportion  of  men  are  incapable  of  interpreting  con- 
sciousness in  any  but  its  simplest  modes,  and  even  the 
remainder  are  liable  to  mistake  for  dicta  of  consciousness 
what  prove  on  closer  examination  not  to  be  its  dicta." — 
Essays,  Vol.  II.,  p.  196. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY    93 

In  other  words,  are  the  elementary  data  of  con- 
sciousness purely  subjective  states,  or  have  they  a 
real  value  ?  If  some  reality  corresponds  with  our 
states  of  consciousness,  is  that  reality  phenomenal 
cTr  noumenal  ? 

Spencer's  reply  to  these  questions  may  be  summed 
up  in  what  he  calls  "  transfigured  realism,"  a  hybrid 
kind  of  theory  in  which  idealism,  monism,  and 
positivism  of  a  mechanical  sort  meet  together 
without  finding  any  way  of  being  compacted  into 
a  body  of  doctrine. 

What  is  this  "  transfigured  realism  "  ? 

In  spite  of  his  primary  thesis,  according  to  which 
our  states  of  consciousness  are  "  only  subjective 
affections,"1  Herbert  Spencer  professes  realism,  and 
he  proves  it  negatively  and  positively. 

His  negative  proof  lies  chiefly  in  an  argument  which 
he  calls  "  the  argument  of  priority."  Suppose,  says 
he,  that  realism  was  not  yet  satisfactorily  estab- 
lished, still  it  should  be  preferred  to  idealism,  for 
it  is  impossible  to  state,  and  a  fortiori  to  prove, 
idealism,  without  presupposing  and  relying  upon 
realism  at  every  step.  Hence  the  risk  of  error 
assumed  to  belong  to  realism  will  reappear,  and  that 
tenfold  as  often,  in  the  idealist  theory.2 

Further,  from  the  two  points  of  view  of  "  sim- 

1  Principles  of  Psychology,  §  86,  cf.  §  87. 

2  Try,   says  Spencer,   to  oppose  to  the  realism  of  the 
ordinary  man  your  idealist  conception  of  nature.     You  will 
find  it  impossible  not  to  assume  both  in  his  case  and  in  your 
own   the   very   thesis   of  the   realist  which   you  desire  to 
combat.     "  Tell   him    (any   labourer   or    farmer)    that  the 
sound  he  hears  from  the  bell  of  the  village  church  exists  in 
himself ;  and  that  in  the  absence  of  all  creatures  having  ears, 
there  would  be  no  sound.     When  his  look  of  blank  amaze- 
ment has  waned,  try  and  make  him  understand  this  truth 


94    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

plicity  "  and  of  "  clearness  "  the  realist  conception 
is  preferable  to  that  of  antirealism.1 

The  positive  proof  is  twofold.  It  arises  at  the 
same  time  from  the  analysis  of  consciousness  and 
from  the  analysis  of  reality.  The  object  of  every 
act  of  consciousness  appears  to  be  determined ;  hence 
there  is  a  more  general  reality,  whereof  the  object 
presented  to  the  consciousness  is  the  limitation: 
consequently  the  possibility  of  consciousness  is  a 
proof  of  the  existence  of  an  absolute  reality. 

Furthermore,  the  consciousness  of  the  Ego  is 
conditioned  by  that  of  the  non-Ego,  and  reciprocally, 
the  consciousness  of  the  non-Ego  is  conditioned  by 
that  of  the  Ego.  But  the  absolute  is  unconditioned. 
Hence  beyond  the  opposition  of  the  Ego  and  the 
non-Ego,  there  is  an  absolute  reality. 

Lastly,  science  has  proved  that  amidst  all  physical 

which  is  so  clear  to  you.  Explain  that  the  vibrations  of 
the  bell  are  communicated  to  the  air;  that  the  air  conveys 
them  as  waves  or  pulses;  that  these  pulses  successively 
strike  the  membrane  of  his  ear,  causing  it  to  vibrate;  and 
that  what  exists  in  the  air  as  mechanical  movements  become 
in  him  the  sensation  of  sound,  which  varies  in  pitch  as  these 
movements  vary  in  their  rapidity  of  succession.  And  now 
ask  yourself,  what  are  these  things  you  are  telling  him 
about  ?  When  you  speak  to  him  of  the  bell,  of  the  air, 
of  the  mechanical  motions,  do  you  mean  so  many  of  his 
ideas  ?  If  you  do,  you  fall  into  the  astounding  absurdity  of 
supposing  that  he  already  has  the  conception  which  you  are 
trying  to  give  him.  By  the  bell,  the  air,  the  vibrations, 
then,  you  mean  just  what  he  means — so  many  objective 
existences  and  actions;  and  by  no  possibility  can  you 
present  to  him  the  hypothesis  that  what  he  knows  as 
sound  exists  in  him,  and  not  outside  of  him,  without  postu- 
lating, in  common  with  him,  these  objective  realities.  By 
no  possibility  can  you  show  him  that  he  knows  only  his 
sensations,  without  supposing  him  to  be  already  conscious 
of  all  these  things  and  changes  causing  his  sensations." — 
Principles  of  Psychology,  §  404. 

1  Principles  of  Psychology,  §§  407-412. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY    95 

and  chemical  phenomena  of  nature,  energy  remains 
constant.  Therefore  energy  is  the  true  reality,  and 
physico-chemical  occurrences  are  only  its  phenomenal 
manifestations. 

Therefore,  concludes  Spencer,  "  The  assumption 
'  inevitably  made  in  all  reasoning  used  to  prove  the 
relativity  of  sensations,'  is  '  that  there  exist  beyond 
consciousness,  conditions  of  objective  manifestation 
which  are  symbolized  by  relations  as  we  conceive 
them.' ' 

But  if  he  is  a  realist,  Spencer  does  not  range  him- 
self along  with  "  the  rough  realism  of  the  child  or 
the  savage,"  who  not  only  believes  in  the  existence 
of  something  real  in  contradistinction  to  thought, 
but  naively  thinks  that  he  knows  the  things  of 
nature  as  they  are.  No.  "  No  relation  in  con- 
sciousness can  resemble,  or  be  in  any  way  akin  to, 
its  source  beyond  consciousness."  ..."  While 
some  objective  existence  manifested  under  some 
conditions,  remains  as  the  final  necessity  of  thought, 
there  does  not  remain  the  implication  that  this 
existence  and  these  conditions  are  more  to  us  than 
unknown  correlations  of  our  feeling  and  the  relations 
among  our  feelings.  The  Realism  we  are  committed 
to  is  one  which  simply  asserts  objective  existence  as 
separate  from  and  independent  of  subjective  exist- 
ence. But  it  affirms  neither  that  any  one  mode  of 
this  objective  existence  is  in  reality  that  which  it 
seems,  nor  that  the  connections  among  its  modes 
are  objectively  what  they  seem.  Thus  it  stands 
widely  distinguished  from  Crude  Realism:  and  to 
mark  the  distinction  it  may  properly  be  called 
Transfigured  Realism."1 

1  Principles  of  Psychology,  §  472. 


g6    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

This  abstract  doctrine  may  be  illustrated  by  an 
analogy.  Let  the  reader  recall  the  theory  of  per- 
spective. He  will  remember  that,  when  looking  at 
anything  out  of  the  window  -for  instance,  at  a  box 
resting  on  the  ground — he  is  able,  while  keeping  his 
eyes  upon  it,  to  trace  upon  the  pane  of  glass,  with 
pen  and  ink,  dots  each  of  which  corresponds  with 
one  of  the  corners  of  the  box,  and  then  join  together 
these  dots  with  lines,  each  of  which  will  cover  one 
of  the  edges  of  the  box.  When  this  has  been  done, 
he  has  on  the  pane  of  glass  an  outline  drawing,  or 
what  we  call  a  perspective  representation  of  the 
box.  This  represents  its  form,  not  as  it  is  conceived 
to  be,  but  such  as  it  is  actually  seen.  If  he  now 
considers  the  relation  existing  between  this  picture 
and  the  box  itself,  he  discovers  that  the  two  things 
differ  in  several  ways.  One  occupies  a  space  of 
three  dimensions,  the  other  a  space  of  two  dimen- 
sions only ;  the  relations  between  the  lines  of  the  one 
are  not  the  same  as  the  relations  between  the  lines 
of  the  other;  the  direction  in  space  of  the  repre- 
sentative lines  are  quite  different  from  the  direction 
of  the  real  lines;  the  angles  they  make  with  one 
another  are  unlike,  and  so  on.  Nevertheless,  the 
representation  and  the  reality  are  so  closely  con- 
nected that  the  object,  the  conditions  of  visibility, 
and  the  intermediate  pane  of  glass  being  given,  no 
other  picture  was  possible,  and  any  change  of  place 
or  distance  in  the  object  will  inevitably  be  accom- 
panied with  a  corresponding  change  in  the  picture 
of  it.  Here,  then,  we  have  a  case  of  symbolization 
in  which,  in  spite  of  the  essential  difference  between 
the  thing  and  its  symbol,  there  is  an  exact,  though 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY    97 

indirect,  correspondence  between  the  changing 
relations  in  the  elements  of  the  one  and  the  changing 
relations  in  the  elements  of  the  other.1 

We  are  therefore  irresistibly  driven  to  believe  in 
the  existence  of  a  certain  objective  reality,  mani- 
festing itself  in  certain  conditions,  but  we  are  obliged 
to  remain  in  ignorance  of  the  nature  of  this  ill- 
defined  reality.  Such  is  the  conclusion  of  psycho- 
logy, and  its  inductions  can  go  no  further. 

There  remains,  however,  a  fundamental  problem. 
If  we  are  in  ignorance  of  the  nature  of  objective 
reality,  whence  comes  our  ignorance  ?  Does  it  apper- 
tain to  the  nature  of  the  thing  known,  or  to  that  of 
the  subject  that  knows,  or  to  that  of  both  together? 

This  problem  is  fundamentally  the  one  which, 
since  Kant's  days,  has  become  the  essential  problem 
of  metaphysics,  the  determination  of  the  limits  of 
human  intelligence. 

Kant  sought  to  resolve  it  by  an  inquiry  into  the 
nature  of  reason  in  itself.  Herbert  Spencer,  with 
more  prudence,  submits  to  analysis,  not  the  faculty  of 
knowing,  but  its  acts,  our  cognitions.  Kant  inferred 
the  unknowableness  of  "  noumena  ";  Spencer,  both 
inductively  and  deductively,  the  existence  of  a 
noumenal  non-Ego,  but  the  unknowableness  of  the 
distinctive  nature  of  the  noumenon,  or  noumena  that 
compose  it. 

We  have  followed  the  English  philosopher  in  the 
inductive  analysis  of  his  Principles  of  Psychology  ; 
let  us  now  turn  to  his  deductive  work,  as  found  in 
his  First  Principles. 

The   aim  of  his  First  Principles  is  to  make  a 

1  Principles  of  Psychology,  §  473. 


g8    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

thorough  inquiry  into  the  primary  notions  of  religion, 
science,  and  consciousness,  in  order  to  reconcile  them 
with  one  another. 

When  Herbert  Spencer  comes  upon  the  scene,  what 
is  the  position  of  philosophic  thought  ? 

Idealism  is  dominant  in  psychology  and  meta- 
physics. It  appears  to  be  recognized,  along  with 
Hume,  that  man's  mind  is  pent  up  within  its  states 
of  consciousness,  and,  along  with  Kant,  that  what 
is  beyond  phenomena  is  necessarily  unknowable. 
In  natural  philosophy,  the  mechanical  theory  reigns 
supreme.  Final  causes  are  proscribed.  All  facts 
of  physics,  chemistry,  biology,  and  even  of  psycho- 
logy, are  modes  of  movement.  The  world  contains 
nothing  but  mechanical  forces,  transformable  into 
one  another  without  increase  or  diminution.  The 
sum-total  of  matter  and  of  energy  is  invariable. 

It  is,  however,  difficult  not  to  believe  in  the 
independent  existence  of  reality;  as  Spencer  under- 
takes to  show  in  his  Principles  of  Psychology* 
idealism  cannot  make  itself  understood  nor  prove 
its  case  without  presupposing  realism.  Conscious- 
ness itself,  in  its  own  dicta,  finds  itself  beating 
against  barriers  imposed  upon  it  from  without,  and 
the  feelings  of  the  Ego  bring  out  the  reality  of  the 
non-Ego.  And  it  is  just  as  hard  to  get  rid  of  the 
Absolute.  All  the  races  of  mankind  believe  in  it, 
and  still  believe  in  it  to-day. 

Religions  which  de  Quatrefages,  an  anthropologist 

of  the  first  class,  regarded  as  so  distinctive  a  trait 

of  humanity,  that  he  denied  the  existence,  either 

historic  or  prehistoric,  of  a  nation  without  a  religion, 

1  See  above,  pp.  94-97. 


99 

live  on  the  absolute.  Is  it  credible  that  there  is 
no  foundation  of  truth  in  these  religions  ?  But,  if 
there  is  any  reason  to  presume  that  religious  aspira- 
tions are  not  vain,  there  is  a  conflict  between  the 
religious  beliefs  of  mankind  and  idealist  metaphysics. 

Face  to  face  with  such  a  striking  contradiction, 
systematic  aloofness  becomes  an  impossible  atti- 
tude ;  the  desire  for  harmony  and  unity  is  too  deeply 
rooted  within  us  for  us  to  remain  impassive  spectators 
of  such  a  chaos.  Here  is  the  first  conflict  that  it  is 
the  business  of  philosophy  to  try  to  put  a  stop  to. 

And  here  is  another.  The  mechanical  theory 
appears  under  the  cloak  of  science  as  the  solely 
plausible  interpretation  of  nature.  But  it  is  very 
hard  to  get  rid  of  the  qualitative  aspects  of  nature 
in  order  to  reduce  them  all  to  terms  of  quantity. 
It  is  hard  to  identify  consciousness  with  nervous 
phenomena;  for  even  if  it  was  agreed  to  regard 
consciousness  and  nervous  phenomena  as  the  inside 
and  the  outside  of  the  same  fact,  there  would  still 
remain  the  need  of  explaining  why  and  how  certain 
material  facts,  among  so  many  others,  come  to 
present  this  twofold  aspect. 

The  solution  of  this  twofold  dispute  can  only  be 
found  by  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  fundamental 
notions  of  the  human  mind;  religious  notions; 
scientific  notions,  or  rather  notions  of  the  mechanical 
theory  regarded  as  the  scientific  conception  of 
nature;  and  philosophic  notions,  or  rather  idealist 
notions — i.e.,  notions  of  knowledge  according  to  the 
idealist  interpretation. 

Religions  give  rise  to  two  problems :  What  is  the 
universe,  and  how  did  it  originate  ? 


ioo   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

As  to  the  origin  of  the  universe,  there  are  three 
hypotheses:  atheism,  which  regards  the  world  as 
self -existing;  pantheism,  which  makes  the  world 
pass  of  its  own  accord  from  power  to  action;  and 
theism,  which  maintains  that  the  creation  of  the 
universe  was  the  work  of  an  external  agent. 

But  these  three  hypotheses  are  inconceivable. 
Besides,  there  is  not  one  of  the  three  that  does  not 
come  sooner  or  later,  either  openly  or  by  some 
subtle  implication,  to  affirm  a  being  existing  of 
itself,  some  sort  of  "  self -existence."  This  "  self- 
existence  "  can  have  had  no  beginning.  But  dura- 
tion without  any  limit  is  unthinkable. 

Hence  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  the  universe 
inevitably  leads  the  mind  to  make  verbal  statements 
which  are  inconceivable.  The  question  of  the  nature 
of  the  first  cause  of  the  universe  leads  to  the  same 
impasse. 

We  are  driven  to  infer  the  existence  of  a  first 
cause  of  the  universe.  But  this  first  cause  must 
be  something  infinite  and  absolute.  But  the  notions 
of  cause,  infinite  and  absolute,  are  incompatible. 
Hence  our  ideas  as  to  the  nature  of  the  universe,  as 
well  as  those  that  refer  to  its  origin,  are  contra- 
dictory, and  therefore  the  propositions  implied  in 
religious  beliefs  have  no  meaning  which  can  be 
represented  in  thought. 

The  only  abstract  inference  fundamentally  dis- 
coverable as  underlying  all  our  inquiries  into  the 
question  of  a  first  cause,  as  well  as  into  all  beliefs, 
polytheistic,  monotheistic,  pantheistic,  and  athe- 
istic, is  this:  that  the  universe  manifests  the  exist- 
ence of  a  power  which  is  absolutely  unfathomable. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   101 

Scientific  theologians  are  moreover  in  agreement 
herein,  that  God  is  incomprehensible. 

The  fundamental  notions  of  science  from  the 
mechanical  standpoint  are  those  of  space,  time, 
matter,  movement,  transmission  of  movement,  force, 
and  the  mode  of  action  of  forces.  From  the  idealist 
standpoint,  these  notions  are  those  of  sensation  and 
of  the  conscious  subject  of  sensations. 

We  have  an  invincible  belief  in  space  and  time, 
but  when  we  look  narrowly  into  what  we  think  we 
know  about  them,  we  find  ourselves  face  to  face 
with  incomprehensible  ideas. — Is  matter  made  of 
solid  elements  or  of  force -centres,  as  Boscovitch 
maintained  ?  Apparently  we  are  driven  to  chcose 
one  of  these  alternatives,  and  either  of  them  is  alike 
inconceivable. — As  to  movement  and  its  transmission, 
as  to  force  considered  in  itself  and  in  its  mode  of 
action,  we  find  ourselves  everywhere  and  always 
involved  in  inconceivable  statements  and  in  con- 
tradictions. 

Thus,  too,  is  it  with  the  notions  implied  in  man's 
consciousness  of  the  true.  Our  states  of  consciousness 
appear  to  follow  one  another  in  a  series  of  successive 
occurrences.  And  this  series  must  be  finite  or 
infinite.  But  neither  of  these  hypotheses  can  escape 
from  contradictions. 

Consciousness  implies  a  conscious  Ego.  In  vain 
does  the  phenomenalist  try  to  reduce  the  Ego  to  a 
bundle  of  impressions,  for  he  cannot  sincerely  refuse 
to  regard  his  impressions  as  his  own.  But  con- 
sciousness of  oneself  is  impossible.  For  conscious- 
ness necessarily  implies  a  subject  and  an  object; 
there  must  be  two  terms.  But  consciousness  of 


oneself  presupposes  a  subject  which  is  itself  its 
object .     Hence  consciousness  of  oneself  is  impossible . 

Therefore,  whether  we  analyze  our  perceptions  of 
external  nature  as  it  is  displayed  to'  us  by  the 
mechanical  theory,  or  whether  we  examine  our  states 
of  consciousness — i.e.,  as  to  things  and  the  Ego — 
on  all  sides  we  find  contradictions  and  what  is 
beyond  our  conceptions.  Hence  we  can  know 
nothing  beyond  the  phenomena  of  experience. 

The  laws  of  thought  lead  to  the  same  conclusion. 
Indeed,  the  exercise  of  thought  is  subject  to  laws 
of  relation,  of  likeness,  and  unlikeness.  To  know 
anything  is  to  perceive  it  in  relation  to  conscious- 
ness, to  distinguish  it  from  other  things,  and  to 
classify  it  along  with  simpler  things  of  the  same 
kind.  But  the  knowledge  of  the  absolute  and  the 
infinite  excludes  these  conditions.  Hence  the  abso- 
lute and  the  infinite  cannot  come  within  the  range 
of  thought,  and  they  are  unknowable. 

What,  then,  are  the  conclusions  of  the  First 
Principles  ? 

Notions  of  the  first  cause,  the  absolute,  and  the 
infinite,  form  the  basis  of  all  religions,  and  they  are 
inconceivable  or  contradictory. 

The  notions  of  time,  space,  matter,  movement, 
force,  underlie  the  knowledge  of  the  world  from  the 
mechanical  standpoint,  and  they  are  inconceivable 
or  contradictory. 

The  notions  of  states  of  consciousness  underlie  all 
psychology,  and  they  are  also  inconceivable  and 
contradictory. 

Lastly,  there  are  three  conditions  of  thought.     In 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   103 

order  to  be  conceivable,  a  thing  must  be  relative, 
unlike  some  things,  like  others — i.e.,  it  must  be 
relative  and  limited.  Such  is  the  law  of  the 
relativity  of  human  thought. 

But  if  this  is  the  case,  what  are  we  to  say  about 
the  absolute  and  the  infinite  ?  Do  these  words 
denote  a  negation  pure  and  simple,  the  negation  of 
conceivability,  as  Hamilton  maintained  ? 

From  a  strictly  logical  point  of  view,  says  Spencer, 
this  inference  is  irresistible.  But  the  laws  of  logic 
have  to  do  with  those  subjects  of  thought,  of  which 
we  are  definitely  conscious.  There  are  other  incom- 
plete thoughts  which  can  never  be  completed,  and 
of  these  we  are  indefinitely  conscious.  They  are 
no  less  real  than  the  preceding,  in  the  sense  that 
they  are  normal  and  undeniable  affections  of  man's 
intelligence .  The  states  of  the  absolute  belong  to  the 
latter  category. 

All  the  arguments  in  favour  of  the  relativity  of 
our  knowledge  presuppose  the  existence  of  some- 
thing which  is  not  relative.  To  affirm  that  we 
cannot  know  the  absolute  is  an  implicit  admission 
that  it  exists,  but  that  we  cannot  know  what  it  is. 

It  is  impossible  to  think  of  a  knowledge  which 
would  have  nothing  but  appearances  for  its  subject- 
matter,  for  an  appearance  with  no  reality  whereof  it 
is  an  appearance  is  unthinkable. 

Limited  space  is  not  conceivable.  When  we  limit 
space,  we  necessarily  assume  something  beyond 
the  limits.  Thus  the  notion  of  the  absolute  is  not 
purely  inconceivable,  it  is  an  affirmation  of  some- 
thing beyond  that  which  is  positively  conceived. 
To  speak  generally,  to  conceive  a  thing  as  relative, 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

is  to  conceive  it  as  opposed  to  something  non- 
relative — i.e.,  to  an  absolute. 

Lastly,  we  cannot  think  of  our  sensible  impres- 
sions without  affirming  the  existence  of  a  cause 
producing  our  impressions.  Hence  it  is  indisputable 
that  there  is  an  absolute  whereof  we  have  an 
indefinite  consciousness. 

But,  it  will  be  said,  if  thought  is  subject  to  the 
law  of  relativity  and  limitation,  how  can  we  explain 
the  genesis  of  the  thought  of  an  object  without 
relations  and  without  limits  ? 

By  means  of  simple  notions,  replies  Spencer,  in 
the  case  of  which  we  mentally  do  away  with  special 
forms  and  limits.  Consciousness  of  the  absolute  is 
an  abstraction,  not  from  a  particular  group  of  con- 
ceptions, but  from  all  our  conceptions.  All  the 
particular  objects  of  thought  vary,  but  something 
constant  subsists  through  all  changes,  and  this  is  exist- 
ence in  general,  immutability  in  general,  the  absolute. 

Not  only  is  it  quite  legitimate  to  believe  in  the 
existence  of  the  absolute,  but  none  of  our  knowledge 
is  more  firmly  based  than  that.  In  fact,  the  cer- 
tainty of  anything  known  is  proportioned  to  our 
inability  to  eliminate  it  from  the  field  of  conscious- 
ness. But  the  knowledge  of  the  absolute  is  neces- 
sarily connected  with  all  knowledge.  Therefore  it 
is  the  most  certain  of  all  knowledge. 

After  the  foregoing  outline,  what  is  the  solution 
of  the  two  contradictions  which  Spencer  sought 
to  reconcile  ? 

Religion  and  science  are  reconciled,  for  if  science 
and  philosophy  show  that  we  have  no  distinct  notion 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   105 

of  the  absolute  and  the  infinite,  they  nevertheless 
allow  us  to  believe  in  something  mysterious  and 
unfathomable,  the  subject-matter  of  religion. 

There  is  also  a  reconciliation  between  science, 
understood  as  a  mechanical  theory  of  the  universe, 
and  idealist  philosophy;  for  if  the  notions  of  time, 
space,  matter,  movement,  and  force  are  fundament- 
ally inconceivable  and  contradictory,  there  neverthe- 
less exists  an  absolute  which  is  manifested  in  the 
phenomena  of  movement  and  force;  and  there  is 
nothing  to  prevent  one  from  interpreting  all  the 
phenomena  which  are  the  subject-matter  of  science 
— i.e.,  the  knowable,  in  terms  of  mass,  energy,  and 
movement . 

In  such  conditions,  philosophy  is  in  harmony 
with  science,  for  whence  arose  the  conflicts  of 
philosophy  ?  From  the  fact  that  metaphysicians 
wanted  to  make  statements  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
absolute,  some  saying  that  the  universe  exists  of  it- 
self without  any  first  cause  (Atheism) ;  others  that  the 
first  cause  is  a  personal  self-existing  being,  a  Creator 
(Theism) ;  and  others  that  it  is  a  being  in  potentiality, 
which  becomes  the  universe  and  the  Ego  (Pantheism) . 

But  science  is  independent  of  these  three  inter- 
pretations. 

Further,  the  conflicts  arose  from  the  fact  that  the 
metaphysicians  wanted  to  explain  the  nature  of  the 
universe  and  of  the  Ego,  some  wishing  to  reduce 
matter  to  solid  elements,  others  to  force-centres; 
the  former  making  the  Ego  a  material  subject,  the 
latter  a  mind. 

But  here,  again,  science  and  philosophy  have 
proved  that  we  know  neither  the  nature  of  matter 


lo6   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

nor  of  the  Ego ;  the  atomic  theory  and  the  dynamic 
theory,  the  materialistic  and  the  spiritualistic 
theories,  are  alike  arbitrary. 

Therefore  the  conflict  is  done  away  with,  because 
there  is  no  encounter. 

One  thing  alone  remains  sure,  that  there  is  an 
ultimate  subject,  whereof  corporeal  and  conscious 
phenomena  are  the  manifestations. 

The  substantial  identity  of  the  Ego  and  the  non- 
Ego,  of  mind  and  matter,  gives  us  Monism.  The 
reduction  of  all  external  phenomena,  including 
neural  facts  observable  by  the  physiologist,  to 
mechanical  phenomena  interpretable  in  terms  of 
mass  and  energy,  gives  us  Mechanism.  The  affirma- 
tion that  we  know  only  our  own  states  of  con- 
sciousness, and  that  things  are  only  the  outward 
side  of  the  psychological  phenomena  of  which  con- 
sciousness perceives  the  inside,  gives  us  Idealism. 

Spencer's  metaphysics,  and  in  particular  his 
rational  psychology,  are  characterized  by  his  fusion 
of  the  different  philosophical  doctrines  originated  by 
Descartes  and  spread  everywhere  in  our  own  age. 
It  is  a  conglomeration  wanting  in  any  real  organic 
unity.  Spencer  is  a  collector  of  ideas  rather  than 
the  creator  of  a  philosophy,  and  this  is  shown  by 
his  own  express  declaration  that  he  regards  philo- 
sophy as  Comte  did,  as  the  general  science  which 
has  to  synthesize  phenomena  and  their  laws — i.e., 
their  relations  of  coexistence  and  succession. 

As  for  his  evolution  theory,  it  is  merely  an  analogy 
daringly  grafted  on  a  hypothesis.  The  hypothesis  is 
this,  that  vegetable  and  animal  species  may  have 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   107 

descended  by  way  of  transformation  from  one  or 
several  primary  types,  by  means  of  natural  selection 
or,  to  speak  more  explicitly,  under  the  favourable 
influence  of  the  combined  advantages  of  environ- 
ment, survival  of  the  fittest  in  the  struggle  for  life, 
and  of  heredity.  His  analogy  is  to  be  found  in 
extending  the  transformation-hypothesis  indefinitely 
to  embrace  all  observable  facts,  from  the  formation 
of  the  starry  worlds,  the  solar  system  and  our  own 
earth,  to  the  genesis  of  societies  and  the  growth  of 
civilizations. 

Everyone  will  agree  that  this  vast  conception 
is  neither  science  properly  so  called,  nor  real  philo- 
sophy. The  momentary  success  of  the  Spencerian 
doctrine  of  evolution  was  due  to  extrinsic  causes 
rather  than  to  its  own  real  value.  The  infatuation 
of  scientists  for  inquiry  into  the  origin  of  life  since 
Schwann's  original  discovery  of  the  cellular  constitu- 
tion of  organisms,  and  the  bringing  into  use  of 
wonderfully  perfected  instruments  of  micrography; 
the  extraordinary  similarities,  observed  by  Darwin, 
between  the  most  distinct  types  of  flora  and  fauna 
belonging  to  the  two  hemispheres ;  the  comparative 
methods  of  study  applied  to  ethnography,  anthro- 
pology, philology,  sociology,  and  religions,  and  their 
coincidence  with  the  discoveries  of  cellular  biology, 
natural  history,  and  embryogeny;  and  the  need  of 
linking  together  the  few  scattered  facts  brought  to 
light  by  the  immense  analytical  labours  to  which  our 
age  has  given  itself  up,  had  predisposed  the  public 
mind  to  take  a  subjective  binding  together  of  facts 
as  the  last  explanation  of  things  by  their  causes, 
which  is  the  supreme  and  constant  end  of  philosophy. 


io8   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 


Alfred  Fouillee 

Alfred  Fouillee  begins  his  work  entitled  Evolu- 
tionnisme  des  idees-forces  by  a  criticism  of  Herbert 
Spencer's  philosophy. 

The  English  philosopher  had  set  himself  to  form 
a  philosophical  synthesis  in  which  positive  science 
was  alone  to  provide  the  elements,  evolution  was 
to  be  the  bond  of  union,  and  idealism  was  to  assume 
the  direction.  This  much  was  called  for  by  the 
state  of  philosophy  when  the  great  English  architect 
began  to  build  up  his  philosophic  structure. 

Above  all,  a  synthesis,  a  unity,  was  what  was 
wanted;  for,  in  view  of  the  accumulated  results  of 
scientific  observation  during  the  eighteenth  century 
and  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth,  a  comprehensive 
conspectus  of  the  whole  was  more  than  ever  imperi- 
ously demanded.  But  Spencer  had  fallen  short  of  his 
aims.  "  His  theory  is  wanting  in  unity.  It  leaves 
the  mind  confronted  with  three  terms  which  have 
no  connecting  link.  First  there  is  an  unknowable, 
and  then  two  series  of  knowable*  facts  —  physical 
facts,  and  psychical  facts  —  the  latter  of  which  comes 
to  be  superadded  to  the  former,  one  knows  not 
how.  .  .  .'51 

To  attempt  once  more,  with  an  even  more  robust 
faith,  the  constructive  unity  which  Spencer  had 
essayed  to  effect  and  failed;  to  start,  as  he  had  done, 
with  the  idealist  and  positivist  data  gained  by 
contemporary  psychology;  to  look,  like  him,  for 

1  A.  Fouillee,  L'evolutionnistne  des  idees-forces.  Intro- 
duction, pp.  vi,  vii. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   109 

a  universal  explanation  of  things  in  the  law  of 
evolution,  but  to  do  away  with  the  transcendent, 
the  dualism  of  the  material  and  the  mental;  and 
thus  to  reach  a  rigorous  monism,  but  one  that  was 
"  immanent  and  experimental " — such  is  the  ideal 
constantly  pursued  by  this  prolific  writer,  of  whose 
philosophic  scheme  we  are  about  to  give  an  outline.1 

The  secret  of  Fouillee's  synthesis  is  the  "  idea- 
force" 

By  idea  must  be  understood  not  only  the  pheno- 
menon that  is  strictly  "  mental "  or  a  phenomenon 
of  cognition,  but,  in  the  Cartesian  sense,  all  internal 
facts  which  are  conscious  or  capable  of  becoming  so.2 

1  Besides    a    quantity    of    fragmentary    essays,    review 
articles,  etc.,  A.  Fouillee  has  written  the  following:  L'avenir 
de  la  metaphysique  fondee  sur  I' experience  ;  L'evolutionnisme 
des  idees-forces  ;  La  liberte  et  le  determinisme  ;  Le  mouvement 
idealiste  et  la  reaction  contre  la  science  positive  ;  Tempera- 
ment et  caractere  ;  Psychologie  du  peuple  francais  ;  Esquisse 
psychologique  des  peuples  europeens  :  and  in  the  domain  of 
morals,   sociology,   and  education:  La  morale,  I' art  et  la 
religion,   d'apres   Guyau ;   Nietzsche   et  I'immoralisme ;  Le 
moralisme  de  Kant  et  I'amoralismc  contemporain  ;  La  critique 
des  systemes  de  morale  contemporains  ;  Les  elements  socio- 
logiques  de  la  morale  ;  La  morale  des  idees-forces  ;  La  France 
au  point  de  vue  moral  ;  Le  mouvement  positiviste  et  la  concep- 
tion sociologique  du  monde  ;  La  science  sociale  contemporaine  ; 
La  propriete  sociale  et  la  democrat ie  ;  L'idee  moderne  du 
Droit  ;  L' enseignement  au  point  de  vue  nationale  ;  Les  etudes 
classiques  et    la   democratic  ;  La  reforme   de    I' enseignement 
par  la  philosophic.     We  might  also  add   four  volumes  on 
La  philosophic  de   Platon  ;   Histoire  generate   de   la  philo- 
sophic ;  La  philosophic  de  Socrate,  and  a  book  on  Descartes. 
Almost  all  these  works  are  published  by  Alcan,  Colin,  or 
Hachette,  of  Paris. 

2  "  We  use  the  word  idea  or  thought  in  the  Cartesian 
sense,  as  expressing  states  of  consciousness  not  only  in  their 
mental  character,  but  also  as  possessing  the  feeling  and 
appetite  that  are  inseparable  from  them.     An  idea,  in  the 
narrowest  sense,  is  an  inward  representation  of  that  which 
is  or  which  may  b«,  a  state  oi  consciousness  representing 


no   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

From  the  days  of  Descartes,  thought  and  the 
mechanical  physical  phenomenon  have  been  set  in 
opposition  to  one  another  under  the  conditions  of 
an  irreconcilable  dualism.  The  mechanical  pheno- 
menon occurs  in  nature ;  the  conscious  subject  looks 
on,  but  has  no  way  of  acting  upon  it.  He  is  but 
a  passive  witness,  and  his  thoughts  are  only  the 
"  reflections,"  the  "  shadows  "  of  reality,  and  not 
"  forces "  that  can  play  a  part  in  the  general 
evolution. 

Spencer  never  saw  the  parlous  side  of  this  philo- 
sophy, but  fell  into  the  trap  like  everyone  else. 

Not  only  did  he  regard  the  mental  phenomenon 
(strictly  so  named)  as  the  merely  subjective  con- 
templation of  an  assumed  reality  independent  of 
that  contemplation,  but,  along  with  Huxley,  Bain, 
Maudsley,  he  allows  himself  to  be  convinced  that 
even  our  feelings  and  volitions  are  powerless  so  far 
as  the  mechanism  of  nature  and  life  is  concerned. 


an  object;  it  is,  as  Spinoza  would  say,  a  mode  of  thought. 
But  the  word  idea  may  be  also  used  in  a  sense  broad  enough 
to  include  all  states  of  consciousness  actually  or  virtually 
turned  back  upon  themselves.  These  two  senses  of  the 
word  idea  are  necessarily  connected.  No  sooner  is  a  state 
of  consciousness  consciously  apprehended  to  be  distinct, 
whether  it  be  an  emotion  of  pleasure  or  of  pain,  an  impulse, 
an  appetite,  or  a  volition,  than  it  becomes  a  form  of  con- 
sciousness capable  of  being  reflected  upon  itself  (eiSoy); 
besides,  any  state  of  consciousness  thus  perceived  exists 
more  or  less  for  a  subject,  and  is  more  or  less  representative 
of  an  object  :  we  have  no  pleasures  or  pains,  still  less  have 
we  appetites,  without  having  some  representation  of  them. 
It  is,  then,  quite  correct  to  call  ideas  all  states  of  conscious- 
ness so  far  as  they  are  inseparable  from  some  representation 
which  gives  them  a  form,  an  object,  and  makes  them  able 
to  be  reflected  upon  themselves  in  the  conscious  subject." 
— L'evolutionnisme  des  idees-forces,  Introduction,  pp.  xi,  xii. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   in 

"  The  whole  of  this  school  of  contemporary  psy- 
chologists tells  us  that  the  automatism  of  reflex 
actions,  already  described  by  Descartes  by  the 
words  undulatio  reflexa,  explains  everything  which 
our  complacency  ascribes  to  the  action  of  our  ideas, 
our  feelings,  and  our  wills."1 

1  The  page  from  which  these  lines  are  taken  must  be 
quoted  in  full,  for  it  gives  an  excellent  sketch  of  the  author's 
governing  idea,  and  exactly  defines  the  point  of  view  which 
he  takes  up  in  psychology.  He  writes:  "Huxley,  com- 
menting on  the  famous  doctrine  of  Descartes  as  to  the 
automatism  of  animals,  showed  his  hearers  a  frog  without 
the  two  lobes  of  the  brain,  nevertheless  performing  wonder- 
ful balancing  feats  to  keep  its  place  in  his  hand  without 
falling  in  spite  of  his  moving  it  in  various  directions.  If 
the  frog  were  a  philosopher,  Huxley  wittily  remarked,  it 
might  reason  thus:  '  I  feel  very  uncomfortable  and  on  the 
point  of  slipping  off;  therefore  I  put  out  my  claws  in  front 
of  me  to  make  sure.  Knowing  that  I  shall  fall  if  I  don't 
put  them  still  further  out,  I  make  them  sure  again,  and  my 
will  brings  about  all  these  fine  adjustments,  the  effect  of 
which  is  to  place  me  in  safety.'  But,  Huxley  concluded,  if 
the  frog  reasoned  thus,  it  would  be  wrong,  for,  in  fact,  it 
performs  everything  just  as  well  without  reason,  feeling,  or 
thought  of  any  kind :  animals  are,  therefore,  automata,  but 
conscious  automata. 

"  Man,  whom  Descartes  had  taken  care  to  place  apart, 
naturally  comes  under  the  general  definition.  There  is  a 
whole  school  of  contemporary  psychologists  to  tell  us  that 
the  automatism  of  reflex  actions,  already  described  by 
Descartes  with  the  words  undulatio  reflexa,  explains  every- 
thing which  our  complacency  ascribes  to  our  ideas,  our 
feelings,  and  our  volitions.  The  shape  of  the  problem  is 
new,  but  the  problem  itself  is  old.  If  we  were  to  go  back 
two  thousand  years  to  the  time  of  the  Greeks  and  the  days 
of  Socrates,  and  to  be  present  at  the  last  discourses  of  the 
sage  in  prison,  we  should  hear  the  same  problem  put  for- 
ward, and  two  solutions  indicated,  one  quite  mechanical, 
the  other  psychological.  Socrates,  indeed,  said  that  the 
supporters  of  the  universal  mechanical  theory,  if  they  were 
asked  why  he  was  sitting  in  prison  ready  to  drink  the  hem- 
lock, would  not  fail  to  answer: — It  is  because  Socrates' 
muscles,  acting  in  such  a  manner  on  his  bones  and  limbs, 
bring  about  such  and  such  a  position  of  body.  And 


112   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Were  this  really  the  case,  observes  Fouillee, 
consciousness  would  be  a  useless  accessory  in  the 
world,  and  therefore  it  is  high  time  for  it  to  have 
already  disappeared,  as  useless  organs  disappear 
through  atrophy.  But  this  has  not  occurred.  The 
psychological  doctrine  of  "  idea-reflections  "  is  an 

Socrates  added : — The  true  reason  is,  that  I  have  an  idea  of 
the  good,  and  that  I  prefer  death  to  living  in  infamy  as  a 
perjured  man. 

"  The  philosophers  of  to-day,  if  they  were  not  governed 
to  some  extent  by  feelings  of  respect,  would  not  fail  to 
compare  Socrates  with  Huxley's  philosophic  frog,  and  to 
say:  The  cause  you  appeal  to  is  not  a  real  one.  You  are 
the  victim  of  a  delusion  when  you  think  you  are  doing 
something  for  an  idea,  a  feeling,  an  act  of  will:  you 
take  a  reflex  action  of  the  mechanism  for  the  spring  that 
drives  it.  Granted,  the  delusion  is  a  natural  and  even  a 
universal  one.  All  of  us  fancy,  indeed,  that  we  choose  what 
we  eat  from  an  anticipation  of  pleasure  ;  we  imagine  that 
the  feeling  of  satisfaction  or  of  disgust  is  what  governs  our 
choice,  and  think  that  our  voluntary  acts  are  the  result  of 
some  desire.  But  desire  and  aversion,  pleasure  and  pain 
are  merely  the  psychological  signs  of  bodily  movements 
which  alone  are  effective.  If,  then,  you  ask :  Has  the  feeling 
of  hunger  or  thirst  anything  to  do  with  Socrates'  movement 
to  seize  the  cup  and  drink  the  hemlock,  or  would  the  same 
result  have  come  about  without  any  feeling  of  the  kind  ? 
Spencer  answers  in  the  same  way  as  Huxley,  Bain,  and 
Maudsley.  The  facts  of  consciousness  are  the  '  subjective 
and  accessory  aspects  '  of  the  living  automaton.  Get  rid  of 
pleasure,  pain,  desire,  and  thought,  and  the  machinery  of 
vitality  will  go  on  just  in  the  same  way,  owing  to  the 
effects  of  purely  natural  forces;  only  we  shall  be  able  quite 
rightly  to  say  of  them  what  Malebranche  said  wrongly  of 
his  dog:  '  It  does  not  feel.'  We,  indeed,  do  feel  (and  so 
did  Malebranche's  dog),  and  we  even  think;  what  can  we 
infer,  except  that  we  are  conscious  automata  ? 

"  Thus,  in  this  philosophy,  consciousness  is  the  paralytic, 
and  the  body  is  the  blind  man;  only  the  blind  man  walks 
just  as  if  he  could  see,  and  the  paralytic  sees  in  vain,  for 
he  does  not  lead  the  blind  man,  who  would  walk  just  as 
well  without  him." — L'evolutionnisme  des  idees-forces,  pp. 
viii-xi. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   113 

arbitrary  one.  The  reasons  it  relies  upon  do  not 
justify  it.1 

The  doctrine  arises  from  the  fact  that,  by  an 
illegitimate  abstraction,  the  idea  is  considered  solely 
from  a  statical  point  of  view,  as  if  it  had  a  certain 
qualitative  content,  constituting  it  thus,  and  not 
otherwise ;  whereas  it  should  also  be  regarded  from 
a  dynamic  point  of  view,  as  a  condition  or  cause  of 
change  in  the  whole  system  of  which  it  forms  a  part . 

As  long  as  we  confine  ourselves  to  the  former 
point  of  view,  "  as  long  as  ideas  are  only  credited 
with  the  simple  representative  content  which  is 
actually  presented  to  consciousness,  so  long  as  we 
picture  them  to  ourselves  as  inert  imprints  or  photo- 
graphic likenesses,  any  notion  of  a  psychical 
dynamism — i.e.,  of  a  mutual  interaction  of  psychic 
facts  which  may  make  one  appear  and  another 
disappear — in  a  word,  any  notion  of  idea-forces 
becomes  inconceivable.  But  this  exclusively  stati- 
cal way  of  representing  ideas  and  facts  of  conscious- 
ness is  a  materialist  metaphor  which  the  psychologist 
has  no  right  to  set  up  as  a  principle .  From  the  point 
of  view  of  consciousness,  we  may  and  must  conceive 
every  state  of  consciousness  as  containing  in  itself 
conditions  of  change  so  far  as  other  states  of  con- 
sciousness are  concerned." 

Furthermore,  conscious  activity  is  not  only  a 
psychic  force,  it  is  the  only  force  properly  so 
called,  for,  from  a  mechanical  point  of  view,  there 
are  no  forces,  there  are  only  movements  and  mathe- 
matical formulas  expressing  the  succession  of  move- 
ments. Effectiveness,  efficient  causation,  action, 

1  L'tvolutionnisme  des  idees-forces,  pp.  xvii.-xxix. 

8 


H4   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

force — all  this  is  beyond  the  mechanical,  as  it  is 
outside  the  province  of  logic,  and  can  only  be  thought 
of  as  psychic. 

To  the  theory  of  idea-reflections,  then,  that  of 
idea-forces  must  be  opposed.  According  to  the 
latter,  all  states  of  consciousness,  representations, 
feelings,  volitions,  are  factors  contributing  to  mental, 
and  even  to  physical,  evolution.1 

"  When,  for  instance,  pain  makes  me  draw  away 
from  anything,  then,  indeed,  to  consciousness  pain 
is  the  explanation  of  such  aversion,  for  in  itself  pain 
has  certain  indispensable  conditions  belonging  to  the 
internal  change  which  is  called  aversion.  Any  other 
explanation  has  nothing  to  do  with  psychology.  The 
notions  of  influence,  action,  efficacy,  force,  are  entirely 
borrowed  from  the  psychological  standpoint.  It  is 
the  impulse  aroused  by  desire,  or  the  repulsion 
caused  by  aversion,  that  gives  me  an  idea  of  inward 
constraint  and  of  a  resisting  force.  Psychology 
cannot  abandon  this  point  of  view  without  com- 
mitting a  kind  of  suicide ;  it  must  refer  materialist 
hypotheses,  as  well  as  spiritualistic  hypotheses,  to 
metaphysics. 

'  The  conceptions  of  feeling-forces,  appetite- 
forces,  idea-forces,  are  therefore  essential  to 
psychology."2 

Granted:  states  of  consciousness  are  forces,  but 
all  natural  states  are  not  conscious.  There  are 
beings  possessed  of  "  ideas,"  and  others  without 
them.  How,  then,  are  these  various  kinds  of 
elements  to  be  combined  into  the  single  synthesis 
demanded  by  a  philosophy  ? 

1  Loc.  cit.,  p.  xvi.  2  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  xxxi,  xxxii. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   115 

Did  not  Spencer  himself  admit  that  "  between  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness  and  physical  occur- 
rences there  is  no  visible  or  conceivable  community 
of  nature  "  ? 

And  did  not  Fouillee,  in  his  answer  to  the  English 
philosopher,  say:  "  The  mental  could  not  be  implied 
in  factors  which  ex  hypothesi  were  entirely  mechani- 
cal, nor  could  it  be  the  effect  of  causes  upon  which 
it  cannot  be  shown  to  be  dependent.  .  .  .  Amongst 
your  primary  data  you  thought  you  had  nothing 
but  movement  and  matter;  you  are  better  off  than 
you  thought,  for  here  is  mind  "  ? 

Must  we  then  give  up  1he  fundamental  unity 
which  metaphysics  invincibly  pursues,  or  must  we 
put  the  mental  among  the  facts  of  evolution,  and 
say  that  there  is,  within  elementary  matter  itself, 
"  something  psychic,  a  germ  of  feeling  and 
appetite  "  P1 

To  give  up  the  idea  of  reducing  nature  to  unity 
is  an  impossibility.  "  Such  an  alternative  would 
condemn  us,  in  fact,  to  an  unintelligible  dualism.'" 

"  After  assimilating  to  ourselves  other  men  and 
animals,  including  polyps,  which  are  almost  indis- 
tinguishable from  plants,  we  ought  suddenly  to 
stop  short  at  the  latter,  and  say :  Here  begins  world 
number  two,  and  it  has  nothing  in  common  as  to 
its  primary  elements  with  world  number  one.  Let 
us  then  draw  a  great  line  to  mark  off  the  world  that 
has  no  feeling,  and  is  without  any  sort  of  appetite, 
from  the  world  that  feels  and  tries.  Then,  coming 
to  the  mineral  kingdom,  we  shall  do  the  same  thing 
over  again,  and  set  up  a  new  and  insurmountable 
1  Loc.  cit.,  p.  li. 


n6   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

wall.  Nature  will  thus  be  divided  into  separata 
regions  by  yawning  dykes.  We  shall  now  only 
have  to  explain  how,  from  the  mineral  furnace 
which  the  glowing  earth  once  was,  vegetable  life 
arose,  and  next  animal  life,  and,  lastly,  man.  It  is 
true  that  we  may  still  summon  Jehovah  to  help  us 
by  bringing  forth  the  different  kingdoms  of  nature, 
and  even  the  different  species  in  each  kingdom,  each 
one  created  by  its  own  distinct  fiat,  or  by  a  special 
miracle.  But  then  the  monistic  bond  which  is 
refused  to  nature  is  carried  higher  up  to  an  eternal 
Man.  Because  we  were  unwilling  to  project  into 
nature  a  few  of  our  own  rudimentary  feelings  and 
appetites,  we  project  our  developed  mind  and  con- 
sidered will  into  the  being  of  a  Demiourgos  or 
Creator.  This  is,  indeed,  again  an  induction,  but 
a  kind  of  backward  one,  and  one  that  runs  counter 
to  the  inductions  of  psychology,  physiology,  and 
every  other  science."1 

Still,  from  the  second  alternative  we  cannot  escape. 
Since  unity  must  exist  in  nature,  and  evolution  has 
to  reveal  its  various  aspects ;  and  further,  since  it  is 
regarded  as  established  that  the  mental  cannot 
arise  from  the  physical,  nor  thought  from  matter 
and  motion,  there  is  only  one  expedient  left,  and 
that  is  to  assign  to  the  mental  and  to  the  physical,  to 
thought  and  to  matter,  a  single  original  substratum. 

But  how  is  this  unity  to  be  brought  about,  since 
all  the  energies  of  consciousness  seem  to  protest 
against  it  ? 

The  repugnance  we  feel  against   coming  down 

1  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  xlviii,  xlix. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   117 

from  the  mental  to  the  physical  by  a  continuous 
slope,  and  to  making  them  fundamentally  unite, 
comes  from  a  logical  defect  already  condemned 
above,  a  defect  of  all  psychologies — i.e.,  a  narrow 
and  superficial  interpretation  of  conscious  activities. 
We  are  accustomed  to  regard  consciousness  as  an 
epiphenomenon  without  any  real  connection  with 
nature,  as  a  simple  "  illumination  "  of  the  physical, 
which,  if  it  were  unilluminated,  would  go  on  just  as 
it  does  to-day,  the  extrinsic  circumstance  of  its 
illumination  alone  excepted.  But,  this  interpreta- 
tion of  the  content  and  the  role  of  consciousness 
must  be  cast  aside.  Consciousness  is  not  something 
outside  of  the  physical,  an  accessory  superimposed 
to  illuminate  it;  it  is  the  physical  itself,  its  inner 
spring,  the  dynamic  principle  of  all  its  energies. 

To  understand  this,  we  must  not  begin  with 
intellectual  acts,  "  for  the  intelligence  is  par  excellence 
the  clearness,  the  distinction,  the  differentiation, 
the  complex  integration  of  the  elements  of  conscious- 
ness." But,  evolution  proceeds  from  the  indistinct 
to  the  distinct,  from  the  simple  to  the  complex,  and 
not  inversely,  from  the  complex  to  the  simple,  from 
the  differentiated  to  the  undifferentiated.  At  the 
starting-point  of  consciousness  we  have  not,  then, 
to  put  absolute  unconsciousness,  "  for  zeros  of 
consciousness  would  never  beget  consciousness," 
but  "  subconscious  "  elements — i.e.  "  indistinct 
elements  of  consciousness.  It  is  natural  to  look  for 
them  in  the  sensations,  not  in  those  that  are  clearly 
differentiated  and  integrated  in  the  five  outward 
senses,  but  in  the  inward  and  vital  sensations, 
arising  from  the  inward  organs.  Even  among  these 


n8   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

sensations,  we  must  get  rid  of  those  which  have  too 
distinctive  qualities,  the  signs  of  higher  differentia- 
tion and  interior  integration.  The  fundamental 
qualities  in  the  sensations  are  those  that  are  not  re- 
presentative, but  only  affective,  the  various  modes  of 
pleasure  and  pain.  And  even  these  modes  denote 
something  too  definite,  and  therefore  too  developed. 
In  pleasure  and  pain  we  must  consider  only  the  begin- 
nings of  feeling  well  or  unwell.  Thus  we  succeed 
in  imagining  a  vague  sense  of  well-being  or  of  being 
out  of  sorts;  and  this  is  an  element  which  is  both 
sensational  and  emotional.  This  element  in  turn 
involves  a  more  or  less  dull  reaction,  the  character- 
istic of  which  is  to  be  found  in  appetite,  in  aspira- 
tion towards,  or  aversion  from,  anything,  with  its 
correlative  movements  to  or  fro.  The  foundation 
of  the  various  appetites  lies  in  the  general  appetite 
for  life — the  last  thing  to  disappear  in  an  animal, 
either  in  its  morbid  or  normal  state.  Hence  we  see 
that  elementary  mental  changes  must  be  called 
appetitions,  inseparable  from  the  elementary  modi- 
fications which  give  rise  to  the  sensations,  and  from 
those  elementary  emotions  that  constitute  vital 
well-being  or  unwellness.  .  .  .  This  '  appetitive 
process,'  with  its  '  three  moments,'  appetition, 
sensation,  emotion,  '  a  process  both  mental  and 
mechanical,'  which  we  shall  adopt  as  the  starting- 
point  of  all  psychological  interpretation,  seems  to 
us  alone  to  offer  the  necessary  and  sufficient  charac- 
teristics of  a  true  interpretation.  ...  It  is  only 
when  one  has  thus  restored  to  movement,  even  of 
the  most  primitive  kind,  its  mental  side,  or  rather 
its  mental  substratum  (sensation,  emotion,  appeti- 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   119 

tion),  that  one  can  admit  the  gradual  evolution  of 
movements,  on  the  one  hand  under  the  form  of 
instinctive  acts,  then  of  reflex  actions  properly  so 
called,  and  on  the  other  hand  under  that  of  volun- 
tary movements,  according  as  the  conscious  element 
increases  or  decreases.  The  interpretation  of 
psychological  facts  is,  then,  in  our  eyes  not  only 
mechanical,  but  also  and  above  all  appetitive: 
omnia  mechanic e  fiunt,  '  all  things  are  done  mechani- 
cally,' but  all  things  are  also  done  by  appetition, 
at  least  among  sentient  beings.  Here  there  are 
not  two  '  aspects,'  but  a  single  reality,  which  is 
directly  revealed  to  itself  by  appetite,  and  which 
indirectly  represents  to  itself  its  relations  with  its 
environment  under  the  form  of  mechanism.  Appe- 
tite, therefore,  remains  the  mainspring  of  psychology, 
and  mechanical  laws  are  only  the  laws  of  the  mutual 
relations  of  appetite  and  its  environment."1 

Such,  according  to  Fouillee,  is  the  explanation  of 
the  world  unity,  and  of  the  evolution  of  all  beings 
from  a  single  primary  "  substratum,"  appetite. 

Here  it  is  not  hard  to  observe  the  influence  of 
Schopenhauer's  pantheism  on  the  mind  of  the 
French  philosopher.  Schopenhauer's  teaching  is 
grafted  upon  Kant's  critique.  The  Koenigsberg 
philosopher  had  submitted  the  whole  kingdom  of 

1  Loc.  oil.,  p.  xxii.  Elsewhere  Fouillee  writes:  "  The 
mechanical  theory  and  the  mental  theory  may  be  definitely 
reduced  to  sensibility  and  activity.  What  is  a  priori  in 
consciousness,  is  not  thought,  but  feeling  and  action.  Kant's 
universal  principles  are  but  the  outward  extension  of  our 
inward  organization.  Fashioned  by  the  macrocosm,  the 
microcosm  by  its  reactions  expresses  the  great  world  around 
it,  and  even  reconstructs  it  in  turn.  .  .  ." — La  liberte  et 
le  dtterminisme ,  p.  188. 


120   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

knowledge,  in  the  criteriological  region,  to  the 
primacy  of  the  practical  reason.  Schopenhauer 
transports  the  theory  from  the  domain  of  meta- 
physics, and  maintains  that  the  basis  of  all  things 
is  will.  The  will,  the  will  to  live,  Der  Wille  zum 
Leben,  is  the  internal  impulse  which  everything 
obeys,  and  man  with  his  conscious  representations, 
and  animals  with  their  feelings,  and  the  growing 
plant,  and  the  falling  stone,  are  so  many  phenomenal 
graduated  objective  manifestations  of  the  universal 
will  "  like  insensibly  diminishing  degrees  of  light." 
This  internal  principle  of  beings  is  not  representable 
to  consciousness,  because  representation  is  sub- 
ordinate to  a  priori  forms  of  time,  space,  and 
causation;  but,  qua  noumenon,  the  will  escapes  from 
the  laws  governing  our  forms  of  representation;  it 
is  universal,  always  identical  with  itself,  free,  and 
infinite. 

The  x  of  the  Kantian  metaphysics  is  therefore  got 
rid  of;  the  thing-in-itself  is  the  cosmic  will,  and 
consciousness  is  the  stage  on  which  it  makes  its  ap- 
pearance. Certain  slight  nuances  apart,  Fouillee's 
"  appetite  "  is  Schopenhauer's  Wille  zum  Leben. 

"  That  which  in  ourselves,"  he  says,  "  seems  to 
come  nearest  to  the  impenetrable  basis  of  all  things, 
is  the  immediate  enjoyment  of  existence  and  of  action, 
whereof  happiness  should  be  the  ideal  fulfilment. 
There  is  a  moment  in  which  we  are  immediately 
aware  of  our  existence,  in  which  life  is  exercised  in 
self -enjoyment.  ..."  This  "  moment,"  in  which 
only  an  "  inward  "  remains,  wherein  the  "  abstract 
notion  of  an  end  properly  so-called  "  is  replaced  by 
the  "  sense  of  concrete  and  immediate  possession 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   121 

aware  of  its  own  action,"  is  apparently  in  substance 
Schopenhauer's  Wille  zum  Leben.  Or,  may  it  not 
be  a  more  or  less  vague  glimpse  of  the  old  notion 
of  the  inward  finality  of  nature,  the  Aristotelian 
idea  of  evep^a  or  eWeXe^eta  p1 

The  "  appetitive  process "  marks  a  reaction 
against  stark  mechanical  theories,  which  refuse  to 
see  in  nature  anything  beyond  necessary  efficient 
causes,  and  it  provides  a  basis  of  reconciliation 
between  materialism  and  rationalism,  the  conflicting 
schools  that  arose  from  the  Cartesian  psychology. 

The  dyke  yawning  between  movement  and 
thought  is  filled  up,  for  both  have  a  common  origin, 
and  therefore  must  have  a  nature  that  is  funda- 
mentally one. 

But  beyond  mechanical  and  conscious  phenomena, 
does  not  the  human  mind  attain  to  the  transcendent, 
the  Ego,  the  absolute  ?  Positivist  idealism  per- 
suades us,  however,  that  we  perceive  nothing 
beyond  phenomena.  Will  the  theory  of  "  idea- 
forces  "  stop  short  at  this  new  problem  ? 

Spencer  inferred  the  reality  of  a  fundamental 
substratum,  the  common  source  of  bodily  energies 
and  of  conscious  activity.  He  judged  that  absolute 
idealism  was  untenable,  and  that  it  must  be  "  trans- 
figured." His  positivism  did  not  shrink  from  the 
affirmation  of  a  transcendent  world,  the  nature  of 
which  he  was  satisfied  to  regard  as  unknowable. 

At  the  beginning  of  his  first  book,  Uavenir  de  la 
metaphysique,  Fouillee  appeared  to  be  almost  in 
favour  of  this  Spencerian  semi-positivism.  In  fact, 
1  La  liberte  el  le  deterntinisme,  p.  23. 


122       CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

it  contains  some  well-written  pages  on  the  "  meta- 
physical needs  "  of  man's  nature.1  They  give  one 
an  anticipation  of  a  realist  belief  in  transcendent 
realities.  But  as  the  revelation  of  his  mind  pro- 
ceeds, he  allows  himself  to  fall  more  and  more  under 
the  influence  of  Kant's  critique,  and  finally  declares 
plainly  that  "  the  limits  of  possible  experience,  of 
possible  consciousness,  are  also  the  limits  of  con- 
ceivable existence.  As  for  an  unknowable  tran- 
scendent, neither  science  nor  ethics  needs  to  trouble 
at  all  about  it."2 

But  then,  whence  comes  our  undeniable  belief  in 
the  absolute  ?  And  "  what  is,  and  whence  comes  the 
irreducible  and  fundamental  thing-in-itself ,  which 
cannot  be  a  long  way  off  me,  since  it  is,  in  fine, 
myself  "  ? 

It  is  the  idea-force,  always  the  idea-force,  that 
must  furnish  the  solution  of  these  engrossing 
problems. 

"It  is  certain,"  says  Fouillee,  "  that  the  Ego  is 
an  idea,  and  an  idea  that  tends  to  realize  itself  by 
the  very  fact  of  conceiving  itself."3  The  idea  of 

1  "  Man  is  a  metaphysical  animal.  Scientific  questions 
are  not  the  only  ones;  others  press  upon  man's  mind: 
whether  the  visible  world  suffices  or  does  not  suffice  unto 
itself,  whether  there  is  a  first  cause  of  all  things,  whether 
this  first  cause,  if  it  exist,  must  be  conceived  as  material, 
as  conscious,  or  as  absolutely  indeterminable,  whether  the 
world  had  a  beginning  or  not  .  .  .  ,  what  are  our  nature, 
origin,  and  destiny  ?" — L'avenir  de  la  metaphysique,  pp.  12, 
13,  16. 

3  "  When  the  psychic  element  has  once  been  re-established 
in  the  course  of  reality,  the  need  of  a  transcendent  and  un- 
knowable world  will  no  longer  be  felt,  and  the  whole  of 
reality  will  be  regarded  as  homogeneous  and  one." — Le 
mouvement  idealiste,  Introduction,  p.  xlvii. 

3  Psychologie  des  idees-forces,  II.,  p.  69. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   123 

the  Ego  creates  the  Ego,  just  as  the  idea  of  a  one 
and  identical  Ego  creates  the  unity  and  identity 
of  that  Ego. 

"  The  idea  of  the  simplicity  of  the  Ego,  in  con- 
ceiving itself,  tends  to  produce  an  approximation 
to  such  simplicity.  ...  A  certain  connexion  and 
unity  is  necessary  to  life,  whether  organic  or  mental. 
.  .  .  The  living  being,  after  willing  to  be  and  to 
live,  wills  to  be  and  to  live  intensely,  and  therefore  in 
a  way  which  is  an  ordered,  harmonious,  one.  Hence 
it  desires,  while  becoming  gradually  conscious  of  its 
feelings,  to  feel  itself  one,  and  then  to  think  itself 
"one."1  Lastly  "it  is  through  the  representation  of 
my  identical  Ego  that  I  realize  a  relative  identity."2 

And  what  is  my  Ego,  fundamentally  ?  Is  it 
something  individual,  or  is  it  merely  a  part  of 
universal  existence  ?  We  know  not. 

"  My  consciousness  may  be  consciousness  of  uni- 
versal existence,"  my  thought  may  be  a  "  concen- 
tration, at  a  particular  moment,  of  the  thought 
pervading  the  whole  universe."  "  We  look  for  the 
Ego,  either  in  the  phenomena  whereof  it  appears  to 
be  the  concrete  harmony,  or  else  in  the  universal 
being,  which  is  no  •  my  thought,  but  thought 

itself:'3 

Echoing  Fici  .^  so      *•  as  to  claim 

for  the  idea  tht  !<•  "  We  ought 

to  desire,"  he  \  w  ought  to  will 

God  to  exist.  ^  ought  >o  act  as  if  He 

existed.     If  the  Sterne  ideal  of  goodness  and  love 

1  Psychologie  des  id"  s-for^~,  pp.  75  -77. 

-  Ibid.,  pp.  79,  80. 

3  La  liberte  et  le  determinisme,  pp.  76  -90. 


124   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

is  as  yet  unrealized,  it  must  be  created.  At  any 
rate,  let  it  exist  within  me,  within  us,  within  all  of 
us,  even  if  it  does  not  exist  in  all  the  world  !  Per- 
haps it  will  then  come  into  existence  in  the  universe 
itself.  No,  man  cannot  say  with  certainty,  either 
in  the  name  of  ethics  or  of  metaphysics,  that  God 
exists ;  still  less  can  he  say  that,  God  does  not  exist ; 
but  he  ought  to  say,  both  in  word  and  thought,  and 
in  act,  Let  there  be  God  !  Fiat  Deus  /" 

In  conclusion,  what  are  the  essential  features  of 
Alfred  Fouillee's  philosophy,  as  shown  in  the  fore- 
going analysis  ?  Between  the  mechanical  and 
spiritualistic  theories  Descartes  had  set  up  an  irre- 
concilable opposition,  and  Fouillee  revolts  against 
this  opposition.  This  dualism  is  unintelligible,  he 
declares .  There  must  be  a  compound  unity  in  beings . 

Conscious  mind  cannot  be  superadded  to  matter 
in  motion,  nor  the  mental  make  a  sudden  irruption 
into  the  physical;  but  the  physical  is  itself  impreg- 
nated with  the  mental.  The  mental  is  the  primary 
mainspring  of  universal  evolution. 

How  is  this  evolution  to  be  explained  ?  It  will 
only  be  explained,  if  we  cast  to  the  winds  the  old 
prejudice  which  made  of  mind  a  kind  of  reflection 
or  illumination  of. reality.  The  mind  is  only  the 
final  manifestation  of  conscious  life;  emotion  pre- 
cedes it,  and  emotion  is  itself  preceded  by  appetition. 

'  There  is  no  other  way  of  entering  into  the  pos- 
session of  the  real  than  by  feeling.  .  .  .  We  can 
only  understand  reality  by  analogy  with  what  we 
call  feeling,  desire.  Hence  comes  the  tendency  to 
put  into  things,  as  an  inward  side  which  is  truly 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   125 

psychic  and  no  longer  physical,  something  analogou« 
to  our  sensations,  pleasures,  pains,  and  desires."1 

Appetite,  an  inward  and  dimly  conscious  tendency, 
this  is  the  primary  substratum  of  beings,  this  is  the 
original  source  of  reality.  Distinct  consciousness 
in  animals  and  men  is  but  the  crown  of  the  appetitive 
process. 

This  finalism,  after  the  manner  of  Schopenhauer, 
marks  a  reaction  against  the  exclusive  dominance 
of  efficient  causes  in  nature,  as  the  affirmation  of 
the  part  assigned  to  the  mental  marked  a  rebellion 
of  the  new  philosophy  against  materialism. 

For  the  rest,  Fouillee  is  and  remains  an  idealist. 
He  does  not  hesitate  to  write:  "  The  only  principle 
that  is  evident  is :  Thought  exists,  there  is  thought, 
there  is  being,  there  is  consciousness."  He  is  also 
positivist,  not  only  in  the  weakened  sense  of  Spencer 
who  believed  in  an  Unknowable,  although  he 
declared  that  he  could  not  discover  its  nature,  but 
he  is  radically  a  positivist,  denying  any  transcendent 
beyond,  any  substance,  Ego,  or  absolute. 

The  Ego  and  the  transcendental  absolute  are 
creations  of  thought.  And  this  final  conclusion  dis- 
covers for  us  in  Fouillee's  idealism  that  tincture  of 
pantheism  which  we  have  already  seen  brought  out 
in  his  monistic  statements  about  the  universe. 


Wilhelm  Wundt 

Wundt's  ambitions  were  above  all  of  a  scientific 
character.     To    study    facts,    physiological    facts, 
physical  facts,  psychological  facts ;  to  observe  them 
1  La  liberte  et  le  determinisme,  p.  339. 


126   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

by  themselves,  to  press  them  closely,  to  disentangle 
their  elements,  and  to  measure  these  alike  in  their 
intensity  and  in  their  duration,  to  study  the  "  psychic 
compounds  "  formed  by  them  and  revealed  to  us  by 
experience  under  the  form  of  representations  and 
emotions,  to  fix  the  empirical  laws  of  their  associa- 
tion and  recurrence;  such  is  the  dominant  interest 
of  him  who  was,  if  not  the  creator,  yet  surely  the 
most  vigorous  promoter  of  psycho-physiology. 

But  Wundt  is  not  only  a  man  of  science,  he  is  also 
a  philosopher. 

One  can  see  from  his  Essays,  his  System  der  Philo- 
sophic, his  three  volumes  of  Logik,  and  in  his  Ethik, 
that  he  does  not  share  the  disdain  for  philoso- 
phical speculation  entertained  by  so  many  scientific 
men.  Along  with  Volkelt1  and  Paulsen2  he  vigorously 
supported  an  effort  made  by  Lotze,  Fechner,  and 
Lange,  in  favour  of  a  more  scientific  conception  of 
philosophy  and  of  a  rehabilitation  of  metaphysics. 

To  him  philosophy  is  the  outcome  of  science,  and 
it  gradually  emerges  from  his  scientific  labours. 
He  defines  it  as  "  The  systemizing  of  the  general 
knowledge  furnished  by  particular  sciences,"  or 
again,  as  "  The  co-ordination  of  particular  kinds  of 
knowledge  into  a  general  conception  of  the  world  and 
of  life,  which  shall  be  in  harmony  with  the  require- 
ments of  reason  and  the  needs  of  consciousness."3 

1  Volkelt,  Ueber  die  Moglichkeit  der  Metaphysik,  Leipzig, 
1884. 

a  Paulsen,  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie,  Berlin,  1896, 
4te  Aufl. 

3  Wundt,  System  der  Philosophie,  Leipzig,  1889,  S.  19, 
21.  Not  to  mention  the  many  articles  published  since  1881 
in  his  Review,  Philosophische  Studien,  we  may  note  among 
his  writings:  Handbuch  der  medizinischen  Physik,  Stuttgart, 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   127 

He  pays  attention  to  the  history  of  systems, 
trying  to  discover  in  them  the  progress  of  philo- 
sophic thought  and  the  slow  development  of  the 
principal  ideas  on  the  synthesis  of  which  he  is  so 
patiently  working.  All  the  doctrines  which  are  so 
prevalent  in  our  own  time  he  has  thoroughly 
mastered  and  has  steeped  himself  in  them,  but  he 
has  made  them  his  own  by  personal  endeavour,  and 
shows  a  tendency  to  throw  them  over  on  more  than 
one  point.  After  Kant,  he  chiefly  owes  his  philo- 
sophical training  to  Herbart.  This  he  acknow- 
ledges in  the  preface  to  his  Grundzilge  der  physio- 
logischen  Psychologic.. 

To  Descartes,  Locke,  Berkeley,  and  Kant,  he 
owes  his  idealist  turn  of  mind.  '  The  world  is  only 
made  up  of  our  representations,"  he  writes;  and 
when  at  last  he  asks  himself  what  the  psychology 
of  the  future  might  be  and  ought  to  be,  he  lays 
upon  it  this  condition — that  it  is  never  to  contradict 
the  ideological  and  critical  theory  to  which  he  is  so 
inviolably  true. 


1867;  Untersuchungen  zur  Mechanik  der  N erven  und  Nerven- 
centern,  Stuttgart,  1876;  Lehrbuch  der  Physiologie  des 
Menschen,  4  Aufl.,  Stuttgart,  1878  ;  Logik,  i  Bd. ;  All- 
gemeine  Logik  und  Erkenntnisstheorie,  1906,  2  Bde.  ;  Logik 
der  exakten  Wissenschaften,  1907,  3  Bde. ;  Logik  der  Geistes- 
wissenschaften;  Ethik,  Stuttgart,  1903,  2  Bde.  ;  Essays, 
Leipzig,  1906 ;  Grundziige  der  physiologischen  Psychologic, 
5  Aufl.,  3  Bde.,  Leipzig,  1902-1903;  Vorlesungen  iiber 
Menschen  u.  Thierseele,  4  Aufl.,  Hamburg,  1906;  Grund- 
riss  der  Psychologie,  8  Aufl.,  Leipzig,  1907 ;  Einleitung  in 
die  Philosophie,  Leipzig,  1906 ;  System  der  Philosophic, 
2  Bde.,  Leipzig,  1906;  Volkerpsychologie,  Leipzig;  Sprache, 
1904,  2  Bde.;  Mythus  und  Religion,  1905-1906,  3  Bde.; 
Sitte  (?).  E.  Konig  and  R.  Eisler  published  monographs  on 
Wundt  at  Leipzig,  1901,  1902. 


128   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

And  yet  Wundt's  idealism  does  not  exclude  a 
certain  kind  of  realism.  "  It  is  impossible,"  he 
says,  "  to  deny  to  the  objects  of  our  thoughts  a 
certain  being  of  their  own."  And  elsewhere: 
"  The  subject-matter  of  psychology  is  the  data  of 
experience,  as  provided  immediately  to  the  intuition 
of  consciousness.  Hence  psychology  is  independent 
of  all  sorts  of  metaphysical  hypotheses,  excepting 
one — 4.e.,  the  hypothesis  that  denies  the  reality  of 
our  states  of  consciousness  and  makes  out  that  they 
are  illusive  deceptions."1 

Hence  the  immediate  data  of  experience  are  real. 
But  the  concrete  data  of  experience  imply  two 
inseparable  but  distinct  elements :  the  content,  and 
the  apprehension  of  such  content,  the  object  of  con- 
sciousness, and  the  conscious  subject.  The  subjec- 
tive point  of  view  is  that  of  psychology  ;  the  objective 
point  of  view  is  that  of  the  natural  sciences. 

Psychology  investigates  the  concrete  data  of 
consciousness  in  their  relations  with  the  subject. 
The  inward  experience  of  the  psychologist  is,  then, 
in  the  strictest  meaning  of  the  word,  immediate. 

Natural  science  gets  rid  of  the  subject  as  far  as 
possible,  and  tries  to  determine  the  nature  and  the 
reciprocal  relations  of  objects.  Thus  it  touches 
experience  less  immediately  than  psychology.  The 
psychologist  regards  the  data  of  experience  directly, 
by  intuition ;  the  observer  of  nature  considers  them 
rather  by  an  ideal  (mental)  process,  and  therefore 
mediately.  The  effect  of  this  procedure  proper  to 
the  science  of  nature  is,  that  the  objects  ideally 

1  Ueber  die  Definition  der  Psychologic  (Philosophische 
Studien,  1896,  S.  22). 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   129 

detached  from  the  concrete  reality  to  which  they 
belong  in  consciousness  are  as  it  were  left  hanging 
in  the  void,  and  the  observer's  mind  is  driven  to 
ascribe  to  them  a  substratum,  such  as  matter  or 
the  like.  These  are  but  subsidiary  notions  (Hulfs- 
begriffe)  with  a  hypothetical  significance,  and  psy- 
chology, the  science  of  immediate  experience,  can 
do  entirely  without  them. 

Thus  psychology  is,  by  definition,  the  strictly 
immediate  science  of  the  concrete  data  of  con- 
sciousness.1 

But  these  data  do  not  present  themselves  as 
objects  possessing  permanent  properties,  but  as  a 
series  of  occurrences,  a  chain  of  acts.  And  to  these 
acts  psychology  is  devoted.  "  The  theory  of  actu- 
ality," says  Wundt,  "  means  nothing  but  this. 
Thereby  I  do  not  intend  to  maintain  an  interpreta- 
tive hypothesis  of  psychic  processes,  I  confine 
myself  to  the  attestation  of  a  property  which,  in 
fact,  belongs  to  them. 

"  I  ask  for  the  immediate  data  of  consciousness 
to  be  taken  for  what  they  are,  as  acts,  the  con- 
nections between  which  we  endeavour  to  under- 
stand and  to  interpret,  and  this  I  regard  as  the 
primary  law  of  psychological  method. 

"  I  only  speak  of  a  theory  of  actuality  to  mark  my 
opposition  to  the  older  conception  of  psychology, 
which  I  call  '  the  theory  of  substantiality.'  ' 
Formerly,  indeed,  psychology  was  defined  as  the 
science  of  the  soul,  and  psychologists,  materialists 
as  well  as  spiritualists,  looked  for  the  explanation 
of  psychic  acts  to  a  substratum  which  was  believed 

1  Philosophische  Studien,  S.  23,  24,  46. 


130 

to  be  entirely  different — i.e.,  to  a  soul-substance. 
But  since  substances  do  not  fall  directly  within  the 
reach  of  consciousness,  the  psychologist  ought  not 
to  deny  or  affirm  them,  nor  can  he  do  so.1  Psycho- 
logy is  the  science  of  immediate  experience,  and 
"  metaphysical  hypotheses  "  are  outside  of  it.2 

To  what  conclusions  does  this  study  of  a  series 
of  acts,  passing  beneath  the  eye  of  consciousness, 
lead  ?  They  may  be  summed  up  in  a  theory 
which,  in  opposition  to  the  intellectualism  of  the 
older  psychologists,  Wundt  calls  psychological  volun- 
tarism. 

Wherever  we  trace  the  influence  of  the  Cartesian 
psychology,  there  we  find  outward  and  inward  ex- 
perience opposed  to  one  another  as  antagonistic 
procedures.  To  outward  experience  acquired  by 
the  outward  senses  was  attributed  the  knowledge  of 
natural  objects  possessing  permanent  qualities, 
independent  of  the  changes  momentarily  undergone 
by  the  subject  who  regarded  them.  To  inward 
experience,  the  source  of  which  lay  in  the  inward 
sense,  were  referred  the  states  of  the  subject. 
Natural  sciences  were  conceived  to  have  as  their 
object  the  data  of  outward  experience ;  psychology, 
those  of  inward  experience. 

And  this  method  was  pushed  further  still.  *As  the 
objects  of  the  inner  senses  were  taken  to  be  copies 
or  likenesses  of  outward  objects,  the  former  were 
credited  with  the  permanent  objective  properties 
which  had  already  been  ascribed  to  the  latter. 
Hence  it  was  generally  concluded  that  "  conscious 

1  Philosophische  Studien,  S.  36. 

2  Grundriss  der  Psychologic,  2te  Aufl.,  1897,  S.  i,  7. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   131 

representations,  as  well  as  external  perceptions, 
have  their  own  object  (subject-matter),  that  this 
object  may  sometimes  disappear  from  the  field  of 
consciousness,  sometimes  reappear,  and  become, 
according  to  the  degree  of  external  stimulus  or  of 
inward  attention,  stronger  or  weaker,  clearer  or  less 
clear,  but  that  nevertheless,  considered  as  a  whole, 
it  possesses  certain  qualifying  attributes  that  are 
absolutely  invariable."  Here,  according  to  Wundt, 
is  a  mistake,  and  it  consists  in  the  realizing  of  our 
representations,  and  this  is  a  kind  of  false  intel- 
lectual sm.1 

From  this  first  miscalculation  a  second  has  arisen. 
The  objective  character  of  psychological  phenomena 
having  succeeded  in  securing  the  chief  attention  of 
psychologists,  representative  or  "mental"  facts 
were  regarded  as  primary,  feeling  and  volition  as 
secondary  phenomena,  which  they  endeavoured  to 
derive  from  the  first.  The  associationists,  and 
before  them,  Herbart,  although  in  different  ways, 
tried  indeed  to  refer  to  elementary  representations 
the  origin  of  psychic  acts,  however  varied  and 
complex. 

But,  says  Wundt,  intellectualism  falsifies  the 
data  of  immediate  experience.  Really,  there  are 
not  two  different  kinds  of  experience,  one  external, 
the  other  inward.  All  natural  objects  are  psycho- 
logical objects.  The  mineral  world,  the  vegetable 
world,  sounds,  rays  of  light,  belong  to  the  sciences 
called  mineralogy,  botany,  physics — and  we  all 
admit  it ;  but  so  far  as  these  different  objects  awaken 
representations  in  us,  they  belong  to  psychology. 
1  Grundriss  der  Psychologic,  S.  16. 


132   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

On  the  other  hand,  our  inner  states,  such  as  our 
affections  and  volitions,  are  outside  the  province 
of  the  natural  sciences,  but  they  are  immediately 
and  indissolubly  connected  with  the  representations 
of  external  things. 

Hence  it  was  wrong  to  oppose  the  inward  ex- 
perience of  the  psychologist  to  the  outward  experi- 
ence of  the  observer  of  nature,  and  intellectualism 
has  no  foundation. 

To  this  intellectualism  of  the  older  psychology 
Wundt  opposes,  on  the  ground  of  a  more  rigorous 
interpretation  of  facts,  psychological  voluntarism.1 

Representation  must  not  take  up  all  the  psycho- 
logist's attention,  and  in  representative  phenomena 
the  objective  aspect  must  not  dominate  alone. 

Real  and  living  consciousness  gives  us  a  complex 
fact  arising  from  a  subject.  This  fact  is  an  in- 
divisible whole  compounded  of  volition  as  much  as 
of  cognition.  The  representation  does  not  exist  by 
itself  any  more  than  the  will  exists  by  itself.  Repre- 
sentation and  will  are  abstractions.  And  far  from 
being  a  representation  which  must  be  regarded 
simply  as  an  object,  the  psychological  act  which 
includes  a  representation  is,  in  its  origin,  essentially 
subjective. 

Nor  must  we,  like  the  intellectualist,  think  of  a 
psychology  which  deals  with  objects  fixed  in  con- 
sciousness in  their  entirety.  The  immediate  term 
of  consciousness  is  not  objects,  but  occurrences,  not 
absolute  realities,  but  acts  occurring  in  the  course 
which  carries  them  along  with  it. 

1  Philosophised  Studien,  S.  51  ff. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   133 

The  immediate  object  of  consciousness,  says 
Wundt,  and  consequently  of  experimental  psycho- 
logy, is  a  succession  of  processes.  "  Psychic  facts 
are  occurrences,  and  not  objects.  Like  all  occur- 
rences, they  flow  on  in  time,  and  are  never  the  same 
for  a  moment  together."1 

But  from  this  last  point  of  view,  volitional  pro- 
cesses have  a  characteristic  signification.  Hence  it 
is  well  to  represent  to  oneself  all  the  occurrences  of 
psychic  life,  including  intellectual  acts,  in  a  voli- 
tional manner,  in  order  the  better  to  note  that  they 
are  all  governed  by  the  law  "  of  occurring  in  time." 
But  we  must  not  transform  this  convenient  analogy 
into  an  objective  theory,  as  if  we  claimed  to  refer 
all  psychic  processes  to  acts  of  will.  Nothing  is 
further  removed  from  the  mind  of  the  Leipzig 
philosopher. 

Psychological  voluntarism,  in  fine,  only  attempts 
to  restore,  in  opposition  to  intellectualism  which  has 
impaired  them,  the  genuineness  of  the  dicta  of  con- 
sciousness. It  may  be  summed  up  in  three  proposi- 
tions: that  inward  experience,  the  source  of  the 
evidence  of  psychology,  has  not  a  separate  domain 
of  its  own,  but  that  it  is  purely  and  simply  immediate 
experience ;  that  immediate  experience  does  not 
touch  things  at  rest,  but  a  constant  flow  of  moving 
occurrences,  and  it  is  not  an  experience  of  objects 
but  of  processes,  which  are  nothing  else  than  the 
common  occurrences  of  every  human  life,  regarded  in 
their  mutual  relations ;  that  each  of  these  processes 
has  an  objective  content,  but  is  at  the  same  time  a 
subjective  act,  and  thus  it  participates  in  the  general 
1  Grundriss  der  Psychologic,  S.  17. 


134   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

conditions  of  knowledge  and  in  those  to  which 
human  actions  are  subject. 

It  is  clear  that  the  voluntarism  just  described  does 
not  go  beyond  the  limits  of  experimental  psychology. 
It  no  more  aims  at  dealing  with  metaphysics  than 
does  the  theory  of  actuality.  The  psychologist  of 
Leipzig  wanted  to  establish  what  are  the  data  of 
immediate  experience  before  entering  upon  the  field 
of  hypotheses  and  going  on  to  philosophy. 

We  shall  soon  meet  with  a  new  form  of  voluntarism 
in  his  writings,  but  it  belongs  to  metaphysics,  and 
we  must  be  on  our  guard  against  confusing  it  with 
his  psychological  voluntarism. 

In  knowledge  Wundt  distinguishes  three  degrees, 
belonging  respectively  to  practical  life,  to  particular 
sciences,  and  to  philosophy.  He  calls  them: 
intuition  (Wahrnehmungs-) ,  understanding  (Ver- 
standes-),  and  reason  (Vernunft-erkenntniss).1  And 
although  these  three  degrees  do  not  seem  to  him 
to  be  specifically  different,  nor  rigorously  marked 
off,  he  sketches  a  hierarchy  of  knowledge  according 
to  their  distinctions. 

Experience  lies  at  the  root.  Particular  sciences 
analyze,  interpret,  and  correct,  each  in  its  own 
sphere,  the  data  of  experience.  And  philosophy 
carries  forward  the  scattered  labours  of  the  sciences 
in  a  universal  way,  it  co-ordinates  the  knowledge 
which  has  been  generally  attained,  and,  embracing 
the  results  of  experience  as  a  whole,  it  disentangles 
from  them,  for  the  use  of  reason  and  feeling,  a  con- 
ception of  the  world  and  of  life.  Thus  establishing 
systematically  the  unity  of  human  knowledge,  it 
1  System  der  Philosophic,  S,  108. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   135 

should  not  confine  itself  to  resolving  the  apparent 
contradictions  arising  out  of  scientific  explanations 
of  facts,  but,  without  ever  ceasing  to  depend  upon 
the  sciences  as  its  legitimate  foundations,  it  may 
very  well  unhesitatingly  go  beyond  the  borders 
of  experience  in  its  deductions,  for  the  purpose 
of  completing  our  understanding  of  reality.  It 
is  this  that  gives  it  its  definition  according  to 
Wundt.1 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  subject-matter  of  philo- 
sophy is,  as  a  whole,  the  same  as  that  of  particular 
sciences,  it  is  not  so  as  to  its  point  of  view,  which 
is  twofold. 

In  fact— and  its  division  depends  upon  this — 
philosophy  has  two  duties:  first  to  investigate,  so 
far  as  its  acquisition  is  concerned,  the  sum-total  of 
human  knowledge;  next,  when  this  work  has  been 
done,  and  the  mind  is  assumed  to  be  in  possession 
of  this  knowledge,  to  study  that  knowledge  itself 
in  the  principles  upon  which  it  is  based.  The 
pursuit  of  the  first  includes  logic,  criteriology,  and 
methodology;  the  pursuit  of  the  second,  the  special 
metaphysics  of  matter  and  mind,  and  general 
metaphysics.2 

The  outlines  of  such  a  philosophical  system,  in 
which,  as  Wundt  writes,  "  metaphysics  is  given  the 
central  place,"  was  bound  to  cause  astonishment, 
and  to  seem  strangely  reactionary  at  a  time  when 
empiricism  was  all  the  vogue,  and  the  publication 
of  the  System  der  Philosophie  in  Germany,  in 
was  a  striking  occurrence. 

1  System  der  Philosophie   S.  18.  21. 
3  Ibid.,  S.  33,  34. 


136   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

And  Wundt's  position  as  physician  and  psycho- 
logist contributed  in  no  small  degree  to  the  surprise 
of  the  scientific  world.  These  six  hundred  pages 
appearing  in  the  form  of  a  solid  treatise  as  the  con- 
clusion of  a  life  passed  in  laboratory  and  experi- 
mental work,  are  most  instructive. 

Even  in  his  preface  Wundt,  knowing  well  the  effect 
he  was  about  to  produce,  took  care  to  define  the 
character  of  his  metaphysics.  "  I  think  it  is  im- 
portant to  declare  at  the  outset  that,  to  my  mind, 
metaphysics  is  neither  a  sort  of  poem  based  upon 
fiction,  nor  a  system  to  be  erected  by  the  reason 
with  the  help  of  a  priori  premises ;  but  on  the  con- 
trary, I  mean  experience  to  be  its  basis,  and  its 
method  to  be  that  which  is  in  use  in  the  various 
particular  sciences,  and  which  consists  in  connecting 
facts  with  one  another  by  means  of  the  principle 
of  sufficient  reason."1 

Let  us  look   more  closely  at  this    principle    of 
sufficient  reason  upon  which  the  whole  of  Wundt's 

1  "  I  consider  that  metaphysics  should  properly  aim,  not 
at  confining  this  connection  to  determinate  spheres  of 
experience,  but  at  extending  it  to  the  whole  field  of  experi- 
ence. That  the  problem  of  knowledge  can  only  be  resolved 
with  the  help  of  presuppositions  that  are  not  obtained 
empirically,  this  is  a  thought  which  is  already  familiar  to 
experimental  sciences.  I  also  think  that  philosophic  meta- 
physics has  no  need  to  reconstruct  itself  afresh,  but  that 
it  should  find  its  starting-point  in  such  elements  as  ex 
hypothesi  are  provided  for  it  by  particular  sciences.  It 
must  examine  these  elements  logically,  make  them  har- 
monize with  one  another,  and  unite  them  in  a  whole  that 
is  free  from  contradictions.  It  may  be  doubted  whether 
it  is  right  to  apply  the  old  name  of  metaphysics  to  an  in- 
vestigation of  this  kind.  But  I  believe  that,  if  the  general 
object  of  a  science  remains  the  same,  any  change  of  aspect 
or  of  method  should  not  prevent  us  from  keeping  its  name 
unchanged." — System  der  Philosophic,  Vorwort,  S.  v.,  vi. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   137 

thesis  rests.  We  must  do  so  all  the  more  narrowly 
because  it  plays  a  considerable  part  in  the  very 
important  portion  of  his  System  which  deals  with 
transcendental  ideas. 

On  this  principle,  which  Wundt  regards  as  intro- 
duced into  philosophy  by  Leibnitz,  is  founded  the 
rule  whereby  we  must  connect  together  all  the  parts 
of  human  knowledge,  if  their  connection  is  to  be 
free  from  contradictions ;  the  law  whereby  the  mind 
binds  together  the  objects  of  thought  by  relations 
of  reason  and  consequence,  thus  establishing  rela- 
tions of  dependence  between  them.1  It  is  not  only, 
like  the  principle  of  identity,  a  law  of  judgment  that 
compares,  but  a  law  of  knowledge  that  conceives.2 

By  this,  we  can  define  the  logical  connections  not 
only  in  the  range  of  actual  experience,  but  also  in 
the  sphere  of  merely  possible  experience;  and  this 
crossing  beyond  the  borders  of  all  real  experience 
is  not  only  what  we  can  do,  but  we  are  bound  to  do 
it  in  order  to  complete  the  data  of  reality.  Indeed, 
we  are  driven  to  give  the  principle  of  sufficient 
reason  a  universal  scope.  The  fact  that  it  is  a  law 
governing  all  scientific  investigation  obliges  us  to 
apply  it  to  every  kind  of  content,  to  every  object  of 
thought.  For,  because  we  only  possess  a  limited 
number  of  facts,  we  must  not  pull  up  short  just  where 
experience  is  no  longer  practicable.  "It  is  absurd 
to  demand  a  general  linking  together  of  those  parts 
of  the  cosmos  which  are  accessible  to  experience,  if 
we  refuse  to  admit  their  connection  with  causes 
and  effects  not  given  by  experience."3 

1  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  77  ff.,  175,  176. 
»  Ibid.,  S.  88,  89.  a  Ibid.,  S.  201 . 


138   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  principle  of  sufficient  reason  presupposes, 
indeed,  connected  elements  forming  parts  of  a  whole. 
But  if  one  of  the  two  elements  is  given  in  experience, 
is  it  not  plain  that  the  other  must  be  looked  for  be- 
yond it  ?  The  human  mind  feels  an  ultimate  need  of 
knowing  the  primary  reason  of  things.  Let  men 
say  what  they  will,  it  cannot  be  confined  within  the 
narrow  borders  of  empiricism.  It  is  imperiously 
driven  to  unify  all  knowledge.1 

But  this  work  of  unification  must  be  wrought  in 

a  threefold  order  of  ideas,  to  which  three  kinds  of 

0 

problems  correspond. 

The  first  order  of  knowledge,  whereof  the  ultimate 
terms  must  be  found  outside  of  experience,  is  that  of 
our  subjective  or  immediate  knowledge.  It  is 
psychology.  The  second  is  that  of  our  objective 
knowledge,  the  natural  sciences — i.e.,  cosmology. 

But  between  immediate  or  subjective  psycho- 
logical knowledge  and  the  knowledge  brought  into 
play  in  the  natural  sciences — i.e.,  mediate  or  objec- 
tive knowledge — the  difference  depends  on  a  dis- 
tinction already  remarked  when  we  were  setting 
these  two  kinds  of  knowledge  in  opposition  to  one 
another;  the  one,  cosmology,  abstracting  the  sub- 
ject from  the  concrete  data  of  representational 
activity,  and  the  other,  psychology,  insisting  on  the 
contrary  on  the  subjective  and  genetic  aspect  of 
such  data.  Can  we  thus  separate  the  object  from 
the  representation,  without  bringing  an  abstractive 
act  to  bear  upon  a  content  which  is  really  one,  and 
yet  capable  of  being  regarded  from  a  twofold  point 
of  view  ? 

*  System  dev  Philosophic,  S.  188-190. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   139 

Besides,  we  cannot  allow  the  two  orders  of  know- 
ledge to  coexist,  but  we  must  get  rid  of  all  duality 
to  return  to  the  single  fact  of  experience.  Hence 
arises  a  new  work  of  completion,  the  result  of  which 
should  be  the  unification  of  the  two  orders,  the 
cosmological  and  the  psychological,  into  one  onto- 
logical  idea,  because  in  each  of  the  two  orders  of 
ideas  we  must  finally  come  to  two  ideas — the  one,  of 
final  condition  or  final  unity  ;  the  other,  of  indefinite 
totality?- 

Therefore  the  special  sciences  demand  a  com- 
plement. Can  they  not  provide  it  for  themselves  ? 
No,  replies  Wundt.  The  understanding  which  they 
call  into  play  does  not  arise  from  the  data  of  ex- 
perience, and  it  only  has  to  explain  facts. 

On  the  contrary,  reason  goes  beyond  experience. 
If  the  understanding  is  satisfied  with  comprehending 
the  world  or  mind,  the  reason  seeks  for  their  causes. 
Both  of  them  doubtless  make  use  of  the  principle  of 
sufficient  reason,  but  "  it  is  only  when  its  universal 
value  is  discovered  that  reason  arises."2 

To  explain  this  diversity  of  aim  and  this  differ- 
ence of  view-point,  Wundt  calls  the  objects  of  reason 
ideas  (Ideeri)  and  not  concepts,  and  consequently 
it  is  to  the  reason  that  he  assigns  the  office  of  re- 
solving transcendental  problems? 

1  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  179,  180,  206. 

2  Ibid.,  S.  189. 

3  System   der   Philosophic ,    S.    181,    182.     Here    Wundt 
appears  to  follow  Kant's  use  of  the  word  idea,  and  he  also 
gives  him  the  credit  of  being  the  first  to  perceive  clearly 
these  transcendental  problems,  but  he  immediately  parts 
company  with  the  famous  philosopher  and  brings  against 
him  these  two  reproaches :  first,  that  he  has  dug  an  impas- 
sable dyke  between  the  knowledge  of  the  understanding  and 


140   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Mathematics  affords  remarkable  instance  of  the 
necessity  felt  by  the  mind  of  going  beyond  experi- 
ence. We  know  from  the  way  in  which  it  makes  use 
of  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  two  kinds  of 
transcendence,  and  we  understand  the  value  of 
transcendental  ideas.  In  fact,  in  a  mathematical 
series/,  if  it  run  to  infinity,  there  will  be  sometimes 
real  quantitative  transcendence,  sometimes  imaginary 
qualitative  transcendence. 

In  the  first,  the  series  assumed  to  be  infinite  is 
qualitatively  always  the  same.  We  come  to  no 
values  other  than  those  with  which  we  began,  and 
which  we  have  found  in  reality.  The  transcendence 
arises  from  our  going  beyond  experience  in  the 
direction  of  infinity.  Between  all  the  factors  there 
is  only  a  quantitative  difference.  We  confine  our- 
selves to  making  a  reality  not  given  in  experience, 
such  as  the  notion  of  a  line  produced  to  infinity. 

As  for  the  second,  it  states  a  pure  possibility  of 
thought*  Here  the  result  of  the  mental  operation 
is  to  make  new  concepts,  differing  in  their  qualities 
from  those  found  in  reality,  and  incapable  of  being 
applied  immediately  to  real  things ;  as,  for  instance, 
the  square  rotTTof  a  minus  quantity. 

that  of  the  reason,  by  his  "  monstrous  conception  "  of  the 
thing-in-itself ;  next,  that  he  has  subordinated  the  solution 
of  transcendental  problems  to  the  postulates  of  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  free  will,  and  the  existence  of  God. 
Doubtless,  he  says  on  the  first  head,  "  our  objective  know- 
ledge consists  only  of  concepts  which  we  are  obliged  to  form 
by  all  the  motives  arising  from  our  need  of  correcting  the 
contradictions  of  our  perceptions.  But  when  this  correction 
has  been  made  with  accuracy,  we  have  no  reason  to  doubt 
the  objective  reality  of  objects  corresponding  to  our  con- 
cepts." (S.  185).  Cf.  Logik,  I.,  S.  546-557. 
1  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  196. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   141 

These  two  kinds  of  transcendence  are  also  to  be 
met  with  in  philosophy.  In  each  of  these  two 
orders,  one  real,  the  other  imaginary,  reason  is  led, 
in  philosophy  as  well  as  in  mathematics,  to  a  two- 
fold idea  of  infinity,  the  infinitely  little,  which  is 
represented  by  unity,  and  the  infinitely  great,  the 
metaphysical  equivalent  of  which  is  totality. ' 

No  one  has  ever  thought  of  disputing  the  value 
and  utility  of  the  infinite  in  mathematics.  May  the 
same  estimate  be  made  of  the  transcendent,  whether 
real  or  imaginary,  in  philosophy  ?  Wundt  replies, 
that  real  transcendence  possesses  in  philosophy  the 
same  value  as  in  mathematics,  but,  in  the  first 
place,  we  might  doubt  whether  the  same  holds  good 
of  imaginary  transcendence. 

Historically,  it  was  Plato  who,  according  to 
Wundt,  was  the  first  to  try  to  introduce  imaginary 
transcendence  into  philosophy.  In  the  theory  of 
Platonian  ideas,  the  question  at  stake  is  not  the 
provision  of  a  simple  explanation,  but  of  a  com- 
pletion of  experience.  We  do  not  pursue  experi- 
mental data  quantitatively,  but  end  by  changing 
them  qualitatively;  the  idea  of  the  real  is  stripped 
of  the  sensible  envelope  with  which  it  is  clothed  in 
experience. 

But,  in  spite  of  the  risks  it  involves,  may  we  not 
admit  that  this  imaginary  transcendental  idea, 
although  unreal  in  itself,  has  often  thrown  light 
upon  the  concepts  which  reality  has  obliged  us  to 
form  ?  Do  not  Plato's  ideas  and  Leibnitz's  mona- 
dology,  although  they  may  not  state  the  truth, 
indicate  the  course  to  be  followed  in  order  to  satisfy 
the  need  of  unity  felt  by  the  reason  ?  Every  system 


142   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

of  any  real  importance  contains  at  least  some  true 
idea.  Thus  the  theory  of  ideas  has  led  to  the 
conviction  that  our  knowledge  of  the  world  comes 
not  from  sensible  experience,  but  from  the  power 
of  concepts;  and  the  principle  of  continuity  formu- 
lated by  Leibnitz  will  be  probably  among  those 
that  survive. 

Thus  in  philosophy  imaginary  transcendence  may 
possess  a  value  analogous  to  that  which  it  has  in 
mathematics,  where  it  often  leads  to  a  deeper  under- 
standing of  real  concepts,  by  enabling  us  to  regard 
them  from  a  more  general  point  of  view.  But  in 
any  case  it  cannot  contradict  experience.  On  the 
contrary,  we  shall  insist  that  it  must  start  with 
real  facts,  and  its  distinctive  character  will  consist, 
not  in  regarding  facts  in  isolation  but  in  embracing 
them  in  their  totality.1 

This  is  the  sphere  of  permanent  hypotheses. 
Granted;  but  if  special  sciences  require  hypotheses, 
how  can  metaphysical  science  do  without  them  ? 
In  special  sciences,  hypothesis  is  merely  a  means  of 
establishing  some  connection  between  real  facts. 
In  metaphysics,  it  will  also  help  to  complete  the  data 
of  experience,  and  will  presuppose,  in  the  sphere 
that  is  inaccessible  to  empiricism,  the  conditions 
required  for  the  formation  of  a  single  whole  that 
satisfies  the  reason.2  In  both  cases,  that  which 

1  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  197  -200. 

2  "  Ideas  can  never  be  the  subject  of  a  demonstration 
properly  so  called.     In  them  we  may  indeed  find  presup- 
positions, which  the  reason  cannot  help  conceiving,  when  it 
passes  beyond  the  borders  of  experience,  and  seeks  the  final 
sufficient  reason  of  observed  facts,  but  their  existence  does 
not  appear  to  be  a  necessary  inference  from  the  given 
premises." — System  der  Philosophic,  S.  439. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   143 

inspires  the  making  of  hypotheses  is  the  same  need 
of  the  mind,  the  absolute  need  of  unity. 

We  are  now  agreed  as  to  the  diversity  of  tran- 
scendental problems.  They  are  three:  the  psycho- 
logical problem,  the  cosmological  problem,  and  the 
ontological  problem;  and  as  to  the  data  of  these 
problems,  they  are  provided  by  experience  ;  and  as 
to  the  means  for  resolving  them,  by  making  use  of 
the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  ;  and  lastly,  as  to 
the  scope  of  the  solution,  the  conception  by  the 
reason  of  the  two  ideas,  the  one  of  unity,  the  other 
of  totality,  the  results  of  transcendental  procedures 
similar  to  the  procedures  of  real  and  imaginary 
transcendence  familiar  to  mathematicians.  The 
transcendental  problem  in  which  we  are  directly  in- 
terested is  that  of  psychology.  What  are  the  general 
conditions  of  this  first  problem  ?  What  is  its  end  ?  On 
what  transcendental  process  does  its  solution  depend  ? 

As  for  psychological  ideas,  says  Wundt,  in 
substance,  historically  two  conceptions  are  found 
in  conflict :  the  individualist  and  universalist  hypo- 
theses; and  according  as  the  essence  of  the  mental 
(spiritual)  has  been  referred  to  volition  or  to  repre- 
sentation, these  hypotheses  have  been  subdivided 
into  opposing  subhypotheses,  intellectualism  and 
animism.1 

1  Leaving  aside  modified  intermediary  forms,  hence  have 
arisen  four  fundamental  metaphysical  conceptions:  intel- 
lectualist  individualism  (Herbart),  which  regards  the  ultimate 
unit  as  a  soul-atom  (Seelenatom) ,  which  is  pure  quality; 
animist  individualism  (Kant),  which  gives  pure  transcen- 
dental apperception,  which  is  the  simplest  volitional 
activity,  as  the  condition  of  all  representation;  intellect- 
ualist  universalism  (Spinoza),  which  chooses  an  infinite 
intelligence  as  the  final  totality;  animist  universalism 


144   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

From  this  division  of  all  the  systems  Wundt  derives 
the  general  conditions  of  the  psychological  problem. 

The  idea  of  the  soul  may  indeed  be  found  in  an 
individualist,  or  in  a  universalist,  form.  Philo- 
sophers were  long  disinclined  to  adopt  the  idea  of 
uniting  all  souls  in  a  spiritual  (mental)  total  cosmos. 
The  idea  of  an  individual  soul  was  long  exclusively 
dominant  in  the  history  of  psychology.  Some  re- 
garded it  as  the  idea  of  an  object  of  experience, 
others  saw  in  it  a  simple  auxiliary  notion  intended 
to  explain  the  connexion  of  the  data  of  inward  ex- 
perience .  But  empirical  psychology  knows  not  what 
to  do  with  these  auxiliary  notions,  for  the  immediate 
facts  apprehended  by  inward  experience  are  free  from 
contradiction,  and  hence  need  neither  the  correction 
nor  the  complement  demanded  from  auxiliary  con- 
cepts. Hence,  according  to  Wundt,  one  can  only 
attach  a  transcendental  signification  to  the  notion 
of  the  soul. 

The  one  aim  of  transcendental  psychology  is,  by 
means  of  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  to  dis- 
cover in  immediately  empirical  facts  their  connec- 
tion and  final  reason  in  such  a  way  as  to  cut  short 
any  ulterior  inquiry. 

As  for  the  transcendental  process,  it  is  necessarily 
imaginary  as  well  as  real  in  psychology.  Neither 

(Schopenhauer,  though  not  without  some  restrictions), 
which  prefers  the  theory  of  a  universally  distributed  and 
active  volition.  (Leibnitz,  an  individualist  and  intellect- 
ualist,  passes,  owing  to  his  idea  of  the  supreme  monad,  to 
universalism.)  Cf.  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  209,  210. 

And  these  four  conceptions  are  further  complicated  by 
a  tripartite  division  of  philosophic  answers  to  the  problems 
of  ontology  into  Materialism,  Idealism,  and  transcendental 
Monism.  Wundt  here  calls  animism  what  he  elsewhere 
terms  metaphysical  voluntarism. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   145 

the  spiritual  cosmos  nor  the  individual  soul  can 
without  absurdity  be  conceived  only  quantitatively, 
the  latter  as  an  individual  unity,  the  former  as  an 
indeterminate  totality.  It  would  be  to  take  away 
from  them  their  spiritual  character,  for  "  the  spiritual 
must  possess  quality."1 

This  imaginary  character  of  all  the  psychological 
hypotheses  causes  them  to  give  rise  to  many  more 
doubts  than  the  solutions  of  the  problems  of  cos- 
mology; but  yet  they  have  the  advantage  of  co- 
ordinating our  experimental  knowledge  with  their 
unexperimental  presuppositions,  in  a  system  "  en- 
closed within  itself  "  of  causes  and  consequences, 
and  thus  they  afford  the  reason  the  satisfaction  that 
it  seeks  from  transcendental  ideas.2 

The  psychological  problem,  moreover,  is  especially 
interesting  for  individual  and  social  life. 

What  is  the  first  question  involved  in  the  psycho- 
logical problem  ?  Its  end,  says  Wundt,  is  the 
idea  of  the  individual  soul.  Since  the  question  comes 
to  be  one  of  applying  to  the  data  of  experience  the 
principle  of  sufficient  reason,  let  us  first  of  all  ask, 
what  are  the  data  of  experience  ?  They  are  the 
representations,  or  rather  the  representational  acts, 
with  which  is  bound  up  a  twofold  feeling:  that  of 
our  own  activity,  and  that  of  our  own  passivity. 

We  are  passive,  indeed,  with  regard  to  repre- 
sentations, for  we  are  conscious  that  their  matter 
is  given  us  without  our  having  to  create  it.  We  are 
active  in  our  representations,  for  we  are  conscious 
of  making  them  arise,  or  of  modifying  them  when 
they  are  already  formed  in  us .  The  twofold  inward 

1  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  371.  2  Ibid.,  S.  372. 

10 


146   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

feeling,  inseparable  from  the  immediate  data  of 
experience,  thus  implies  the  presence  of  objects  the 
action  of  which  we  undergo,  and  the  exercise  of 
an  action  by  ourselves  upon  objective  representa- 
tions. '  The  analysis  of  immediate  experience  thus 
gives  this  result:  on  the  one  hand,  an  activity 
and  a  passivity  which  vary  in  mode,  and  on  the 
other  hand,  the  objects  of  this  activity  and  passivity 
— i.e.,  representations."1 

Representations  may,  in  a  certain  way,  be 
detached  from  the  Ego,  and  be  conceived  as  inde- 
pendent objects.  But  the  active  and  passive  states 
possess  this  peculiarity,  that  they  are  essentially 
involved  in  consciousness  and  cannot  be  isolated 
from  it. 

Does  this  mean  that  these  two  states  have  the 
same  immediateness  of  connection  with  the  Ego  ? 
Assume  that,  by  thinking,  we  eliminate  the  objects 
represented  and  the  external  relations  of  our  con- 
scious states  with  such  objects,  do  passivity  and 
activity  each  preserve  the  same  connection  with 
the  Ego  ?  Are  these  states  so  complex  as  to  defy 
a  final  endeavour  to  analyze  them  ? 

Indeed,  no.  Activity  belongs  more  immediately 
to  inward  experience  than  does  passivity.  In  fact, 
we  cannot  help  referring  passivity  to  the  activity 
of  the  object  presented  to  us,  so  that  activity  appears 
to  us  to  be  strictly  primary.  '  We  find  the  origin 
of  all  our  active  and  passive  states  in  a  reciprocal 
activity  of  subject  and  object."2 

Activity  proper,  thus  considered  in  itself,  the 
source  of  our  activity  and  of  our  passivity,  we  call 

1  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  381.  -  Ibid.,  S.  386. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   147 

the  Ego.  This  Ego,  isolated  in  thought  from  the 
objects  upon  which  it  acts,  is  our  will.  "  There  is 
then  nothing,  absolutely  nothing,  either  outside  of 
man,  or  within  him,  which  he  can  rigorously  call  his 
own,  proper  to  the  Ego,  except  the  will."1 

Such,  strictly  considered,  are  the  data  of  con- 
sciousness. Let  us  now  apply  to  them  the  principle 
of  sufficient  reason. 

The  principle  of  sufficient  reason  obliges  us  to  go 
back  from  a  transitory  state  of  inward  experience 
to  another  presupposed  state,  from  the  volitional 
elements  of  a  first  state  to  the  prior  volitional 
elements  that  have  predetermined  them. 

And  when  we  have  got  rid  of  everything  in  the 
content  of  experience  that  is  accidental  and  external 
to  the  subject  as  such,  the  volitional  activity  itself 
will  alone  remain,  apperception  pure  and  simple, 
conceived  as  independent  of  all  determinations  of 
the  content.  This  ultimate  condition  of  all  inward 
experience  Kant  called  transcendental  apperception. 

It  must  be  regarded  as  an  incessant  activity. 

But  since  every  activity  presupposes  necessarily 
the  objects  upon  which  it  is  exercised,  transcendental 
apperception,  or  pure  will,  is  an  idea  of  the  reason 
which  excludes  all  experimental  realization.  More- 
over, it  is  of  no  use  to  empirical  psychology.2 

1  System  der  Philosophic  S.  386,  387. 

3  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  388.  There  is,  however, 
another  conception  of  the  soul  which  depends  upon  the 
understanding,  and  which  empirical  psychology  can  turn  to 
account  as  an  auxiliary  hypothesis.  It  is  this:  it  regards 
the  soul  not  as  pure  will  without  an  object,  but  as  a  com- 
pound unity,  a  "  spiritual  organism."  This  is,  in  fact, 
nothing  but  the  living  body  itself.  The  soul  and  body,  in 
virtue  of  this  conception,  do  not  really  differ.  Between  the 


148   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Thus  two  ways  are  offered  to  us  for  a  trans- 
cendental regression  :  we  may  either  go  back  to 
the  object  of  representation,  leaving  completely  on 
one  side  the  activity  connected  with  the  representa- 
tion, and  thus  attain  to  the  concept  of  an  absolute 
and  substantial  quality,  immutable  in  itself;  or 
else,  eliminating  representations  as  being  the  simple 
objects  of  this  activity,  we  may  go  back  to  the 
concept  of  this  activity  itself.  On  the  one  hand,  we 
get  the  idea  of  a  soul-substance  (substantieller  Seelen- 
begriff),  on  the  other,  the  idea  of  a  soul-activity 
(actueller  Seelenbegriff] . 

The  second  conception,  according  to  Wundt,  is 
to  be  preferred.  Alone  does  it  take  sufficient 
account  of  the  will  and  of  its  development  ;  alone  is 
it  found  to  be  in  accord  with  the  fact,  that  all  know- 
two  there  is  only  the  difference  of  aspect.  The  one,  the 
concept  soul,  enables  the  living  body  to  be  regarded  from 
the  aspect  of  inward  experience,  the  other  concept  allows 
it  to  be  regarded  from  the  aspect  of  outward  experience. 

This  empirical  concept  of  the  soul  may  be  used  for  the 
nterpretation  and  explanation  of  psychic  facts.  It 
assumes,  indeed,  that  a  physical  process  corresponds  with 
every  psychic  process  (psycho-physical  parallelism). 
Thanks  to  it,  we  can  mend  the  breaks  in  the  chain  (i.e.,  the 
interruptions  in  the  continuity  of  inward  experience)  of 
psychic  processes  with  the  help  of  intermediate  links  pro- 
vided by  the  physical  processes.  S.  389,  582,  583. 

This  concept  leads  one  to  attribute  to  all  the  elements  of 
the  organism  a  "  psychic  aptitude,"  a  kind  of  instinctive 
tendency  dimly  endowed  with  consciousness. 

A  superficial  consideration  of  these  statements  might 
make  one  think  that  they  were  in  disagreement  with  the 
preceding  doctrine  of  Wundt,  which  denies  the  use  of 
"  auxiliary  concepts "  in  psychology.  But  the  contra- 
diction is  only  in  appearance.  There,  Wundt  was  speaking 
strictly  from  the  point  of  view  of  inward  experience;  here, 
he  is  regarding  psychic  facts  in  their  relation  to  physical 
processes. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   149 

ledge  refers  representations  to  objects  given  to 
thought  as  the  matter  of  its  activity.1 

Nevertheless,  the  idea  of  the  soul  we  have  now 
reached  is  individual  and  finite,  and  it  cannot 
suffice.  We  must  carry  on  this  idea  to  that  of  a 
spiritual  totality,  the  outcome  of  a  universal  psycho- 
logical regressus. 

The  soul,  indeed,  as  substance  or  as  activity,  must 
be  connected  with  the  other  spiritual  unities,  for, 
being  transcendental  will  without  an  object,  it  would 
remain  ever  void  of  content,  and  this  hypothesis 
would  be  unthinkable. 

But  the  idea  of  a  spiritual  totality  may  take  two 
very  distinct  forms.  It  may  go  so  far  as  to  deny 
to  the  individual  any  real  autonomy,  rejecting  as 
a  delusion  the  psychological  reversion  to  unity. 
Such  was  the  common  characteristic  of  most  of  the 
universalist  conceptions  of  the  world — conceptions 
which  by  this  excess,  especially  in  the  case  of 
Spinoza  and  of  Schopenhauer,  encountered  great 
difficulties  that  led  to  their  failure. 

Can  it  be  supposed,  indeed,  that  the  spiritual 
whole,  as  the  universal  principle,  is  a  unity,  the 
essence  of  which  consists  in  representation  ?  Such 
a  unity  would  be  lacking  in  activity.  Can  it  be 
supposed  that  the  essence  of  this  unity  is  will  ? 
Will,  as  universal  principle,  would  be  a  unity  without 
content.2 

Hence  we  must  abandon  the  hypothesis  of  a 
universal  principle  which  would  swallow  up  the 
autonomy  of  the  individual  unit.  Hence,  there 
only  remains  one  hypothesis:  the  spiritual  totality 

1  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  391.          a  Ibid.,  S.  392-396. 


150   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

must  be  a  collective  will  in  which  volitional  units 
subsist. 

The  data  of  experience  justify  the  conclusion 
drawn  from  this  regressus.  Experience  shows  us, 
indeed,  in  the  family,  the  tribe,  the  corporation,  so 
many  groupings  of  individual  wills,  associated  with 
one  another  by  reciprocal  action,  and  thus  each  one 
forming  a  whole.  Each  whole  has  a  place  in  a  scale 
wherein,  from  the  individual  to  the  nation,  from  the 
nation  to  the  whole  civilized  world,  the  spheres  of 
the  volitional  units  become  more  and  more  com- 
prehensive. 

This  scale,  such  as  it  is  perceived  by  experience, 
stops  at  a  last  step,  but  reason  cannot  stop  there. 
The  principle  of  sufficient  reason  obliges  us  to  pursue 
the  series  mentally,  beyond  experience,  in  two  direc- 
tions. This  ideal  series  begins  with  the  pure  will 
which  we  have  already  considered,  and  ends  in  a 
total  human  will  in  which  all  individual  wills  are 
united  for  the  conscious  pursuit  of  their  ends. 

Doubtless,  this  ideal  humanity  of  the  future  is 
not  a  fact  of  experience:  it  is  a  presupposition  of 
experience.  But  it  is  nevertheless  the  term  to  which 
all  human  wills  in  their  evolution  are  and  must  be 
directed.  They  progressively  approach  this  term, 
without  ever  reaching  it. 

Therefore  the  idea  of  spiritual  totality  possesses, 
thus  differing  from  other  transcendental  ideas,  a 
practical  importance  of  a  moral  nature,  seeing  that 
it  is  the  rule  of  our  actions. 

The  psychological  regressus  of  the  individual  has 
brought  us  to  an  Ego,  to  pure  will.  How  does  the 
Ego,  thus  conceived,  become  a  representative  Ego  ? 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   151 

Representation  is  not  a  primary  fact,  in  the  same 
way  as  the  will.  It  follows  upon  the  interaction  of 
wills.  Representations,  in  their  turn,  unite  voli- 
tional individualities  into  collective  wills.1 

Language  is,  in  fact,  the  bond  of  union  between 
individuals,  and  the  natural  means  whereby  they 
realize  a  common  will  between  themselves. 

It  is,  then,  by  entering  into  relation  with  other 
volitional  units,  and  by  the  fact  of  its  participation 
in  the  totality  of  minds,  that  the  individual  will 
becomes  a  representative  and  concrete  reality.2 

Let  us  return  for  a  moment  to  the  moral  evolution 
of  wills.  What  is  the  source  of  their  tendency 
towards  an  ideal  term,  that  of  future  humanity  i 
The  will  possesses  an  unlimited  capacity,  and  ideal 
humanity  will  be  inevitably  limited  both  in  space 
and  time.  Where,  then,  shall  we  find  the  raison  d'etre 
of  this  ideal  term,  and  of  the  movement  towards  it  ? 

Ideal  humanity  necessarily  demands,  says  Wundt, 
a  transcendental  idea  of  a  complementary  kind. 
This  is  the  idea  of  God,  the  idea  of  an  unknowable, 
perfect,  infinite  Being,  whereon  ideal  humanity 
necessarily  depends.  Because  ideal  humanity  can 
never  answer  for  us  to  the  requirements  of  an 
infinite  totality,  we  replace  it  by  the  idea  of  an 

1  "  Since  the  individual  psychological  regressus,  which 
gave  us  pure  will  as  the  last  condition  of  individual  being, 
must  take  place  in  the  case  of  all  the  elements  that  consti- 
tute a  spiritual  community,  representation  no  longer  appears 
as  a  primary  fact,  but  as  a  product  of  the  plurality  of  wills ; 
whether,  on  the  one  hand,  reciprocal  action  intervening 
between  wills  produces  representation;  or  whether,  on  the 
other  hand,  volitional  elements  make  use  of  it  as  a  means 
of  forming  higher  volitional  units." — System  der  Philosophic, 
S.  403. 

-  System  der  Philosophie,  S.  397-403. 


I 


152 

infinite  God,  the  supreme  reason  for  such  an  ideal. 
And  thus  the  moral  idea  finds  its  logical  complement 
in  the  religious  idea.1 

What  is  the  result  of  the  regressive  method  which 
we  have  applied  in  the  foregoing  pages  to  psycho- 
logy P  To  what  result  does  the  same  method  lead  in 
cosmology  ?  And  how  do  the  results  haimonize  ? 

The  psychological  regression,  on  the  one  hand,  has 
brought  us  to  the  idea  of  a  transcendental  apper- 
ception, pure  will,  devoid  of  objects,  but  the  ultimate 
indispensable  condition  of  all  inward  experience. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  cosmological  regression  in 
the  system  has  led  on  to  the  idea  of  an  infinite 
totality  of  final  units,  without  being  able  to  deter- 
mine the  proper  being,  material  or  spiritual,  of  such 
units.2 

Are  these  two  parallel  results  to  be  allowed  to 
stand  ?  That  would  be  to  profess  a  dualism  which 
is  repugnant  to  our  fundamental  tendency  towards 
unity,  and  it  leads  to  insoluble  difficulties. 

Hence  we  are  driven  to  this  alternative.     We 

must  represent  to  ourselves  every  reality  under  the 

form  of  inward  experience,  which  means  idealism  ; 

or  under  the  form  of  outward  experience,  which  means 

materialism.     Outside  these  two  hypotheses,  there 

is  only  room  for  purely  imaginary  forms,  the  reality 

of  which  cannot  be  warranted  by  any  experience. 

Which  of  the  two  are  we  to  choose  ? 

When  we  distinguished  the  two  points  of  view, 

the  one  cosmological,  and  the  other  psychological, 

1  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  403  -406. 

2  These  units  are  the  material  atom  or  the  mathematical 
point,  according  to  the  point  of  view  from  which  they  are 
regarded. — Ibid.,  S.  207,  363,  364. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   153 

what  criterion  did  we  make  use  of  ?  Experience  ? 
No;  for  the  content  of  immediate  experience  never 
presents  us  an  object  without  some  participation 
on  the  part  of  the  subject,  nor  an  act  of  conscious- 
ness without  some  represented  object.  The  dis- 
tinction of  our  two  points  of  view  was  then  the 
effect  of  an  abstraction,  and  hence  we  cannot  stop 
at  it  as  if  it  were  a  definitive  end  of  our  inquiries.1 

The  primary  fact  is  one,  and  intuition  (Wahrneh- 
mung)  perceives  it  as  one:  understanding  (Verstand) 
isolates  in  it  the  subjective  aspect,  the  will  and 
impression,  and  the  objective  aspect,  the  concept. 
Reason  (Vernunft)  pursued  the  two  series  as  far  as 
it  could,  the  one  subjective,  the  other  objective,  thus 
dissociated  by  the  abstractive  act  of  the  under- 
standing. 

Thus  we  discover  in  the  dualism  of  the  results  of 
our  two  regressions  what  appears  to  be  an  indication 
of  the  dissociation  effected  at  the  outset  by  the 
understanding,  and  at  the  same  time  we  understand 
the  need  of  resolving  into  a  final  unity  the  dualism 
which  the  regressive  method  has  run  against. 

Moreover,  since  the  transcendental  apperception 
is  pure  will,  the  gap  must  be  filled  with  objects,  and 
its  relationto  them  must  be  discovered.  Those  unities, 
too,  which  the  cosmological  regressus  brought  to 
light,  require  to  be  determined.  Hence  the  duality 
of  the  two  parallel  series  should  disappear.  What  is  to 
be  the  higher  ontological  unity  that  will  get  rid  of  it  ? 

1  "  This  opposition  between  the  spiritual  and  the  material 
may  no  doubt  serve  in  a  transitory  way  as  an  auxiliary 
concept  for  empirical  psychology,  but  it  cannot  be  regarded 
as  the  ultimate  foundation  of  real  occurrences." — System 
der  Philosophic,  S.  560. 


154   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

It  is  activity,  and  this  is  will. 

It  is  activity. 

The  end  of  the  psychological  regression,  pure  will, 
is  pure  activity.  But  this  pure  will  becomes  repre- 
sentative. Now,  the  representative  fact  possesses 
an  element  of  passivity,  and  therefore  there  must 
be  an  active  cause  to  explain  the  passivity  of  our 
representational  states.  But,  apart  from  the  sub- 
ject, in  representation  there  is  only  the  object. 
Hence  objects  must  be  active. 

And  their  activity  is  will. 

Indeed,  the  only  activity  we  know  is  that  of  the 
will.  Hence,  if  objects  are  activity,  they  are  will. 
Therefore  the  object  must  be  regarded  as  a  volitional 
unit. 

The  cosmos  is  a  totality  of  volitional  units.  The 
interaction  of  volitional  units  begets  representations, 
and  thus  volitional  units  become  representational 
beings.1 

"  The  world  is  the  totality  of  volitional  activities 
which  determine  one  another  by  means  of  repre- 
sentational activity  and  thus  become  ordered  in  an 
evolutionary  series  of  volitional  units  of  varied 
scope."2 

Thus,  the  world  is  a  graduated  series  of  conscious 
beings.  "  Nature  (Matter)  is  the  threshold  of  spirit 
(mind),"  Die  Natur  ist  Vorstufe  des  Geistes. 

This  totality  of  volitional  units  recalls  the  monado- 
logy  of  Leibnitz.  In  both  cases,  there  are  conscious 
beings  modelled  on  the  conception  of  the  Ego;  in 

1  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  407  -420. 

2  Ibid.,  S.  421. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   155 

both  cases,  unlike  Schopenhauer's  pantheism,  there 
is  a  multiplicity  of  elements.  Nevertheless  Wundt 
will  not  call  his  volitional  units  monads.  For  the 
monad  of  Leibnitz  and  Herbart  is  a  substance 
endued  with  activity. 

But  the  volitional  unit,  the  final  basis  of  being, 
cannot  be  a  substance.  The  characteristic  of  sub- 
stance is,  in  fact,  permanence.  The  mind  conceives 
the  object  apart  from  the  subjective  act  that  presents 
it  to  consciousness;  and  this  object,  isolated  from 
conscious  activity,  possesses  a  relative  constancy: 
the  mind  then  carries  on  the  concept  of  the 
object  to  that  of  an  object  pure  and  simple, 
possessing  an  absolute  constancy;  and  thus  we 
get  substance. 

But  the  primary  foundation  of  being  can  only  be 
conceived  as  activity,  will.  Hence,  it  is  a  con- 
tradiction to  think  of  it  as  inert  and  permanent — 
in  short,  as  substance.  Therefore  volitional  units 
cannot  be  identified  with  the  substantial  monads 
of  Leibnitz  and  Herbart,  even  if  they  are  considered 
as  endowed  with  activity.1 

From  this  fairly  detailed  analysis  of  the  works 
of  Wundt  what  general  conclusions  are  to  be  drawn 
from  our  own  point  of  view  ? 

Wundt  is  still  enveloped  in  idealism.  He  was 
not  able  to  break  away  from  the  shackles  of  Kant's 
critique,  nor  to  escape  entirely  from  his  metaphysical 
agnosticism.  Nevertheless  he  believes  in  the  reality 
of  the  facts  of  experience,  and,  contrary  to  Kant, 
declares  that  "  the  thing-in-itself  is  not,  as  he  thinks, 

1  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  427  -429. 


hypothetical  in  the  sense  that  its  whole  content 
must  be  treated  with  caution.  It  is  hypothetical 
in  the  sense  that  certain  of  its  elements  belong  to 
ascertained  knowledge,  while  others  wait  upon  the 
indefinite  development  of  human  knowledge  in  order 
to  be  brought  to  light."1 

The  transcendental  problems  of  cosmology,  psy- 
chology, and  ontology,  are  not  capable,  according 
to  Wundt,  of  scientific  solutions  belonging  to  the 
understanding.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  they  are 
not  indecipherable  enigmas.  Relying  upon  the 
principle  of  sufficient  reason,  we  can  connect  tran- 
scendental ideas  with  the  facts  of  experience.  If, 
then,  Wundt  remains  in  bondage  to  subjectivism, 
he  carefully  and  constantly  tries  to  link  up  his 
highest  metaphysical  speculations  with  the  surest 
facts  of  experience.2 

A  close  examination  of  the  complexity  of  the 
content  of  experience  revealed  to  him  the  arbitrari- 
ness of  the  exclusive  intellectualism  of  many  psycho- 
logists, and  he  restored  will  to  its  place  of  honour 
in  the  life  of  consciousness.  But  the  German 
philosopher  allowed  himself,  too,  to  be  carried  to 
extremes.  For  the  intellectualism  he  was  fighting 
against,  because  it  was  so  exclusive,  he  substituted 
a  metaphysical  voluntarism  quite  as  extravagant, 
besides  its  disagreement  with  the  real  dicta  of 
consciousness. 

Furthermore,  Wundt's  metaphysical  structure  has 
in  it  more  than  one  inconsistency.  We  cannot 

1  Logik,  I.,  S.  547. 

2  Volkelt  claims  Wundt  in  favour  of  the  possibility  of 
metaphysics,  against  prevalent  idealism. — Erfahrung  und 
Denken,  S.  538. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   157 

discuss  it  in  detail,1  but  a  few  general  remarks  are 
demanded. 

First,  how  can  pure  wills,  devoid  of  all  objects,  be  re-  . 
garded  as  able  to  act  upon  one  another  ?  Why  should 
the  interaction  of  purely  volitional  units  be  thought 
a  sufficient  reason  for  the  origination  of  representa- 
tions ?  Whatever  Wundt  may  say,  this  representa- 
tivity  which  suddenly  springs  up  from  an  entirely 
volitional  activity  is  very  like  a  creation  ex  nihilo. 

Next,  in  Wundt's  philosophy,  the  object  of  repre- 
sentation sometimes  signifies  the  ideal  term  of  the 
representation,  sometimes  a  material  thing,  according 
to  the  needs  of  his  system.  Here  we  have  a  funda- 
mental equivocation.  When  Wundt  speaks  of 
representation,  the  object  is  the  result  of  an  act  of 
abstraction  of  the  understanding,  whereby  the 
subjective  impression  is  isolated  in  consciousness 
from  the  term  of  the  representation.  Hence,  the 
object  has  only  an  ideal  existence.  But,  when  he 
wants  to  explain  the  passing  of  the  will  from  the 
state  of  pure  will  to  that  of  a  subject  endowed  with 
the  power  of  representation,  he  makes  the  object  a 
reality  which  acts  upon  the  will.  How  can  these 
two  offices  ascribed  to  the  object  be  reconciled  with 
one  another  ?  And  yet  from  this  confusion  mainly 
arises  the  author's  monism. 

Lastly,  how  can  strict  logic,  which,  according  to 
Wundt,  must  make  transcendental  deductions  start 
from  the  data  of  experience,  be  reconciled  with  the 
position  that  the  ideas  of  the  reason  cannot  be  an 
object  of  demonstration  rightly  so  called  ? 

1  Many  parts  of  the  system  are  closely  examined  by 
Gutberlet,  Wundt's  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  281,  341,  in 
the  Philosophisches  Jahrbuch,  1891. 


158   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  last  chapters  of  the  Grundziige  der  physio- 
logischen  Psychologic  review  the  opposing  theories 
of  materialism  and  of  spiritualism,  the  latter  being 
understood  in  the  sense  of  Cartesian  psychology. 

Neither  of  these  theories  withstands  the  examina- 
tion. Materialism  fails  to  recognize  the  priority  of 
consciousness  to  outward  experience,  says  Wundt, 
and  it  tries  to  establish  an  utterly  unintelligible 
identification  between  the  phenomena  of  conscious- 
ness and  nervous  processes.  Cartesian  spiritualism 
relies  upon  ambiguities.  It  infers,  for  instance, 
from  the  unity  which  is  peculiar  to  the  phenomena 
of  consciousness,  the  simplicity  of  the  principle  from 
which  they  spring.  It  is  powerless  to  explain  the 
reciprocal  action  of  body  and  mind,  because, 
instead  of  putting  a  common  bond  between  the 
two,  to  account  for  their  mutual  dependence, 
it  opposes  them  to  one  another  as  irreconcilable 
antagonists . 

If  Wundt  could  set  himself  free  from  his  idealist 
and  positivist  prejudices,  and  get  rid  of  his  false 
notion  of  substance  taken  from  Kant,  and  follow 
freely  the  bent  his  own  investigations  have  given 
him,  he  would  logically  be  bound  to  make  the 
fundamental  theories  of  the  Aristotelian  psychology 
his"  own.  He  would  no  longer  put  the  characteristic 
mark  of  psychology  in  consciousness.  He  would 
accept  in  all  the  bearing  given  to  it  by  Aristotle 
and  the  Scholastics,  the  notion  which  regards  the 
soul  as  the  "  first  entelechy  of  the  living  body." 
And  the  soul,  thus  understood,  would  appear,  in 
full  truth,  as  "  the  empirical  concept  which  is 
everywhere  made  use  of  when  there  is  a  real  and 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   159 

successful  study  of  empirical  psychology,  and  not 
barren  speculation."1 

Here,  in  fact,  we  have  the  final  conclusion  of  the 
Grundzilge  der  physiologischen  Psychologic :  "  We 
cannot  fail  to  admit  that  animism  " — i.e.,  as  Wundt's 
context  shows,  that  anthropology  which  defines 
the  soul  as  the  principle  of  life — "  succeeds  better 
than  other  psychological  theories  in  taking  account 
of  the  facts  of  experience,  and  therefore  in  connecting 
the  phenomena  of  consciousness  with  the  general 
manifestations  of  life. 

"  All  the  investigations  of  psychology  lead  us  to 
infer  the  solidarity  of  psychic  processes  and  physical 
processes.  There  fore  it  is  proved  that  the  psychic  life 
has  the  physical  life  as  its  necessary  basis.  Never- 
theless, animism  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  definitive 
solution  of  the  problems  of  life.  To  be  accepted  as 
such,  it  does  not  suffice  for  it  to  be  in  agreement  with 
experience,  it  must  also  have  a  reply  to  the  criterio- 
logical  objections  which  neither  materialism  nor 
spiritualism,  in  then:  historical  forms,  can  face."2 

Wundt's  psychology  thus  remains  impregnated 
with  the  agnostic  idealism  which  is  the  outcome  of 
the  psychological  systems  that  sprung  from  Car- 
tesianism,  but  it  shows  a  reaction  against  the 
antagonism  set  up  between  the  philosophy  of  matter 
and  the  philosophy  of  mind ;  it  inaugurates  a  move- 
ment of  thought  which  is  favourable  to  the  restora- 
tion of  immanent  finality  to  nature,  and  which, 
in  psychology,  helps  the  revival  of  the  metaphysical 
theses  of  Aristotelian  and  Scholastic  anthropology, 

1  System  der  Philosophic,  S.  389. 

2  Grundzuge,  II.,  4  Aufl  ,  1893,  cap.  23,  S.  635. 


160       CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 


III 

THE  GENERAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGY 
OF  TO-DAY 

The  state  of  mind  \ve  have  met  with  in  the  masters 
of  psychology,  we  shall  discover  anew  in  the  intel- 
lectual atmosphere  around  us,  and  we  shall  find  it 
also  in  facts. 

What  are  the  general  characteristics  of  psychology 
to-day  ? 

They  may  be  reduced  to  three. 

Descartes  reduced  psychology  to  the  study  of 
thought.  So,  to-day,  the  subject-matter  of  psycho- 
logy is  confined  to  the  facts  of  consciousness. 

Metaphysics  in  general,  and  consequently  what 
was  formerly  called  rational  psychology,  are  almost 
universally  given  up.  On  the  other  hand,  meta- 
physics in  the  Kantian  sense,  i.e.,  idealist  criticism, 
the  sole  object  of  which  is  to  determine  the  limits 
of  thought,  is  everywhere  predominant.  It  is 
above  all  under  this  influence  that  positivism  appears 
in  the  garb  of  phenomenalism,  and  psychology, 
confined  to  the  investigation  of  consciousness, 
makes  further  and  further  progress  toward  an 
idealist  and  subjectivist  monism. 

On  the  other  hand,  empiricism  and  the  mechanical 
theory  have  helped  to  fasten  the  attention  of 
psychologists  upon  the  quantitative  aspect  of  psychic 
phenomena.  The  inquiries  of  experimental  psycho- 
logy have  taken  a  great  leap  forward,  and  open  up 
a  future  full  of  promise. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY       161 

The  doctrine  that  the  sole  subject-matter  of  psychology 
is  the  facts  of  consciousness  has  now  become  a  dogma. 

Physical  and  physiological  phenomena  are  con- 
sidered to  form  a  department  by  itself,  and  to 
depend  on  external  observation.  Psychic  facts  form 
a  second  department  separate  from  the  first,  and 
they  can  be  observed  by  consciousness:  they  are 
ranged  under  the  common  name  of  thought,  and 
soul  or  mind  is  the  name  given  to  the  subject  that 
gives  them  attention. 

It  matters  little,  moreover,  whether  with  some 
"  out-of-date  "  psychologists  one  admits  the  exist- 
ence of  faculties,  or  whether  with  the  phenomenal- 
ists  one  holds  all  that  is  not  a  present  instantaneous 
fact  to  be  but  vain  entities,  "  phantoms  begotten 
of  words  " ;  in  either  case  consciousness  is  called 
upon  by  all  to  form  the  line  of  demarcation  between 
physiology  and  psychology,  between  the  domain  of 
mind  and  matter. 

When,  in  his  third  Meditation,  Descartes  tried 
to  enumerate  his  "  thoughts,"  he  put  them  into  two 
general  groups:  those  that  are  "  as  the  images  of 
things,"  such  as  are  one's  thoughts  of  a  man,  a 
chimera,  of  heaven,  of  an  angel,  of  God;  and  those 
that  comprise  something  more  than  the  simple 
representation  of  a  thing,  such  as  thoughts  translated 
by  such  expressions  as  "  I  wish,"  "  I  fear,"  "  I 
affirm,"  or  "  I  deny." 

He  reserved  the  name  of  "  ideas  "  exclusively  to 
the  thoughts  of  the  first  class,  and  then  he  sub- 
divided the  thoughts  of  the  second  class  into  sub- 
groups of  a  rather  vague  kind,  comprising  "  volitions, 
affections,  and  judgements.''' 

ii 


162   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

In  this  way  Descartes  departed  from  the  tradi- 
tional classification  in  two  directions.  It  was 
generally  admitted  before  his  day  that  the  idea,  or 
ra'her  the  simple  representation,  and  the  judgement 
were  phenomena  of  the  same  order,  and  that  they 
belonged  to  the  same  kind  of  faculties,  called  appre- 
hensive or  cognitive.  On  the  other  hand,  before 
Descartes'  time  affections  and  volitions  were  referred 
to  the  same  class  of  faculties,  those  called  volitional 
or  appetitive. 

But  here  was  Descartes  setting  the  judgement  in 
opposition  to  the  idea,  as  if  these  were  thoughts  of 
different  kinds.  At  the  same  time,  he  appears  to 
put  the  same  distinction  between  affections  and 
volitions  as  between  judgements  and  affective  or 
volitional  phenomena. 

The  opposition  between  the  idea  and  the  judgement 
did  not  survive  the  writer  of  the  Meditations  :  and 
they  continued  to  be  classified  both  under  the 
common  names  of  mental  phenomena  or  thoughts. 
But,  in  consequence  of  this  confusion  of  the  mental 
phenomenon  with  the  inward  fact  or  "  thought  " 
in  general,  a  fresh  ambiguity  slipped  into  the 
language  of  philosophy. 

A  rigorous  analysis  of  inward  acts  led  to  their 
arrangement  in  two  different  orders,  the  one  sensible 
and  material,  the  other  suprasensible,  immaterial, 
and  spiritual  or  mental.  The  former  are  intrinsically 
and  immediately  connected  with  the  physico- 
chemical  processes  of  the  bodily  organism,  the  latter 
are  only  subject  to  the  laws  of  physical  nature, 
indirectly  and  extrinsically,  by  means  of  the  former. 
The  old  Scholastics  unanimously  respected  the 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   163 

distinction  of  these  two  orders  of  inward  facts. 
They  attributed  to  the  inner  sense  the  feeling  of  the 
existence  of  the  former,  and  reserved  the  name  of 
consciousness  to  the  intuition  of  the  second. 

But,  following  Descartes,  who  gave  the  common 
name  of  thought  to  all  the  processes  of  which  we  have 
an  "  inward  perception,"  people  grew  accustomed  to 
group  together  under  the  common  and  supposedly 
synonymous  name  of  "  thoughts,"  and  "  conscious  " 
facts,  sensible  as  well  as  suprasensible  acts.  Gradu- 
ally the  distinction  of  nature  formerly  set  up  between 
them  vanished  to  such  a  degree  that,  for  a  very  large 
number  of  psychologists,  there  is  no  longer  any 
essential  difference  between  knowing  and  mental 
knowledge,  perception  and  understanding,  the  psychic 
and  the  mental,  the  inner  sense  and  consciousness. 

Hence  follows  the  very  natural  inference  that  there 
is  only  a  difference  of  degree  between  the  animal 
and  man. 

As  to  the  distinction  suggested  by  Descartes 
between  affective  phenomena  and  volitional  acts, 
it  gradually  crept  into  modern  philosophy.  We 
know  the  importance  of  the  "  lesser  perceptions  "  or 
"  dull  perceptions  "  in  the  Monadology.  Leibnitz 
regarded  them  as  states  of  soul  of  which  we  are 
dimly  conscious,  and  he  therefore  opposes  them  to 
the  clearly  and  distinctly  conscious  states,  to  repre- 
sentation and  volition.  Owing  to  the  influence  of 
two  German  philosophers,  Sulzer  and  Tetens,1  the 
Leibnitz  feeling  was  soon  regarded  as  a  faculty  in 
itself,  distinct  from  the  apprehensive  and  appetitive 

1  Tetens,  Philosophische  Versuche  uber  die  menschliche 
Natur  und  ihre  Entwickelung.  Cf.  Windelband,  Geschichte 
der  Philosophic ,  2te  Aufl.,  Freiburg,  1899,  S.  418. 


164   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

faculties.  And  Kant  gave  this  classification  the 
weight  of  his  authority. 

Henceforward,  the  threefold  division  of  the  "  facul- 
ties of  the  soul  "  into  understanding,  will,  and  sensi- 
bility, or  of  "  psychic  facts  "  into  mental,  voluntary, 
and  affective  facts,  was  almost  universally  accepted.1 

We  shall  dwell  no  more  at  present  upon  this 
first  general  characteristic  of  psychology,  for  we 
shall  have  to  return  to  it  in  our  next  chapter  in 
.  order  to  discuss  Descartes'  psychology. 

The  second  general  characteristic  of  psychology 
is  the  abandonment  of  metaphysics,  and  notably,  of 
rational  psychology.  Metaphysical  agnosticism  be- 
comes, mainly  under  Kant's  influence,  phenomen- 
alism, and  the  dominant  desire  of  psychologists  not 
to  go  outside  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  leads 
most  of  them  to  idealist  and  subjectivist  monism. 

The  triumph  of  agnosticism  in  the  sphere  of  meta- 
physics involves  the  negation  of  faculties,  of  the 

1  There  is  no  need  to  prove  the  general  agreement  of 
psychologists  as  to  the  exclusive  attribution  of  conscious 
phenomena  to  psychology,  and  as  to  the  tripartite  division 
above  mentioned.  Here  we  quote,  by  way  of  example, 
Alexander  Bain,  in  his  The  Senses  and  the  Intellect :  "  Mind  is 
opposed  to  matter,  as  subject  to  object,  the  inward  world  to 
the  outward  world,  extension  to  non-extension.  The  pheno- 
mena of  non-extension  are  commonly  classed  under  three 
heads:  i.  Feeling,  which  includes,  though  not  exclusively, 
pleasures  and  pains.  Emotion,  passion,  affection,  feelings, 
are  but  so  many  names  for  feeling.  2.  Volition  or  will, 
which  embraces  all  our  activities  so  far  as  they  are  directed 
by  feeling.  3.  Thought,  intelligence,  or  perception. 

As  to  our  sensations,  they  come  partly  under  feeling, 
partly  under  thought. 

The  sum  of  these  three  classes  of  phenomena  makes  a 
definition  of  mind." 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY       165 

substantial  Ego,  and  finally,  of  any  possibility, 
beyond  phenomena,  of  a  thing-in-itself. 

The  discrediting  of  metaphysics  is  surely  not 
entirely  the  work  of  Kant.  Francis  Bacon,  Hobbes, 
Locke,  Hume,  and  John  Stuart  Mill,  in  England; 
the  mechanical  physics  of  Descartes,  the  sensation- 
alism of  Condillac,  Comte,  Littre,  and  Taine,  in 
France,  have  also  disseminated  and  popularized 
empirical  and  phenomenalist  philosophy.  Positivist 
ideas  were  in  the  air,  writes  Lange,  in  all  the  greater 
countries  of  Europe  at  the  beginning  of  the  present 
century  (the  nineteenth).1 

Then  the  prejudice  created  by  the  extraordinary 
progress  of  experimental  sciences  and  by  their 
marvellous  application  to  industry,  the  contrast 
between  the  certainty  of  their  results  and  the 
sterility  of  metaphysical  disputes  in  the  vain  dis- 
cussions of  the  decadents  of  the  School,  filled  men 
with  distrust  of  speculation.  And  this  was  all 
the  more  the  case,  in  that  the  antagonism  set  up  by 
Descartes  between  body  and  mind,  between  physical, 
or,  rather,  mechanical  science,  which  depends  upon 
outward  observation,  and  psychology,  which  was 
reduced  to  the  study  of  inward  facts  by  means  of 
consciousness,  led  men  of  science  to  believe  that 
the  temper  of  psychology  revolts  against  outward 
observation  and  natural  science;  and,  applying 
afterwards  to  philosophy  in  general  what  they 
thought  was  true  of  psychology,  they  concluded 
that  philosophic  method  is  exclusive  of  scientific 

1  See  above,  p.  50.  Cf.  Lange,  Geschichte  des  Materialis- 
mus  (1866),  II.,  p.  84 ;  Kuno  Fischer,  Francis  Bacon  und 
seine  Nachfolger,  Leipzig,  1875,  and  Geschichte  der  neuern 
Philosophic,  I.,  S.  143,  Heidelberg,  1889. 


166   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

method,  and  finally  inferred  that  philosophy  and 
science  were  in  opposition  to  one  another. 

This  prejudice  against  philosophy  is  clearly  ex- 
pressed by  Comte  in  his  Cours  de  philosophic  positive  : 

"In  no  respect  whatever  is  there  any  room  for 
this  illusory  psychology,  the  final  transmutation  of 
theology,  the  revival  of  which  is  so  vainly  attempted 
to-day,  and  which,  without  troubling  itself  with  the 
physiological  investigation  of  our  mental  organs, 
or  with  observing  the  rational  procedure  which 
effectively  governs  our  various  scientific  researches, 
claims  to  discover  the  fundamental  laws  of  the 
human  mind  by  regarding  it  in  itself — i.e.,  by  getting 
entirely  rid  of  cause  and  effect. 

"  The  preponderance  of  positive  philosophy  has 
gradually  become  what  it  is  since  the  time  of  Bacon. 
To-day  it  has  won  such  a  complete  ascendency 
even  over  those  minds  which  were  farthest  removed 
from  its  immense  development,  that  metaphysicians 
given  up  to  the  study  of  the  intelligence  could 
only  hope  to  slacken  the  decadence  of  their 
so-called  science  by  taking  steps  to  present  their 
teaching  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  it  seem  also 
founded  on  the  observation  of  facts.  For  this 
purpose,  they  have  latterly  pretended  to  distinguish 
with  an  extraordinary  subtlety  two  kinds  of  obser- 
vation of  equal  importance,  the  one  outward,  the 
other  inward,  the  latter  being  intended  only  for  the 
study  of  mental  phenomena.  This  is  not  the  place 
to  examine  this  fundamental  sophism.  I  must 
confine  myself  to  indicating  the  chief  consideration 
that  clearly  proves  that  this  pretended  direct  con- 
templation of  the  mind  by  itself  is  purely  illusory. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   167 

"  A  short  time  ago,  it  was  thought  that  sight  was 
explained  by  saying  that  the  luminous  action  of 
bodies  formed  on  the  retina  pictures  representing 
outward  shapes  and  colours.  To  this  physiologists 
rightly  objected  that,  if  luminous  impressions  acted 
as  pictures,  then  another  eye  would  be  required  to 
see  them.  Is  not  this  still  more  the  case  in  the 
present  instance  ? 

"It  is  palpable,  indeed,  that  through  inevitable 
necessity  the  human  mind  can  directly  observe  all 
phenomena  except  its  own.     For,  by  whom  would 
the  observation  be  made  ?     We  may  conceive,  with 
regard  to  moral  phenomena,  that  a  man  may  be 
able    to    observe    himself   so    far  as  concerns  the 
passions  which  animate  him,   for  this  anatomical 
reason,  that  the  organs  which  are  their  seat  are 
distinct   from  those  that   make   the   observations. 
Even  if  everyone  were  able  so  to  observe  himself, 
such  observations  plainly  could  never  possess  any 
great  scientific  value,  and  the  best  way  to  observe 
the   passions  is  always   to  note  them  outside   of 
oneself;  for  any  extreme  state  of  passion,  which  is 
just  the  one  which  it  is  most  important  to  investi- 
gate, is  necessarily  incompatible  with  such  observa- 
tion.    But,  as  for  observing  in  this  manner  mental 
phenomena   in   process   of   manifestation,   that    is 
plainly    impossible.     The    thinker    cannot    divide 
himself  into  two  parts,  one  of  which  reflects  while 
the  other  regards  its  reflections.     The  organ  ob- 
served and  the  organ  observing  are   in  this  case 
identical,  hence  how  can  observation  take  place  ? 

"  Therefore   this  so-called   psychological  method 
is  in  principle  radically  fruitless.     Further,  note  to 


168   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

what  utterly  contradictory  procedures  it  directly 
leads  !  On  the  one  hand,  you  are  told  to  isolate 
yourself,  as  far  as  possible,  from  all  outward  sensa- 
tions. You  must  particularly  refrain  from  all 
mental  work,  for  if  you  had  to  make  the  simplest 
calculation,  what  would  become  of  your  inward 
observation  ?  On  the  other  hand,  after  all  your 
precautions,  when  you  have  attained  to  this  perfect 
state  of  intellectual  slumber,  you  must  busy  yourself 
with  your  mental  operations,  when  none  are  taking 
place  !  Our  descendants  will  doubtless  some  day  find 
such  pretensions  as  these  brought  upon  the  scene. 

"  The  results  of  such  a  strange  method  of  pro- 
cedure are  in  perfect  conformity  with  their  principle. 
For  two  thousand  years  metaphysicians  have  thus 
studied  psychology,  and  they  are  unable  to  agree 
upon  a  single  intelligible  and  soundly  settled  pro- 
position. Even  to-day  they  are  divided  into  a  host 
of  schools  which  are  incessantly  disputing  about 
their  own  first  principles.  Inward  observation  begets 
almost  as  many  divergent  opinions  as  there  are 
individuals  to  maintain  them. 

"  True  scientists,  those  who  are  devoted  to  positive 
studies,  are  still  asking  these  psychologists  in  vain 
to  name  a  single  real  discovery,  great  or  small,  due 
to  this  much  vaunted  method."1 

Another  proof  that  the  founder  of  positivism 
identified  philosophy  with  the  study  of  the  human 
mind  by  psychological  methods,  is  that,  according 
to  him,  to  return  to  the  Aristotelian  tradition,  to 
start  from  outward  observation  to  go  on  to  the 
higher  generalizatoins  of  experience,  is  to  repudiate 
1  A.  Comte,  Cours  de  philosophie  positive,  I.,  pp.  34-37. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   169 

the  mind  and  to  forsake  the  method  of  the  "  meta- 
physicians "  and  to  establish  "  positive  philosophy." 
"  I  regret  that  I  had  to  adopt,  failing  any  other, 
such  a  term  as  philosophy,  which  has  been  so  much 
abused  by  the  way  in  which  it  has  been  used  in 
so  many  different  senses.  But  the  epithet  positive, 
which  I  use  to  modify  its  meaning,  seems  to  me 
enough  to  dissipate,  even  at  first  blush,  any  essential 
ambiguity,  at  least  in  the  minds  of  those  who 
appreciate  its  significance.  Hence  I  shall  here  be 
satisfied  to  state  that  I  use  the  word  philosophy  in 
the  sense  given  to  it  by  the  ancients,  and  particularly 
by  Aristotle — to  designate  the  general  system  of 
human  ideas;  and,  by  adding  the  word  positive,  I 
show  that  I  have  in  mind  that  particular  form  of 
philosophizing  which  consists  in  regarding  theories, 
belonging  to  any  order  whatsoever,  as  having  for 
their  object  the  co-ordination  of  observed  facts, 
which  constitutes  the  third  and  final  stage  of  general 
philosophy,  which  was  first  theological,  and  then 
metaphysical,  as  I  explain  at  the  outset."1 

Thus,  as  we  said  before,  the  persistence  of  sensa- 
tionalism and  of  the  mechanical  theory,  originating 
in  the  philosophy  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries ;  the  prejudice  of  thinking  that  philosophy 
only  recognizes  one  method,  that  of  inward  observa- 
tion, and  that  the  metaphysician  is  irrevocably  shut 
out  from  the  study  of  nature;  the  prestige  arising 
from  the  progress  and  discoveries  of  the  physical 
sciences,  in  favour  of  empiricism  and  to  the  detri- 

1  A.  Comte,  Cours  de  philosophic  positive,  Avertissement, 
pp.  vii,  viij. 


170   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

ment  of  speculation — all  these  causes  contributed  to 
the  rise  of  positivism,  particularly  in  France  and 
in  England,  quite  independently  of  the  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason. 

But  the  author  of  the  Critique  formulated  the 
theory  of  positivism. 

The  French  sensationalists,  and  the  English 
empiricists,  with  the  exception  of  Hume,  were 
dogmatists.  Like  Spinoza  and  Leibnitz,  they  ac- 
cepted the  fact  of  consciousness,  and  never  thought 
of  questioning  its  legitimacy.  Even  in  Comte, 
positivism  is  rather  a  method  than  a  critical  theory. 
But  Hume,  upon  whom  empiricism  and  rationalism 
appear  to  converge,  shook  the  common  belief  in 
certitude.  Hence  the  past  had  to  be  revised.  The 
problem  of  the  possibility  of  certain  knowledge 
became  the  order  of  the  day.  But  it  is  the  first 
problem  we  have  to  decide,  for  if  the  nature  of  things 
is  attainable,  it  is  only  so  by  means  of  knowledge.1 

1  Professor  L.  De  Lantsheere  has  given  a  very  good 
analysis  of  the  psychological  reason  of  the  importance 
assumed  in  modern  philosophy  by  the  criticism  of  know- 
ledge. 

"  The  source  of  this  requirement  is  easily  understood. 
It  appears  difficult  to  admit  that  man's  mind  has  been  in 
error  until  the  new  ideas  came  in.  And  yet  some  reason 
must  be  found  for  such  blindness.  The  simplest  is  to 
suppose  that  the  ancients  never  carefully  examined  the  very 
basis  of  knowledge,  and  that  they  failed  to  understand  its 
limits.  How  could  they  formerly  assert  the  certainty  of 
things  which  we  have  to-day  decided  to  be  false,  if  it  were 
not  for  want  of  method,  and  through  failure  to  recognize 
the  true  criterion  and  the  true  conditions  of  certitude  ? 
Further,  every  important  epoch  of  the  new  philosophy 
begins  with  a  revision  of  the  knowing  faculty.  Thus  it  was 
that  Descartes,  with  the  help  of  doubt,  undertook  to  resolve 
the  question  that  vexed  him,  when  he  was  confronted  with 
the  incoherencies  of  the  Scholastics  of  the  seventeenth 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   171 

And  it  was  Kant  who  was  the  first  to  tackle  it 
straightforwardly:  his  critical  genius  broods  over 
all  the  philosophy  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Kant's  Critique  led  to  two  incoherent  conclusions 
— the  possibility  of  an  empirical  certitude,  and  an 
inevitable  agnosticism  in  metaphysics.  These  two 
conclusions  coincide  with  the  two  aspects  of  positive 
philosophy,  the  one  affirmative,  the  other  negative. 

In  fine,  Kant  concluded  that  man's  mind  can 
know  nothing  but  the  phenomena  of  experience, 
perceived  in  the  intuitions  of  time  and  space, 
according  to  the  subjective  laws  of  the  categories. 
Plato's  distinction  between  the  fyaivon^vov  and 
the  voovpevov  has  therefore  no  meaning  so  far  as 
human  knowledge  is  concerned.  The  only  know- 
able  voovfitvov  is  the  ^aivo^vov.  A  metempirical 
voovfievoi',  a  thing-in-itself,  is  nothing  to  an  intel- 
ligence which  is  subject  to  the  conditions  of  human 
knowledge. 

Does  this  mean  that  the  "  thing-in-itself  "  does 
not  exist,  or  that  its  existence  is  impossible  ?  Or 
that,  if  it  exists  or  its  existence  is  intrinsically 
possible,  it  is  absolutely  unintelligible  ?  No;  our 
necessary  ignorance  of  what  is  beyond  our  experience 
does  not  enable  us  to  affirm  or  to  deny  the  objective 
reality  of  the  transcendental  world. 

century.  Thus  it  was  that  Kant  took  the  same  problem  in 
hand,  when  the  movement  of  thought  aroused  by  the 
Cartesian  philosophy  resulted,  in  the  person  of  Won,  in  a 
dogmatism  which  appeared  to  him  to  be  dangerous.  And 
thus  once  more,  the  deceptions  springing  from  the  downfall 
of  the  great  idealist  systems  brought  men's  minds  back  to 
Kantian  principles,  combining  them  with  the  recent  dis- 
coveries of  physiology  and  psycho-physics." — Revue  neo- 
scolastique,  April,  1894,  p.  108, 


172   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  subjective  laws,  whereby  the  understanding 
can  only  conceive  an  object  in  the  intuitions  of 
passive  impressions  furnished  by  sensation,  would 
not  govern  a  mind  capable  of  creating  entirely  its 
own  intelligible  objects,  or  of  borrowing  their 
elements  from  some  other  source  than  sensation; 
and  therefore  it  is  not  impossible  for  intelligences 
to  exist  that  are  capable  of  knowing  the  tran- 
scendental sphere,  or  "  things-in-themselves." 

Hence  the  possibility  of  metaphysics  in  a  negative 
sense  becomes  intelligible .  Metaphysics,  thus  under- 
stood, does  indeed  maintain  that  it  is  not  incon- 
sistent to  think  that  noumena  or  things-in-them- 
selves may  be  intelligible  to  a  mind  independent  of 
the  law  of  sensational  intuition,  but  at  the  same  time 
it  maintains,  and  herein  it  reveals  the  limitations  of 
its  scope,  that  for  the  human  mind  they  are  neces- 
sarily unknowable.  They  are  therefore,  to  use 
Kant's  expression,  "  boundary-concepts  "  (Grenz- 
begriffe] — in  other  words,  they  mark  the  limits  beyond 
which  experimental  science  necessarily  cannot  pass. 

Such  was  the  negative  work  of  the  author  of  the 
Critique  :  "to  prove,"  as  is  well  said  by  M.  Ravaisson, 
"  the  nullity  of  metaphysics,  and  to  reduce  theoreti- 
cal philosophy  to  the  analysis  of  the  knowing 
faculties  which  would  show  their  inability  of  going 
beyond  the  borders  of  physical  knowledge."1  In 
fine,  the  Kantian  Critique  is  a  theory,  deductive 
in  form,  of  the  positivism  outlined  by  Comte  and 
practised  by  most  contemporary  psychologists. 
We  remarked  above  that  the  two  conclusions  of 

1  Ravaisson,  Revue  de  metaphysique  et  de  morale,  No.  i, 
January,  1893,  p.  6. 


173 

the  Kantian  Critique  are  inconsistent.  Indeed, 
empirical  certitude  accords  but  ill  with  the  general 
principles  of  the  Critique.  These  lead  on  logically 
to  the  negation  of  all  objective  certitude.  "  The 
old  metaphysics,"  says  the  Preface  of  the  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason,  "  used  to  say  that  our  knowledge 
must  be  governed  by  its  subject-matter.  But,  on 
this  hypothesis,  we  should  try  in  vain  to  make  any 
a  priori  judgement  with  regard  to  such  matters  so 
as  to  widen  the  field  of  science.  All  our  endeavours 
would  be  fruitless.  To  explain  the  possibility  of 
science,  we  must  assume,  on  the  contrary,  that  the 
subject-matter  must  be  governed  by  our  power  to  know" 

This  is  a  general  assumption,  and  there  is  nothing 
in  Kant's  Critique  which  sets  a  logical  limit  to  its 
scope.  Hence  in  the  empirical,  as  well  as  in  the 
speculative,  sphere,  we  can  only  know  the  laws  of 
our  own  thinking.  In  both  cases  the  one  criterion 
of  truth  is  the  harmony  of  thought  with  itself. 

The  objective  reality  of  phenomena  is  no  more 
guaranteed  to  us  than  that  of  noumena.  Empirical 
science  and  metaphysics  partake  of  the  same  certi- 
tude in  subjective  assent,  but  also  in  the  same 
objective  incertitude.  Nevertheless,  all  metaphysics 
is  not  deemed  impossible;  provided  that  it  is  not 
assigned  an  objective  import,  and  that  its  essentially 
subjective  character  is  maintained,  the  human  mind 
may  be  allowed  to  essay  constructive  efforts  therein. 

Fichte,  Schelling,  Hegel,  and  later  on  Schopen- 
hauer and  von  Hartmann,  devoted  themselves  ex 
professo  to  this  great  work;  but,  even  apart  from 
them  and  their  famous  systems,  all  metaphysical 
attempts  received  a  subjectivist  form. 


174   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

On  the  one  hand,  empiricism  or  positivism  became 
phenomena  list ;  on  the  other  hand,  metaphysical 
speculations  were  unable  to  shake  off  subjectivism, 
and  made  it  a  rule  for  the  non-Ego  to  be  swallowed 
up  in  the  Ego,  and  to  explain  nature  by  conscious- 
ness. Hence  arose  the  monism  which  appears  as  the 
common  feature  of  the  systems  of  Spencer,  Fouille'e, 
and  Wundt,  and  as  the  final  word  in  conjecture  in 
every  philosophy  that  tries  to  go  beyond  immediate 
fact. 

Jacobi,  Fries,  and  Reinhold1  made  the  first  efforts 
to  draw  subjectivist  conclusions  from  the  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason,  but  it  was  the  special  work  of  Fichte  to 
give  them  prominence. 

The  existence  of  what  we  ordinarily  call  a  thing, 
an  object,  of  what  dogmatic  philosophy  calls  a 
Thing-in-itself  (Ding-an-sich),  is  the  work  of  man's 
consciousness. 

As  opposed  to  representations  which  are  arbitrary, 
there  are  some  in  consciousness,  says  Fichte,  that  are 
accompanied  by  a.  feeling  of  necessity.  To  account  for 
such  necessity  should  be  the  chief  aim  of  a  theory  of 
knowledge.  The  knowledge  which  carries  along  with 
it  the  feeling  of  necessity  we  call  experience.  We 
have,  then,  to  discover  the  foundation  of  experience. 

This  question  admits  of  two  replies.  Experience 
implies  conscious  activity  with  something  as  its 
object.  Hence  the  necessity  that  is  inherent  in 
experience  may  be  caused  either  by  its  object  or 
by  consciousness.  The  first  answer  is  dogmatic,  the 
second  is  idealist. 

1  Cf.  Windelband,  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  2te  Aufl., 
Freiburg-i-Br.,  1899,  S.  467  ff. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   175 

Dogmatism  regards  consciousness  as  a  product  of 
things,  and  subordinates  mental  activity  to  the 
mechanical  necessity  of  causality;  and  therefore  it 
is  a  theory  of  materialistic  fatalism.  Idealism,  on 
the  other  hand,  regards  things  as  a  product  of  con- 
sciousness, the  function  of  which  depends  only 
upon  itself;  and  hence  it  is  a  theory  of  activity 
proper  and  of  free  will. 

Morality  and  analysis  of  consciousness  concur  in 
favour  of  idealism.  Such  is  the  line  of  thought 
pursued  by  Schleiermacher,  Schelling,  and  Hegel,1 
and  they  made  it  the  starting-point  of  their  philo- 
sophic systems,  which  for  at  least  a  quarter  of  a 
century,  at  first  in  Germany,  and  afterwards  in 
France,  Italy,  and  the  United  States,  aroused  an  en- 
thusiasm which  it  is  hard  to  form  any  idea  of  to-day. 

This  success,  which  was  rather  the  work  of 
imagination  than  of  reason,  led  to  a  reaction  in  the 
direction  of  rough  materialism,  about  1850.  It  was 
the  time  of  the  noisy  triumphs  of  Karl  Vogt,  Mole- 
schott,  and  Biichner,  but  this  materialism  led  to 
a  counter-movement  which  carried  men's  minds 
towards  an  idealist  conception  of  philosophy. 

Kant  was  not  slow  in  regaining  public  support. 
Zeller,  Liebmann,  and  Lange,  among  philosophers, 
Helmholz  among  scientists,  were  revivers  of  the 
Critique,  and  thenceforward,  in  the  Universities  as 
well  as  in  the  scientific  world,  the  influence  of  Kant 
has  only  gone  on  increasing,  involving  what  tem- 

1  It  is  true  that  Herbart  and  Schopenhauer,  like  the 
founders  of  idealist  pantheism,  maintained  the  reality  of 
the  thing-in-itself ;  but  they  claimed  to  be  faithful  to  the 
teaching  of  Kant,  and  therefore  to  the  subjectivism  of  the 
categories. 


176   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

porarily  appeared  to  be  the  final  downfall  of  meta- 
physics. 

Run  through  the  countries  which  are  the  chief 
leaders  of  thought,  Germany,  England,  the  United 
States,  and  France;  look  at  the  University 
syllabuses,  the  periodicals,  the  various  publications : 
everywhere  you  will  find  metaphysics,  and  particu- 
larly rational  psychology,  deserted,  idealism  pre- 
dominant, and  passing  into  subjectivist  monism. 

"  In  Germany,  scarcely  fifty  years  ago,"  wrote 
M.  Levy-Bruhl  in  1895,  "  Hegel's  metaphysics  were 
almost  universally  dominant."  To-day,  "  Hegelians 
disappear  one  after  another,  like  those  who  wear  the 
medals  of  St.  Helena.  Schopenhauer  still  has  a  few 
admirers;  but  pessimism,  as  a  philosophic  system, 
counts  scarcely  any  adherents  now  in  Germany. 
Still  more  transitory  was  the  success  of  von  Hart- 
mann,  the  famous  writer  of  the  Philosophic  des 
Unbewussten.  He  still  brings  out  books,  but  the 
public  no  longer  reads  them.  No  metaphysical 
doctrine  nowadays  secures  acceptance,  and  hardly 
any  makes  even  a  bid  for  it.  Nietzsche  was  lately 
the  subject  of  very  keen  infatuation,  but  the  fashion 
which  exalted  him  to  the  skies  is  already  beginning 
to  leave  him  in  the  lurch.  Besides,  he  is  a  brilliant 
moralist,  and  not  a  metaphysician;  and  the  violent 
paradox  in  which  he  rejoices  does  not  furnish  the 
materials  for  a  consistent  system.  There  remains 
M.  Wundt,  a  man  of  sound  and  lucid  mind,  a  good 
logician,  an  all-round  man  of  learning,  who  started 
with  physiology,  and  ended  by  daring  to  launch  out 
into  metaphysics.  To-day  he  is  indisputably  the 


177 

most  appreciated  of  German  philosophers.  But, 
bold  innovator  as  he  is  in  psychology  and  morals, 
M.  Wundt  becomes  almost  timid  as  soon  as  he 
touches  upon  the  ultimate  questions  of  metaphysics. 
Moreover,  it  is  that  part  of  his  work  that  exercises 
the  least  influence.  The  work  of  his  laboratory  of 
physiological  psychology  awakens  more  interest, 
and  holds  our  attention  more  firmly  than  his  theory 
of  consciousness  or  conception  of  the  universe. 

"  In  fine,  if  it  be  true  that  public  indifference 
discourages  metaphysical  speculation,  there  is, 
indeed,  no  startling  novelty  to  shake  us  out  of  our 
indifference.  The  latter  does  not  extend  to  all 
philosophical  investigation,  whatever  it  may  be; 
the  success  of  most  of  M.  Wundt's  books  is  enough 
to  prove  that.  And  besides  his  works,  many  others 
of  considerable  importance  are  appearing  in  Ger- 
many, dealing  with  logic,  morals,  and  sociology. 

'It  is  metaphysics  that  is  especially  neglected. 
There  are  few  new  books  on  the  subject,  and  the 
vogue  they  have  is  but  slight,  one  may  say  practically 
nil.  Not  long  ago,  a  young  Privatdocent  of  Berlin 
was  asked:  '  What  philosophical  school  do  you 
belong  to  ?'  'To  my  own,'  he  replied  with  a  smile. 
Indeed,  he  would  have  been  sore  put  to  it  to  give 
any  other  answer  than  this  quip,  unless  he  had  taken 
refuge  behind  some  great  historic  name. 

"  Moreover,  if  any  kind  of  metaphysical  teaching 
was  to-day  exercising  an  observable  influence  upon 
men's  minds,  should  we  not  find  some  echo  of  it  in 
our  Universities  ?  Look  at  the  prospectuses  of  a 
few  of  them,  and  see  how  small  a  place  is  to-day 
assigned  to  metaphysics.  In  the  University  of 

12 


178   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Konigsberg  forty-five  professors  have  given  notice 
of  courses  of  lectures  in  the  School  of  Philosophy. 
This  school  comprises  what  is  taught  in  France  in 
the  schools  of  Literature  and  Science.  Of  the 
forty-five  professors  only  three  deal  with  subjects 
covered  by  philosophy,  and  not  one  with  meta- 
physics proper.  In  the  University  of  Munich,  the 
Philosophy  school  is  subdivided  into  two  sections— 
the  section  of  the  mathematical,  physical,  and 
natural  sciences,  and  the  section  of  the  moral  and 
social  sciences.  The  latter  reckons  thirty-six  pro- 
fessors, among  whom  five  in  the  winter  term  of 
1894-1895  had  to  deal  with  really  philosophical 
subject-matters,  especially  with  logic  and  psycho- 
logy; two  of  them  were  also  to  lecture  on  meta- 
physics. Lastly,  the  Philosophy  School  of  Berlin 
numbers  no  less  than  a  hundred  and  sixty  professors. 
Sixteen  of  them  give  notice  of  courses  dealing  with 
different  parts  of  philosophy,  especially  with  psycho- 
logy, logic,  social  sciences  and  the  history  of  various 
doctrines :  only  one  has  anything  to  do  with  a  sub- 
ject that  properly  belongs  to  metaphysics  (the  proofs 
for  the  existence  of  God) ;  another  will  investigate 
modern  positivism.  And  this  is  all.  The  figures 
speak  for  themselves,  and  the  inference  is  self- 
evident.  There  is  no  original  metaphysical  specu- 
lation: the  interest  of  disciple  and  master  alike  is 
entirely  devoted  to  other  subjects."1 

During  the  summer  term  of  1897,  the  syllabuses 
of  the  twenty-one  German  Universities,  seminaries 
and  diocesan  institutions  excepted,  include  only 
Jour  courses  in  general  metaphysics.  If  these 

1  L6vy-Briihl,  Revue  des  deux  mondes,  1895. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   179 

figures,  which  are  really  absurd,  are  to  be  compared 
with  those  of  other  courses  of  teaching,  the  follow- 
ing facts  will  suffice:  Introduction  to  Philosophy, 
Fundamental  Questions,  Propaideutics :  thirty-three 
courses;  Logic,  Criteriology,  Psedagogy:  thirty-three 
courses;  Psychology:  forty-one  courses;  Special 
Subjects,  excluding  those  of  Metaphysics:  forty- 
one  courses;  General  History  of  Philosophy,  and 
Special  Histories  of  various  Philosophical  Schools: 
seventy-six  courses.1 

Kant's  two  Critiques,  and  some  of  his  other 
writings,  are  the  favourite  philosophical  subject  in 
the  German  Universities.  The  Berlin  Academy  is 
publishing  a  new  edition  of  Kant's  works,  and  the 
enterprise  is  being  strongly  supported.  Since  1896 
a  new  review  has  been  running,  called  Kantstudien,2 
which  undertakes  to  study,  both  from  the  doctrinal 
and  the  historical  point  of  view,  the  work  of  the 
Konigsberg  philosopher,  and  to  gather  together  all 
the  traces  of  his  influence  throughout  the  world. 

The  idealist  movement  has  lately  given  rise  in 
Germany  to  the  formation  of  a  group  of  writers 
who  give  their  common  programme  the  name  of 
the  Philosophy  of  Immanence.  Amongst  them  may 
be  cited  the  names  of  Schuppe,  von  Schubert- 
Soldern,  Kauffmann,  and,  from  some  points  of  view, 
Rehmke.  This  group  has  long  had  an  organ  of  its 
own,  entitled  Zeitschrift  fur  immanente  Philosophic, 
and  founded  in  1895  by  Kauffmann. 

1  As  to  the  disfavour  into  which  metaphysics  has  fallen 
in  Germany,  see  Busse,  Die  Bedeutung  der  Metaphysik  fur 
die  Philosophic  und  die  Theologie  (Zeitschrift  f.  Philosophic 
u.  philos.  Kritik,  November,  1897,  S.  26). 

*  Founded  by  Vaihinger,  now  edited  by  Bauch, 


i8o   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  object  of  the  Philosophy  of  Immanence  is  to 
describe  reality,  excluding  any  idea  of  a  hypothetical 
complement,  and  any  metaphysical  assumption. 
Its  essential  characteristic  is  the  negation  of  every- 
thing that  may  be  regarded  as  transcendent.  It 
recognizes  nothing  outside  of  consciousness.  Conscious 
being  and  real  being  are  identical.1 

Not  only  this,  but  Kauffmann  considers  that 
"  opposition  of  subject  and  object  is  not  to  be 
found  in  reality,  but  it  is  merely  a  hypothetical 
complement."2  Such  a  theory  is  admitted  to  lead 
on  logically  to  solipsism,  but  the  consequence  is 
denied  in  practice. 

The  sharp  conflict  between  spontaneous  realism 
and  the  subjectivism  of  the  philosophic  schools  led 
Richard  Avenarius,  a  professor  of  the  University  of 
Zurich,  to  make  a  fresh  attempt,  the  object  of  which 
is  to  break  away  from  the  schools,  and  to  overcome 
empiricism  and  criticism  with  the  help  of  what  he 
calls  empiric-criticism.  His  principal  work  is  the 
Kritik  der  reinen  Erfahrung.3  Its  dominant  idea  is 
that  man's  mind  should  rise  above  all  systems  that 
affirm  or  deny,  either  the  real  or  the  ideal,  either 

1  "  The  idea  of  the  knowable  comprises  only  facts  of 
consciousness,  and  the  latter  are  identified  with  facts  of 
empirical    reality." — Kauffmann,    Immanente    Philosophie, 
Leipzig,   1893,  S.  iii.     See  Wundt's  critical  exposition  of 
Immanent  Philosophy,  Ueber  naiven  und  kritischen  Realis- 
mus  (Philosophische  Studien,  1896,  S.  318-408).     See  also 
Schubert-Soldern's  reply  to  Wundt  (Ibid.,   1897,   13  Bd., 
S.  305-318). 

2  Immanente  Philosophie,  S.  38. 

8  Kritik  der  reinen  Erfahrung,  i  vols.,  Leipzig,  1888  and 
1890.  A  new  and  fuller  edition  appeared  in  1907.  The 
writer  died  in  1896  at  Zurich.  Several  young  scholars, 
among  whom  were  Carstanjen  and  Willy,  made  themselves 
experts  in  empirio-criticism,  and  maintained  their  master's 


matter  or  mind,  either  the  relative  or  the  absolute; 
for  all  systems  do  injury  to  the  primary  general 
fact  which  everyone  recognizes.  And  what  is  this 
fact  ? 

The  first  axiom  of  empirio-criticism  will  tell  us. 
Avenarius  formulates  it  thus:  "  Every  human  being 
assumes  that  he  is  in  an  environment  (Umgebung) 
made  up  of  various  parts,  and  also  assumes  that 
other  human  beings  are  possessed  of  various  modes  of 
expression,1  and  lastly,  that  there  is  some  kind  of 
interdependence  between  the  mode  of  expression 
and  the  environment.  The  basis  of  all  the  philo- 
sophical conceptions  of  the  universe,  whether  they 
be  critical  or  not,  is  never  anything  more  than  a 
modification  of  this  primary  assumption."2 

The  philosopher's  fundamental  rule  is  to  start 
with  this  fact,  not  for  the  sake  of  making  speculative 
or  dogmatic  additions  thereto,  but  in  order  to 
describe  and  analyze  it.  This  is  all  that  Avenarius 
claims  to  do. 

And  since  he  never  makes  any  separation  between 
the  essential  terms  of  this  assumption — i.e.,  the 

teaching.  Carstanjen  published  a  life  of  Avenarius  and  an 
epitome  of  his  philosophy  in  the  Vierteljahrsschrift  fur 
wissenschaftliche  Philosophic,  1896,  S.  361-391. 

On  Empirio-criticism,  see  M.  Delacroix  (Revue  de  metaphy- 
sique  et  de  morale,  1897,  I898),  and  particularly  M.  F.  Van 
Cauwelaert  (Revue  neo-scolastique ,  1906,  1907). 

1  By  "  modes  of  expression  "  (Aussageri)  must  be  under- 
stood all  manner  of  expressions  whatsoever,  e.g.,  word, 
gesture,  movement,  for  instance,  such  as  laughter;  in  fine, 
all  that  reproduces  a  perception,  a  thought,  a  memory,  etc. 

2  Kritik  der  reinen  Erfahrung,  I.,  Vorwort,  vii.     To  this 
primary  axiom,  which  concerns  the  content  of  knowledge, 
the  author  adds  a  second  relative  to  its  form.     It  comes  to 
this:  he  says  that  scientific  knowledge  uses  fundamentally 
the  same  procedure  as  ordinary  knowledge. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

environment  and  the  individual  or  Ego — because  any 
complete  description  must  include  them  both  as 
the  connected  parts  of  an  indivisible  totality, 
empirio-criticism  is  monist,  or  rather,  the  problems 
of  dualism  and  monism  are  meaningless  so  far  as  it 
is  concerned.1 

In  England,  it  is  long  since  the  famous  philologist, 
Max  Miiller,  introduced  the  ruling  ideas  of  his 
fatherland  into  the  country  of  his  adoption.  The 
philosophy  of  his  book,  The  Science  of  Thought,  is 
Kant's,  and  it  is  due  to  him  that  Noire,2  Kant's 

1  The  problem  of  the  Kritik  should  be  that  of  determining, 
in  a  logical  sense  and  in  a  hypothetical  manner,  the  relations 
between  the  individual  and  his  environment. 

This  relationship  is  twofold.  The  environment  acts,  on 
the  one  hand,  upon  the  individual  by  the  stimuli  to  which  he 
responds,  and  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  condition  upon 
which  the  individual  exists  and  is  preserved,  affording  him 
sustenance  and  protection. 

Avenarius  uses  the  expression  R  (for  Reiz,  or  stimulus)  as 
an  equivalent  of  anything  of  descriptive  value  belonging  to 
the  environment,  and  the  expression  E  (for  Empfindung, 
or  sensation)  the  "  psychic  "  equivalent  of  anything  of 
descriptive  value  belonging  to  the  content  of  personal 
expression. 

"  Psychic  "  values  depend  upon  the  R  values,  indirectly 
by  means  of  the  central  nervous  system  called  system  C. 
First,  to  determine  the  changes  in  system  C  effected  by 
the  environment,  next,  to  describe  and  classify  the  psychic 
values,  according  to  the  oscillations  of  system  C — such  is  the 
task  undertaken  by  the  author  of  the  Kritik  der  reinen 
Erfahrung. 

"  Thus  he  succeeded,"  says  one  of  his  followers,  "  in 
regarding  the  two  worlds  of  being  and  thought  from  a 
unitive  and  consequent  point  of  view,  as  E  values  depending 
upon  the  determinate  changes  of  system  C." — Carstanjen, 
Vierteljahrsschrift  fur  wissenschaftliche  Philosophic,  1896, 
S.  381. 

2  Ludwig  Noir£,  Die  Lehre  Kant's  und  der  Ursprung  der 
Vernunft,  Mainz,  1882 ;  Die  Entwickelung  der  abendldndischen 
Philosophic,  Mainz,  1883. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   183 

intelligent  and  devoted  commentator,  became  known 
in  England.  Max  Miiller  celebrated  the  centenary  of 
the  first  edition  of  the  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft 
by  publishing  a  translation  of  it  in  English. 

The  prestige  of  Darwin  and  Herbert  Spencer  long 
exercised  its  fascination  over  men's  minds,  and 
bound  them  down  to  the  problem  of  evolution.  A 
Pleiad  of  distinguished  scientists — Huxley,  Tyndall, 
and  Romanes;  men  who  were  psychological  ob- 
servers rather  than  metaphysicians,  the  successors 
of  David  Hume  and  Hartley,  particularly  the  two 
Mills  and  Alexander  Bain — seconded  the  empirical 
tendency  of  philosophical  thought ;  but  the  influence 
of  Kant,  though  late  in  coming,  is  none  the  less 
powerful  at  the  present  time.  Mr.  Balfour,  a  first- 
class  observer,  remarks  that  "  Transcendental 
Idealism  "  is  only  represented  in  England  by  a  small 
minority,  but  that  this  minority  is  an  elite  of 
specialists,  and  its  importance  must  not  be  under- 
rated.1 

The  development  of  Kantian  idealism  in  England 
has  had  its  usual  logical  consequences.  Mr.  T.  H. 
Green  was  regarded  as  the  leader  of  this  movement 
of  thought,  and  Hegelianism  has  won  a  place  in  the 
Universities  of  Glasgow  and  Oxford.  Caird,  who 
followed  Jowett  at  Oxford,  and  Bradley  of  Merton 
College,  carried  on  the  Hegelian  tradition.2 

1  Balfour,  The  Foundations  of  Belief ,  pp.  6,  138  ff. 

2  Bradley's  Appearance  and  Reality,  which  made  its  mark 
in  England,  ends  thus:  "  There  is  a  great  and  too  well- 
known  saying  of  Hegel's,  which  I  do  not  accept  without 
reserve.     But  I  will  end  with  a  proposition  not  unlike  it, 
and  which  perhaps  more  accurately  expresses  the  essential 
method  of  Hegel's  philosophy.     Apart  from  mind,  there  is 
not,  and  there  cannot  be,  any  reality;  and,  so  far  as  a  thing 
is  mental,  so  far  is  it  truly  real." 


184   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

In  the  United  States,  during  the  first  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century  Scotch  realism  exercised  con- 
siderable influence;  later  on,  they  became  enthusi- 
astic about  evolution,  Herbert  Spencer's  even  more 
than  Darwin's.  Thus,  owing  to  the  "  transfigured  " 
realism  of  the  English  evolutionist,  men's  minds 
began  to  ferment  with  the  leaven  of  idealism,  and 
now  for  over  twenty-five  years  the  youth  of  America 
has  been  importing  frankly  idealist  theories  from 
the  German  Universities,  theories  rather  Hegelian 
than  Kantian;  and  to-day  they  may  be  said  to  be 
the  predominant  doctrines  in  the  University  teaching 
of  the  United  States.1 

In  France,  at  the  first  quarter  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  Victor  Cousin,  and  later  Vacherot,  Secretan, 
and  Ravaisson,  were  influenced  in  varying  degrees 
by  German  idealism.  Kant's  action  chiefly  began 
to  make  itself  felt  with  Charles  Renouvier.2  His 
Essais  de  critique  generate,  published  between  1854 
and  1864,  exercised  an  obscure  but  continuous 
influence  upon  French  thought;  MM.  Pillon, 
Dauriac,  H.  Michel,  Prat,  and  Brochard,  were 
directly  connected  with  him,  and  the  last-named 
calls  M.  Renouvier  "  the  man  who  may  be  justly  re- 
garded to-day  as  the  most  important  representative 

1  Cf.   Royce,   Systematic  Philosophy  in  America  in  the 
Years  1893-1895    (Archiv  fur   system.     Philosophic,   1897, 
S.  248).     Cf.  Mattoon  Monroe  Curtis,  An  Outline  of  Philo- 
sophy  in   America    (Western   Reserve    University   Bulletin, 
March,  1896). 

2  On  this  head  of  a  school,  who  died  in  September,  1903, 
see  Le  neo-criticisme  de  Charles  Renouvier,  by  E.  Janssens 
(Lou vain,  1904),  and  La  philosophic  de  Charles  Renouvier, 
by  G.  S6ailles  (Paris,  1905). 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   185 

of  French  philosophy."  A  few  years  later,  M. 
Lachelier  introduced  Kant's  Critique  into  University 
teaching;  and  one  of  the  most  popular  men  with 
young  Frenchmen,  M.  Boutroux,  the  follower  of 
Lachelier,  continued  to  uphold  the  critical  tendency 
of  his  master. 

In  1872  M.  Renouvier  founded  the  Critique 
philosophique.  It  disappeared  in  1889.  M.  Pillon 
next  year  started  an  annual  Review  written  in  the 
same  spirit,  entitled  UAnnee  philosophique.  This 
does  not  show  that  writers  and  professors  in  France 
had  adopted  the  Critical  system  en  bloc,  but  only 
that  Kant's  thought  had  penetrated  into  intellectual 
circles.  Along  with  him,  Hegel  and  Berkeley  were 
studied  more  than  any  others,  so  that  one  may  say 
that  the  general  tendency  of  philosophy  in  France 
to-day  runs  in  the  direction  of  idealism  or  sub- 
jectivism. 

The  courses  of  lectures  show  the  same  unpopu- 
larity of  metaphysics,  and  philosophic  thought  is 
becoming  even  more  scattered,  if  possible,  than  in 
Germany,  in  questions  of  detail.  For  the  educa- 
tional year  1897-1898,  you  will  fail  to  discover  on 
the  programmes,1  either  of  the  College  de  France,  or 
of  the  Universities  of  Paris,  Aix,  Algiers,  Besancon, 
Bordeaux,  Caen,  Clermont-Ferrand,  Dijon,  Grenoble, 
Lille,  Lyon,  Montpellier,  Nancy,  Poitiers,  Rennes, 
and  Toulouse,  a  single  course  on  General  Meta- 
physics. There  were  all  sorts  of  lectures,  on  ancient 
or  modern  Philosophy,  ^Esthetics,  the  general 
conditions  of  consciousness,  creative  imagination, 

1  See  the  Revue  de  metaphysique  el  de  morale,  Supplement, 
September -November,  1897. 


186   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

democracy  in  France,  social  science,  etc.  M. 
Se"ailles  at  the  University  of  Paris  gave  notice  of 
lectures  on  "  The  Law  of  Synthesis  in  Mental  Life," 
and  M.  Hamelin  of  Bordeaux  on  "  The  Principal 
Elements  of  Representation,  and  their  Association." 
M.  Bernes  of  Montpellier  took  as  his  subject  "  The 
Notion  of  Justice,  and  some  of  the  Phases  of  its 
Evolution."  But  not  one  of  them  all  possesses  that 
sort  of  "  justice  "  which  leads  one  to  look  for  the 
true  "  Law  of  Synthesis  in  Mental  Life  "  which  is 
to  be  discovered  with  the  help  of  psychology,  when 
based  upon  sound  metaphysics  ! 

Nevertheless,  the  Revue  de  Metaphysique  et  de 
Morale,  founded  in  1893,  deserves  special  mention 
as  an  indication  of  a  new  orientation  of  thought  in 
France.  It  marks  a  reaction  against  the  exclusive 
cult  of  fact,  and  therefore  one  cannot  but  applaud 
the  efforts  of  such  young  men  in  their  ambition  "  to 
be  of  service  to  reason  for  the  sake  of  the  highest 
good,  and  for  the  honour  of  their  country."  '  They 
have  been  seized  with  the  desire,"  they  tell  us,  "  to 
put  philosophic  thought  in  France  in  a  position  to 
reveal  itself  openly,  hoping  it  will  thus  be  seen  to  be 
second  to  none  in  vigour."1 

But  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  metaphysics 
of  the  new  Review  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  old 
ontology  or  former  philosophy  which,  going  beyond 
the  physical  properties  of  the  sensible  world,  and 
beyond  geometrical  or  arithmetical  quantities, 
investigates  being  as  such,  with  its  attributes  and 
relations. 

The  programme-article  might  leave  one  in  doubt 

1  Article-programme,  January,  1893,  p.  5. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   187 

as  to  the  matter.  "  Here,"  it  says,  "  we  wish  to 
throw  into  relief  the  doctrines  of  philosophy 
properly  so-called.  We  would  recall  public  attention 
to  the  general  theories  of  thought  and  of  action, 
which  it  has  abandoned  for  some  time,  and  which 
have  nevertheless  always  been,  under  the  now 
decried  name  of  metaphysics,  the  only  source  of 
rational  beliefs."1  But  the  articles  which  have 
appeared  since  1893  by  MM.  Rauh,  Remacle,  Louis 
Weber,  Halevy,  Brunschwicg,  and  Bergson,  prove 
that  they  do  not  regard  metaphysics  as  much  more 
than  the  psychological  analysis  of  thought. 

The  most  original  writer  of  this  group  is  M. 
Bergson.  M.  Fonsgrive  says  of  his  work  Matiere  et 
memoir e  that,  since  the  time  of  Maine  de  Biran, 
nothing  showing  such  progress  in  philosophy  has 
appeared  in  France.2 

M.  Bergson  has  epitomized  his  psychology  in  two 
books,  Essai  sur  les  donnees  immediate^  de  la  con- 
science, and  Matiere  et  memoir  e? 

Driven  by  the  necessities  of  individual  and  social 
life,  we  are  naturally  led  to  represent  to  ourselves 
the  data  of  consciousness  as  definite  things,  as 
quantitative,  juxtaposed,  and  simultaneous  ele 

1  Article-programme,  p.  2. 

2  Spiritualisme  et  materialisme  (La  Quinzaine,  i  fevrier, 

1897)- 

3  Paris,  Alcan,  1889  and  1896.      He  also  wrote  Le  rire 
(1900),  L'evolution  creatrice  (1907),  and  important  articles  in 
the  Revue  philosophique  (1898,  1902,  1906),  and  in  the  Revue 
de  metaphysique  et  de  morale  (1903,   1904).     Cf.  G.  Dwel- 
shauwers,    Etude   sur   la   philosophie   de   M.    Bergson    (La 
Belgique  artistique  et  litteraire,   1906).     M.  Bergson  appears 
more  and  more  as  the  inspirer  of  "  the  new  philosophy  "  or 
"  new  positivism,"  particularly  as  explained  by  MM.  Wilbois 
and  Le  Roy.     See  M.  L.  Noel,  Bulletin  d'epistemologie  (Revue 
neo-scolastique,  1907,  pp.  220  ff.). 


i88   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

ments.  This  way  of  representing  things  to  our- 
selves "  in  the  language  of  space,"  as  the  Essai  sur 
les  donnees  de  la  conscience  tells  us,  is  inspired  by 
our  utilitarian  needs.  The  artifice  used  by  scientific 
method  consists  in  getting  rid  of  the  conventional 
part  of  our  ordinary  knowledge,  and  in  coming  into 
contact  with  the  real  as  it  is.1  But,  what  is  this 
real  of  which  we  are  conscious  ?  It  is  made  up 
of  qualitative  occurrences  which  follow  one  another 
in  time. 

The  first  book  allowed  the  opposition  between 
the  "  utilitarian  or  artificial  "  Ego  and  the  "  funda- 
mental "  "  true  "  Ego  to  remain.  The  second  got 
rid  of  this  dualism.  Opposition  between  the  two 
principles,  body  and  soul,  matter  and  mind,  does  not 
exist,  says  this  author,  in  the  real  content  of  con- 
sciousness, it  is  at  the  outset  an  artificial  creation 
of  the  understanding.  "  It  may  be  resolved  into 
the  threefold  opposition  between  non-extension  and 
extension,  quality  and  quantity,  free  will  and 
necessity."2  But,  between  non-extension  and  ex- 
tension there  is  an  intermediate  term,  which  is  the 
real  strictly  so  called — i.e.,  extensiveness,  the  extensive 
character  of  sensation.  In  the  same  way,  between 
quality  and  quantity  there  is  a  transition — i.e., 
tension.  Lastly,  the  opposition  between  free  will 

1  "  In  fine,  the   artifice   of   method   consists    simply  in 
distinguishing  the  view-point  of  ordinary  or  useful  know- 
ledge   from   that   of   true    knowledge.     The    duration,    in 
which  we  see  ourselves  act,  and  where  it  is  good  for  us  so  to 
see  ourselves,  is  a  duration  whereof  the  elements  can 
dissociated   or   associated   together;    but   the   duration 
which  we  act  is  a  duration  wherein  our  states  become  merged 
in  one  another." — Matiere  et  memoir e,  p.  205. 

2  Matter e  et  memoir e,  pp.  273-278. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   189 

and  necessity  is  analogously  resolved  "  by  a  greater 
and  greater  latitude  being  allowed  to  movement  in 
space  and  by  the  increasing  tension  which  accom- 
panies consciousness  in  time." 

Although,  however,  M.  Bergson  has  set  himself 
to  free  consciousness  from  the  conventional  to  help 
it  to  an  intuition  of  pure  reality,  he  has  not  succeeded 
in  emancipating  himself  from  idealism.  According 
to  him,  reality  is  only  a  whole  made  up  of  images.1 

Other  writers  in  this  French  Review,  particularly 
M.  Remacle  and  M.  Louis  Weber,  made  it  their 
business  to  push  idealism  to  an  extreme.  Idealism 
cannot  stop,  says  M.  Remacle,  at  denying  the  know- 
ableness  of  the  realities  of  the  external  world.  Logic 
compels  us  to  admit  that  even  the  inward  noumenon, 
the  substantial  Ego,  even  our  states  of  consciousness, 
as  soon  as  they  are  over,  are  necessarily  unknowable. 
Generally  speaking,  it  is  not  their  office  to  inform 
us  of  the  existence  or  nature  of  anything  that  differs 
from  themselves. 

These  passages  must  be  quoted.  They  enable  us 
to  judge  how  destructive  the  idealist  principle 
can  be. 

'  To  speak  of  knowing  a  state  of  consciousness," 
writes  M.  Remacle,  "  is  to  make  use  of  a  contradictory 
expression;  for  knowing  it,  clearly  does  not  mean 
knowing  it  as  it  is,  or  rather,  as  it  was,  for  it  is  no 
longer  itself  when  the  mind  notes,  as  we  say,  that 
it  is  in  or  before  the  mind.  .  .  .  There  are,  then, 
two  forms  of  idealism,  which  are  indispensable :  the 

1  "  I  call  matter,"  he  writes,  "  the  whole  composed  of 
images,  and  perception  of  matter  these  same  images  referred 
to  the  possible  action  of  a  certain  determinate  image,  ».«., 
my  bofly." — Ibid.,  p.  7. 


igo   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

» 

idealism  which  may  be  called  external  as  applying 
to  the  external  world,  and  the  idealism  which  we 
shall  call  inward  as  applying  to  the  inward  world. 
The  second  is  the  underlying  reason  for  the 
first.  .  .  ." 

"  The  science  man  used  to  boast  so  much  of  is 
only  a  chimera,  which  he  has  made  out  of  his  own 
substance  from  the  time  when,  in  the  pride  of  man's 
thought,  along  with  the  notion  of  the  Ego,  there 
appeared  the  possibility,  and  then  the  necessity,  of 
reflection."1 

"  Not  only  is  it  not  possible  for  us  to  know  an 
objective  non-Ego,  but  also  we  cannot  know  with 
a  reflective  knowledge  our  own  states  of  conscious- 
ness, for  we  are  a  mode  of  duration,  and  spontaneous 
consciousness  alone  can  furnish  us  with  any  real 
knowledge."2 

If  we  cannot  know  either  an  objective  non-Ego 
or  a  past  state  of  consciousness,  what  becomes  of 
reflection  ?  It  is  but  the  desire  of  our  own  future 
conscious  existence.  The  act  of  reflection  ends  by 
creating  a  new  state  of  consciousness;  it  begets  a 
prolongation  of  our  existence  towards  the  future. 

Psychology  only  pursues  this  realization  of  our- 
selves systematically.  Hence  it  is  not  a  science  but 
an  art — the  art  of  realizing  the  soul  according  to  a 
certain  ideal  which  must  be  duration.  "  Hence 
normal  psychology  may  be  thus  denned:  it  is  an 
expansion  of  ourselves  in  duration,  produced  in 
accordance  with  duration." 

1  Remade,   Revue  de  metaphysique  et  de  morale,   1893, 
pp.  254  and  265. 

2  Recherche  d'une  methode  en  psychologic  (Revue  de  meta- 
physique et  de  morale,  1896,  p.  149). 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   191 

Since  our  duration  is  a  qualitative  existence  and 
an  incessant  becoming,  the  art  of  psychology  must 
observe  two  rules.  The  first  is,  not  to  bring  into 
play  any  objective  element — i.e.,  any  notion  borrowed 
from  space — for  the  homogeneous  characteristics 
of  space  are  diametrically  opposed  to  those  of 
duration;  the  second  is,  never  to  affirm  oneself 
definitively,  but  always  to  break  up  all  certitude, 
for  consciousness  must  always  tend  towards  real 
doubt,  since  psychological  construction  can  never 
be  any  more  than  a  becoming,  like  the  soul  which 
practises  it. 

In  the  antithesis  between  subject  and  object,  there- 
fore, we  should  take  part  neither  in  favour  of  the 
one  nor  of  the  other,  nor  against  both.  The  mind 
should  observe  a  critical  attitude  for  itself,  and  also 
with  regard  to  any  fact,  even  if  it  belong  to  our  own 
psychological  past.  Thus,  the  soul  will  not  give 
itself  away  to  any  fact} 

M.  Louis  Weber,  in  his  turn,  accuses  the  idealists 
of  inconsistency.  He  says  that  they  regard  meta- 
physics as  a  theory  of  knowledge;  but,  to  them, 
knowledge  is  a  thing  in  itself,  which  they  claim  to 
make  into  a  science;  hence  they  fall  into  that  very 
realism  which  they  desire  to  avoid. 

The  categories  of  the  understanding,  the  forms 
of  sensible  intuition,  and  states  of  consciousness, 
are  put  forward  by  Kant,  Renouvier,  and  Spencer, 
as  determinate  things,  as  "objects";  the  idea  of 
an  object  and  the  object  itself  are  opposed  to  one 
another  as  two  heterogeneous  terms,  the  first  having 

1  Recherche  d'une  methode  en  psychologic  (Revue  de 
physique  et  de  morale,  1897,  pp.  320-341). 


192       CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

a  logical  existence  only,  the  second  being  assumed 
to  have  a  real  existence;  between  the  two  hetero- 
geneous terms,  the  idea  and  its  object,  knowing  and 
known,  a  fixed  relation  is  assumed  to  exist,  and 
current  idealism  endeavours  to  determine  this 
relation. 

But  all  these  conceptions  are  realistic.  There  is 
no  existence  but  "  logical  existence;  and  existence 
includes  nothing  but  the  idea  of  existence." 

"It  is  ordinarily  held  that  a  thing's  existence 
.  .  .  does  not  depend  upon  the  affirmation  of  it, 
which  makes  it  participate  in  the  immediate  being 
of  its  utterance. 

"  In  fact,  we  live  in  an  innate  and  ineradicable 
belief  in  things,  the  external  world  and  ourselves, 
and  we  cannot  help  crediting  all  things  with  an 
existence  which  is  distinct  from  and  independent 
of  our  ideas  of  it. 

"  Thus  all  ideas  seem  to  have  corresponding 
objects  which  are  not  ideas;  or,  at  any  rate,  when  an 
idea  is  an  idea  of  what  is  real,  its  object,  the  reality 
itself,  must  have  an  existence  apart  from  its  logical 
existence. 

"  The  history  of  philosophy  is  to  some  extent 
mixed  up  with  the  history  of  the  pursuit  of  this  ob- 
jective reality.  All  the  resources  of  dialectics,  and 
all  the  penetrative  powers  of  psychology  have  been 
directed  towards  this  end,  and  at  each  step  forward 
the  ultimate  object  of  knowledge  has  ever  receded 
still  farther  out  of  reach  in  the  dim  distance.  The 
history  of  philosophy  is  the  history  of  the  vicissitudes 
of  our  incurable  realism.  For  the  materialistic 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   193 

object,  extended  and  divisible,  there  has  been  sub- 
stituted the  psychical  object,  sensation  or  image, 
appetition  or  volition,  and  then  for  this  an  object 
purely  intellectual,  categories  of  the  understanding, 
and  forms  of  intuition,  and  then  the  strictly  rational 
object,  the  universal  idea  and  the  conscious  thought 
of  oneself.  Phenomenalism  itself  has  not  escaped 
from  realism,  for  while  regarding  the  realism  that 
preceded  it  as  an  inevitable  consequence  of  our 
mental  structure  and  an  inseparable  element  of 
the  representational  link,  binding  together  the  re- 
presentation and  what  it  represents,  it  laid  down 
the  categories  as  a  higher  reality  than  the  reality 
made  known  through  them,  and  gave  a  supreme 
existence  to  the  conditions  whereby  existence  is 
thought  of.  Whether  the  idea  chosen  as  the  stop- 
ping-point was  that  of  the  world,  that  of  an  image 
of  the  world,  or  that  of  the  idea  of  such  an  image 
of  the  world,  in  any  case  they  fell  back  into  the 
delusions  of  naif  realism,  for  they  always  believed 
in  the  existence  of  an  object  for  all  these  ideas,  and 
always  fancied  they  apprehended  an  ultimate  reality 
existing  in  and  of  itself,  an  extra-logical  existence — 
i.e.,  external  to  the  judgments  wherein  it  was 
affirmed  as  the  logical  subject  of  the  verb  to  be."1 

"  In  vain  do  you  reply  that  ideas  correspond  with 
objects,  and  that  existence  should  be  attributed  to 
these  objects  as  such,  and  not  to  our  ideas  of  them. 
What  is  the  object  of  an  idea,  so  far  as  the  latter  is 
presented  to  reflection  ?  In  its  turn,  it  is  merely 
an  idea  whereof  the  first  is  the  idea  raised  to  a  higher 

1  L.  Weber,  L'idealisme  logique  (Revue  de  metaphysique  et 
de  morale,  November,  1897,  P-  684). 

13 


194   CONTEMPORARY-  PSYCHOLOGY 

degree  of  reflection  and  advanced  to  the  rank  of  an 
idea.     Reflection  moves  in  the  bosom  of  being,  and 
its  objects  are  but  forms  of  being,  or  else,  as  being, 
it  contemplates  itself  when  it   affirms  itself.     No 
doubt  we  live,  we  perceive,  and  we  suffer,  but  how 
do  we  form  judgments  about  all  this,  except  by  the 
ideas  we  have  about  living,  perceiving,  and  suffering  ? 
It  matters  little  whether  the  occurrence  whereof 
we  affirm  the  existence  be  fictitious  or  real;  fiction 
and  reality,  in  the  core  of  being,  have  only  a  relative 
significance.     The  question  is,  to  find  out  whether 
the  affirmation  about  living,  perceiving,  and  suffering, 
is  not  a  logical  affirmation,  a  reflection  of  discursive 
thought,  just  in  the  same  way  as  the  affirmation  of 
anything  else.    The  question  is,  to  find  ou+  whether 
the  existence  of  the  objects  which,  by  an  inevitable 
illusion  of  the  mind's  eye,  are  placed  far  beyond 
the  sphere  of  the  affirmation  which  gives  them  a 
place  in  speech,  is  not  merely  the  logical  existence 
which  belongs  to  every  affirmation,  whether  true 
or  false. 

"  But  to  have  a  glimpse  of  this  question  is  already 
to  have  given  it  an  implicit  reply.  If  existence  is 
not  logically  distinguishable  from  being,  neither  is 
it  distinguishable  really,  for  reality,  the  sign  of 
which  we  are  in  search  of  apart  from  being,  is 
entirely  contained  therein,  by  the  very  fact  that  we 
claim  to  oppose  the  one  to  the  other,  as  outside  is 
opposed  to  inside.  The  other  thing  than  an  idea  is 
itself  only  an  idea. 

"  Thus,  in  fine,  do  all  the  varied  efforts  of  Kantian 
and  post-Kantian  Criticism,  of  positivism  and 
agnosticism,  resemble  one  another.  All  of  them 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   195 

pretend  to  attain  to  extra-logical  existence,  outside 
of  being,  which  is  as  self-contradictory  as  to  hope  to 
get  beyond  the  terrestrial  atmosphere  in  a  balloon. 

"  Not  only  matter  and  extension,  but  also  appeti- 
tion  and  volition,  and  even  our  so-called  inner  and 
deep  consciousness  of  the  fluidity  and  inapprehen- 
sibleness  of  our  states  of  consciousness,  are  confused 
concepts,  revealing  our  belief  in  an  existence  which 
should  sustain  logical  existence  as-the  inner  fire  of 
the  earth  sustains  the  surface  whereon  we  move."1 

We  have  now  reached  the  final  term  of  anti- 
realist  negation.  Descartes  laid  down  this  principle : 
the  only  indubitably  certain  thing  is  this,  the 

1  L.  Weber  (Revue  de  metaphysique  et  de  morale,  pp.  694, 
698,  699).  M.  Weber  speaks  of  logical  existence  in  his 
criticism  of  realism.  It  would  be  more  accurate  to  speak  of 
logical  being.  Being  is  real  or  logical.  Real  being  is  that 
which  exists,  or  may  exist,  independently  of  the  thought 
which  represents  it.  Unreal,  logical,  purely  mental  being  is 
that  which  has  no  other  entity  than  that  given  to  it  by 
representation.  The  notion  of  the  latter  is  negative,  and 
hence  presupposes  essentially  the  notion  of  reality.  What 
sort  of  belief  could  be  given  to  any  logical,  unreal  being,  if 
it  did  not  presuppose  a  real  being  whereof  it  is  the  negation  ? 

M.  Weber  asks  if  "  the  affirmation  of  living,  perceiving, 
suffering,  is  not  a  logical  affirmation." 

Apparently,  such  affirmation  is  an  affirmation.  But 
that  is  not  the  question.  The  question  is,  to  ascertain 
whether  the  affirmation  of  living,  perceiving,  suffering,  is  the 
affirmation  of  an  affirmation,  and  no  more;  or  whether  it  is 
the  affirmation  of  something  that  may  be  called  living, 
perceiving,  suffering. 

Further,  the  question  is  to  ascertain  whether  the  affirma- 
tion about  living,  perceiving,  feeling,  is  a  purely  mental 
entity,  or  whether  it  is  the  striking  expression  of  a  mind 
that  lives,  and  feels  itself  alive,  the  act  of  someone  who  puts 
life,  perception,  feeling,  into  the  region  of  logic. 

A  balloon  cannot  get  above  the  confines  of  the  atmosphere 
of  our  earth,  you  reply.  But  if  there  be  confines,  these 
must  possess  a  hither  and  a  farther  side.  The  farther  side 
is  all  fiction,  if  you  will,  but  what  of  the  hither  side  ? 


196   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

testimony  of  consciousness  as  to  the  reality  of 
thought  and  of  the  thinking  Ego.  Locke,  Berkeley, 
and  Hume,  one  after  the  other,  dispute  the  validity 
of  our  cognitions  of  external  things.  Hume  goes  so 
far  as  to  deny  the  substantiality  of  the  soul. 

Up  to  this  point,  empirical  certitude  nevertheless 
remains  protected  from  scepticism.  Kant  himself, 
somewhat  illogically  it  is  true,  sets  over  against 
phenomenal  representations  the  data  of  experience, 
and  makes  intuition  presuppose  impressions,  and 
the  form  of  thought  a  content,  a  subject-matter. 

But  if  the  fact  that  the  subject  participates  in 
the  representation  of  an  object  suffices  to  invalidate 
the  significance  of  what  is  represented,  it  is  clear 
that  the  axe  of  the  idealist  must  sooner  or  later 
strike  down  consciousness  and  cut  at  the  roots  of  all 
certitude,  even  that  which  is  inward.  Inward 
idealism,  as  M.  Remacle  justly  observes,  is  the 
underlying  reason  of  outward  idealism. 

It  is  said  that  idealism  thus  understood  leads  on 
to  solipsism.  But  this  does  not  go  far  enough. 
Solipsism  gets  rid  of  all  outside  of  the  thinking 
subject,  it  is  true,  but  it  nevertheless  affirms  that 
there  is  a  conscious  subject,  the  person  who  judges, 
reasons,  and  mentally  translates  idealism  into  a 
formula.  Solus,  ipse.  But  solipsism  is  logical  so 
far  as  it  admits  of  no  other  individual  than  myself — 


Therefore  there  is  a  world  which  is  not  mere  fiction.  The 
human  race  calls  it  things,  reality. 

But  perhaps  M.  Weber  only  wants  to  make  out  that  a 
balloon  ascent  is  nothing  more  than  a  fictional  aeronaut 
going  up  in  a  fictional  balloon  through  an  imaginary  space 
to  imaginary  limits  which  separate  an  imaginary  atmo- 
sphere from  other  imaginary  things  ?  .  .  . 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   197 

solus — but  it  forgets  its  own  premises  in  admitting 
that  self,  ipse,  a  subject  ever  identical  with  itself 
amidst  all  its  judgments,  reasonings,  resulting  in 
the  statement  of  idealism;  and  when  out  of  the 
phenomenal  self  given  in  representation,  it  creates 
a  permanent  self,  myself,  ipse,  or  a  substantial  Ego. 

Antirealism  carries  negation  still  farther.  It 
attacks  the  reality  of  the  subject  and  of  the  repre- 
sentative act  itself. 

Mental  life  runs  on  like  a  river,  through  duration. 
The  witness  seated  on  the  bank  looks  straight  in 
front  of  himself.  He  sees  the  passing  stream,  but 
when  he  afterwards  tries  to  recover  it,  the  stream 
has  passed  on.  "  Reflection  cannot  take  hold  of 
past  acts."1 

What  then  remains  for  consciousness  ?  Nothing 
but  logical  affirmation.  The  only  attainable  being, 
infers  M.  Weber,  is  logical  being,  rational  being.2 

Need  we  say  that  idealism  thus  understood  is 
too  manifestly  self-contradictory  not  to  betray 
some  error  in  its  original  conception  ?  We  shall 
try  to  make  this  clear  when  we  submit  to  criticism 

1  How  is  it  that  M.  Remacle  fails  to  see  that  if  this  were 
the  case,  consciousness  would  have  no  sense  of  duration  ? 
To  feel  that  one  endures,  is  to  find  oneself  the  same  at  two 
different  moments.     Imagine  a  moving  series  of  mathemati- 
cal points  endowed  with  consciousness,  then  each  one  will 
be  aware  of  its  place  at  a  given  moment.     Granted ;  but  if  it 
does  not  know  what  was  its  position  a  moment  ago,  it  will 
not  be  aware  that  its  place  is  altered,  nor  will  it  perceive 
any  succession  of  positions  in  the  case  of  one  point ;  hence 
there  will  be  neither  movement,  nor  duration. 

2  In  our  CritSriologie  generate  (5th  ed.,  pp.  402  ff.)  we 
reply   to   M.    Weber's   criticisms   in   answer   to   ourselves 
(Mercure  de  France,  December,   1898)  as  to  the  difficulty 
raised  in  the  text. 


198   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  general  principle  in  the  name  of  which  idealism 
claims  to  invalidate  all  certitude.  We  shall  here 
confine  ourselves  to  showing,  that  idealism  as  fol- 
lowed by  the  writers  of  the  Revue  de  metaphysique 
et  de  morale,  regards  the  problem  of  knowledge  from 
a  too  restricted  point  of  view — i.e.,  from  an  entirely 
negative  standpoint.  But  no  theory  of  knowledge 
can  entrench  itself  in  antirealism,  it  has  a  positive 
function  to  fulfil. 

It  is  a  primary  law  of  philosophy  to  regard  the 
elementary  facts  of  consciousness  in  their  integrity, 
and  to  make  a  synthesis  which  overlooks  none  of  the 
data.  But  amongst  the  primary  data  there  is  this 
indisputable  fact :  that  some  of  our  representations, 
unlike  others,  are  accompanied  by  the  sense  of  an 
impression  experienced  by  us,  whereof  we  feel  that 
we  are  not  the  originators.  Fichte  called  this  the 
sense  of  necessity,  and  remarked  that  we  give  the 
name  of  experience  to  the  representations  accom- 
panied by  this  feeling.  Herbert  Spencer  signalized 
the  same  fact  by  opposing  to  "  weak  states  of 
consciousness" — i.e.,  to  representations  of  the 
imagination  the  succession  of  which  may  depend 
upon  ourselves — "  strong  states  "  which  govern  the 
Ego  and  impose  upon  it  the  law  of  their  connection. 

Deussen,  a  German  professor  of  Kiel,  energetically 
emphasizes  this  inevitable  resistance  of  the  con- 
sciousness to  the  systematic  conclusions  of  idealism. 
"  From  the  idealist  point  of  view,"  he  writes,  "  the 
world  is  a  representation.  I  can  only  apprehend 
the  whole  of  the  material  universe  of  space  and 
time  by  means  of  the  intelligence,  but  by  its  very 
nature  my  intelligence  can  only  furnish  me  with 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   199 

representations ;  hence  the  whole  universe,  including 
my  body,  so  far  as  my  intelligence  regards  it  in 
space  and  time,  is  nothing  more  than  my  own 
representation."  "  But,"  he  adds,  "  the  strength 
of  this  idealist  inference  is  the  measure  of  the 
resistance  which  we  cannot  help  opposing  thereto. 
This  resistance  is  fortified  by  reflection.  To  increase 
the  sense  of  it  in  ourselves,  it  is  enough  to  think  that, 
if  idealism  is  really  true,  the  sharpest  pains,  the 
cruellest  wounds  in  our  own  bodies,  would  be,  so 
far  as  the  intelligence  is  concerned,  representations 
just  as  much  as  the  pains  or  wounds  that  affect  other 
people."1 

Any  kind  of  philosophy,  whether  idealist  or  realist, 
is  bound  to  reckon  with  this  feeling  of  passivity 
which  is  irresistably  affirmed  in  consciousness. 
Over  against  this  feeling,  there  is  the  object  tfiat 
makes  itself  felt ;  over  against  representations  which 
we  call  experience,  there  is  that  which  is  experienced, 
called  by  us  reality.  To  fail  to  recognize  these 
primary  facts,  is  arbitrarily  to  get  rid  of  one  of  the 
essential  elements  of  the  critical  problem  of  know- 
ledge. 

Reality  itself — and  idealists  admit  this  2 — does  not 
appear  to  be  homogeneous.  Material  motion  and 
consciousness,  "  the  physical  and  the  mental," 
"  body  and  mind  "  are  evidently  opposed  to  one 
another. 

Hence  there  immediately  arises  this  alternative. 
Must  the  two  series  be  allowed  to  subsist,  and  must 

1  Deussen,    Die    Elementc    der    Metaphysik,    S.    21,    22, 
Leipzig,  Brockhaus,  1890. 

2  Cf.  HofMing,  Outlines  of  Psychology,  Lowndes's  transla- 
tion, p.  62  (Macmillan,  1891). 


200   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

they  be  referred  to  distinct,  independent  substances, 
solely  endowed  with  reciprocity  of  action  upon 
one  another  ?  Or  must  they  be  reduced  to  unity, 
and  to  what  unity  ?  Must  we  say,  with  material- 
istic monism,  that  matter  at  a  certain  stage  of 
its  development  begets  consciousness,  and  alone 
accounts  for  intellectual  life  ?  Or,  on  the  contrary, 
must  we  say,  with  spiritualist  monism,  that  the 
immaterial  begets  the  material,  and  the  mental  is 
the  element  which  constitutes  the  physical  ?  Or, 
lastly,  if  neither  of  these  empirical  conceptions  of 
monism  is  intelligible,  must  we  take  refuge  in  the 
hypothesis  of  a  single  metaphysical  entity,  whereof 
the  irreducible  phenomena  of  movement  and  of 
consciousness  are  apparent  modes  ? 

All  these  hypotheses  have  their  supporters.  Just 
now,  materialistic  monism,  regarded  as  an  immediate 
explanation  of  inward  phenomena,  is  in  much  dis- 
favour. This  is  shown  by  quotations  already  given. 
Spiritualist  monism,  regarded  from  the  same  point 
of  view,  scarcely  finds  an  echo.  No  one  understands 
how  material  phenomena  can  be  interpreted  in 
terms  of  consciousness. 

But,  just  as  the  material  phenomenon  cannot  be 
conceived  at  any  moment  of  the  evolution  of  matter 
as  identifiable  with  a  mental  act,  nor  the  latter  as 
identifiable  with  a  material  process,  so  one  cannot 
conceive  any  real  action  of  the  one  upon  the  other. 
Assume,  for  instance,  that  a  movement  can  be  con- 
verted into  heat,  and  heat  into  a  chemical  process 
of  brain-matter :  can  it  then  be  said  that  this  nervous 
process  is  converted  into  an  equivalent  of  conscious 
thought  ? 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   201 

The  scientist  who  observes  the  course  of  natural 
phenomena  from  the  outside  has  no  right  to  main- 
tain a  transformation  of  this  kind,  for  conscious 
thought  escapes  his  methods  of  observation. 
Besides,  there  is  no  common  measure  between  a 
conscious  thought  and  the  physico-chemical  pro- 
cesses that  precede  it.  Is  there  then  a  hiatus  in 
the  continuity  of  nature  ? 

No  scientist  will  admit  it.  The  nervous  process 
which  stimulates  thought  is  converted  into  another 
equivalent  material  process,  and,  thanks  to  this  law 
of  continuity,  the  constant  persistence  of  energy 
is  maintained.  As  for  the  psychical  process,  there 
is  nothing  to  be  said  about  it,  except  that  it  proceeds 
pari  passu  with  the  material  process,  but  without 
any  sort  of  causal  link ;  it  is  parallel  to  the  physical 
process,  and  experience  can  provide  no  further 
testimony. 

'  The  physical  processes  are  never  the  result  of 
psychic  processes,"  says  Paulsen;  "  and  inversely, 
the  psychic  processes  are  never  the  result  of  physical 
processes."1  Or,  according  to  Ziehen,  the  two 
series  are  not  subordinate  to  one  another,  they  are 
co-ordinate.2 

Thus  is  summed  up  that  conception  of  nature, 
and  more  especially  of  human  nature,  which  is 
called  the  theory  of  parallelism.  And  it  is  towards 
this  that  psychology  is  generally  tending  to-day. 

According  to  slightly  graded  interpretations  of 
this  hypothesis,  one  may  suppose,  with  Wundt  for 

1  Paulsen,  Einleititng  in  die  Philosophic,  4  Aufl.,  Berlin, 
1896,  S.  88-91. 

*  Ziehen,  Leitfaden  der  physiologischen  Psychologic, 
6  Aufl.,  Jena,  1902,  S.  256, 


202       CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

instance,  that  all  the  particles  of  organized  matter 
have  a  concomitant  psychic  parallel,  or  go  further 
still  and  maintain  with  Durand  de  Gros  that  all 
matter,  even  inorganic  matter,  is  endowed  with  life 
to  a  certain  extent  (polyzoism-polypsychism) ;  with 
Fouillee,  that  the  mental  everywhere  under- 
lies the  physical;  or,  with  Paulsen,  that  there 
is  nothing  in  the  world  that  is  not  animate 
and  conscious  (Allbeseelung) .  But  it  is  plain 
that  this  unlimited  extension  of  the  theory 
is  capricious.  Experience,  observes  Ziehen,  does 
not  reveal  to  us  an  appearance  of  two  series  of 
processes,  the  one  physical,  the  other  psychic, 
except  in  the  very  circumscribed  region  of  the 
cortical  matter  of  the  brain. 

And  here,  and  here  only,  we  touch  the  vital  spot 
of  the  problem  of  parallelism. 

Many  who  had  given  up  the  idea  of  subordinating 
cerebral  functions  to  spiritual  (mental)  force  (spirit- 
ualism), or  psychic  functions  to  cerebral  activity 
(materialism),  tried  to  reduce  the  two  co-ordinate 
series  of  phenomena  to  unity,  by  having  recourse 
to  the  metaphysical  hypothesis  of  Spinoza,  or  to 
>some  other  akin  to  it.  They  imagine  a  single 
absolute  substance,  God  or  the  world,  and  endow  it 
with  two  attributes,  thought  and  extension,  extensio 
and  cogitatio,  or  they  suppose  the  smallest  material 
molecules  as  in  possession  of  both  extension  and 
psychic  qualities,  such  as  memory.  But,  as  Ziehen 
justly  remarks,  "  These  theories  only  provide  us  with 
a  formal  logical  unity,  in  order  to  bind  together  two 
disunited  series.  They  are  unproved  conjectures 
which  afford  no  outlet  for  connecting  the  two  series." 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY       203 

With  the  help  of  a  more  or  less  skilful  sophistry, 
adds  Ziehen,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  conceal 
the  contrast  between  the  two  series.  Some  say  the 
two  series  are  rooted  in  the  Absolute,  wherein  they 
are  identical;  and  the  Absolute,  becoming  twofold, 
gives  rise  to  the  differentiation  of  the  two  co-ordinate 
series.  Others  enjoy  the  verbal  satisfaction  of 
saying  that  the  corporal  and  spiritual  (mental)  are 
the  same  reality  regarded  from  two  different  points 
of  view :  by  observation,  from  without ;  or  by  intro- 
spection, from  within.1 

In  fact,  concludes  Ziehen,  we  must  come  back 
to  the  undeniable  distinction  of  the  two  co-ordinate 

1  This  "  hypothesis  of  identity  "  is  to-day  accepted  by 
many  psychologists.  "  We  are  obliged,"  says  Hoffding, 
"  to  think  of  the  reciprocal  actions  of  the  elements  which 
compose  the  brain  and  the  nervous  system  as  the  outward 
form  of  the  inner  ideal  unity  of  consciousness." — Outlines  of 
Psychology,  p.  65. 

Ebbinghaus  writes  in  the  same  sense:  "  Material  things, 
and  the  soul  are  in  part  as  it  were  two  tissues  woven  out  of 
one  stuff.  .  .  .  The  same  processes  which,  seen  from  out- 
side, are  material  and  nervous,  are  intuitions,  thoughts, 
and  desires,  when  seen  from  within." — Grundzuge  der 
Psychologic,  S.  46. 

Historically,  this  hypothesis  dates  from  Fechner.  "  Be- 
tween body  and  soul,  matter  and  mind,  there  is  only  the 
difference  of  the  point  of  view.  The  two  may  be  compared 
with  the  outside  and  the  inside  of  a  circle.  Just  as  an 
observer  inside  the  circle  cannot  see  the  convex  surface, 
nor  can  one  who  is  outside  see  the  concave  surface,  so  the 
observer  of  nature  cannot  read  within  consciousness,  nor  can 
consciousness  directly  see  nature.  We  cannot  be  on  both 
sides  of  a  thing  at  the  same  time.  Therefore,  in  fact,  there 
is  only  one  reality,  and  its  apparent  duality  arises  from  our 
manner  of  regarding  it." — Fechner,  Elemente  der  Psycho- 
fhysik,  2te  Aufl.,  Bd.  I.,  S.  1-7.  Taine  popularized  this 
illusory  interpretation  of  immaterial  phenomena  in  France. 
The  latter,  he  tells  us,  are  like  the  concave  side  of  a  lentil, 
the  outward  observation  of  which  regards  the  convex  side 
only. 


204   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

series,  and  give  up  the  idea  of  discovering  any  real 
principle  of  unity  in  them. 

This  is  a  stumbling-block  to  the  theory  of  evolu- 
tion !  For,  in  fact,  the  cerebral  processes  go  on 
normally  according  to  the  needs  of  the  bodily  life, 
independently  of  consciousness.  Therefore,  the 
latter  is  only  a  superfluous  epiphenomenon,  inex- 
plicable by  the  laws  of  biological  evolution. 

But,  replies  Ziehen,  experimental  psychology  need 
not  hamper  itself  with  metaphysical  problems.  It 
has  the  right  and  the  duty  to  keep  to  immediate 
facts.  Well,  strictly  speaking,  are  the  two  co- 
ordinate series  of  physical  processes  and  psychic 
processes  alike  immediate  ? 

No.  Look  at  a  tree.  You  may  think  the  tree 
and  the  sight  of  it  occur  to  you  simultaneously. 
But  really,  this  is  not  the  case.  The  visual  im- 
pression alone  is  immediate.  The  objective  repre- 
sentation of  the  tree  is  an  operation  that  follows 
upon  the  initial  impression.1  Hence  the  psycho- 
logist must  confine  himself  to  psychic  processes  only. 

Therefore,  says  Ziehen,  for  us  who  limit  ourselves 
to  a  strictly  critical  and  experimental  conception  of 
psychology,  the  difficulties  of  the  theory  of  parallel- 
ism do  not  arise. 

Furthermore,  among  modern  philosophers  we  find 
great  repugnance  towards  the  irreducible  antagonism 
which  was  reached  by  the  two  parties,  one  rationalist 
the  other  mechanist,  of  the  Cartesian  psychology. 
And  this  antagonism  is  easily  explained. 

First,  there  is  the  natural  tendency  to  unification 
of  man's  mind.  The  many  elements  between  which 

1  Ziehen,  Leitfaden  der  physiologischen  Psychologic, 
pp.  256-260. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY       205 

there  is  no  plain  inconsistency  necessarily  call  for 
some  attempt  at  unification. 

Next,  there  are  so  many  indications  of  unity 
between  body  and  soul  in  man  that,  far  from 
imposing  itself  on  the  consciousness,  Descartes' 
psychological  dualism  appears  to  unprejudiced 
minds  inconsistent  with  consciousness. 

Lastly,  the  following  reason,  of  an  historical 
nature,  is  not  less  powerful.  Ideas  of  continuity 
and  of  evolution  are  prevalent  to-day  in  all  quarters 
where  scientific  and  philosophic  work  is  carried  on. 
Among  those  who  are  influenced  by  Hegelian 
arguments  evolution  becomes  idealist.  Among 
others  who  are  followers  of  the  universal  mechanical 
theory  and  the  biological  theories  of  Spencer  or 
Darwin  evolution  bears  a  more  or  less  materialist 
character.  But  all  think  that  it  must  be  admitted 
as  a  postulate,  that  differences  between  beings  are 
not  due  to  an  irreducible  diversity  of  nature,  but 
to  a  gradual  accumulation  of  infinitesimal  changes. 
This  dominant  influence  of  the  idea  of  continuity  in 
nature  dates  from  Leibnitz.  The  brilliant  application 
he  made  of  it  in  inventing  the  differential  calculus 
led  men  to  think  that  monads  made  an  infinite 
series,  each  term  of  which,  although  having  a  proper 
and  independent  nature  of  its  own,  nevertheless 
differs  only  insensibly  and  less  and  less  perceptibly 
from  that  which  precedes  or  follows  it.1  Thus 
interpreted,  the  old  saying,  natura  non  facit  saltum, 
contained  in  germ  the  theories  that  explain  the 
origin  and  differentiation  of  beings  by  evolution, 

1  See  De  Lantsheere,  Revue  neo-scolastique,  April,  1894, 
p.  107. 


206   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

and  their  unity  as  a  whole  by  a  unity  of  nature  or 
of  composition. 

To  sum  up :  the  founders  of  the  systems  we  have 
described,  such  as  Herbert  Spencer,  A.  Fouillee, 
and  W.  Wundt;  philosophers  like  Deussen,  Kauff- 
mann,  Avenarius,  and  Paulsen;1  psychologists  like 
Fechner,  Hoffding,  Ziehen,  Ebbinghaus;  all  these 
have  a  tendency  towards  monism.  Their  starting- 
point  and  their  arguments  vary  according  to  the 
ontological,  psychological,  or  criteriological  point  of 
view  they  take  up,  but  the  final  result  is  the  same 
in  all  cases. 

Therefore  we  had  good  reason  for  signalizing  the 
abandonment  of  metaphysics  in  the  traditional  sense 
of  the  word  as  one  of  the  characteristics  of  con- 

1  A  French  writer  who  began  with  quite  other  tendencies, 
M.  Paul  Janet,  ended  his  first  work,  Principes  de  meta- 
physique  et  de  psychologic,  with  these  words:  "  As  for  our- 
selves, we  do  not  hesitate  to  admit  that  the  notion  of 
divine  personality  has  been  much  exaggerated,  that  divine 
attributes  have  been  far  too  much  likened  to  human 
attributes,  that  theodicy  has  been  too  much  drawn  from 
psychology;  that,  from  another  standpoint,  transcendence 
has  been  pressed  too  far,  for,  taken  literally,  it  would 
estrange  man  from  God,  and  God  from  man;  and  without 
going  so  far  as  pantheism,  we  admit  what  a  German  philo- 
sopher has  called  panentheism,  irav  tv  6«p."  Op.  cit.  II., 
p.  615.  Paris,  Delagrave,  1897. 

This  German  philosopher  is  Krause,  whose  main  ideas 
have  been  introduced  into  Belgium  by  Tiberghien. 

"  The  transcendence  of  the  theologians  may  be  reconciled 
with  the  immanence  of  the  philosophers.  These  notions 
do  not  exclude,  they  complete,  one  another.  Their  harmony 
makes  panentheism.  This  is  methodically  realized  by 
Krause's  teaching." — Tiberghien,  Introduction  d,  la  philo- 
sophic, Bruxelles,  1880,  xxxvi,  Preface  of  2nd  ed.  Again: 
"  We  are  right  in  saying  that  Krause's  teaching  .  .  .  marks 
in  the  order  of  providence  the  arrival  of  the  third  age  of 
mankind." — Essai  theorique  sur  la  generation  des  connais- 
sances  humaines,  Bruxelles,  Perichon,  1844,  p.  695. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   207 

temporary  psychology,  and  also  the  predominance 
of  idealism  and  subjectivism,  and  lastly,  a  general 
tendency  towards  monism. 

Contemporary  psychology  presents  a  third  striking 
characteristic.  It  is  the  increasing  influence  attri- 
buted to  experience. 

The  tendency  to  submit  the  results  of  observa- 
tion to  mathematical  formulae  ruled  the  domain 
of  physics  for  two  centuries,  and  it  ended  by  entering 
into  the  sphere  of  psychology. 

Weber  was  the  first  to  make  methodical  efforts 
in  this  direction.  His  experiments  were  directed 
towards  ascertaining  the  relations  between  the 
increase  of  an  external  stimulus  and  the  correspond- 
ing increase  in  sensation.  The  result  of  these 
researches  was  erected  into  a  law  bearing  Weber's 
name.  Sensations  increase  in  absolutely  equal 
quantities,  when  their  stimuli  increase  in  relatively 
equal  quantities. 

Fechner1  threw  Weber's  law  into  this  technical 
formula:  The  increase  in  sensation  follows  an  arith- 
metical progression,  while  that  of  the  stimulus 
follows  a  geometrical|-progression ;  or  again,  into 
the  form  of  this  other  statement :  Sensation  in- 
creases as  the  logarithm  of  stimulus.  This  study 
of  the  relations  between  the  stimulus  and  the 
differentiation  of^sensations  is  strictly  called  psycho- 
physics. 

1  The  first  edition  of  the  Elemente  der  Psychophysik 
appeared  in  1860.  In  the  first  and  most  considerable 
portion  of  the  treatise  the  writer  devotes  himself  to  giving 
the  principles,  methods  and  laws  of  "  measurement  "  in  its 
application  to  the  different  kinds  of  sensations. 


208   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Wundt  himself  is  the  founder  of  psychophysiology.1 
This  new  science,  of  which  psychophysics  is  only  a 
part,  embraces  the  experimental  study  of  conscious 
phenomena  in  their  relations  with  physiological  and 
physical  facts. 

We  say  new  science,  for  the  acknowledged  ambition 
of  Wundt  and  his  followers  is  to  effect  a  fresh  division 
of  labour  for  the  benefit  of  their  favourite  studies. 
Experimental  psychology,  to  their  mind,  has  its 
own  aims  and  methods,  it  constitutes  a  science 
which  is  distinct  both  from  other  natural  sciences 
and  from  philosophy.2 

Wundt  founded  the  first  laboratory  of  psycho- 
physiology  at  Leipzig  in  1878.  Since  then,  hundreds 
of  workers  have  followed  in  their  master's  footsteps, 
and  many  of  them  have  gone  in  turn  to  France, 
Belgium,  and  above  all  to  the  United  States,  to  set 
up  centres  of  experimental  research  in  psychology. 

1  Beitrdge  zuv  Theorie  der  Sinneswahrnehmung,  Leipzig, 
1862;  Vorlesungen  uber  Menschen-  und  Thierseele,  i.  Aufl., 
1863;  Grundzuge  der  physiologischen  Psychologic,   i   Aufl., 
1874. 

2  "  Experimental  psychology,"  writes  M.   Binet,   "  has 
been  definitively  organized  into  a  distinct  and  independent 
science.     At  the  present   time,   experimental   psychology 
stands  for  a  whole  of  scientific  researches  which  are  self- 
sufficing  up  to  a  certain  point  in  the  same  way  as  botanical 
and  zoological  researches.     It  has  shaken  itself  free  from 
that  confused  and  ill-defined  mass  of  knowledge  to  which 
the  name  of  philosophy  has  been  given.     It  has  cut  the 
rope  which  hitherto  bound  it  to  metaphysics. 

"  Let  us  be  clearly  understood  as  to  this  important  point 
of  teaching.  Experimental  psychology  is  independent  of 
metaphysics.  It  does  not  presuppose  any  particular  solu- 
tion of  the  great  problems  of  life  and  the  soul.  Of  itself  it 
has  no  spiritualist,  materialist,  or  monist  tendency.  It  is  a 
natural  science,  and  nothing  more." — A.  Binet,  Introduction 
&  la  psychologic  exp6rimentale,  Paris,  Alcan,  1894. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   209 

M.  Victor  Henri,  since  1893,  has  become  the 
historian  of  this  movement.  A  well  documented 
articje  which  he  then  published  in  the  Revue  philo- 
sophique1  describes  the  four  laboratories  then 
existing  in  Germany,  and  gives  an  insight  into  the 
work  carried  on  in  them.  Less  than  fifteen  years 
after  these  researches  were  inaugurated,  he  was  able 
to  mark  with  satisfaction  the  very  considerable 
advance  made  hi  these  undertakings  and  their 
extension  to  an  unhoped-for  degree. 

In  the  year  1893  there  were  thirty  laboratories  in  the 
two  hemispheres.  Sixteen  of  these  were  in  America, 
two  in  England,  one  in  France,  one  in  Italy,  one 
in  Switzerland,  one  in  Denmark,  one  in  Sweden,  one 
in  Roumania,  one  in  Holland,  one  in  Belgium,  and 
four  in  Germany,  where  the  movement  took  its  rise. 

Of  the  four  original  laboratories,  the  first  was  set 
up  in  Leipzig  by  Wundt  in  1878.  In  1893  it  pos- 
sessed eleven  rooms  and  received  an  annual  sub- 
vention of  1,500  marks.  The  greatest  attention  was 
devoted  to  psychometry,  and  the  first  fourteen  years 
already  provided  forty-five  works,  which  might  be 
regarded,  when  taken  as  a  whole,  as  a  detailed  course 
of  introduction  to  experimental  psychology.  Twelve 
subjects  were  on  the  list  in  1893,  the  most  important 
of  which  was  one  devoted  to  the  investigation  of 
time -sensations  by  Meumann.  In  1892  a  new 
theory  of  Lehmann's  as  to  the  transition  from 
pleasure  to  pain  attracted  the  attention  of  the 
learned  world.  At  this  period  the  laboratory  was 

1  Victor  Henri,  Les  labor  atoires  de  psychologie  exp6yi- 
mentaleenAllemagne  (Revue  philosophique,  t.  xxxvi.,  Decem- 
ber, 1893,  pp.  608-622). 


210   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

attended  by  twenty-two  pupils  taught  by  Wundt, 
Kiilpe,  and  Meumann. 

The  second  was  founded  at  Gottingen  by  E. 
Miiller  in  1879,  and  comprised  five  rooms.  It  was 
long  the  private  property  of  the  founder,  and  when 
it  was  made  over  to  the  University,  it  received  an 
annual  endowment  of  500  marks.  The  apparatus, 
largely  the  acquisition  of  one  of  the  students,  was 
plentiful,  but  the  students  were  few.  The  work 
done  has  been  issued  in  two  special  Reviews,  and 
at  that  date  had  only  appeared  in  four  sections, 
by  Miiller  and  Schumann. 

The  third  was  instituted  at  Bonn  by  Martius  in 
1888,  and  was  then  his  private  property.  In  every 
way  it  resembled  that  of  Leipzig,  and,  owing  to 
reasons  that  had  nothing  to  do  with  science,  it 
attracted  very  few  students,  and  published  its 
experiments  in  the  Philosophische  Studien. 

The  fourth  and  last  was  founded  in  Berlin  by 
Ebbinghaus,  and  although  it  was  not  then  com- 
pletely organized,  it  already  numbered  eight 
students,  and  gave  splendid  promise. 

Starting  from  Germany,  the  movement  spread 
everywhere.  There  are  now  laboratories  in  Moscow, 
Rome,  and  Geneva,  and  France  possesses  two.  In 
1888  a  laboratory  was  founded  in  the  School  of 
Higher  Studies  of  Paris,  and  placed  under  the 
control  of  MM.  Beaunis  and  Binet.1  A  second  was 
set  up  at  Rennes  under  the  control  of  M.  Bourdon. 

In  America,  since  1881,  the  date  of  the  foundation 
at  the  Hopkins  University  of  Baltimore  by  Stanley 

1  See  Binet,  Introduction  A  la  psychologic  exptrimentale 
(Paris,  Alcan,  1894),  for  a  description  of  the  Paris  laboratory. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   211 

Hall,  a  pupil  of  Wundt's,  of  the  first  laboratory, 
which  did  not  last  more  than  five  years,  the  position 
of  experimental  psychology  is  still  stronger  than  in 
Germany.  In  1894  a  very  complete  book  by  Dr. 
E.  B.  Delabarre,  the  president  of  the  laboratory  at 
the  Brown  University  of  Providence,  gave  a  clear 
account  of  laboratory  work.  From  this  treatise 
and  other  publications  (Scripture,  The  New  Psycho- 
logy), it  appears  that  the  twenty-seven  laboratories 
then  existing  in  the  Colleges  and  Universities  of 
the  United  States  made  use  of  123  rooms,  provided 
with  apparatus,  etc.,  totalling  about  £11,000,  and 
endowed  with  nearly  £2,500  per  annum. 

"  Of  these  twenty-seven  laboratories,  eight  or 
nine  were  almost  entirely  devoted  to  teaching; 
from  five  to  eight  others  also  undertook  certain 
special  researches ;  ten  or  more  combined  instruction 
and  research  in  equal  proportion."  And  the  sixteen 
Universities  (in  the  case  of  which  Delabarre  ex- 
plicitly gives  the  figures)  devoted  not  less,  when 
taken  as  a  whole  together,  than  187  hours  a  week 
to  psychology.  As  for  metaphysics,  it  is  almost 
everywhere  left  out. 

The  fact  that  in  1893  there  was  set  up  at  the 
Chicago  Exposition  a  psychological  section,  in  which 
were  two  laboratories  regularly  working  under  the 
direction  of  the  most  eminent  professors  of  the 
science  in  the  United  States,  rightly  was  noted  as  "  a 
most  significant  event."  Since  then  the  movement 
has  only  grown  in  a  still  more  remarkable  manner. 

Japan,  and  even  China,  follow  the  example  of  the 
rest  of  the  world.  A  great  laboratory  is  at  work  in 
the  University  of  Tokyo,  under  the  direction  of 


212   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Professor  Motora,  and  a  professorship  of  experi- 
mental psychology  has  been  set  up  in  the  University 
of  Pekin. 

Wundt,1  Ziehen,2  Kiilpe,3  Ebbinghaus,4  and 
Gutberlet,6  in  Germany;  Sergi  6  in  Italy;  Sully7  in 
England;  Ladd,8  Dewey,9  Titchener,10  Baldwin,11 
William  James,12  Scripture,13  and  Sanford,14  in  the 
United  States,  have  set  down  in  special  treatises 
the  progressive  results  of  psychophysiology. 

Reviews  specially  devoted  to  experimental  psycho- 
logy increase  in  number.  Since  1905,  Wundt  has 
followed  up  the  Philosophische  Studien  which  he 
published  from  1881  to  1903,  with  the  Psycho- 
logische  Studien.  In  1890  Ebbinghaus  and  Kronig 
founded  the  Zeitschrift  fur  Psychologic  und  Physio- 
logic der  Sinnesorgane,  which  was  divided  later  on. 
Since  1903  Meumann  has  edited  the  Archiv  fur 
die  eesammte  Psychologic.  With  von  Lay  he 

1  Grundzuge  der  physiologischen  Psychologic  ;  Vorlesungen 
uber  Menschen-  und  Thiersecle  ;  Grundriss  der  Psychologic. 

2  Leitfaden  der  physiologischen  Psychologic,  7te  Aufl.,  Jena, 
1906. 

3  Grundriss  der  Psychologic  auf  experimenteller  Grundlage, 

1893- 

*  Grundziige  der  Psychologic,  2te  Aufl.,  Bd.  I.,  Leipzig, 
1905. 

5  Psychophysih.     Histprisch-hritische  Studien  tiber  experi- 
mentelle  Psychologic,  Mainz,  1905. 

6  La  psychologic  phsysiologique,  French  Trans.,  Paris,  1888. 

7  The  Human  Mind,  London,  1892. 

8  Elements  of  Physiological  Psychology,  1900.     Outlines  of 
Physiological  Psychology,  1901. 

9  Psychology,  New  York,  1887. 

10  A  Primer  of  Psychology,  New  York,  1900.    Experimental 
Psychology,  1901.     An  Outline  of  Psychology,  4th  Ed.  1905. 

11  Handbook  of  Psychology,  Boston,  1891. 

12  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  London,  1890. 

13  The  New  Psychology,  New  York,  1898. 

14  Course  of  Experimental  Psychology. 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   213 

issued  Die  experimentclle  Pddagogik.  We  may 
also  mention  Krapelin's  Psychologische  Arbeiten 
(since  1895),  the  Beitrage  zur  Psychologic  und 
Philosophic  of  Martins  (since  1895),  the  Schriften 
der  Gesellschaft  filr  Psychologische  Forschung,  the 
Psychologische  Untersuchungen  of  Lipps,  the  Abhand- 
lungen  aus  dem  Gebicte  der  pddagogischen  Psychologic 
und  Physiologic  of  Ziegler  and  Ziehen,  Stern's 
Beitrage  zur  Psychologic  der  Aussagc,  the  Zeitschrift 
fur  pddagogische  Psychologic  und  Pathologic  of 
Kemsies,  the  Journal  fur  Psychologic  und  Neurologic 
of  Forel  and  Vogt,  and  the  Zeitschrift  filr  Religions- 
psychologic  of  Bresler  and  Vorbrodt. 

In  France,  where  M.  Th.  Ribot  made  known 
English  and  German  contemporary  psychology, 
MM.  Beaunis  and  Binet  founded  Uannee  psycho- 
logique  in  1895,  M.  Binet  the  Bibliotheque  de  peda- 
gogic et  de  psychologic  in  1898,  MM.  Pierre  Janet 
and  Georges  Dumas  the  Journal  de  psychologic 
normale  et  pathologique  in  1904,  and  M.  Toulouse 
the  Bibliotheque  Internationale  de  psychologic  ex- 
perimentale  in  1900.  In  Geneva,  MM.  Flournoy 
and  Claparede  have  been  issuing  the  Archives  de 
psychologic  since  1902. 

Italy  has  its  Rivista  di  psicologia  by  Ferrari,  and 
De  Sarlo's  Ricerche  di  psicologia. 

England  appears  to  nave  kept  quite  aloof  from  the 
German-founded  movement.  Doubtless,  it  is  in- 
disputable that  men  like  Spencer,  Bain,  Sully,  and 
Galton,  have  powerfully  contributed  to  the  direction 
actually  taken  by  psychology,  but  hitherto  the 
English  have  devoted  little  pains  to  experimentation 
properly  so  called.  Nevertheless  Messrs.  James 


214   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Ward  and  Rivers  have  been  bringing  out  The 
British  Journal  of  Psychology  since  1905. 

In  America,  the  vigour  of  the  movement  is  shown 
by  the  founding  of  two  great  Reviews  devoted 
exclusively  to  Psychology:  The  American  Journal 
of  Psychology,  started  in  1878  by  Stanley  Hall,  and 
The  Psychological  Review,  edited  since  1894  by  Mark 
Baldwin.  Supplementary  to  the  latter  have  ap- 
peared Psychological  Monographs  running  already 
into  more  than  eight  volumes.  Besides  these 
miscellanies,  there  are  two  annual  publications,  The 
Studies  of  the  Yale  Psychological  Laboratory,  edited 
by  E.  W.  Scripture,  and  The  Bulletin  of  the  American 
Psychological  Society.  Several  Universities  also 
publish  Annals  in  which  psychological  work  finds  a 
place ;  for  instance,  The  Nebraska  University  Series, 
and  the  Annals  of  Pennsylvania  University.  Further, 
there  are  two  very  prosperous  psychological  societies, 
and  one  of  them,  which  published  .a  volume  of  its 
work  in  1889,  is  affiliated  to  the  English  Psychical 
Research  Society. 

Lastly,  as  a  final  testimony  to  the  universal 
interest  in  the  researches  of  experimental  psychology, 
and  as  a  pledge  of  vitality  in  this  young  and  de- 
veloping science,  there  have  already  been  five 
Congresses,  held  in  Paris  (1889),  London  (1892), 
Munich  (1896),  Paris  (1900),  and  Rome  (1905).  In 
Paris  the  Congress  was  called  Congr&s  international 
de  psychologic  physiologique.  The  Munich  Congress 
took  in  the  whole  field  of  psychology,  and  was  called 
The  Internation-al  Congress  of  Psychology,  a  title 
which  has  been  retained  ever  since.  The  last 
Congress,  which  was  held  in  Rome,  received  more 


CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY   215 

than  two  hundred  and  fifty  works  and  communi- 
cations. 

It  is  clear  that  in  proportion  as  men's  thoughts 
turn  away  from  metaphysics,  their  labours  become 
engrossed  in  the  experimental  part  of  psychology. 

And  now,  with  contemporary  psychology  before 
us  in  its  main  outlines  and  with  its  distinctive 
characteristics,  let  us  make  a  bold  sketch  of  psycho- 
logy, or  rather,  of  Aristotelian  and  Scholastic 
Anthropology. 

We  shall  devote  our  next  chapter  to  contrasting 
the  rationalist  -psychology  of  Descartes  with  the 
Aristotelian  and  Scholastic  conception  of  anthro- 
pology. The  Cartesian  psychology  is  wholly  taken 
up  with  facts  of  consciousness.  In  our  next  chapter 
we  shall  bring  out  the  corresponding  characteristic 
of  the  traditional  philosophy. 

The  following  chapters  will  include  first  of  all  a 
criticism  in  principle  of  Idealism,  the  natural  result 
of  the  Cartesian  psychology  (Chap.  V.) ;  next,  of  the 
mechanical  theory,  which  sprang  from  the  physics 
of  the  French  reformer  (Chap.  VI.) ;  lastly,  of  the 
agnostic  Positivism  in  which  idealist  and  mechanical 
tendencies  have  joined  hands  (Chap.  VII.).  The 
common  aim  of  these  three  studies  will  be  to  bring 
out  the  excesses  and  defects  involved  in  the  second 
characteristic  which  we  ascribed  to  contemporary 
psychology.1 

The  eighth  and  last  chapter  gives  a  study  of  the 
neo-Thomist  movement,  and  of  the  possibility  of 
adapting  the  Scholastic  teaching  to  experimental 
researches. 

1  See  above,  p. 


CHAPTER  IV 
PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY 

BY  Anthropology  we  here  mean  the  philosophy  of 
Man,  We  oppose  the  term  to  that  of  Psychology, 
which,  strictly  speaking,  refers  to  the  philosophy 
of  the  soul. 

Indeed,  the  dominant  idea  of  the  following  pages 
is  this — that  the  studies  now  classed  under  the 
name  of  psychology  too  often  put  too  close  restric- 
tions upon  their  subject-matter  by  substituting  the 
study  of  the  soul  or  mind  for  the  study  of  composite 
man. 

The  aim  of  the  psychologist  is  to  study  man,  the 
manifold  manifestations  of  his  activity,  and  the 
nature  of  the  principle  from  which  it  springs.  But 
through  the  influence  of  ideas  which  it  is  hard  to 
take  account  ^r,  it  comes  to  pass  that  we  allow 
ourselves  to  notice  in  human  nature  simply  the 
subject  which  consciousness  reveals  to  itself,  and 
get  to  think  that  what  escapes  the  inward  attention 
of  the  mind  is  no  longer  man  from  the  psychological 
standpoint,  but  man  as  regarded  by  the  physiologist 
or  the  physicist.  Hence  it  follows  that  man  as  he 
is  studied  in  fact  by  the  psychologist  is  not  by  any 
means  man  as  the  psychologist  intended  to  study 
him. 

216 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY     217 

Hence  the  conclusions  of  this  kind  of  psychology, 
since  they  are  drawn  from  the  data  of  consciousness 
exclusively,  may  perhaps  be  applicable  to  an  ideal 
being  whose  entire  nature  consists  in  thinking,  but 
they  are  certainly  not  verified  in  the  case  of  that 
real  being  of  body  and  mind  which  constitutes 
ourselves. 

It  is  maintained  on  the  testimony  of  consciousness 
that  man's  soul  is  one,  simple,  and  immaterial. 
But  we  know  nothing  of  a  being  that  is  one,  simple, 
and  immaterial,  in  the  way  described.  Man  as  we 
know  him  is  revealed  to  us  as  much  by  scientific 
observation  as  by  consciousness.  He  is  subject  to 
the  laws  of  gravity  and  attraction;  he  affords  the 
same  reactions  as  the  materials  of  our  chemical 
laboratories;  zoology  ranks  him  with  the  primates; 
the  circulation  of  the  blood  and  the  organization  of 
the  nervous  system  depend  in  his  case,  as  in  that 
of  other  organized  beings,  on  general  physiological 
laws.  How  can  he  be  regarded  as  a  being  apart  ? 
And  the  materialist  concludes  thus:  all  your  argu- 
ments in  favour  of  the  simplicity  and  immateriality 
of  the  soul  miscarry:  there  is  no  immaterial  soul. 

Let  it  be  granted,  that  there  is  no  proof  of  the 
existence  of  an  immaterial  soul,  the  whole  activity  of 
which  consists  in  consciousness,  and  the  immateriality 
of  which  is  revealed  immediately  by  consciousness. 
A  being  of  this  sort  is  purely  hypothetical.  Against 
the  existence  of  such  an  imaginary  being,  the 
demands  of  physics  and  physiology  are  legitimate, 
and  the  conclusions  which  the  materialist  draws 
from  them  admit  of  no  reply. 

But  our  modern  materialist  with  his   cons,  just 


218   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

as  much  as  the  Cartesian  spiritualist  with  his  pros, 
reasons  aside  from  the  question  really  at  issue. 

Is  there,  or  is  there  not,  a  corporal  being,  existing 
in  space,  subject  to  physical  agencies,  made  up  of 
living  cells,  provided  with  vertebrae,  a  nervous 
system,  and  the  organs  of  sense,  and  further  fur- 
nished with  a  psychic  activity  that  is  at  least  on 
a  level  with  that  of  the  highest  animals  ?  Quite 
plainly,  Yes. 

Now,  the  object  of  an  unprejudiced  psychology  is 
the  complex  being  whom  we  call  Man.  Medieval 
philosophers  said  he  was  a  microcosm,  to  indicate 
how  far  his  wealth  of  activities  is  a  kind  of  synthesis 
of  all  cosmic  energies. 

Are  all  the  exercises  of  human  activity  reducible 
to  those  of  the  lower  animals,  or  if  there  are  any 
which  are  irreducible,  of  what  kind  are  they  ?  And 
what  are  these  exhibitions  in  themselves,  and  in 
relation  to  one  another,  and  in  relation  to  the 
subject  that  manifests  them  ?  Such  are  the  essen- 
tial problems  of  the  science  of  anthropology. 

And  so  we  come  to  this  definition:  the  funda- 
mental thesis  of  anthropology,  from  the  Scholastic 
standpoint  in  contrast  with  the  psychology  of 
Descartes,  consists  in  maintaining  the  substantial 
unity  of  man. 

The  highest  acts  of  mental  and  moral  life  depend 
upon  the  body. 

The  normal  temperature  of  the  human  body  is 
about  98°  F.  Two  or  three  degrees  below  numb 
the  brain,  and  two  or  three  degrees  above  heat  it 
to  the  point  of  delirium. 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY     219 

Mosso  judges,  according  to  the  beating  of  the 
pulse,  whether  a  person  is  distraught,  or  able  to 
reflect.  He  remarks  a  modification  in  the  curve, 
when  the  subject  is  perusing  a  page  of  easy  reading 
or  striving  to  translate  a  passage  of  Homer. 

The  plethysmograph  shows  the  variations  in  the 
emotions.  These,  again,  aid  or  impede  the  will, 
according  to  circumstances,  but  free  will  must 
always  take  account  of  them.  All  of  us  feel  in  our 
members  the  humiliating  law  spoken  of  by  St.  Paul, 
against  which  we  must  struggle,  if  virtue  is  to  win 
the  victory.1 

1  St.  Thomas  admirably  sums  up  the  mutually  dependent 
relations  between  soul  and  body  in  a  passage  which  has 
often  been  quoted,  but  which  we  cannot  refrain  from  re- 
producing here:  Secundum  naturae  ordinem,  propter  colli- 
gantiam  virium  animae  in  una  essentia,  et  animae  et  coupons 
in  uno  esse  composite,  vires  superiores  et  inferiores,  et  etiam 
corpus,  invicem  in  se  effluunt  quod  in  aliquo  eorum  super- 
abundat ;  et  inde  est  quod  ex  apprehensione  animae  trans- 
mutatur  corpus,  secundum  calorem  et  frigus  et  quandoque 
usque  ad  sanitatem  et  aegritudinem,  et  usque  ad  mortem  : 
contingit  enim  aliquem  ex  gaudio  vel  tristitia  vel  amore  mortem 
incurrere.  .  .  .  Anima  conjuncta  corpori,  ejus  complexiones 
imitatur  secundum  amentiatn  vel  docilitatem,  et  alia  hujus- 
modi.  Similiter  ex  viribus  superioribus  fit  redundantia  in 
inferiores  ;  cum  ad  motum  voluntatis  intensum  sequitur  passio 
in  sensuali  appetitu,  et  ex  intensa  contemplatione  retrahuntur 
vel  impediuntur  vires  animates  a  suis  actibus  ;  et  e  converse  ex 
viribus  inferioribus  fit  redundantia  in  superiores  ;  ut  cum  ex 
vehementia  passionum  in  sensuali  appetitu  existentium  obtene- 
bratur  ratio,  ut  judicet  quasi  simpliciter  bonum  id  circa  quod 
homo  per  passionem  afficitur. — De  Veritate,  Q.  XXVI., 
A.  10. 

Many  experiments  might  be  adduced  by  way  of  scientific 
commentary  on  the  above,  e.g.,  those  of  M.  Ch.  Fere: 

"  I  have  often  remarked  that  when  a  subject  was  the 
victim  of  a  painful  emotion,  the  tension  of  the  apparatus 
slackened  and  remained  below  the  normal,  whereas  it  in- 
creased when  the  subject  was  in  an  opposite  state  of  feeling. 
The  plethysmograph  may  therefore  reveal  psychic  manifes- 


220   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Thus,  the  functions  of  human  life  of  every  degree 
possess  a  mutual  interdependence.  The  soundness 
of  the  organs  and  their  normal  physiological  working 
assure  the  regularity  of  nutritive  and  sensational 
life,  and  these  constitute  the  necessary  foundation 
of  the  mental  and  moral  life.  Therefore  between 
all  forms  of  human  activity  there  is  a  bond  of  unity. 
One  principle  must  bind  them  together,  and  one 
original  tendency  must  make  them  converge  towards 
the  wonderful,  steady,  and  orderly  end  which  they 
fulfil. 

Here  we  shall  leave  the  subject,  as  we  do  not 
mean  now  to  set  forth  ex  professo  the  principal 
theses  of  Scholastic  psychology  one  after  the  other, 
but  merely  to  indicate  their  bearing,  and  to  mark 
their  place  in  discussing  the  systems  with  which 
we  are  contrasting  them. 

If  such  is  man's  nature,  and  if,  therefore,  the 
conscious  soul  is  only  a  part  of  man,  and  a  part  that 
depends  in  all  its  manifestations  upon  that  other 
part,  which  is  the  body,  it  is  impossible  to  infer  the 
nature  of  the  soul  from  an  exclusive  consideration 
of  the  mind. 

"  I  am  something  that  thinks,  and  nothing  more," 
said  Descartes,  "  and  it  is  this  thing  that  thinks 
that  I  call  indifferently  spirit,  soul,  mind,  or  reason." 

tations  apart  from  any  apparent  motive.  In  the  case  of  a 
deranged  person  I  was  able  to  ascertain  that  there  were 
changes  in  the  circulation,  even  when  the  hallucinations 
were  only  slight.  This  discovery  may  be  useful  in  the  case 
of  lunatics  who  are  shamming,  to  reveal  hallucinations  or 
impulses,  and  to  indicate  to  the  doctor  the  degree  of  excite- 
ment or  depression,  and  also  to  show  him  the  best  influences 
to  sway  the  patient  with." — Ch.  F6re,  Sentiment  et  moitve- 
ment,  Paris,  Alcan,  1887,  p.  115. 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY     221 

\ 

I  am  something  that  thinks,  or  more  exactly,  it 
is  my  nature  to  be  able  to  think.  Yes. 

I  am  nothing  more  than  something  that  thinks — 
in  other  words,  my  whole  nature  is  thinking  or 
mind.  No. 

Descartes'  proposition  is  true  so  far  as  it  is 
affirmative,  but  it  is  disproved  by  the  testimony  of 
consciousness  and  experience,  as  soon  as  it  is  made 
exclusive. 

Besides,  it  is  not  strictly  accurate  to  say,  even  in 
an  affirmative  sense,  that  I  am  something  that 
thinks.  I  am  only  something  endowed  with  the 
power  of  thinking. 

Before  I  began  thinking  I  existed,  and,  what  is 
more,  I  acted.  The  babe  in  its  mother's  womb  is 
not  essentially  different  from  the  subject  which, 
later  on,  judges,  reasons,  and  deliberates.  What 
experience  or  experiment  is  there  to  prove  that  it 
thinks  ? 

The  brilliant  historian  of  the  Cartesian  philosophy, 
M.  Francisque  Bouillier,  admits  this  consequence, 
so  as  not  to  have  to  repudiate  the  principle  from 
which  it  logically  springs.  "  Consciousness  is  abso- 
lutely penetrated  by  all  psychological  phenomena," 
he  writes,  "  and  conversely,  so  are  all  psychological 
phenomena  by  consciousness.  .  .  .  Consciousness 
is  not  only  co-extensive  with  all  the  faculties  of  the 
intelligence,  but  with  all  the  faculties  of  the  soul 
without  exception."1 

But  a  system  which  results  in  such  consequences 
is  self -condemned. 

1  F.  Bouillier,  De  la  conscience  en  psychologic  et  en  morale, 
Ch.  VI.,  p.  82. 


222   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

From  the  moment  when  the  segmentation  cell 
leaves  its  parents  and  divides,  multiplies,  gives  rise 
to  germinal  structures,  and  is  then  differentiated 
progressively  into  tissues  and  forms  adapted  to  the 
various  functions  of  the  organism ;  from  the  moment 
when,  in  vertebrates,  the  central  nervous  system 
begins  to  take  shape,  until  the  time  when  the  cerebral 
hemispheres  are  fully  developed,  there  are  several 
months  during  which  physiological  life  is  manifested 
without  our  having  any  reason  to  infer  that  there  is 
any  conscious  life. 

Embryogeny  proves  that  the  hemispheres  only 
begin  to  take  shape  after  seven  months  of  embryonic 
life,  and  many  months  are  needed  before  they  are 
fully  developed.1 

From  the  beginning  of  extra-uterine  life  certain 
nervous  phenomena  may  very  well  occur  in  the  case 
of  the  new-born  infant — and  even  in  the  case  of 
the  embryo  in  the  last  period  of  its  intra-uterine 
life;  but  the  physiology  of  the  nerves  and  brain 
leads  us  to  infer  that  any  inner  sense  of  the  vital 
activities  can  only  arise  later  on.  According  to  the 
last  works  of  Flechsig,  indeed,  the  brain  of  the  new- 
born infant,  from  a  functional  point  of  view,  is 
entirely  similar  to  the  brains  of  lower  mammals 
without  centres  of  association.  Until  the  end  of 
the  first  month,  all  the  new-born  child's  movements 
are  reflex  movements.  Through  the  lack  of  develop- 
ment of  its  centres  of  association,  called  by  Flechsig 
"  mind-centres,"  the  infant  is  incapable  of  voluntary 
movements,  and  all  its  manifestations  of  vitality 
consist  in  reflex  reactions  to  external  stimuli.  More- 

1  Hertwig,  Embryologie,  p.  395. 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY     223 

over,  the  maturity  of  a  nervous  fibre  is  characterized 
by  the  appearance  of  myelin  around  its  cylinder- 
axis;  but  Flechsig  ascertained  that  the  sensory 
fibres  of  the  telencephalon  only  begin  to  form 
myelin  after  the  eighth  month  of  embryonic  exist- 
ence; and  hence,  before  thtn  the  conduction  of 
impressions  to  the  projectory  centres  is  impossible, 
and  it  is  only  when  the  latter  centres  are  provided 
with  myelonal  fibres  that  their  connection  with 
centres  of  association  can  be  established,  which  only 
occurs  after  the  second  month  of  extra-uterine  life.1 

In  fact,  says  Preyer,  the  new-born  infant  only 
gradually  co"mes  to  look  at  things.  At  first  his 
sight  is  but  vague  and  passive,  and  looks  at  nothing. 
It  is  only  later  on  that  he  shows  clear  and  active 
sight.  Then  he  begins  to  follow  with  his  eyes  and 
the  movement  of  the  head  any  slowly  moving 
object,  and  regards  things  within  range  of  his  own 
accord.2 

These  conclusions  of  the  learned  psychologist  of 
Jena,  as  well  as  those  of  the  Leipzig  anatomist, 
coincide  with  the  old  distinction  of  the  Scholastics 
between  the  external  senses  and  the  inner  sense. 
The  life  of  the  senses  goes  through  several  successive 
stages.  Sense-consciousness,  and  a  fortiori  mental 
consciousness,  is  not  at  the  beginning  but  at  the 
end  of  this  evolution.  Sensible  life  itself  is  preceded 
by  a  stage  of  biological  development  in  which  all 
the  activities  of  the  soul  are  expended  in  the  organi- 
zation of  living  matter. 

1  P.  Flechsig,  Gehirn  und  Seele,  Leipzig,  1896,  S.  23. 
Cf.  Van  Gehuchten,  Anatomic  du  systtme  nerveux,  Louvain^ 
1897,  p.  704. 

-  Preyer,  L'dme  de  Venfant,  p.  147. 


224   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Therefore,  the  essence  of  the  human  soul  is  not 
in  thought — i.e.,  in  the  exercise  of  the  act  of  thinking; 
nor  even  in  the  power  of  thinking  or  knowing,  even 
in  the  most  rudimentary  sense  of  the  word.  The 
primary  function  of  the  soul  is  to  inform  bodily 
matter,  to  "  animate  "  it — i.e.,  to  make  it  live — to 
organize  it,  and  to  render  it  apt  to  exercise  the 
functions  of  the  sensible  life  in  proportion  to  the 
development  of  the  whole  organism.  Intellectual 
life,  properly  so  called,  depends,  in  its  turn,  upon 
the  sensory  functions  in  which  it  finds  forced 
auxiliaries.  Thus,  the  first  fundamental  thesis  of 
the  Scholastic  anthropology  as  to  the  substantial 
unity  of  man  leads  directly  on  to  the  following 
thesis : 

It  is  of  the  nature  of  man's  soul  to  inform  matter. 
Its  operations,  and  especially  consciousness,  are 
posterior  to  the  substantial  act  of  information. 

As  to  the  order  of  the  appearance  of  the  acts 
which  originally  emanate  from  the  subject,  it  is 
as  follows :  Naturally  and  chronologically,  sensation 
is  posterior  to  biological  phenomena.  The  inner 
sense,  appetition,  and  spontaneous  movements  are 
posterior  to  external  sensation.  Lastly,  intellectual 
knowledge  and  acts  of  the  moral  order  are  the  last 
to  appear  in  the  life  of  the  soul. 

The  analysis  and  comparison  of  these  various  acts 
lead  to  the  formulation  of  a  third  thesis : 

The  different  acts,  of  which  man's  nature  is  the 
first  principle,  are  only  produced  by  the  faculties  ; 
and,  between  nature  and  the  faculties,  as  also  between 
the  faculties  themselves,  there  is  a  real  distinction. 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY  225 

To  sum  up :  To  the  exaggeratedly  simple  psycho- 
logy of  the  author  of  the  Discours  de  la  methode  and 
the  Meditations,  a  psychology  according  to  which 
the  soul  is  a  thinking  being  and  nothing  else  (so 
that  between  thought  and  the  thinking  soul  there 
is  simply  the  difference  of  the  point  of  view),  Scholas- 
tic philosophy  opposes  the  thesis  of  the  real  distinc- 
tion between  the  substance  and  its  acts,  between  the 
substance  and  its  faculties;  and  it  insists  upon  the 
multiplicity  of  the  faculties,  and  endeavours  to 
show  the  foundation  of  their  division. 

Thus,  we  desire  to  prove  that  our  acts  are  not 
pure  modalities  of  the  soul,  as  Descartes  maintained, 
but  that  they  proceed  from  the  substance  of  the 
soul  by  means  of  faculties  which  are  really  distinct 
from  it. 

In  truth,  this  thesis  extends  far  beyond  man's 
soul  to  all  created  substances.  No  created  sub- 
stance, indeed,  acts  of  itself,  but  all  need  inter- 
mediaries, called  instrumental  causes,  powers, 
faculties,  to  fulfil  the  acts  of  which  they  are  the 
original  principles. 

In  fact,  in  the  created  being,  to  exist  and  to  act 
are  two  forms  of  act  which  cannot  be  identified. 

But  an  act  gives  the  measure  of  the  power  which 
it  actualizes,  for  there  is  necessarily  some  proportion 
between  the  act  of  a  subject  and  the  subject  of  the 
act.  Semper  enim  actus  proportionatur  ei  cnjus  est 
actus,  says  St.  Thomas. 

Therefore,  the  two  subjects  respectively  capable 
of  the  act  of  existing  and  of  the  act  of  acting  are 
not  identical. 

But,  to  the  former  we  give  the  name  of  essence 

'5 

* 


226   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

or  substance ;  to  the  subject  of  the  second,  the 
name  of  operative  power.  Hence  there  is  a  real 
difference  between  essence  or  substance  and  opera- 
tive power. 

In  God  alone,  substance  is  active  of  itself.  Or 
rather,  that  which,  in  created  beings,  answers 
respectively  to  essence,  and  to  power,  to  existence, 
and  to  action;  in  the  case  of  the  divine  Being  is 
but  one  and  the  same  transcendent  perfection. 

Perhaps  the  objection  will  be  made,  that  the  act 
of  existence  comes  under  essence,  whereas  operation 
comes  under  essence  assumed  to  exist.  Hence  it 
appears  legitimate  to  conclude  that,  in  order  to 
explain  how  existence  and  action  answer  to  different 
subjects,  it  is  not  necessary  to  admit  one  or  more 
faculties  distinct  from  essence. 

But  one  cannot  make  of  operation  an  act  that 
rests  upon  the  act  of  existence.  The  latter  is  neces- 
sarily the  final  act.  Esse  est  ultimus  actus.  Exist- 
ence is  the  crown  of  all  being  and  of  everything 
there  is  in  any  being.  Try  to  conceive  it  as  an  actual- 
izable  power  which  is  actualizable,  either  in  opera- 
tion or  otherwise,  and  you  will  not  succeed.  When 
you  have  said  of  a  thing,  substance,  power,  opera- 
tion, or  no  matter  what,  that  it  exists,  you  have 
uttered  the  final  word  about  it,  and  nothing  can  be 
added  thereto.  Esse  est  ultimus  actus. 

Hence  operation  cannot  actualize  existence.  And 
therefore  the  metaphysical  argument  of  St.  Thomas 
stands.  Operation  and  existence  really  differ  from 
one  another.  But  acts  that  really  differ  can  only 
determine  potentialities  that  really  differ.  Hence 
the  power  determined  by  the  act  of  operation  really 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY  227 

differs  from  the  essence  determined  by  the  act  of 
existence. 

We  know  that  phenomenalists  maintain  that  we 
are  the  victims  of  an  illusion.  They  say  that 
"  faculty  "  is  merely  a  word  meaning  "  a  permanent 
possibility  of  action." 

We  shall  discuss  this  conception  of  activity  later 
on,  when  we  have  to  criticize  positivism.  Here  we 
shall  continue  our  proof  of  the  existence  of  faculties 
really  distinct  from  the  substantial  subject  that 
makes  use  of  them.  Let  us  now  apply  to  the 
human  soul  the  thesis  of  the  real  diversity  of 
faculties.  Q^.^^  \j  i>U  li 

Assume  that  substance  is  not  really  distinct  from 
its  powers.  Assume,  for  instance,  that  the  sub- 
stance or  nature  of  man  may  be  really  taken  for 
the  powers  of  organic  life,  of  the  life  of  the  senses 
and  of  the  mind.  Assume,  in  other  words,  that 
man  has  only  one  active  power,  and  then  it  follows 
that  there  must  be  one  act  in  which  all  the  activity 
of  which  the  soul  is  capable  would  be  found. 

But  this  is  not  the  case.  The  soul  never  exerts 
more  than  a  part  of  its  energy,  either  by  way  of 
sensation  or  sensible  appetition,  or  by  way  of  vital 
functions,  or  else  by  way  of  mind  or  volition.  These 
forms  of  activity  are  variously  associated  or  com- 
bined, but  we  are  never  conscious  of  one  sole  act  in 
which  the  fulness  of  the  soul's  activity  is  summed 
up.  Therefore  human  nature  is  not  a  single  power. 

Assume,  on  the  contrary,  that  man  possesses 
several  really  distinct  principles  of  action,  and  then 
each  one  will  have  its  proper  mode  of  activity  and  its 
special  conditions  of  exercise.  The  soul  will  expend 


228   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

its  energy  in  various  ways  according  to  circum- 
stances, and  this  is  what  experience  testifies  in  fact . 

Shall  we  say,  then,  that  the  soul  consists  of  a 
single  power,  but  that  it  never  meets  with  condi- 
tions suited  to  its  fulness  of  action  ?  This  would 
be  an  arbitrary  supposition,  for  a  power  which  is 
never  fully  realized  may  be  regarded  as  chimerical. 
Acts,  indeed,  are  the  only  means  we  have  for  dis- 
covering a  principle  of  action.  Consequently,  to 
affirm  the  existence  of  a  principle  of  action,  and 
not  to  know  any  of  its  acts,  would  be  a  piece  of 
a  priori  reasoning. 

Hence  Descartes  was  deluded  when  he  thought 
he  could  confuse  the  reality  of  the  act  of  thinking 
with  the  reality  of  the  thinking  subject.  He 
allowed  himself  to  be  deceived  by  the  fact  that 
inward  phenomena,  "  notions  and  judgements,  sen- 
sible affections,  and  even  will,"  can  all  be  repre- 
sented in  thought.  He  did  not  see  that,  notwith- 
standing their  common  representational  character, 
they  are  none  the  less  different  in  their  intrinsic 
reality. 

Living,  knowing  by  the  senses  or  the  mind, 
willing  a  sensible  or  a  suprasensible  good,  moving, 
are  acts  that  cannot  be  identified;  and  therefore 
the  principles  from  which  such  acts  respectively 
proceed  cannot  be  identified. 

Indeed,  such  acts  diversify  the  powers  from  which 
they  spring,  and  for  which  they  are  done ;  for  what 
is  a  power  but  a  means  of  making  an  act  ?  Thus 
act  and  power  are  correlatives. 

Wherefore,  if  the  classification  of  acts  means  the 
classification  of  powers;  if  the  two  classifications 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY   229 

can  only  possess  one  and  the  same  foundation; 
since  the  foundation  of  the  real  distinction  between 
acts  is  the  formally  adequate  distinction  between 
their  objects,  this  same  formally  adequate  distinc- 
tion between  the  objects  is  the  foundation  of  the 
real  distinction  between  the  powers  or  faculties. 

It  may  be  objected  that  a  distinction  in  the  effects 
does  not  clearly  prove  a  corresponding  distinction 
in  their  principles.  We  reply  with  Cardinal  Cajetan, 
that  this  is  not  the  right  way  of  looking  at  it. 
"  Acts  distinguish  powers,  not  as  effects  distinguish 
their  efficient  causes,  but  as  ends  distinguish 
means."1 

There  is  no  doubt  that  a  faculty  is  an  efficient 
principle  whereof  the  act  is  the  effect  or  result. 
But,  from  another  point  of  view,  is  it  not  a  means 
whereof  the  act  is  the  object  or  end,  an  aptitude  or 
tendency  to  realize  that  end  ? 

Hence  follows  this  dilemma.  Either  it  is  possible 
for  a  tendency  to  be  towards  various  adequately 
distinct  ends — and  this  is  absurd — or  else  these 
same  ends,  being  adequately  distinct  objects, 
correspond  to  tendencies  of  distinct  natures — i.e., 
to  faculties  or  powers  that  are  really  distinct. 

Besides,  there  are  acts  between  which  there  is  a 
real  and  vital  reciprocity,  as  consciousness  testifies. 
How  can  these  be  identical  ?  At  the  same  moment, 
how  can  the  subject  be  agent  and  patient,  mover 
and  moved  ?  Therefore,  how  can  the  principles  of 
such  acts  be  reduced  to  identity  ? 

Is  it  not  true,  in  fact,  that  willing  is  really  sub- 

1  Cajetan,  In  Summ.  Theol.,  I.,  Q.  LIV.,  A.  3.  Cf.  Suarez, 
De  Anima,  II.,  cap.  2,  n.  7  et  seq. 


230   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

ordinate  to  the  presentation  of  the  good  which  is  its 
object  ?  Is  it  not  true,  that  the  will  can  keep  the 
mind  under  control  and  command  its  attention  ? 

It  is  well  established,  then,  that  a  created  nature 
cannot  act  of  itself,  but  needs  powers  distinct  from 
itself  to  bring  into  play  the  resources  of  activity 
of  which  it  is  the  original  principle. 

"  The  same  conclusion,"  says  St.  Thomas, 
"  emerges  from  the  order  that  exists  between  the 
powers  of  the  soul,  and  from  their  reciprocal  influ- 
ence upon  orie  another.  Thus,  we  are  bound  to 
observe  that  one  power  moves  another — e.g.,  the 
mind  the  will.  But  this  could  not  take  place  if  all 
the  powers  were  the  very  substance  of  the  soul. 
Two  absolutely  identical  beings  cannot  move  one 
another."  Therefore,  for  this  reason  again,  we  come 
to  a  multiplicity  of  faculties,  and  for  us  the  corollary 
follows,  that  they  are  distinct  from  the  substantial 
being  of  the  soul,  since  a  single  subject  cannot  be 
identical  with  several  terms  that  are  not  identical 
with  one  another. 

Acting  upon  such  considerations,  the  Scholastics 
distinguished  five  different  kinds  of  faculties  in  man. 
These  comprised  respectively,  organic  life,  sensible 
knowledge,  mental  knowledge,  volition  consequent 
upon  these  two  kinds  of  knowledge,  and  acts  of 
locomotion. 

The  considerations  we  have  mentioned  gave  rise 
to  two  controversies  which  it  would  be  interesting 
to  dwell  upon  for  a  moment. 

The  first  tries  to  ascertain  whether  the  faculties 
are  really  anything  more  than  convenient  labels 
for  classing  together  acts  wearing  the  same  appear- 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY   231 

ance.  Is  it  not  enough,  with  Taine,  to  look  upon 
them  as  "  permanent  possibilities  "  of  sensations  ? 
But  this  discussion  will  be  better  relegated  to  the 
chapter  in  which  we  shall  examine  the  doctrines  of 
positivism.1 

The  second  discussion  concerns  the  part  assigned 
to  "  affective  sensibility  "  in  our  psychological  life. 
With  regard  to  this,  we  only  desire  to  show  how  the 
controversy  now  stands. 

The  Cartesian  psychology  substituted  the  study 
of  the  soul  for  the  study  of  man,  and  at  a  single 
step  it  cut  out  of  its  programme  biological  and 
locomotive  phenomena.  It  went  on  contrasting 
"  mental  "  with  "  volitional "  phenomena,  but 
allowed  doubt  to  hang  over  the  natural  distinction 
between  sensible  and  suprasensible  phenomena,  for 
it  labelled  with  the  ambiguous  name  of  "  inner 
sense  "  or  "  consciousness  "  all  the  acts  that  spring 
from  knowledge,  and  gave  the  name  of  "  will  "  to 
all  those  that  are  of  an  appetitive  character. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  lumped  together  affective 
phenomena  in  a  group  or  faculty  apart,  which  it 
called  "  affective  sensibility,"  or  sensation. 

At  first  sight,  between  the  representational  activity 
of  the  senses  or  of  the  mind  and  the  volitional 
movement  to  which  it  gives  rise,  it  may  appear  that 
in  us  there  is  presented  an  intermediary  state 
wherein,  without  any  relation  of  subject  to  object 
or  of  object  to  subject,  occurs  a  change  that  is 

1  We  should  overstep  the  limits  of  our  subject  were  we  to 
try  to  justify  the  traditional  doctrine  about  the  faculties  on 
every  point.  Regarding  this  essay  merely  as  a  general 
introduction  to  psychology,  we  confine  ourselves  to  giving 
only  the  main  outlines  of  the  theories  we  mention. 


232   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

entirely  inward  and  passive,  and  which  is  translated, 
still  within  us,  into  the  shape  of  feeling  or  sensation, 
which  may  be  agreeable  or  disagreeable,  pleasurable 
or  painful.  Shall  we  not,  then,  have  to  give  these 
affective  or  emotional  phenomena  a  place  of  their 
own  in  psychology,  and  therefore,  according  to 
what  we  have  just  said,  a  special  affective  faculty  ? 

We  think  not.  To  desire  a  good,  to  take  posses- 
sion of  it,  to  enjoy  it — these  do  not  appear  to  us  to 
be  specifically  different  acts,  but  much  rather  as 
three  stages  or  moments  following  one  another  in 
the  continued  development  of  a  tendency  that  is 
fundamentally  one. 

Two  competitors  aspire  to  a  position.  They  not 
only  wish  for  it,  but  they  both  take  steps  towards 
it.  This  is  the  first  stage — i.e.,  the  desire  for  a  good 
that  is  absent. 

One  of  the  two  succeeds,  and  the  other  fails;  the 
first  rejoices,  the  second  grieves.  Are  they  not  both 
following  in  opposite  ways  one  single  tendency  ? 
It  was  satisfied  in  the  one  case,  crossed  in  the  other, 
but  it  was  the  same  tendency  that  made  them  aspire 
to  the  position  just  now,  and  that  later  on  made 
them,  in  opposite  directions,  rejoice  in  having  won 
it,  or  grieve  over  failing  to  get  it. 

But  everyone  grants  that  the  faculty  of  desiring 
the  good  is  nothing  else  than  the  will.  Hence  is  it 
not  natural,  by  inference,  to  refer  pleasure  or  pain  to 
the  will,  while  the  transition  from  desire  to  pleasure 
or  from  desire  to  pain  should  be  attributed  to  the 
determining  action  of  an  intermediary  principle, 
sensational  or  intellectual  knowledge  ? 

A  distant  good  was  regarded  as  desirable.     Looked 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY     233 

upon  as  within  the  reach  of  the  will,  it  is  recognized 
as  accessible,  and  the  will  takes  hold  of  it,  and  gets 
possession  of  it.  The  expansion  of  the  will,  which 
follows  upon  this  taking  possession  of  the  object, 
is  called  enjoyment. 

Hence  it  seems  to  us  that  enjoyment  is  a  manner 
of  being  of  the  volitional  faculty,  and  that  it  is 
provided  by  a  judgement  which  shows  that  a  loved 
good  is  present.  What  brings  the  volitional  faculty 
into  contact  with  the  loved  object  is  a  determining 
cognitive  act,  the  intuition  that  the  object  of  the 
tendency  or  of  the  desire  is  now  within  the  reach  of 
the  will. 

If  this  analysis  is  correct,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
class  affective  data  apart  from  the  will,  nor  to 
require  a  special  faculty  to  explain  affective  states. 

The  psychology  of  the  school  of  Descartes  and 
Leibnitz  shut  its  eyes  to  the  existence  of  passive 
faculties  within  us,  and  this  appears  to  have  given 
rise  to  mistakes  on  their  part.  We  call  a  faculty 
passive,  not  in  the  sense  that  it  may  or  can  be  acted 
upon  by  an  agent  in  opposition  to  it;  for  in  that 
sense  one  may  say  that  all  created  powers  are 
passive.  All  indeed,  even  mechanical  and  physico- 
chemical  forces,  are  governed  by  the  law  of  action 
and  reaction.  When  they  act  upon  a  patient,  this 
in  turn  reacts  upon  them,  and  consequently  they  in 
their  turn  undergo  its  action,  which  is  the  result  of 
theirs. 

But  there  are  passive  or  receptive  powers  in  this 
sense,  that,  in  order  to  be  able  to  exercise  their 
action,  they  need  to  receive  an  intrinsic  complement, 
a  kind  of  formal  co-principle  to  complete  their  apti- 


234   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

tude  for  such  exercise  and  to  determine  the  direction 
of  their  activity.  Without  some  such  determination, 
a  cognitive  faculty,  which  is  capable  of  knowing  any 
kind  of  object,  would  never  know  such  and  such 
particular  objects,  unless  they  had  actually  been 
submitted  to  the  exercise  of  its  energy.  In  the 
same  way,  the  power  of  volition  could  never  be 
exercised  in  the  concrete,  unless  an  occasion  were 
presented  to  the  volitional  faculty  by  the  cognition 
of  a  being  thus  intended  to  be  an  object  of  the  act 
of  a  specialized  volition.1 

It  is  this  passive  phenomenon,  inherent  in  various 
faculties  of  the  soul,  that  the  partisans  of  the 
tripartite  division  thought  they  ought  to  regard  as 
a  fact  to  be  classed  apart,  as  arising  from  a  special 
faculty. 

It  appears  to  be  more  in  conformity  with  the 
data  of  inward  experience  to  make  it  a  simple 
generic  characteristic  common  to  several  faculties. 
Thus  pleasure  would  be  explained  as  a  manner  of 
being  of  our  appetitive  faculties,  and  especially  of 
the  will,  when  in  presence  of  and  in  possession  of 
their  object;  for  if  all  the  faculties  may  be  causes 
of  pleasure,  it  is  nevertheless  in  the  appetitive 
faculties  that  pleasure  resides. 

Let  it  be  further  remarked  that  although  pleasure 
and  pain  betray  indisputable  passivity  to  a  certain 
extent,  they  are  none  the  less  not  exclusively  passive 
on  that  account. 

Every  normal  action — that  is  to  say,  every  action 
that  does  not  overstep  the  bounds  of  the  activity 

1  Potentia  appetitiva  est  potentia  passiva  quae  nata  esi 
moveri  ah  apprehenso. — St.  Thomas,  Sumtna  Theol.,  xa, 
Q.  80,  A.  2,  ad  6. 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY      235 

of  a  correlative  faculty  of  the  soul,  but  is  included 
in  the  natural  hierarchy  which  harmoniously  sub- 
ordinates all  the  faculties  to  the  intrinsic  end  of  the 
whole  being — begets  in  the  will  a  passive  disposition 
to  receive,  by  means  of  cognition,  the  definite  term 
of  such  and  such  a  particular  effort.  In  such  con- 
ditions there  arises  an  activity  which  bears  the  will 
towards  the  term  which  is  presented  to  it.  And 
when  the  action  remains  normal,  the  obtaining  by 
the  will  of  the  desired  good  causes  pleasure,  a  pleasure 
that  increases  according  to  the  increase,  and  within 
the  bounds,  of  the  degree  of  the  activity. 

In  the  case  of  pain,  quite  recent  experiments  have 
once  more  proved  its  correspondence  with  the 
exaggeration  or  diminution  of  energy  expended, 
and  this  confirms  our  opinion  on  the  subject.1 

This  conception  of  passive  power  was  wanting 
in  the  case  of  Descartes.  Moreover,  instead  of 
regarding  the  intelligence,  as  it  really  is,  as  an 
aptitude  of  the  soul  for  being  affected  by  things, 
Descartes  considered  that  the  thinking  soul  was  an 
active  substance  of  its  own  nature,  drawing  from 
itself,  in  its  solitary  independence,  the  notions  of 
self,  of  other  spirits  (minds),  of  God,  and  of  outward 
sensible  things. 

No  doubt,  from  the  moment  that  it  is  conscious 
of  acting,  the  soul  is  in  the  state  of  perceiving 
within  itself  the  bare  fact  of  its  own  existence. 
Indeed,  its  action  is  not  manifested  without  bringing 
to  light  the  cause  of  action  which  it  involves.  For 
this  the  least  action  which  comes  into  consciousness 
1  D.  Mercier,  Psychologic,  8th  ed.,  II.,  p.  160. 


236   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

suffices.  The  general  sense  of  our  inner  life,  which 
is  called  cenasthesis,  and  which  many  philosophers 
consider  should  be  referred  to  a  separate  funda- 
mental sense,  is  inseparable  from  a  dim  conscious- 
ness of  the  existence  ol  the" Ego. 

But,  with  the  exception  of  this  primary  notion 
of  the  soul's  presence  to  itself,  all  the  wealth  of  the 
intelligence  depends  upon  the  efficient  causes  to  the 
action  of  which  it  is  subject. 

There  is  no  part  of  it  which  does  not  reveal  the 
sensible  origin  of  its  content,  and  the  use  of  which 
does  not  demand  the  collaboration  of  the  imagina- 
tion and,  necessarily,  of  the  mechanism  of  the 
brain.  On  this  subject,  consult  consciousness, 
consult  the  physiology  of  the  brain,  go  back  to  the 
lowest  strata  of  speech,  and  everywhere  you  cannot 
fail  to  discover  the  dependence  of  thought  upon  the 
world  of  sense.1 

It  is  a  commonplace  with  a  certain  school  of 
spiritualist  philosophers  to  distinguish  ideas  into 
pure  ideas  and  mixed  ideas,  the  first  being  regarded 
as  the  products  of  the  mind  alone,  and  the  second 
as  arising  from  the  concurrence  of  the  imagination 
or  the  senses.  But  consciousness  testifies  that 
there  are  no  pure  ideas.  All  our  mental  repre- 
sentations demand  the  concurrence  of  the  senses 
with  the  mind.  They  depend  upon  the  senses  not 
only  for  production,  but  also  for  reproduction. 
Every  idea  has  an  image  as  its  substratum,  and 
without  this  it  cannot  revive. 

Even  the   Being  whom  we   apprehend   as   sub- 
stantial Mind,  as  the  supreme  Spirit,  as  well  as  all 
1  SeefurtherD.Mercier,  Psychologic,  II.,  No.  167,  pp.  11-20, 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY     237 

others,  we  cannot  help  representing  to  ourselves 
with  the  assistance  of  elements  borrowed  from  the 
world  of  matter.  All  the  positive  elements  of  the 
content  of  our  notion  of  God  are  attributable  to 
the  things  of  sensible  experience  as  much  as  to  God 
Himself.  And  we  are  driven  to  have  recourse  to 
a  negation  to  mark  this  positive  content  with  a  sign 
that  makes  it  applicable  to  God  only. 

Moreover,  if  we  will,  we  can  give  ourselves  an 
actual  feeling  of  the  sensible  being  the  inevitable 
aid  of  the  soul  in  its  ascent  towards  the  abstract. 
If  we  undertake,  for  instance,  to  provide  ourselves 
with  an  actual,  distinct  representation  of  the  notion 
of  equality,  are  we  not  conscious  of  going  immediately 
in  quest  of  two  sensible  things,  of  two  magnitudes, 
of  which  the  two  lines  of  the  sign  of  equality  (=) 
are  the  symbol  ?  We  bring  these  two  concrete 
magnitudes  together,  and  we  compare  them  for  the 
purpose  of  abstracting  from  this  example  a  relation 
that  is  not  exclusively  bound  to  its  sensible  sub- 
stratum. We  endeavour  to  fix  in  our  minds  an 
intelligible  abstraction  which  will  define  equality. 
St.  Thomas,  then,  is  right  in  saying  experimento 
cognoscimus  nos  abstrahere — "  experience  teaches  us 
that  we  make  abstractions."  And  is  not  the  very 
word  "  abstraction  "  (abs-tractio)  truly  significant  of 
our  efforts  to  separate  from  their  sensible  substrata 
the  intelligible  attributes  of  the  objects  which  we 
consider  and  compare  ?  We  are  conscious  of  the 
indispensableness  of  some  sensible  support,  even  for 
the  purpose  of  reviving  an  abstract  concept.  '  The 
life  of  the  intelligence  ends,"  according  to  the 
saying  of  St.  Thomas,  "  in  detaching  the  idea  from 


238   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  image  and  in  discerning  it  in  the  thing 
imagined."1  Hence  the  connection  between  the 
idea  and  its  concrete  substratum  is  natural  and 
indisputable. 

But,  in  the  work  of  abstraction,  the  faculty  that 
performs  the  cognitive  act  is  not  of  itself  an  active 
force.  It  is  a  passive  power  which,  in  order  to  act, 
must  receive  an  intrinsic  complement  without  which 
it  would  remain  practically  impotent.  And  this 
second  ideological  theorem  also  depends  upon 
experience. 

Indeed,  there  is  a  kind  of  knowledge  which  is 
called  habitual,  a  sort  of  state  that  is  intermediate 
between  bare  potentiality  and  the  act  in  exercise. 

Before  we  began  to  learn  geometry,  we  had  a 
potential  knowledge  of  it.  Our  teacher,  using  his 
knowledge  of  it,  possessed  an  actual  knowledge  of 
it,  and  his  teaching  helped  us  to  possess  in  fact  the 
knowledge  which  we  could  potentially  acquire.2 

Now,  between  this  simple  power  of  acquiring  a 
notion  and  the  notion  itself,  taken  at  the  moment 
when  it  is  presented  to  the  mind,  there  is  an  inter- 
mediate stage  in  which  the  idea  informs  the  cognitive 
power  and  makes  the  act  of  cognition  immediately 
possible.  At  this  moment,  however,  the  object  of 

1  Finis  intellectivae  potentiae  .  .  .  est  cognoscere  species 
intelligibiles  quas  apprchendit  a  phantasmatibus  et  in  phantas- 
matibus  secundum  statum  praesentis  vitae. — Summa  Theol., 
3a,  Q.  n,  A.  2,  ad  i. 

2  The  Scholastic  doctrine  of  habitus  has  been  profoundly 
treated  by  Cardinal  Satolli  in  his  De  habitibus  doctrina 
sancti   Thomae   Aquinatis,  Romae,  1897.     Chapters  I.  and 
IX.:  Noiio  habitus  ;  De  distinctione  virtutum  intellectualium 
are  specially  remarkable  from  the  ideological  standpoint 
taken  by  ourselves. 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY  239 

the  notion  does  not  as  yet  reveal  its  content  to 
consciousness.  The  idea,  when  regarded  in  this 
intermediate  stage,  is  called  habitual. 

When  we  cease  to  practise  a  science,  its  habitual 
ideas  still  remain  with  us,  and  the  science,  which 
was  actual,  thenxbecomes  habitual.  Its  presence 
in  us  is  shown  by  the  faculty  we  possess  of  awakening 
in  ourselves  at  will  the  notions  we  have  acquired, 
and  this  we  must  not  confound  with  the  simple 
power  of  acquiring  them. 

Will  it  be  said  that  this  habitual  knowledge  is  a 
simple  disposition  to  do  over  again  the  work  already 
done,  an  acquired  facility  of  setting  to  work  again  ? 
No;  it  is  more  than  that.  He  who  possesses  any 
science  habitually  can  revive  its  objective  elements, 
its  notions,  at  will.  His  greater  facility  in  doing 
over  again  the  work  already  done  appears  to  be  a 
consequence  of  what  he  has  acquired;  and  because 
he  is  stocked  with  the  habitual  ideas  required  for  the 
exercise 'of  his  intellectual  perception,  he  experiences 
a  greater  readiness  in  linking  together  the  concepts, 
judgements,  and  reasonings  of  the  science  possessed 
by  him — e.g.,  geometry. 

Thus  ideas,  the  store  of  which  makes  habitual 
knowledge,  are,  at  the  moment  of  their  appearance, 
complementary  determinations  of  the  cognitive 
power  of  the  understanding.  They  are,  in  the 
language  of  the  School,  "  intelligible  species  "  or 
"  intelligible  forms,"  by  means  of  which  the  intel- 
ligence, j/ov9  SwapiKos,  is  enabled  to  pass  from 
potentiality  to  act. 

Now,  it  is  physically  impossible  for  a  power  to 
provide  itself  with  the  intrinsic  complement  required 


240   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

for  its  own  action;  for,  in  order  to  provide  it,  it 
would  have  to  act,  and  therefore  to  presuppose  the 
very  complement  in  which  it  is  wanting.  A  faculty 
in  a  potential  state,  such  as  the  rovs  Bwatuxos, 
calls  for  an  active  force  to  act  upon  it.  This  active 
force  is  called  by  Aristotle's  psychology  the  creative 
intelligence,  vovs  TTOIIJTIKOS.  This  is  really  dis- 
tinct from  the  cognitive  faculty;  for,  to  act  in  an 
efficient  manner,  and  to  conceive  the  representation 
of  a  thing,  are  two  specifically  different  acts,  and 
therefore,  according  to  the  principle  already  laid 
down,1  they  depend  upon  faculties  which  cannot  be 
reduced  to  one  another. 

The  creative  or  efficient  intelligence  does  not  act 
alone.  Its  action  combines  with  that  of  the  imagi- 
nation to  effect  in  the  subject  destined  to  conceive 
representations  of  things  the  determination  de- 
manded by  cognition. 

Descartes,  as  we  have  already  remarked,  had  no 
conception  of  a  passive  understanding.  He  regarded 
the  mind  as  originally  possessed  of  all  the  conditions 
required  for  the  exercise  of  thought.  According  to 
him,  certain  ideas,  such  as  that  of  God,  cannot  be 
acquired.  Indeed,  he  says  that  the  idea  of  the  per- 
fect Being  cannot  come  from  an  imperfect  being 
nor  from  ourselves,  and  consequently  it  cannot 
come  from  the  created  things  around  us.  Hence  it 
must  be  innate,  and  God  must  be  the  author  of  it. 
The  fallacy  of  all  this  is  patent. 

Doubtless  an  idea  of  the  perfect  Being,  which 
itself  would  be  perfect,  could  only  come  from  a 
1  See  above,  p  228. 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY  241 

perfect  cause,  and  therefore  from  God.  But  our 
idea  of  the  perfect  Being  is  only  very  imperfect, 
and  the  great  variety  of  the  elements  of  which  it 
is  composed,  and  their  sensible  origin,  and  the 
negations  which  we  are  driven  to  attach  to  them 
to  fit  them  for  being  applied  to  so  high  a  concept 
as  that  of  God,  bear  witness  to  the  inevitable 
imperfection  of  our  idea  of  the  perfect  Being. 

Thus  Descartes'  innateness,  far  from  being  able 
to  appeal  to  experience,  is  convicted  of  being  in 
opposition  to  it.  Moreover,  his  theory  is  useless. 
For  the  purpose  of  our  ideas  is,  indeed,  according 
to  Descartes,  to  bring  us  into  intercourse  with  the 
world  which  is  outside  the  Ego.  But,  in  this  case, 
what  is  the  use  of  innate  ideas  ?  Will  it  be  said 
that  their  application  to  natural  things  is  made 
blindly,  or  that  it  is  made  consciously  ? 

Let  us  grant  the  first  alternative.  Let  us  suppose 
that  we  borrow  all  the  content  of  these  ideas  from 
the  thinking  subject,  and  that  we  afterwards  apply 
them  blindly  to  external  things.  On  this  hypothesis, 
what  guarantees  the  Tightness  of  our  application  of 
our  ideas  to  existing  things  ?  Every  step  taken  by 
the  understanding  becomes  a  leap  into  the  unknown. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  mind  carries  on  the  work 
of  application  consciously;  if,  in  other  words,  it 
has  the  power  of  comparing  the  conformity  of  its 
ideas  with  the  things  to  which  they  are  applied, 
it  is  useless  to  assume  the  existence  of  innate  ideas. 
Indeed,  no  sooner  is  the  intelligence  able  to  borrow 
ideas  from  the  things  of  nature  to  put  alongside  of 
its  innate  ideas  than  the  latter  must  double  the 
work  to  be  done . 

16 


242       CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  ideology  of  Descartes,  so  far*as  it  deals  with 
the  genesis  of  ideas,  is  not  only  a  theory  without 
a  foundation  and  contradicted  by  experience,  it  is 
also  a  superfluity. 

From  a  criteriological  point  of  view,  Descartes' 
philosophy  is  no  less  defective. 

The  chief  object  of  the  author  of  the  Discours  de 
la  methode  and  the  Meditations  was  to  make  sure 
of  the  fact  of  existence. 

When  I  have  done  my  best  to  push  my  doubt  to 
its  furthest  limits,  when  I  have  come  to  doubt 
everything  without  exception,  there  remains  the 
fact,  says  Descartes,  that  I  doubt,  I  think,  I  exist. 
The  certainty  of  the  existence  of  my  doubt,  my 
thought,  myself,  this  is  "the  first  principle  of  the 
philosophy  I  was  looking  for." 

Being  conscious  of  my  doubt,  I  am  conscious  of 
my  imperfection.  Being  conscious  of  my  imper- 
fection, I  must  have  a  prior  knowledge  of  perfection. 
The  notion  of  perfection  can  only  come  from  a 
perfect  God.  Therefore  God  exists,  my  nature  is 
His  work,  and  I  can  rest  assured  that  this  infinitely 
wise  and  good  Being  will  not  allow  me  to  go  astray 
when  I  use  my  powers  to  form  clear  and  distinct 
notions  of  the  things  which  I  naturally  want  to  know. 

Whatever  one  may  think  as  to  the  value  of  the 
supreme  guarantee  of  certitude  which,  from  a  syn- 
thetic point  of  view,  the  mind  may  find  in  the  divine 
attributes,1  it  is  indisputable  that,  from  an  analytical 
point  of  view,  Descartes'  criteriology  is  lacking. 

1  See  a  remarkable  study  on  the  subject  by  M.  G.  Fonse- 
grive,  Les  pretendues  contradictions  de  Descartes  (Revue 
philosophique,  t.  xv.,  1883,  pp.  511  and  643). 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY  243 

Indeed,  the  question  of  the  certainty  of  the  fact 
that  things  exist  is  a  secondary  one  in  criteriology. 
The  major  and  most  important  part  of  knowledge 
is  made  of  ideal  judgements.  The  mathematical  and 
metaphysical  sciences  are  purely  ideal.  The  physical 
sciences  and  the  practical  work  of  our  daily  life 
presuppose  the  use  of  numerous  principles  of  the 
same  order.  It  is  enough  to  mention  the  laws  of 
numbers,  the  axioms  as  to  being  and  non-being, 
and  the  principle  of  causality. 

Now,  the  certainty  of  an  ideal  judgement  is  inde- 
pendent of  contingent  existence.  Whether  there 
be  or  be  not  in  nature  real  things  which  can  be 
multiplied,  nevertheless  in  every  multiplication,  the 
multiplicand  may  become  the  multiplier,  and  in- 
versely the  multiplier  the  multiplicand,  and  yet  the 
result  will  not  be  invalidated.  The  contradiction 
between  being  and  non-being,  and  between  affirma- 
tion and  negation,  dominates  and  precedes  all 
experience.  Even  if  the  physical  world  were 
annihilated,  even  if  the  self-conscious  mind  were 
the  sole  existing  being,  still  it  would  be  true  that 
the  transposition  of  the  factors  would  not  change 
the  sum  of  their  product,  that  being  excludes  non- 
being,  and  affirmation  negation. 

No  doubt,  even  in  this  hypothesis,  there  would 
remain  a  contingent  existence,  that  of  the  thinking 
subject.  But  if  the  existence  of  thought  and  of  the 
thinking  Ego  is  the  indispensable  condition  of  an 
intuition  of  the  terms  governed  by  the  principles, 
and  therefore  of  the  psychological  formulation  of  the 
principles  themselves,  the  truth  of  the  formulated 
principle  is  nevertheless  not  based  upon  the  existence 


244   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

of  the  psychological  fact  any  more  than  the  certainty 
of  the  principle  has  as  its  determining  cause  the 
truth  of  the  psychological  fact. 

Therefore  the  object  of  the  rational  sciences  is 
distinct  from  that  of  the  sciences  of  observation, 
and  it  raises  quite  a  different  problem  in  critical 
philosophy  from  the  problem  of  the  certainty  of 
existences. 

Moreover,  the  latter,  even  if  confined  to  the 
certainty  of  the  existence  of  thought  and  of  the 
thinking  subject,  cannot  do  without  the  help  of 
ideal  principles. 

To  be  sure  that  one  thinks  and  exists,  is  not 
merely  to  have  an  intuition  of  the  inward  manifesta- 
tion of  a  phenomenal  object ;  it  means  forming  a 
judgement  that  beyond  the  phenomenal  object  there 
is  a  real  existence ;  or,  better  still,  we  may  say  that 
it  means  to  judge  that,  given  the  fact  of  conscious 
perception  from  which  the  judgement  arises,  it  is 
necessary  for  the  objective  term  of  consciousness  to 
have  some  corresponding  reality.  To  be  sure  of 
a  thing,  it  is  not  enough  to  know  that  the  thing 
exists,  one  must  also  be  convinced  that  nothing  can 
be  anything  else  than  what  it  is.  The  certainty  of 
the  most  elementary  fact,  even  the  fact  of  thought, 
must  therefore  have  as  its  indispensable  support 
the  affirmation  of  a  necessity  higher  than  any 
concrete  existence.  It  is  necessary  that  what  I 
perceive  shall  be  nothing  else  than  that  which  I 
perceive — in  other  words,  that  it  shall  be  true* 

1  Contingentia  possunt  dupliciter  considerari  :  uno  modo 
secundum  quod  contingentia  sunt  ;  alio  modo  secundum  quod 
in  eis  aliquid  necessitates  invenitur  :  nihil  enim  est  adeo 
contingens,  quin  in  se  aliquid  necessarium  habeat ;  sicut  hoc 


PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOLOGY  245 

Thus,  in  the  general  question  of  certitude,  there 
are  two  problems  which  are  essentially  distinct. 
The  first  has  to  do  with  the  objectivity  of  the  relation 
between  the  predicate  and  the  subject,  and  may  be 
confined  to  the  objectivity  of  principles  of  an  ideal 
order:  the  second  has  to  do  with  the  objective 
reality  of  the  terms  of  the  judgement,  whether  that 
reality  is  concerned  with  that  of  the  Ego,  or  whether 
it  has  to  be  verified  in  things  existing  outside, 
belonging  to  the  non-Ego. 

But  the  solution  of  the  first  problem  is  inde- 
pendent of  the  solution  demanded  by  the  second, 
whilst  the  latter  is  essentially  subordinate  to  the 
former. 

Kant  wisely  appreciated  the  distinction  of  these 
two  successive  stages  of  the  critique  of  the  reason. 
Descartes  had  no  clear  idea  of  the  subject.  He 
concentrated  all  his  dogmatic  efforts  solely  upon 
proving  the  reality  of  existence,  and  the  result  was 
a  critical  philosophy  that  was  narrow  and  funda- 
mentally defective. 

The  examination  of  Descartes'  psychology  has 
led  us  to  bring  out  the  fundamental  theses  which 
the  great  innovator  of  modern  philosophy  contra- 
dicted or  failed  to  understand,  and  to  which  we 
have  endeavoured  to  draw  attention. 

i.  Man  is  a  single  compound  substance,  made  of 
matter  and  an  immaterial  soul. 


ipsum  quod  est  Socratem  currere,  in  se  quidem  contingent  est, 
sed  habitudo  cursus  ad  motum  est  necessaria,  necessarium 
enim  est  Socratem  mover  i,  si  currit. — St.  Thomas,  Summa 
Theol,  ia,  Q.  86,  A.  3. 


246   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

2.  It  is  of  the  nature  of  man's  soul  to  inform 
matter.     Operations,  especially  consciousness,  are 
posterior  to  the  informing  act. 

3.  The  substance  of  the  soul  is  not  active  of  itself. 
Moreover,  no  created  substance  acts  immediately  of 
itself.     Hence   there   must   be   intermediary   prin- 
ciples, faculties  or  powers  really  distinct  from  the 
subject  from  which  they  emanate,  between  the  soul 
and  its  acts. 

4.  The  powers  of  man  are  included  in  five  classes. 
His  distinctive  powers  have  as  their  respective  terms 
thought  and  volition.     There  is  no  room  for  assign- 
ing a  place  apart  to  affective  phenomena,  nor  for 
recurring,  in  order  to  elucidate  them,  to  the  hypo- 
thesis of  a  special  faculty  which  is  named  affective 
sensibility  or  feeling. 

j  5.  The  mind,  the  higher  cognitive  faculty  of  the 
soul,  is  a  passive  power.  The  prerequisite  for  its 
cognitive  acts  is  a  complementary  intrinsic  deter- 
mination, the  faculty  of  which  depends  upon  the 
combined  effects  of  imagination  and  the  active 
intelligence;  and  the  latter  is  an  efficient  cause 
which  is  really  distinct  from  the  cognitive  power  of 
the  understanding. 

6.  The  criteriological  problem  is  twofold.  First, 
it  deals  with  the  objectivity  of  the  relations  to  which 
form  is  given  by  judgements,  and  methodical  strict- 
ness requires  that  it  should  be  primarily  confined  to 
judgements  of  an  ideal  character.  Next,  it  deals 
with  the  objective  reality  of  the  terms  of  the  judge- 
ment. The  solution  of  the  second  problem  essenti- 
ally depends  upon  the  solution  of  the  first. 


CHAPTER  V 

CRITICISM  OF  THE  IDEALIST  PRINCIPLE 

ONE  fundamental  idea  underlies  all  idealist  theories. 
It  is  that  it  is  fundamentally  impossible  to  reach 
any  absolute  reality  beyond  ideas.  It  is  physically 
impossible  for  the  subject  to  go  outside  of  himself. 
Therefore  the  thing-in-itself,  das  Ding-an-sich,  is 
essentially  unattainable. 

It  is  important  to  remark,  at  the  outset,  that 
idealism  cannot  stop  halfway. 

The  idealist  tells  us  it  is  impossible  for  the  subject 
to  go  outside  of  himself  to  lay  hold  of  the  external 
world.  Like  Descartes,  he  cannot  possibly  tell 
whether  his  ideas  inform  him  faithfully  as  to  nature, 
even  as  to  the  existence  of  material  things.  Indeed, 
who  can  give  us  any  assurance  that  the  modality  of 
the  cognitive  act  does  not  disfigure  absolute  reality  ? 

But  if  this  argument  tells  against  our  knowledge 
of  the  external  world,  it  tells  equally  well  against 
the  information  given  by  consciousness.  For,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  consciousness  only  reaches  the  reality 
of  the  conscious  Ego  and  of  its  own  conscious  states 
by  means  of  acts  of  cognition.  If  we  are  allowed 
to  be  satisfied  with  the  assumption  that  conscious- 
ness essentially  distorts  reality,  we  are  logically 
driven  to  go  further  and  to  maintain,  with  M. 

247 


248   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Remacle,  that  "  there  is  illusion  in  every  state  of 
consciousness,  .  .  .  that  to  speak  of  knowing  a 
state  of  consciousness  is  a  self-contradictory  phrase, 
for  by  knowing  it,  we  plainly  do  not  mean  knowing 
it  as  it  is.  Hence  we  must  conclude  that  there  are 
necessarily  two  kinds  of  idealism:  an  idealism  that 
may  be  called  outward,  because  it  has  to  do  with 
the  external  world;  and  an  inward  idealism,  which 
has  to  do  with  the  inner  world.  The  second  is  the 
underlying  reason  of  the  first." 

Does  this  go  far  enough  ?  Is  M.  Remacle  con- 
sistent ?  "  The  state  of  consciousness,"  he  writes, 
"is  an  existence  in  itself,  an  absolute.  Man's 
mental  life  is  nothing  else,  in  its  mysterious  depths, 
than  an  incessant  flux  of  things-in-themselves." 

No  doubt,  he  maintains  that  "  knowledge  does 
not  lay  hold  of  the  thing-in-itself  .  On  the  contrary, 
knowledge  is  opposed  to  consciousness.  The  con- 
scious state,  so  far  as  it  is  a  conscious  state,  has 
no  relation  to  anything  whatever.  But  knowledge 
gives  it  a  relative  character,  and  transforms  the 
reality  into  an  illusion.  It  is,  by  its  very  definition, 
'  the  creation  of  an  illusion  or  of  an  appearance, 


Nevertheless  M.  Remacle  still  admits  the  existence 
of  things-in-themselves,  conscious  states  which  the 
subject  "  distorts,"  as  we  may  grant,  when  Tantalus- 
like  he  endeavours  to  know  them  ;  but  since  he  means 
to  know  them,  apparently  he  believes  in  the  reality 
that  he  pursues. 

Now,  such  a  position  is  illogical.  If  it  is  of  the 
nature  of  knowledge  to  distort  reality,  it  is  also  bound 
to  distort  conscious  states,  by  the  very  fact  of  taking 


CRITICISM  OF  IDEALIST  PRINCIPLE    249 

the  state  of  consciousness  as  the  term  of  the  cognitive 
act.  But,  if  we  are  to  speak  of  a  state  of  conscious- 
ness for  the  purpose  of  opposing  it  to  an  object  of 
knowledge,  apparently  we  must  first  know  it.  To 
speak  of  things  of  which  we  have  no  knowledge  is 
not  idealism,  but  psittacism. 

Therefore  it  is  self-contradictory  to  speak  of  a 
state  of  consciousness  as  of  a  thing-in-itself,  free 
from  all  cognitional  distortion,  in  order  to  oppose 
it  afterwards  to  the  same  thing-in-itself  disfigured 
by  a  subsequent  act  of  cognition. 

The  instance  which,  according  to  M.  Remacle, 
knowledge  (perception)  distorts,  can  only  be  dis- 
torted by  being  present  to  the  mind,  and  conse- 
quently, by  thus  undergoing  the  distortion  which 
presentation  to  the  mind  and  by  the  mind  renders 
inevitable.  Thus  it  becomes  impossible  to  compare 
a  perfect  instance  with  a  distorted  instance,  a  pure 
reality,  even,  were  it  the  reality  of  a  state  of  con- 
sciousness, with  a  reality  impaired  by  cognitive 
representation. 

Consequently,  the  supposed  opposition  between 
some  reality  in  itself  and  the  object  of  a  cognition 
is  unintelligible.  It  is  self -contradictory  to  oppose 
the  "  known  "  to  an  unknown  "  conscious  some- 
thing," and  thus  the  problem  of  knowledge,  as 
stated  by  M.  Remacle — i.e.,  the  problem  of  the 
conformity  of  a  cognition  with  a  thing-in-itself — is 
an  absurdity. 

Let  us  refer  once  more  to  the  profession  of  faith 

of  that  extreme  idealist,  M.  Louis  Weber,  when  he 

refuses  to  distinguish  real  being  from  logical  being. 

'  We  constantly  fall   into  the  illusions  of  a  na'if 


250       CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

realism,  when  we  confer  on  all  things  an  existence 
that  is  distinct  from  and  independent  of  the  notions 
we  have  of  them.  .  .  .  Men  have  always  believed 
in  the  apprehension  of  an  ultimate  reality,  existing 
in  itself  and  by  itself,  and  in  distinguishing  it  by  an 
extra-logical  existence  —  i.e.,  an  existence  outside  of 
the  judgements  in  which  it  was  affirmed  as  the 
logical  subject  of  the  verb  to  be.  .  .  .  But  extra- 
logical  reality  is  only  a  word  that  conceals  a  self- 
contradictory  concept.  ...  To  say  that  the  real 
is  inconceivable,  unnameable  or  ineffable,  is  still 
saying  too  much,  for  by  thus  determining  it  in  what 
is,  indeed,  quite  a  negative  manner,  we  still  affirm 
it  positively  and  make  it  participate  in  being.  The 
real  ought  never  to  be  given  as  object." 

This  is  the  suicide  of  reason.  It  has  been  said 
that  idealism  leads  to  solipsism.  But  that  does 
not  go  far  enough.  For  here  the  Ego  itself  founders, 
states  of  consciousness  disappear,  and  the  real  is 
annihilated  in  "  logical  "  being.1 

In  such  conditions,  is  the  mental  life  worth  living  ? 
Would  it  not  rather  be  the  wise  man's  ideal  to  wither 
up  and  become,  as  Aristotle  puts  it,  a  "  stump," 
<f>vT(2,  without  thought  or  feeling  ? 


1  The  most  indubitable  of  all  propositions  concerning 
existence  is  that  which  affirms  existence  in  general.  There 
is  no  doubt  that  something  exists,  for  if  we  suppose  that 
nothing  exists,  this  very  negation  of  existence  implies  an 
affirmation  of  the  existence  of  the  negative  proposition  itself. 

Existence  thus  given  absolutely  and  without  any  deter- 
minate content,  refractory  to  all  negations  because  it 
embraces  them  all,  revives  whenever  we  turn  back  upon 
self,  and  whenever  we  judge  our  own  judgements,  and  it  is 
logical  existence  or  being.  The  two  terms  may  be  used 
interchangeably.  —  Revue  de  metaphysique  et  de  morale, 
November,  1897,  P-  682. 


CRITICISM  OF  IDEALIST  PRINCIPLE    251 

The  consequences  of  this  argument  cannot  be 
avoided,  and  M.  Weber  himself  admits  that  if,  in 
practice,  one  is  driven  to  make  a  concession  to 
realism,  and  to  speak  of  the  real  as  if  it  existed,  it 
must  be  done  at  the  expense  of  a  compromise 
between  logic  and  absurdity.  The  necessity  of 
living  and  acting  compels  thought  to  be  the  inde- 
fectible auxiliary  of  life  and  action;  but,  as  this 
writer  grandiloquently  remarks,  the  evident  illegi- 
timacy and  illogicality  of  this  practical  position  are 
enough  to  secure  for  idealism  its  full  rights  in  the 
world  of  theory  and  to  maintain  its  indisputable 
truth  in  that  sphere. 

But,  unfortunately  for  this  theory,  it  not  only 
works  inconsistently  in  practice,  it  is  also  illogical  in 
itself.  For  whence  comes  the  concept  of  the  real, 
if  the  real  is  non-existent  ?  Consequently,  whence 
conies  the  idea  of  denying  realism  in  favour  of 
logical  idealism,  if  logical  being  is  all  that  is  presented 
to  the  mind  ?  Will  it  be  replied  that  the  real 
means  the  negation  of  logic  ? 

But  it  is  the  contrary  of  this  that  is  true.  Directly, 
we  only  perceive  what  is  real.  The  act  of  percep- 
tion and  the  logical  existences  to  which  it  gives  rise 
demand,  in  order  to  appear  to  the  mind,  a  second 
mental  process  following  upon  the  first.  A  stroke 
of  lightning  pierces  the  clouds,  and  I  perceive  it: 
that  is  the  first  act.  Then,  I  perceive  that  I  saw 
the  lightning  flash:  this  apperception  is  a  second 
act  which  only  became  possible  after  the  first  and 
depended  upon  the  first.  Therefore,  the  existence 
of  a  logical  affirmation  is  not  directly  knowable. 
It  can  only  arise  in  the  second  place,  and  hence  it 


252   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

is  not  the  concept  of  some  logical  existence  that 
could  cause  a  contradictory  concept  of  the  real  to 
arise  in  the  mind,  but  on  the  contrary  the  real 
which,  by  a  process  of  negation,  leads  on  to  the 
concept  of  logical  being.  Indeed,  the  latter  is 
denned  as  an  existence  which  is  neither  realized  nor 
realizable  in  nature. 

Thus  logical  idealism  only  requires  to  be  stated 
to  be  disproved.  It  affirms  that  logical  being  alone 
is  conceivable,  and  denies  the  conceivability  of  the 
real.  But  the  conceivability  of  logical  being  is  only 
intelligible  subject  to  the  conception  of  the  real 
which  it  denies.  It  follows  that  the  statement  of 
logical  realism  cannot  be  discussed.  It  means  an 
unintelligible  battle  of  words. 

The  etymology  of  ideological  speech  confirms  this 
conclusion. 

Connaitre  (English  cognition),  from  cognoscere 
(yiyv(iHTKa>t  from  jijvo^at,,  to  be  born),  is  connected 
with  conceive,  concept,  conception,  and  with  the 
root  idea  of  bodily  generation. 

To  apprehend,  comprehend,  perceive  (percipere, 
from  caper  e},  are  borrowed  from  the  sense  of  touch. 
The  Latin  verb  cogitare,  whence  the  word  cogitation 
(from  cum  and  agitare,  frequentative  of  agere), 
betrays  a  similar  origin.  To  think  (English  word 
pensive),  penser  (pendere,  pcnsare),  etymologically 
signifies  peser  (to  weigh) ;  to  abstract,  abstraire  (ab 
and  trahere),  is  equivalent  to  extraire,  to  extract ;  to 
reflect,  reflechir  (re  and  fleeter e]  signifies  to  bend  back. 

To  judge,  juger  (judicare,  jus  dicer  e],  comes  from 

a  Sanscrit  root  yu,  which  means  to  join,  to  bind* 

1  Max  Miiller,  Science  of  Thought,  p.  390,  Longmans,  1887. 


CRITICISM  OF  IDEALIST  PRINCIPLE    253 

To  discern,  discerner  (from  cernere,  from  circinus, 
from  circus,  circle),  to  surround  with  a  ring,  to 
set  apart  into  separate  spheres. 

Envisager  (to  look  at  the  face),  consider er  (from 
sidus,  star,  to  look  at  the  stars),  are  borrowed  from 
the  sense  of  sight. 

To  know,  savoir  (sapere),  is  taken  from  the  sense 
of  taste. 

Intelligence  (intelligere,  from  inter  legere,  to  choose 
amongst  many  things)  denotes  a  selection  amongst 
sensible  things. 

We  might  follow  out  this  nomenclature  inde- 
finitely, but  these  few  specimens  of  the  sensible 
origin  of  our  ideological  notions  are  enough  to 
confirm  our  conclusion,  that  outward  idealism 
leads  on  to  "  inward  "  idealism,  and  the  latter  to 
"  logical"  idealism,  the  statement  of  which  destroys 
itself.1 

Another  consequence  of  idealism  is  the  inevitable 
negation  of  any  distinction  between  logic  and  truth, 
between  illogicality  and  error. 

If  the  human  mind  knows  nothing  but  its  own 
ideas,  it  may  very  well  be  logical  or  illogical — 
i.e.,  in  accord  or  in  disaccord  with  itself  in  the 
association  of  its  ideas,  judgements,  and  reasonings — 
but  the  question  of  the  harmony  or  want  of  harmony 
between  its  perceptions  and  some  objective  reality 
that  they  mentally  represent  becomes  meaningless. 
We  should  thus  be  driven  to  strike  out  of  our  speech 
any  expressions  that  reveal  any  opposition  between 
exactitude  or  logical  correctness  and  truth. 

1  See  the  passage  quoted,  p.  93,  from  Herbert  Spencer, 
showing  that  idealism  is  necessarily  buttressed  by  realism. 


254   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Underlying  idealism  there  is  a  defective  interpre- 
tation of  the  data  of  the  problem  of  certitude. 

We  have  already  remarked  that  Descartes  con- 
centrated his  attention  upon  the  problem  of  exist- 
ence, and  did  not  directly  endeavour  to  justify  the 
value  of  the  abstract  principles  on  which  the  rational 
sciences  depend,  and  upon  which  even  the  experi- 
mental sciences,  as  well  as  our  daily  judgements, 
must  be  founded.  But,  in  the  Cartesian  psychology, 
the  problem  of  existence  was  stated  in  a  way  which 
we  regard  as  fundamentally  unsound,  and  hence 
arises,  in  our  opinion,  the  essential  fault  of  idealism. 

It  is  commonly  said  that  truth  is  the  conformity 
of  thought  with  things,  and  by  the  word  "  things  " 
is  meant  things-in-themselves.  To  know  that  one 
knows  the  truth,  is  therefore  to  perceive  the  con- 
formity of  a  perception  with  a  thing-in-itself, 
absolutely. 

Now,  What  is  the  critical  problem  in  essence  ? 

Its  purpose  is  to  ascertain  whether  man's  mind  is 
able  to  know  the  truth. 

Therefore,  according  to  the  conventional  notion 
with  which  we  began,  the  critical  problem  essentially 
consists  in  ascertaining  whether  man's  mind  can 
see  the  conformity  of  its  perceptions  with  the  things 
it  regards,  not  relatively  to  itself,  but  to  their 
absolute  state. 

What  has  been  done  towards  solving  this  problem  ? 
On  the  one  hand,  it  has  been  assumed  that  there  is 
pure  reason — i.e.,  man's  mind  considered  in  itself, 
so  conditioned  as  to  make  knowledge  possible,  and 
that  before  any  putting  into  act  of  its  cognitive 
powers.  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  assumed 


CRITICISM  OF  IDEALIST  PRINCIPLE    255 

that  there  is  a  thing-in-itself,  apart  from  its  relations 
with  the  cognitive  powers  oi  the  mind.  Then  the 
question  has  been  asked,  how  far  the  act  of  the 
cognitive  powers  could  represent  the  thing-in-itself, 
das  Ding-an-sich. 

Well,  it  is  this  very  problem  itself  which  is  mean- 
ingless. It  is  so  in  two  ways.  It  is  meaningless, 
first  of  all,  because  to  wish  to  judge  of  the  power 
of  the  mind  without  exercising  the  mind  is  to 
require  what  is  impossible. 

To  estimate  a  man's  muscular  powers,  we  make 
him  exert  them  and  then  use  a  dynamometer. 
To  estimate  the  cognitive  powers  of  the  under- 
standing, the  latter  must  be  brought  into  play  in 
an  act  of  cognition.  For  no  power  can  be  estimated 
directly,  as  power  in  itself.  It  can  only  be  estimated 
in  act,  for  therein  it  stands  revealed,  but  in  itself 
it  is  essentially  unknowable. 

Kant's  fundamental  mistake  lay  in  imagining  a 
"  pure  reason,"  the  laws  of  the  action  of  which 
were  to  be  ascertained  by  an  analysis  of  the  reason 
itself,  prior  to  the  acts  whose  principle  or  seat  it 
was  to  be.  A  "  transcendental "  critique  of  such 
a  kind  is  radically  impossible.  To  hope  to  solve 
the  problem  of  knowing  the  truth  by  an  analysis 
of  the  metaphysical  conditions  of  the  possibility  of 
knowledge  is  a  chimera.  Our  cognitive  faculties  are 
in  the  same  position  as  man's  moral  consciousness. 
Ex  fructibus  eorum  cognoscetis  eos,  says  the  Gospel. 
The  tree  is  known  by  its  fruits. 

The  claim  to  make  the  critical  problem  consist 
in  comparing  the  cognitive  power,  apart  from  all 
cognitive  acts,  with  an  absolute  thing-in-itself,  is 


256   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

meaningless  for  another  reason.  A  thing-in-itself, 
i.e.,  a  thing  assumed  to  exist,  but  without  any 
relation  to  the  subject  meant  to  know  it,  is  a  pure 
nullity  to  the  latter. 

How  can  an  act  of  cognition  be  compared  with 
simple  nothingness  ?  How  can  one  judge  whether 
there  be  conformity  or  disagreement  between  a 
cognition  and  that  which  is  nothing  at  all,  so  far 
as  the  knowing  mind  is  concerned  ? 

The  question  is  quite  unintelligible.  The  indis- 
pensable condition  for  confronting  a  thing  with  any 
cognition  of  it — for  instance,  a  material  something 
with  my  cognition  of  that  something — is  that  it 
become  an  object  present  to  the  knowing  mind.  The 
word  object,  ob-jectum,  is  significant  from  this  point 
of  view;  it  designates  not  simply  what  is  given, 
but  what  is  given  over  against  (ob)  the  subject.  It 
therefore  shows  the  thing  already  put  into  relation- 
ship with  the  knowing  mind. 

Given  this  relation,  reality  comes  within  the 
domain  of  knowableness.  Cognoscible  reality  is 
what  metaphysics  calls  ontological  truth. 

When,  owing  to  a  prior  subjective  apprehension 
of  the  knowing  mind,  reality  has  become  a  reality 
present  to  the  knowing  mind,  and  consequently,  a 
knowable  reality,  ontologically  true,  then,  and  then 
only,  it  can  be  represented. 

Indeed,  the  knowing  mind  is  constantly  subject 
to  innumerable  stimuli.  The  stuff  of  the  brain  is 
extremely  mobile.  Hence  the  first  subjective  pre- 
sentation is  not  fixed  once  for  all,  stamped  in  a  final 
shape,  but  it  is  diffused,  and  provides  the  knowing 
mind  with  several  objective  aspects  which  it  can 


CRITICISM  OF  IDEALIST  PRINCIPLE    257 

grasp  one  after  the  other.  Every  side  of  this  scat- 
tered whole  then  becomes  the  relatively  simple 
object  of  a  fresh  apprehension.  This  diffusion  or 
scattering  of  the  object  apprehended,  we  call  the 
manifestation  of  the  ontologically  true,  or  techni- 
cally, the  evidence  of  truth. 

When  the  object  of  a  first  concept  has  thus 
diffused  its  content  and  provided  matter  for  fresh 
representations,  the  mind  sees  before  it  two  objec- 
tive terms  that  can  now  be  compared  (compar,  par 
indicating  the  quality  of  the  terms,  cum  their 
simultaneity  in  the  mind  of  the  subject),  a  compara- 
tive act  between  them  becomes  possible.  There 
are  two  objective  terms  that  can  be  referred  to  one 
another,  and  which  are  able  to  be  identified  or  are 
not  able  to  be  identified. 

The  object  of  the  first  act  of  apprehension  con- 
tained matter  for  such  reference,  but  only  contained 
it  implicitly.  Its  development,  what  we  have 
called  the  diffusion  of  this  content,  renders  the  formu- 
lation of  the  reference  formally  possible,  and  the 
formulation  of  the  reference  we  call  a  judgement. 

Therefore,  to  judge  is  to  state  expressly  that  an 
object  represented  to  the  mind  is  altogether  or 
partly  identical  with  an  object  previously  presented 
to  the  mind. 

The  object  of  the  act  of  representation  is  called 
the  predicate,  and  that  of  the  previous  apprehension 
is  called  the  subject.  Thus,  judgement  is  the  mental 
act  which  refers  one  or  more  predicates  to  a  subject 
given  in  the  mind.  The  reference  expressed  by  the 
judgment  states  that  a  predicate  belongs  or  does 
not  belong  to  the  subject.  The  judgement  is  true 


258   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

when  the  reference  as  to  this  relationship  is  stated 
in  conformity  with  the  requirements  of  the  content 
of  the  first  apprehension,  with  the  ontologically  true ; 
it  is  false  when  the  statement  of  the  judgement  is 
not  in  accord  with  the  requirements  of  ontological 
truth. 

To  put  the  matter  more  shortly,  the  truth  of  a 
cognition  or  logical  truth  is  the  accordance  of 
knowledge  with  ontological  truth,  and  logical  error 
is  the  disagreement  of  knowledge  (cognitions)  with 
ontological  truth.1 

The  critical  problem  is  that  which  has  to  do  with 
the  existence  or  non-existence  of  logical  truth.  It 
therefore  consists  in  taking  as  the  object  of  reflective 
consideration  a  primary  spontaneous  judgement,  for 
the  purpose  of  seeing  whether  it  possesses  logical 

1  Let  us  illustrate  these  abstract  considerations  with  a 
concrete  example.  Their  criteriological  importance  justifies 
our  dwelling  upon  them  in  this  manner. 

Suppose  a  whole  divided  into  parts.  Neither  this  whole 
in  itself,  nor  the  same  whole  as  apprehended  by  a  primary 
act  of  mental  representation,  is  true  or  false. 

But  suppose  the  whole  is  broken  up,  and  that  it  reveals 
to  the  mind  what  it  is,  and  that  by  a  second  act  of  appre- 
hension the  mind  represents  it  to  itself  afresh,  either  as  a 
whole,  or  in  part.  Henceforward,  there  are  in  the  mind  two 
terms  referable  to  one  another;  then  the  reference  becomes 
possible,  and  must  be  made.  The  whole  divided  into  parts 
(the  term  of  the  primary  act  of  apprehension)  is  identical 
with  the  same  whole,  the  collection  of  the  divided  parts 
(the  term  of  the  second  act  of  apprehension);  or,  more 
simply,  the  whole  is  identical  with  the  sum  of  its  parts. 
On  the  contrary,  the  divided  whole  (the  object  of  the 
primary  apprehension)  is  not  identical  with  the  same  object 
regarded  in  each  of  its  parts;  or,  the  whole  is  not  identical 
with  any  single  one  of  its  parts.  The  two  references,  one 
of  identity,  the  other  of  non-identity,  the  two  ontological 
truths,  call  for  two  mental  acts,  one  of  composition,  the 
other  of  division,  for  two  judgements,  one  affirmative,  the 
other  negative. 


CRITICISM  OF  IDEALIST  PRINCIPLE    259 

truth  or  not,  or,  which  comes  to  the  same  thing,  for 
the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  the  statement 
of  the  judgement  agrees  with  the  requirements  of 
ontological  truth  materially  contained  in  the  object 
of  the  mind's  primary  act  of  apprehension.  The 
consciousness  of  ascertaining  the  logical  truth  of  its 
judgement  gives  the  mind  the  contentment  which 
arises  from  the  satisfaction  of  its  natural  desire  for 
knowledge,  and  which  is  called  certitude. 

This  analysis  shows  the  two  ontological  conditions 
of  the  possibility  of  certain  knowledge,  conditions 
which  the  originators  of  the  idealist  philosophy 
have  failed  to  understand. 

They  thought  they  could  set  over  against  the 
real  in  itself  a  subject  capable  of  representing  it, 
and  then  analyze  the  mental  structure  of  the  sub- 
ject, and  consequently  say  whether  such  repre- 
sentation was  or  was  not  a  faithful  expression  of 
absolute  reality.  This  attempt  has  been  proved  to 
be  an  intrinsically  impossible  one  on  two  grounds. 

The  representative  power  is  only  knowable  by 

The  whole  in  itself  makes  the  object  of  a  primary  mental 
representation;  the  sum  of  the  united  parts,  seized  in  the 
scattered  whole,  makes  the  object  of  a  second  mental  repre- 
sentation; the  relation  of  identity  between  the  two  objects 
is  an  objective  or  ontological  truth;  the  intuition,  and  con- 
sequently, the  affirmation  of  this  truth,  is  a  judgement 
logically  true. 

Thus  the  Scholastics  were  right  in  saying  that  logical 
truth  is  to  be  formally  found  only  in  the  judgement.  And,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  common  sense  agrees  with  this  doctrine. 
The  words  of  a  dictionary,  which  are  the  expression  of  a 
simple  conceptual  apprehension,  are  not  regarded  by  any- 
body as  true  or  false.  Truth  and  error  are  attributes  of  the 

proposition.      Ilepi  ybp  <rdvdtai.v  KO.I  diaipffftv  £<TTI  rd  ^eOWj  re  KCU  rd 

d\7j^s.  Circa  conjunctionem  et  disjunctionem  falsum  et  verum 
est. — Aristotle,  De  Interpretations,  c.  i. 


260    CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

means  of  the  act  of  representation  in  which  it  is 
exercised.  The  thing-in-itself,  taken  absolutely, 
is  a  nullity  so  far  as  the  knowing  mind  is  concerned. 
Thus,  the  problem  of  knowledge,  as  stated  by  the 
idealist,  is  doubly  insoluble. 

Thus,  too,  the  criticisms  directed  by  idealism 
against  the  possibility  of  a  knowledge  thus  dis- 
figured miss  the  mark,  but  it  is  easily  seen  that  they 
do  not  affect  a  more  accurate  theory  of  the  certainty 
of  knowledge. 

The  essential  condition  of  the  possibility  of  a 
problem  of  knowledge  is,  as  we  maintain,  the 
presence  in  the  mind  of  two  concepts,  the  results  of 
two  successive  acts  of  apprehension.  The  judgement 
that  unites  these  concepts,  affirming  the  belonging 
or  the  not -belonging  of  the  second  to  the  first,  of 
the  predicate  to  the  subject,  is  the  sole  act  that  can 
be  true  or  false. 

Since  the  judgement  may  be  true  or  false,  it 
demands  a  check.  This  check,  the  exercise  of 
which  presupposes  what  Montaigne  called  a  "  judi- 
cative  instrument  " — i.e.,  a  means  of  distinguishing 
between  the  true  and  the  false,  in  a  word,  a  criterion 
of  truth — this  check  is  the  whole  object  of  the 
critique  of  knowledge. 

But  criteriology  gives  rise  to  two  essentially 
distinct  problems  with  regard  to  this  subject. 

Has  the  act  whereby  the  synthesis  of  the  pre- 
dicate with  the  subject  is  effected  for  its  deter- 
mining cause  an  entirely  subjective  law  of  thought, 
or  is  it  brought  into  play  by  an  objective  cause 
acting  upon  the  mind  ?  And  is  this  act  a  synthetic 
judgement  a  priori,  as  Kant  maintains,  or  is  it  an 


CRITICISM  OF  IDEALIST  PRINCIPLE    261 

act  of  perception  and  assent  arising  from  the  evi- 
dence of  the  objective  connection  of  the  predicate 
with  the  subject  ? 

Such,  in  brief,  is  the  statement  of  the  first  problem, 
that  of  the  subjectivity  or  objectivity  of  the  act  of 
judgement. 

Let  us  admit  that  dogmatism  is  right,  and  that 
the  objective  value  of  principles  is  certain.  Then, 
the  principle  of  contradiction — for  instance,  "  a 
thing  cannot  both  exist  and  not  exist " — and  the 
principle  of  causality,  "  the  contingent  must  depend 
upon  a  cause  " — afford  guarantees  for  real  certitude. 

But  the  application  of  these(  principles  to  the 
facts  of  experience  gives  rise  to  a  second  problem 
which  is  essential  to  critical  philosophy. 

We  have  remarked  that  the  most  pronounced 
idealists  confess  that  they  experience  a  necessity 
which  they  did  not  themselves  originate,  something 
that  they  inevitably  undergo,  and  which,  like  every- 
one else,  they  are  driven  to  call,  reality,  experience. 
Is  there  anyone  in  all  the  world  who  dares  to  main- 
tain that  the  pain  of  toothache  is,  strictly  speaking, 
no  more  than  a  mental  representation  ? 

Plainly,  No.  However  much  one  might  wish  it 
were  so,  one  could  not  assert  it  with  sincerity. 
But,  if  the  mind,  or  that  6ther  part  of  ourselves 
which  we  call  the  body,  has  a  passive  sensation  of 
an  impression  experienced,  there  must  be  an  active 
cause  that  gives  rise  to  the  impression;  and  if  this 
cause  is  not  the  Ego  that  feels  it,  there  must  be  a 
non-Ego,  an  external  world. 

Hence  if  it  can  be  shown  that  the  object  of  our 
concepts  is  taken  from  realities  which  outward 


262   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

or  inward  experience  makes  us  feel,  it  is  established 
that  our  concepts  have  not  only  a  simple  pheno- 
menal objectivity,  but  that  they  are  endowed  with 
objective  reality. 

\s          And  this  is  the  secow^  problem  which  is  essential 
to  critical  philosophy. 

Here  we  stop  short.  Our  aim  was  to  criticize 
the  principle  underlying  contemporary  idealism. 
The  positive  work  of  defining  criteriological  problems 
more  explicitly  and  of  finding  out  a  solution  of  them, 
we  shall  endeavour  to  carry  out  elsewhere.1 

1  Mercier,  Criteriologie  generate  de  la  certitude,  5th  ed., 
Louvain,  1906.  In  this  edition  we  deal  with  the  criticisms 
made  by  Dr.  Medicus  in  an  article  in  Kantstudien  (1902), 
entitled,  Ein  Wortfuhrer  der  Neuscholastik  und  seine  Kant- 
kritik.  As  to  our  point  of  view  and  the  notion  of  truth 
upon  which  the  work  is  founded,  see  many  discussions  in  the 
Revue  neo-scolastique  (1895,  X899,  1900). 

*"»j  ^$*V$*J*jfr 


/       ,4^1  <n  (>&^*u**i,  n 


/ 

V-W 


CHAPTER  VI 
CRITICISM  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  MECHANISM 

TO-DAY  the  materialistic  mechanical  theory  (Mechan- 
ism) is  done  with. 

We  have  already  referred  to  the  solemn  protests 
of  Dubois-Reymond  at  the  Congress  of  Leipzig  in 
1872 ;  we  have  seen  the  spiritualist  (idealist)  reaction 
of  Durand  de  Gros,  Fouillee,  and  Wundt,  and 
noted  the  avowals  of  Herbert  Spencer  himself  on 
the  subject. 

The  leaders  of  contemporary  psychology  agree 
in  saying  "  that  it  is  impossible  to  reduce.,  by 
means  of  successive  identifications,  psychology  to 
physiology,  and  the  latter  to  chemistry  or  physics, 
and  these  in  turn  to  simple  changes  in  space,  to 
movement  and  extension." 

In  spite  of  this,  materialist  ideas  are  always 
floating  in  the  air,  and  many  scientists  and  philo- 
sophers have  come  to  Herbert  Spencer's  vague 
state  of  mind,  in  which  he  declared  that  among  the 
primary  facts  of  evolution  nothing  could  be  ad- 
mitted except  "  molecular  attraction  and  repul- 
sion," and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  between  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness  and  material  facts 

263 


264   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

"  no  community  of  nature  was  visible  or  con- 
ceivable." 

This  may  be  put  into  the  following  terms:  that 
materialism  is  an  arbitrary,  and  even  unintelligible 
hypothesis,  but  it  is  a  necessary  consequence  of 
science,  which  to-day  is  one  with  the  mechanical 
theory. 

Is  it  true  that  science  must  be  on  the  side  of 
Mechanism  ?  How  can  such  an  allegation  be  justi- 
fied ? 

The  dogmas  of  the  mechanical  theory  are  the  two 
following:  the  phenomena  of  matter,  if  not  all  the 
phenomena  in  the  world,  are  modes  of  movement; 
there  are  efficient  causes  only;  there  are  no  final 
causes  in  nature. 

The  first  proposition  rests  upon  the  discoveries 
of  thermodynamics;  the  second  owes  its  vogue  to 
the  physics  of  Descartes,  the  sarcasms  of  Bacon, 
and  the  theories  of  Darwin.  Let  us  make  a  closer 
examination  of  them. 


MECHANISM  AND  PHYSICAL  SCIENCE. 

Thermodynamics  does  not  justify  the  mechanical 
theory. 

No  doubt,  if  the  world  of  matter  consisted  solely 
of  a  system  of  moving  bodies,  there  would  be  in 
reality  nothing  but  mechanical  actions.  The  physi- 
cal and  chemical  forces  would  be,  indeed,  mechanical 
forces,  and  therefore  it  would  not  be  hard  to  under- 
stand that  their  interplay  must  be  governed  by  a 
general  law  of  mechanical  equivalence.  The  New- 


PRINCIPLES  OF  MECHANISM         265 

tonian  law  of  the  equality  of  action  and  reaction 
would  be  synonymous  with  that  of  mechanical 
equivalence.  Then,  urged  on  by  our  inclination 
towards  unification  and  simplicity,  we  should  ex- 
tend this  mechanical  notion  to  living  organisms, 
and  we  should  get  the  plant-machine,  the  animal- 
machine,  and  lastly  the  man-machine. 

But  this  systematizing  procedure  cannot  be 
justified  either  a  priori  or  a  posteriori. 

It  cannot  be  justified  a  priori  ;  for  who  dares  to  tell 
us  that  he  feels  bound  to  interpret  "  the  mental 
processes  by  means  of  the  mechanism  of  the  atoms 
of  the  brain  "  P1  "  That  he  can  even  conceive  the 
possibility  of  reducing  quality  to  a  simple  form  of 
quantity  "  ?2  "  That  he  perceives  an  identity  of 
nature  in  physical  occurrences  and  facts  of  con- 
sciousness "  ?3 

No;  according  to  the  sincere  admissions  of  its 
warmest  advocates,  a  universal  mechanical  theory 
is  unintelligible.  Yet  what  matters  this,  if  it  be 
scientifically  proved  ? 

But  is  it  scientifically  proved  ?  Doubtless,  in 
nature  all  forms  of  bodily  energy  are  exchanged 
for  one  another.  Indubitably,  too,  the  play  of 
mechanical  forces  is  subject  to  the  law  of  a  strict 
equality  of  action  and  reaction. 

Now,  it  has  been  established,  if  not  quite  rigor- 
ously, at  any  rate  precisely  enough  for  practical 
certainty,  that  the  mechanical  equivalent  of  the 
heat  unit  is  about  927  Ibs.  Hence  there  are  at 
least  two  forms  of  energy,  heat  and  mechanical 

1  Dubois-Reymond,  see  above,  p.  74. 

2  Fouillee,  see  p.  75. 

8  Herbert  Spencer,  p.  77. 


266   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

energy,  which  have  an  equivalent  exchange- 
value  . 

Weber  and  Helmholz  proved  that  the  conclusions 
of  thermodynamics  are  applicable  to  electricity,  the 
volt-unit  being  equal  to  twenty-three  heat-units. 
Thus  science  tends  to  generalize  the  application  of 
the  law  of  mechanical  equivalence  to  the  various 
forms  of  natural  energy.  It  also  tends  to  regard 
all  the  systems  of  natural  forces  as  conservative — 
i.e.,  as  verifying  the  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of 
energy. 

No  doubt,  the  experimental  verification  of  the 
doctrine  is  not  strictly  accomplished,  either  in  the 
case  of  systems  of  terrestrial  forces,  or  still  less  in 
the  case  of  the  whole  universe.1  It  does  however 

1  The  theorem  of  the  conservation  of  energy,  regarded  in 
the  broadest  manner,  may  be  stated  as  follows:  "  In  any 
shut-off  or  isolated  system,  i.e.,  on  which  no  external  force, 
whether  mechanical,  calorific,  electric,  etc.,  is  exercised,  the 
sum  of  energy  is  invariable,  but  on  condition  that  in  the 
cinematic  energy  there  be  included  not  only  that  which 
corresponds  with  the  visible  rates  of  movement  of  the 
different  points  of  the  system,  but  also  that  which  arises 
from  the  invisible  movements  to  which  the  heat  or  light  of 
the  system  is  attributed,  as  well  as  the  electric  currents, 
etc.,  running  through  it;  it  is  on  condition  also  of  compre- 
hending within  its  potential  energy  not  only  what  arises 
from  mechanical  action  ordinarily  so  regarded,  but  also  that 
which  may  be  due  to  electrical  tensions,  chemical  affinities, 
etc." — Appell,  TraitS  de  mechanique  rationelle,  t.  ii.,  p.  123, 
1896. 

But,  says  the  learned  M.  Pasquier,  it  is  not  proved  that 
all  systems  of  earthly  mechanical  force  are  conservative.  We 
are  certainly  inclined  to  believe,  he  says,  that  most  natural 
forces  (gravitation,  molecular  forces,  and  the  forces  of 
heat,  electricity,  and  magnetism,  etc.)  are  of  such  a  Irnd 
that  the  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy  applies  to 
them.  .  .  . 

"  Nevertheless,"  he  continues,  "  we  do  not  think  that  the 
present  state  of  knowledge  allows  us  to  affirm,  as  most 


PRINCIPLES  OF  MECHANISM          267 

apply  to  the  forces  of  inorganic  or  organic  nature 
with  sufficient  probability  to  be  regarded  without 
rashness,  as  established. 

Let  us,  then,  take  it  as  an  established  fact,  and 
ask  whether  the  mechanical  theory  of  philosophy 
is  a  necessary  or  legitimate  consequence  of  the 
present  state  of  natural  science. 

We  say,  No. 

Movement  is  the  general  condition  of  the  action 
of  material  bodies.  It  is,  indeed,  shown  by  experi- 


authors  do,  that  all  terrestrial  forces  are  certainly  of  such  a 
kind.  Consequently,  in  our  opinion,  it  is  not  certain  that 
the  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy  can  be  applied 
to  any  earthly  systems.  Indeed,  there  are  certain  forces 
(the  friction  of  solids  with  solids,  liquids,  or  gases,  the 
resistence  of  media,  the  electro-dynamical  laws  of  Weber, 
Gauss,  and  Riemann)  which,  in  appearance  at  any  rate,  are 
the  functions  of  various  rates  of  speed. 

"  While  admitting  that  these  forces  are  but  little  known, 
we  do  not  think  that  it  is  proved  that,  in  the  last  analysis, 
they  are,  like  the  rest,  exclusively  functions  of  distances. 
Having  regard  to  our  ignorance  as  to  these  rather  obscure 
laws  of  earthly  mechanics,  we  prefer  to  take  our  place  in 
the  ranks  of  those  who  reserve  judgement.  .  .  ." 

If  we  have  to  be  prudent  in  applying  the  doctrine  to  our 
own  earth,  still  greater  reserve  is  needed,  in  M.  Pasquier's 
opinion,  in  applying  it  to  the  entire  universe. 

"  First,  science  is  still  a  long  way  from  having  given  us  a 
knowledge  of  this  universe  as  a  whole.  We  are  scarcely 
beginning  to  have  some  idea  of  the  motion  and  constitution 
of  the  stars  and  the  nebulae.  Further,  we  think,  with 
M.  Duhem,  that  metaphysical  reasons  alone  would  suffice 
to  make  us  doubt  the  legitimacy  of  making  such  an  applica- 
tion of  the  doctrine;  for,  even  if  metaphysics  could  prove 
that  the  universe  is  quite  limited,  it  is  certainly  powerless 
to  determine  the  conditions  of  such  limits.  Can  it,  for 
instance,  affirm  that  they  can  be  assimilated  to  surfaces 
impermeable  by  heat  ?  Yet  this  is  an  indispensable  con- 
dition for  regarding  the  total  work  of  external  forces  beyond 
the  limits  as  perpetually  of  no  account." — Pasquier,  Cours 
de  mfcanique  rationnellc,  Section  3,  pp.  78-89-90. 


268   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

ments  that  bodies  only  act  upon  one  another  in  a 
sensible  manner  when  they  are  within  definite 
appreciable  distances,  and  the  intensity  of  their 
reciprocal  action  depends  upon  such  distance. 

Hence  the  movement  that  brings  two  bodies 
nearer  to  one  another  is  a  condition,  either  of  the 
calling  into  play,  or  of  the  intensification,  of  any 
material  force.  A  fortiori  is  movement  an  indis- 
pensable condition  of  the  interchange  of  material 
forces,  if,  as  experiments  prove,  these  bodies  only 
act  by  means  of  contact  ? 

Even  the  highest  forms  of  natural  activity,  such 
as  that  of  thought  and  rational  will,  are  not  carried 
out  without  the  assistance  of  material  forces  subject 
to  this  law  of  contact.1 

Therefore,  to  bring  experience  into  harmony  with 
the  laws  of  mechanical  physics,  it  is  not  necessary 
to  admit  that  physical,  chemical,  biological  pheno- 
mena are  identified  in  every  way  with  mechanical 
phenomena;  it  is  enough  to  acknowledge  that 
material  forces  do  not  act  unless  they  are  accom- 
panied with  movement.  Facts,  if  wisely  interro- 
gated, prove  no  more  than  this.  "  The  most 
superficial  study  of  facts,"  wrote  Him  in  1868, 
"  teaches  us  that  the  phenomena  of  light,  heat,  and 
electricity,  may  be  substituted  for  one  another, 
and  make  reciprocal  exchanges;  that  they  are 
related  to  one  another  as  equivalents;  that,  when 
one  appears  to  vanish  without  giving  rise  to  some 
working  or  motion  in  a  material  body,  it  gives  rise 
to  another  phenomenon  of  the  same  class.  These 

1  Cf.  Mercier,  La  pensee  et  la  loi  de  la  conservation  de 
I'enevgie,  p.  8, 


PRINCIPLES  OF  MECHANISM          269 

facts  have  been  admirably  investigated  of  late,  and 
they  have  also  been  classed  and  co-ordinated  in  the 
most  methodical  way  by  many  physicists;  let  me 
mention,  for  instance,  Grove's  fine  book.  Not  one 
of  these  facts,  not  even  the  most  unimportant  of 
them,  enables  us  to  affirm  or  deny  that  light,  heat, 
and  electricity,  must  be  referred  to  one  and  the 
same  principle.  All,  without  exception,  lead  on 
to  one  and  the  same  final  conclusion :  Reciprocal  re- 
lationship, substitution  subject  to  a  law  of  quantita- 
tive equivalence,  to  a  higher  law  of  equilibrium. 
Nihil  ex  nihilo  ;  nihil  in  nihilum."1 

The  proposition  which  has  become  a  common- 
place in  popular  scientific  publications,  that  natural 
forces  may  be  reduced  to  motion,  thus  calls  for  a 
distinction. 

The  exercise  of  natural  forces  requires  motion. 
Hence  these  forces  always  have  a  mechanical  aspect, 
and  consequently  the  intensity  of  their  action  is 
calculable  in  terms  of  mechanics:  this  proposition 
is  an  expression  of  fact  in  each  one  of  its  parts. 
Also,  we  must  add  that  the  motor  phenomenon 
which  accompanies  the  exercise  of  natural  forces 
cannot  be  called  a  or  the  motion,  except  in  a  generic 
sense.  In  reality,  it  varies  according  to  the  physical 
or  chemical  phenomena  which  are  brought  into 
play.  Sometimes  the  motion  consists  of  the  un- 
dulations of  elastic  molecules  of  ponderable  matter, 
e.g.,  as  in  acoustics;  sometimes  of  vibrations  of 
ponderable  matter,  as  of  ether ;  this  is  the  case  with 

1  Him,  Analyse  ilimentaire  de  I'univers,  Paris,  1868. 
Cf.  De  San,  Cosmologia,  Lovanii,  1881,  pp.  339  ff.  Also, 
Nys,  Cosmologie  du  monde  inorganique,  2nd  ed.,  Louvain, 
1906,  pp.  140-164,  350  ff. 


270   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  phenomena  of  heat,  light,  and  electricity.  In 
chemical  phenomena,  the  motion  arising  from  the 
intervention  of  physical  forces  is  variable.  Hence, 
in  nature,  there  is  not  pure  motion  or  movement, 
there  are  motions  or  movements. 

But  the  essential  criticism  of  the  proposition,  that 
natural  forces  may  be  reduced  to  motion,  is  drawn 
from  the  very  analysis  of  motion. 

Motion  or  movement,  as  such,  is  only  the  succession 
of  different  positions  taken  up  in  space  by  something 
that  moves.  Movement,  as  such,  is  not  an  action, 
not  even  such  a  borrowed  action  as  we  call  com- 
municated, and  such  as  the  ancients  designated  by 
the  words  ab  extrinseco.  But,  can  it  be  admitted 
that  that  which  is  not  an  action  constitutes  of  itself 
the  inmost  substratum  of  all  the  modes  of  exercise 
of  material  forces  P1 

Clearly  not.  Besides,  when  men  of  science  talk 
of  movement,  they  use  the  word  in  two  very  different 
senses.  Sometimes  they  mean  by  it  movement 
properly  so  called — i.e.,  local  displacement,  the 
series  of  successive  positions  occupied  by  a  moving 
object;  sometimes  the  active  impulse  that  enables 
one  body  to  act  upon  another — for  instance,  light 
or  heat  to  act  upon  our  organs  of  sense.  But  this 
impulse  qualifies  the  agent  to  which  it  belongs,  and 
it  is  a  quality. 

Will  it  be  said  that  this  quality,  this  impelling 
nisus,  is  only  a  motive  force  ?  Suppose  that  it  was 
so,  even  then  it  would  be  established  that  sensible 
nature  cannot  be  reduced  to  motion,  in  the  strict 

1  Boutroux,  De  la  contingence  des  lois  de  la  nature,  2nd  ed., 
Paris,  1895,  pp.  63  ff. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  MECHANISM         271 

sense  of  the  word,  but  that  it  is  endowed  with 
forces.  From  the  diverse  changes  undergone  by 
the  recipient  of  the  impulse,  one  might  infer  the 
diversity  of  the  impelling  forces. 

Would  it  then  be  legitimate  to  infer,  on  scientific 
grounds,  that  the  diversity  of  the  latter  is  exclusively 
quantitative  and  mechanical  ?  No.  These  active 
forces  produce  motion,  therefore  they  are  motive 
forces  ;  but  there  is  nothing  in  experience  to  justify 
the  statement  that  they  are  motive  forces  and 
nothing  else. 

We  know  that  it  is  a  commonplace  with  many 
scientists  to  lay  down  the  principle  of  the  unity  of 
physical  forces.  And  hence  follows  both  the  identi- 
fication of  these  forces  with  mechanical  force  and 
the  entirely  mechanical  interpretation  of  the  law 
of  the  conservation  of  "  force." 

But  this  doctrine  has  in  its  favour  neither  obser- 
vation nor  the  general  support  of  scientific  men  of 
eminence . 

Lange,  the  celebrated  historian  of  materialism, 
makes  an  explicit  avowal  of  it.  The  interpretation 
of  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy  in  the 
sense  of  the  mechanical  theory  is  not  a  scientific 
conclusion,  "it  is  only  an  ideal  of  reason."  The 
inner  nature  of  matter  and  of  force,  he  says,  escapes 
the  notice  of  the  man  of  science;  the  problem  to 
which  it  gives  rise  depends  upon  the  theory  of 
knowledge. 

We  will  quote  the  learned  German  in  full,  because 
his  avowal  shows  that  no  more  than  observed 
fact  can  the  authority  of  thinkers  be  quoted  to 
prove  that  the  primary  dogma  of  materialist  philo- 


272   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

sophy  is  worthy  of  being  regarded  as  a  scientific 
theory : 

"  The  law,  now  looked  upon  as  so  important,  of 
the  conservation  of  energy,  may  be  expanded  in 
different  ways.  Thus,  first  one  may  admit  that  the 
elements  of  chemistry  have  certain  invariable 
properties,  along  with  which  the  general  machinery 
of  atoms  co-operates  to  give  rise  to  phenomena; 
next,  one  may  also  suppose  that  the  properties  of 
the  chemical  elements  are  themselves  nothing  but 
determinate  forms  of  general  and  essentially  uniform 
material  motion.  As  soon  as  chemical  elements  are 
regarded  as  simple  changes  of  some  primary  and 
homogeneous  matter,  the  latter  hypothesis  is  easily 
understood.  But  it  must  be  acknowledged  that 
the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy,  as  interpreted 
by  this  most  rigid  and  logical  theory,  is  very  far 
from  being  proved.  It  is  only  an  '  ideal  of  the 
reason  ' ;  but  since  this  ideal  is  the  supreme  end  of 
all  empirical  investigation,  we  could  scarcely  leave 
it  on  one  side."1 

MECHANISM  AND  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  FINAL 
CAUSES. 

We  have  remarked  the  powerful  reaction  against 
the  systematic  exclusion  of  final  causes  in  nature. 
Schopenhauer's  "  will  to  live,"  the  "  idea-force  " 
which  Fouillee  identified  with  appetite,  and  Wundt's 
"  voluntarism,"  are  so  many  indications  of  a 
return  of  philosophy  to  finality.  The  neo-Kantian 

1  Lange,  Histoire  du  materialisms,  French  translation 
from  the  German,  II.,  p.  229,  Paris,  1897. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  MECHANISM         273 

movement,  now  so  active  in  France,  corresponds 
with  an  analogous  tendency. 

One  of  the  most  prominent  men  in  Germany, 
Professor  Paulsen  of  Berlin,  is  quite  to  the  point  in 
denouncing  what,  along  with  the  naturalist  von 
Baer,  he  calls  "  teleophoby,"  and  does  not  shrink 
from  saying  that  the  finalist  view  is  the  most  im- 
portant view  in  the  study  of  nature.1 

In  the  same  way,  in  France,  M.  Emile  Boutroux 
of  the  Sorbonne  has  long  been  an  opponent  of  the 
extreme  tendencies  of  mechanical  determinism. 
He  does  not  admit  that  it  is  true  that  necessity 
rules  supreme  in  nature,  since  experience  proves 
that  there  is  a  certain  amount  of  contingency  in 
the  succession  of  phenomena,  which,  according  to 
him,  is  the  sign  of  a  certain  degree  of  spontaneity 
in  beings,  and  consequently,  of  the  finality  which 
governs  them. 

"  Beings  of  all  classes,"  he  writes,  "  have  an 
ideal  to  aim  at,  and,  for  that  very  reason,  there 
must  be  in  all  of  them  a  certain  amount  of  spon- 
taneity, a  power  of  change  that  is  proportioned  to 
the  nature  and  value  of  their  ideal.  .  .  .  The 
ontological  order,  or  causal  connection  of  pheno- 
mena, contains  the  true  causes  or  metaphysical 
powers  that  give  rise  to  the  world's  changes.  .  .  . 
Hence  contingence  rules  up  to  a  certain  point  in 
the  series  of  determining  causes.  ...  It  is  finality 
itself  that  implies  a  certain  amount  of  contingence 
in  the  succession  of  phenomena."2 

1  F.  Paulsen,  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie,  S.  224-239 ; 
Kaitsalitdt  und  Finalitdt,  Berlin,  1896. 

2  Boutroux,  De  la  contingence  des  lois  de  la  nature,  pp.  143, 
167,  168.     Cf.  De  Videe  de  loi  naturelle,  Paris,  1895. 

18 


274   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

For  M.  Boutroux,  the  question  of  ascertaining 
whether  finality  can  be  discovered  in  nature  there- 
fore amounts  to  ascertaining  whether  there  is  any 
place  for  contingence  in  the  succession  of  pheno- 
mena; and  inversely,  mechanical  determinism  finds 
its  expression  and  its  proof  in  a  world  ruled  by 
uniformity  and  by  necessity. 

This  does  not  appear  to  us  to  be  an  accurate 
definition  of  the  problem  of  finality. 

It  is  true  that  liberty  (free  will)  and  spontaneity 
imply  a  certain  amount  of  contingence.  For,  by 
definition,  liberty  means  the  power  of  choosing  a 
means  which  is  only  contingently  connected  with 
the  end  willed  by  the  free  agent.  Spontaneity  is 
the  pursuit  of  a  wished-for  good,  and  therefore  of 
a  known  good.  Hence  it  is  not  subject  to  the  iron 
laws  of  mechanical  determinism,  but  follows  the 
capricious  influences  of  feeling  induced  in  the  sub- 
ject by  an  individual — and  therefore  relative- 
appreciation  of  outward  realities. 

But,  even  if  there  were  no  agents  endowed  with 
free  will  and  spontaneity,  the  problem  of  final  causes 
would  still  exist. 

'  Teeth  grow  under  the  dominion  of  necessity," 
said  Democritus.  "  The  front  teeth  are  incisors 
and  fitted  to  tear  things  to  pieces,  the  molars  are 
flat  and  useful  for  crushing  foods.  What  is  there 
in  all  this  to  make  us  discover  an  end  pursued,  and 
not  a  mere  coincidence  ?  In  a  general  way,  wher- 
ever a  final  cause  appears  to  govern  a  concurrence 
of  things,  we  have  only  to  make  one.  Where  things 
have  coincided  just  as  if  some  intentional  adapta- 
tion had  brought  them  together,  the  effects  are  sure, 


PRINCIPLES  OF  MECHANISM         275 

because  chance  has  endowed  them  advantageously 
for  enduring ;  on  the  contrary,  where  the  concurrence 
is  not  so  lucky,  the  results  have  disappeared  and 
are  disappearing,  as  Empedocles  said  was  the  case 
with  monsters  which  were  half-man  and  half- 
brute."1 

This  is  Aristotle's  summary  of  the  old  statement  of 
mechanical  determinism  and  the  problem  of  finality. 
From  Democritus  to  Darwin  the  essential  terms  of 
the  argument  have  not  changed.  In  nature  there  are 
favourable  factors,  such  as  the  shape  of  the  incisors 
for  tearing  to  pieces  and  that  of  the  molars  to  crush ; 
and  these  are  the  effects  of  efficient  causes.  Must 
they  also  be  regarded  as  cases  of  ends  and  means  ? 

No  doubt,  they  are  effects,  the  last  terms  of  a 
series  of  antecedents  and  consequents.  This  is  not 
denied  by  the  finalists.  But  the  point  in  dispute 
is,  to  ascertain  whether  efficient  causes  alone  are 
enough  to  explain  nature  as  a  whole  and  from  every 
point  of  view. 

It  is  not  a  case  of  presenting  an  ultimatum  to  the 
finalist  by  saying:  Well,  there  are  your  incisors; 
why  do  you  wonder  at  their  tearing  things  to  pieces  ? 
There  are  your  molars;  why  wonder  at  their  crush- 
ing things  ?  Your  bird  has  wings;  of  course  it 
uses  them  to  fly.  Your  eye  is  so  made  as  to  see 
the  light,  and  there  is  light;  so  your  eye  must  see 
it.  Wherein  lies  the  mystery,  then  ?  And  what 
do  you  gain  by  saying  that  the  incisors  are  made 
to  tear  to  pieces,  the  molars  for  crushing  food,  the 
bird's  wings  for  flying,  and  the  eye  for  seeing  the 
light  ? 

i  Aristotle,  Physics,  II.,  Ch.  VIII. 


276   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

No,  the  finalist  is  not  driven  to  choose  either 
efficient  causes  or  final  causes  as  alternatives.  He 
admits,  like  the  mechanical  theorist,  the  causal 
action  of  antecedents  that  effect  consequents;  but, 
he  adds,  is  there  not  such  and  such  an  ordered 
whole  of  consequents  as  could  never  have  occurred 
without  the  effect  being  the  end  for  the  purpose  of 
which  nature  has  arranged  the  action  of  the  ante- 
cedents ? 

Apparently,  there  is  no  a  priori  reason  why  the 
seventy-five  simple  elements  of  chemistry  should 
combine  into  more  and  more  complex  compounds 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  produce  an  albuminoid 
molecule  at  the  right  moment,  and  then  a  con- 
siderable blending  of  heterogeneous  albuminoid 
substances  into  a  combination  of  protoplasm,  to 
give  rise  to  cellular  organisms,  and  finally  to  osseous 
structures  so  arranged  on  the  one  hand  and  on  the 
other,  as  here  to  crush  things  in  a  jaw,  there  to 
form  contractile  muscles  in  a  bird's  wing,  or  lastly, 
the  infinitely  complex  visual  apparatus,  which  we 
call  an  eye. 

Indeed,  there  is  no  wonder  in  an  animal  devouring 
and  crushing  its  food  when  it  has  teeth,  in  a  bird 
flying  when  it  has  wings,  in  an  eye  seeing,  since  it 
can  see  the  light  and  light  is  there  to  be  seen;  but 
what  is  more  or  less  disconcerting  to  the  mind, 
when  it  is  unable  to  go  beyond  the  notion  of  mechani- 
cal causation,  is  this :  that  chance  events  should  be 
able  to  produce  an  incisor  or  a  molar,  a  bird's  wing 
or  an  eye. 

All  the  materials  for  building  an  edifice  exist  in 
nature.  Why  do  they  never  happen  to  make  a 


277 

palace  by  fortuitous  concurrence  ?  Gold,  silver, 
and  copper  exist  in  nature.  How  is  it  that  the 
atoms  of  such  metals  never  fit  together  of  them- 
selves in  such  a  way  as  to  make  a  clock  ? 

When  we  see  heaps  of  stone  and  sand  and  mortar, 
we  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  the  building,  near 
which  we  see  them  lying,  is  the  work  of  hands 
directed  by  intelligence.  When  pieces  of  metal  are 
made  into  a  clock,  who  doubts  but  that  some 
intelligence  has  intervened,  and  that  intentional 
adaptation  is  displayed  ? 

Why  should  those  natural  palaces  which  we  call 
birds'  nests,  ant-hills,  and  other  wonders  of  nature, 
escape  the  law  of  governing  thought  and  final 
purpose  ?  Why  should  those  pieces  of  mechanism 
that  are  so  well  adapted  to  their  functions,  and 
which  we  call  organs  in  living  animals,  be  so  easy 
to  explain  without  purpose,  when  we  cannot  explain 
the  works  of  man  without  it  ? 

"  If  nature  had  to  build  houses,"  says  Aristotle, 
"  it  would  only  have  to  act  in  the  same  way  as  our 
architects  and  masons.  And  inversely,  if  art  or 
industry  had  to  copy  the  various  works  of  nature, 
man  could  only  imitate  the  procedure  of  nature. 
Therefore  it  is  legitimate  to  attribute  to  nature  the 
finality  (purpose)  we  find  in  man's  works,  and 
vice  versa."1 

What,  then,  is  a  final  cause  ?  It  is  not  a  force 
superadded  to  efficient  causes  for  the  purpose  of 
explaining  what,  in  a  given  case,  could  not  be 
attributed  to  antecedent  causes.  "  When  actual 
and  accurately  observed  facts  suffice,"  says  M. 

1  Aristotle,  Physics,  II.,  Ch.  VIII.,  4. 


278   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Boutroux,  "  to  explain  a  phenomenon  completely, 
its  explanation  is  causal.  When  the  actual  facts 
do  not  suffice,  and  when  we  must  appeal  to.  some- 
thing hitherto  unrealized,  hitherto  non-existent, 
something  that  will  perhaps  never  be  fully  realized 
or  which  is  not  likely  to  be  so  in  the  future,  and 
which  therefore  appears  to  be  possible  only,  the 
explanation  is  of  a  more  or  less  final  character."1 

We  greatly  fear  that  such  a  manner  of  speaking 
makes  for  ambiguity.  A  final  cause  is  not  "  some- 
thing not  yet  existing,"  for  how  can  anything  non- 
existent act,  "  be  a  cause  ?"  Such  a  definition  of 
final  causes  is  at  most  only  applicable  to  the  extrinsic 
ends  that  the  supreme  "  Governor "  must  have 
had  in  view,  in  order  to  govern  the  harmony  of 
creatures  in  the  whole  universe .  The  true  final  causes 
for  which  Aristotle  contended  in  his  Physics  are 
internal  final  causes,  immanent  in  the  things  of  nature. 

Descartes  and  Bacon  only  knew  of  extrinsic  final 
causes,  and  it  was  an  easy  matter  for  them  to  scoff 
at  them.  Leibnitz  made  his  final  causes  substances, 
and  consequently  came  to  grief  over  the  same 
difficulties  as  his  rivals.  We  must  go  back  to  the 
Peripatetics  to  get  a  true  notion  of  the  immanent 
finality  of  nature.  This  immanent  finality  is  an 
underlying  impulse  that  directs  every  being's 
activity.  In  reality,  it  is  of  the  essence  of  being, 
but  it  is  this  essence  regarded  as  tending  entirely 
towards  a  term  which  is  its  end.  In  virtue  of  this 
final  inclination,  appetitus  naturalis,  being,  which 
is  one,  acts  through  all  its  powers  or  faculties, 
towards  the  end  ordained  for  its  activity. 

1  De  I' idee  de  loi  naturelle,  p.  97. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  MECHANISM         279 

The  principal  argument  in  favour  of  final  causes 
is  this,  that  if  there  were  no  principles  of  inward 
finality,  beings  and  their  actions  would  be  left  to 
chance ;  hence  disorder  in  nature  would  be  the  rule 
and  order  the  exception,  contrarily  to  the  evidence 
of  universal  experience. 

Indeed,  suppose  that  the  innumerable  elements  of 
which  the  stars  are  formed,  as  well  as  our  continents 
and  oceans  and  the  almost  infinite  numbers  of 
species,  animal  and  vegetable,  of  our  earth,  had 
inwardly  no  principle  of  stability,  and  that  they 
were  entirely  abandoned  to  chance,  we  might  still 
conceive  that  there  would  be  a  certain  dynamic 
equilibrium  set  up  in  the  universe,  seeing  that  some 
such  equilibrium  is  solely  a  function  of  mass  and 
distance,  and  that  the  two  conditions  of  mass  and 
distance  are  inseparable  from  matter;  but  apart 
from  this  equilibrium  and  the  uniform  mechanical 
laws  that  govern  it,  what  would  inevitably  become 
of  the  order  of  the  cosmos  ? 

Chance  may  also  produce  order,  as  Aristotle  rightly 
observes,  but  only  exceptionally,  in  paucioribus. 

Taking  account  of  all  possible  concurrences  of 
cosmic  elements,  the  a  priori  probability  of  chaotic 
concurrences  would  be  infinitely  great,  that  of  an 
orderly  combination  infinitely  little.  Anomalies 
and  monstrosities  would  therefore  be  the  rule, 
harmonious  instances  the  exception.  Every  moment 
there  would  arise  an  innumerable  quantity  of 
unstable  aggregates  which  would  be  disintegrated 
immediately  afterwards.  Permanent  compounds 
would  be  regarded  as  marvels. 

But  what  say  science  and  experience  ?     Every 


280   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

inorganic  body  submitted  to  observation  and 
analysis  is  found  to  be  endowed  with  mineral, 
physical,  and  chemical  properties  that  characterize 
it  and  are  discoverable  in  a  considerable  class  of 
instances  of  the  same  species.  The  instances  of 
each  species  have  their  specific  laws,  and,  amidst 
all  influences,  some  favourable  and  others  the  reverse, 
to  which  these  bodies  are  continually  subject,  the 
mineral  and  chemical  species  persist. 

If  we  take  living  things,  the  most  elementary 
organism,  even  that  of  a  cell,  presents  an  harmonious 
and  astonishingly  complex  arrangement  of  mechani- 
cal, physical,  and  chemical  forces,  the  combination 
of  which  is  indispensable  to  their  being  organized. 
Albuminoid  substances  are  at  least  fivefold,  made  of 
carbon,  hydrogen,  nitrogen,  oxygen  and  sulphur.  An 
albuminoid  molecule  comprises  hundreds  of  atoms. 
How  complex,  then,  is  the  composition  of  proto- 
plasm ?  And  what  can  be  said  of  the  cell  itself, 
and  of  the  differentiation  of  its  organism  ?  Still 
more,  what  is  to  be  said  of  multicellular  organisms 
which  have  given  rise  to  innumerable  animal  and 
vegetable  species  throughout  the  world  ? 

And  each  of  these  organisms  in  each  one  of  its 
parts  is  subject  to  continual  motions  of  assimilation 
or  of  dissimilation.  The  living  thing  grows  and 
multiplies,  and  this  flow  of  life  goes  on  for  centuries, 
and"  indefinitely,  without  the  biological  kingdom 
ever  being  invaded  by  disorder. 

Is  all  this  the  work  of  chance  ?  It  is  no  use  to 
say  that  all  this  is  the  result  of  organization,  for 
the  thing  we  are  trying  to  account  for  is  organization 
itself,  the  harmonious  whole  appropriated  to  the 


PRINCIPLES  OF  MECHANISM          281 

operation  of  life  which  it  realizes,  and  its  generaliza- 
tion in  space  and  perpetuation  in  time. 

It  is  of  no  use  to  say  with  Darwin,  that  circum- 
stances happen  to  be  favourable  and  organisms  are 
adjusted  to  their  environment  and  become  pro- 
gressively stronger  in  the  struggle  for  life.  In  this 
theory  of  natural  selection  there  is  simply  a  petitio 
principii.  For,  how  is  it  that  the  instance,  which 
is  surrounded  with  favourable  circumstances  that 
adapt  it  to  its  environment  and  strengthen  it  in  the 
struggle  for  life,  resists  adverse  influences  of  the 
environment,  and  struggles  for  life  successfully 
when  the  dispositions,  which  are  assumed  to  be  in- 
dispensable for  it  not  to  succumb,  are  wanting  to  it  ? 

Years,  and  perhaps  centuries,  are  required  before 
an  accumulation  of  happy  changes,  with  the  help 
of  heredity,  can  create  an  organ  capable  of  some 
new,  useful,  or  necessary  function.  In  the  interval, 
whence  does  the  living  thing  derive  its  power  of 
resistance  ?  To  resist,  it  must  find  a  base  of 
resistance.  But,  ex  hypothesi,  this  base  does  not 
yet  exist ;  then,  how  can  it  make  resistance  possible 
before  it  has  come  into  being  ? 

Of  the  harmonious  disposition  and  the  persistence 
of  organized  types,  as,  in  a  more  general  way,  of  the 
existence  and  persistence  of  specific  types  in  nature, 
there  is  only  one  plausible  explanation :  that  is  that 
each  one  of  such  specific  types  must  have  within  it 
an  internal  principle  of  stability,  in  virtue  of  which 
the  elements  and  forces  at  the  disposal  of  any  given 
substance  respectively  take  that  direction,  that  is 
demanded  by  the  conservation  and  development  of 
the  whole. 


282   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Now,  it  was  these  internal  principles  of  stability 
that  the  medieval  philosophers  called,  along  with 
Aristotle,  specific  forms,  or  specific  substantial  forms, 
of  nature's  combinations. 

That  which  in  the  order  of  a  being's  constitution 
is  called  its  specific  form,  is  in  the  order  of  finality 
the  internal  principle  which  induces  the  being  to 
act  and  to  incline  itself  with  all  its  powers  towards 
the  end  which  the  Author  of  nature  has  assigned  to 
its  activity. 

The  principle  of  finality  does  not  add  a  new  force 
to  efficient  forces.  It  is  not  meant  to  explain  the 
production  of  a  contingent  residue,  which  the 
inevitable  laws  of  efficiency  could  not  account  for. 
It  is  the  necessary  complement  implanted  in  nature 
itself,  in  virtue  of  which  the  fundamental  principle 
of  efficiency  and  all  the  forces  or  faculties  derived 
from  it  are  enabled  to  exert  their  activity. 

Thus,  between  the  efficient  cause  and  the  final 
cause  there  is  a  true  mutual  interdependence.  The 
efficient  principle  is  the  cause  of  the  end,  and  the 
final  cause  is  the  cause  of  efficiency.  The  efficient 
principle  is  the  cause  of  the  end,  for  it  must  be  so. 
The  end,  in  its  turn,  is  the  cause  of  efficiency,  for 
efficiency  only  arises  in  order  to  realize  the  end. 
Hence  it  is  from  the  end  that  the  agent  derives  its 
power  of  efficiency.1 

To  deny  the  principle  of  inward  principles  is  to 

1  Efficiens  est  causa  finis,  finis  autem  causa  efficientis, 
Ejficiens  est  causa  finis  quantum  ad  esse  quidem,  quia  movendo 
perducit  efficiens  ad  hoc  quod  sit  finis.  Finis  autem  est 
causa  efficientis  non  quantum  ad  esse,  sed  quantum  ad 
rttionem  causalitatis.  Nam  efficiens  est  causa  in  quantum 
agit ;  non  autem  agit  nisi  causa  finis.  Unde  ex  fine  habet 
suam  causalitatem  efficiens. — St.  Thomas,  in  V  Metaph., 


PRINCIPLES  OF  MECHANISM         283 

condemn  oneself  to  substitute  for  the  rational  ex- 
planation of  facts  a  magical  word  Chance,  which 
explains  nothing;  or  else,  it  is  to  go  back  to  an 
extrinsic  Cause,  and  to  its  immediate  intervention 
at  every  moment  in  the  production  of  all  the  pheno- 
mena of  things  created,  and  of  the  existence  and 
preservation  of  the  order  of  nature. 

These  inferences  are  confirmed  by  history.  The 
Occasionalism  of  Malebranche  and  of  Leibnitz, 
which  substitutes  the  immediate  action  of  God  for 
the  action  of  secondary  causes ;  Darwinian  theories, 
renewing  the  theory  of  Chance  of  Democritus  and 
Empedocles;  these  sprang  from  the  antifinalist 
physics  of  Descartes  and  Bacon,  just  as  an  explosion 
arises  from  a  heap  of  slowly  accumulated  explosive 
materials. 

Lect.  2.  See  on  this  subject  M.  Domet  de  Verges,  Cause 
efficient*  et  cause  finale  (printed  from  the  Annales  de  philo- 
sophie  chretienne),  pp.  130  ff.  Cf.  P.  de  Regnon,  La  meta- 
physique  des  causes,  Liv.  VI.,  Ch.  III.;  and  Mercier,  Meta- 
physique  generate  ou  Ontologie,  4th  ed.,  Louvain,  1905, 
pp.  4513-517. 


CHAPTER  VII 
CRITICISM  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM 

ONLY  the  sensible  is  the  object  of  knowledge,  so 
that  for  us  the  non-sensible  must  be  synonymous 
with  the  unreal. 

Such  is  the  fundamental  doctrine  of  positivists 
when,  like  John  Stuart  Mill,  they  lay  down  the 
thesis  that  man's  mind  has  only  one  mode  of  thought, 
"  the  mode  of  thinking  positively  " — i.e.,  in  ordinary 
speech,  that  man  can  only  know  in  one  way,  by 
the  way  of  the  senses. 

The  discussion  to  which  positivism  gives  rise  is 
concentrated  in  this  essential  proposition:  that  the 
sensible  comprises  the  whole  sphere  of  the  know- 
able  ("  all  our  knowledge  is  the  knowledge  of 
sensations  ") ;  and  man  is,  by  nature,  in  ignorance 
of  everything  outside  of  the  empirical  order. 

But  this  proposition  is  a  postulate  without  any 
justification.  That  the  primary  material  of  all  our 
knowledge  is  furnished  by  sensible  experience, 
outward  or  inward,  we  are  far  from  disputing.  We 
have  already  taken  care  to  lay  down  the  same 
doctrine  in  opposition  to  the  theories  of  innate 
knowledge  which  are  derived  from  Descartes. 

But  there  is  no  proof  that  the  materials  thus 
gained  must  indefinitely  keep  the  characteristics  of 

284 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          285 

concreteness  and  contingence  which  appertain  to 
them  in  nature  and  in  our  sensational  perceptions 
of  them.  Along  with  Aristotle  and  all  the  medieval 
philosophers,  we  venture  to  maintain  that  the 
empirically  acquired  materials  are  found  to  be  sub- 
jected in  us  to  a  mental  elaboration  which  makes 
us  see  them,  apart  from  their  particular  character- 
istics, in  an  abstract  condition.  Every  time  we 
ask  what  a  thing  is,  il  ecru,  according  to  the  well- 
known  phrase  of  Aristotle,  we  try  to  define  it  by 
means  of  an  abstract  statement;  the  being  that 
anything  is,  TO  ri  fy  elvai,  is  present  to  the  mind, 
in  its  abstract  state. 

Beings  are  arranged  in  classes,  occurrences  under 
laws,  and  general  sciences  are  established,  because 
abstract  being,  reflectively  considered  in  that  which 
in  its  own  nature  and  in  our  sensations  gives  it 
individuality,  may  be  referred  to  an  indefinite 
series  of  subjects  which  possess,  or  may  possess, 
underlying  their  own  distinctive  features,  the  one 
nature  which  the  mind  was  able  to  abstract  from 
them. 

If  positivism  is  right,  in  all  this  there  is  nothing 
but  so  many  mental  illusions.  The  notion  of  the 
abstract  is  a  chimera.  The  notion  of  the  universal 
is  but  a  collective  notion — i.e.,  a  limited  sum  of 
perceptions.  The  notion  of  the  right  (straight),  for 
instance,  or  of  all  right  lines  would  find  no  place  in 
our  list  of  knowledge.  We  should  only  know  lines 
as  determined  by  their  concrete  characters  of  size, 
direction,  and  material  substratum,  by  their  position 
in  space,  and  by  their  realization  in  nature  at  a 
given  moment. 


286   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Mathematical  and  metaphysical  laws  would  be 
nothing  but  brief  statements  condensing  a  definite 
number  of  sensations  and  ascertained  results  for 
the  convenience  of  memory.  Demonstrative  reason- 
ing, separate  inductions,  would  only  possess  a  verbal 
value,  and  induction  itself  would  only  be  an  accumu- 
lation of  experiences.  Science  and  philosophy 
would  thus  be  finally  nothing  but  a  co-ordination  of 
empirical  judgements. 

But,  to  make  a  thesis  out  of  such  paradoxical 
ideas,  they  should  be  supported  with  proofs.  For, 
before  thinking  that  the  spontaneous  judgements  of 
mankind  are  at  fault,  as  Pere  Monsabre  shrewdly 
observes,  it  is  legitimate  to  presume  that  mankind 
is  right. 

Positivism  has  no  scruples  of  this  kind.  It 
formulates  straight  away,  as  if  it  were  axiomatically 
plain,  the  principle  that  the  sensible  and  the  sensible 
alone  can  be  the  object  of  knowledge. 

But  this  principle  is  far  from  being  clearly  proved. 
The  ideas  of  being  and  corporal  being  do  not  mean 
the  same  thing.  Corporeity  adds  something  to 
being  which  being  does  not  include .  Thus  there  is  an 
intelligibility  intrinsically  attaching  to  being,  quite 
independently  of  the  intelligibility  attaching  to  cor- 
poral being. 

Hence  it  plainly  follows  that  the  intrinsic  possi- 
bility of  incorporeal  beings  cannot  be  denied  a  priori 
on  the  ground  of  the  analysis  of  our  essential  concepts. 

No  doubt  the  intrinsic  possibility  of  beings  that 
differ  from  bodies  can  no  more  be  affirmed  a  priori  ; 
for,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  our  concepts  owe  all  their 
positive  content  to  sensible  experience,  and  sensible 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          287 

experience  only  has  to  do,  and  can  only  have  to 
do,  with  the  corporeal.  Hence  we  do  not  see  any 
positive  possibility  of  the  immaterial,  nor  conse- 
quently, how  it  can  be  positively  intelligible  by 
means  of  some  suprasensible  power  of  intellection; 
but  neither  do  we  see  the  evident  impossibility  of 
the  immaterial,  and  consequently,  the  evident 
impossibility  of  hyperempirical  knowledge. 

The  entire  discussion  as  to  the  possibility  or 
impossibility  of  metaphysics  depends  upon  this 
distinction. 

This  discussion  cannot  be  resolved  a  priori,  and  it 
is  unscientific  to  settle  it  by  cutting  the  Gordian 
knot  with  a  simple  negation. 

We  who  oppose  metaphysics  to  agnosticism  claim 
to  start  from  empirical  facts  and  to  show  that,  even 
on  empirical  grounds,  contradiction  is  inevitable  if 
the  immaterial  does  not  exist.  If  it  exists,  ap- 
parently it  is  possible ;  and  the  rights  of  metaphysics 
are  assured.  Hence  the  positivist  plea  to  bar 
discussion  on  the  point  is  a  flagrant  refusal  of 
justice  in  our  case. 

Whoever  comes  forward  with  proofs  of  the  exist- 
ence, and  therefore  of  the  possibility,  of  the  im- 
material, has  a  right  to  be  heard.  It  is  mere 
prejudice  to  deny  him  a  hearing. 

Besides,  anyone  who  thinks  takes  a  hand  in 
metaphysics,  either  by  way  of  negation  or  of  affirma- 
tion. For,  by  the  very  fact  of  denying  metaphysics, 
the  agnostic  implicitly  recognizes  the  existence  of 
the  problems  to  which  it  gives  rise. 

Will  it  be  said  that  the  time  for  the  making  of 
a  priori  systems,  after  the  manner  of  Fichtes 


288   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Schilling,  Hegel,  Hartmann,  and  Schopenhauer,  is 
past ;  and  that  the  Comparison  of  the  sustained  pro- 
gress of  the  natural  sciences  that  investigate  realities 
with  the  barrenness  of  metaphysics  during  the  first 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century  should  teach  us  to 
keep  clear  of  systems,  the  sole  merit  of  which,  if  it 
can  be  regarded  as  a  merit,  lies  in  the  originality 
of  their  inventors  ?  Well,  here  we  are  all  agreed. 

But  there  are  certain  general  problems  which 
particular  sciences  do  not  resolve,  though  they  lead 
up  to  them.  Beyond  the  confines  of  physics  and 
psychology  there  are  certain  ultimate  questions  as 
to  the  nature  of  matter  and  mind,  and  as  to  the 
manner  of  conceiving  the  universality  of  things. 
To  such  "  final  and  universal  "  problems,  as  Paulsen 
rightly  observes,  man  inevitably  seeks  an  answer  as 
long  as  he  is  inspired  with  a  desire  to  know,  and  in 
this  sense,  he  continues,  metaphysics  is  immortal.1 

The  inner  nature  of  beings,  their  relations  in  the 
universe  as  a  whole,  the  objectivity  and  the  genesis 
of  knowledge,  the  moral  import  of  men's  action: 
such  questions  as  these  must  always  be  of  interest 
to  the  thinking  mind.2 

1  Paulsen,  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie,  S.  46,  47. 

3  Paulsen  reduces  the  principal  metaphysical  problems 
of  to-day  to  the  following  terms : 

The  first  general  question  that  presents  itself  is  that  of 
the  nature  of  reality.  This  question  cannot  find  any  simple 
answer  off-hand,  for  the  real  is  not  presented  to  us  in  any 
uniform  manner.  There  is  visible  reality,  as  in  physics; 
but  there  is  also  invisible  reality,  as  in  psychology.  Are 
there  two  entirely  distinct  kinds  of  reality  ?  Can  the 
physical  kind  and  the  psychical  kind  be  reduced  to  one  and 
the  same  kind  ? 

The  differences  in  the  replies  to  this  question  result  from 
the  different  metaphysical  points  of  view,  which  are  de- 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          289 

About  seventy  years  ago,  when  Hegel  fell  from 
his  pedestal  and  was  trampled  upon  by  Schopen- 
hauer, when  "  the  Hegelian  extreme  left,"  repre- 
sented by  Feuerbach,  Bruno  Bauer,  Max  Stirner, 
and  Arnold  Ruge,  turned  its  back  upon  its  master, 
and  identified  the  "  idea  "  with  concrete  nature, 
just  as  any  materialist  atheist  of  the  eighteenth 

signaled  by  the  names  of  Dualism,  Materialism,  Spiritualism 
or  Idealism. 

Philosophy  always  tends  from  dualism  towards  monism, 
and,  according  to  the  unity  in  which  it  results,  reverts  to  a 
monism  that  is  materialist,  or  idealist,  or  tinctured  with 
agnosticism. 

The  second  problem  is  cosmological  or  theological.  It  may 
be  stated  thus :  What  must  be  our  notion  of  the  connection 
of  things  ?  What  is  the  form  of  reality  regarded  as  a  whole  ? 

Atomism,  Theism,  and  Pantheism,  are  the  different  replies 
to  this  question.  Atomism  or  pluralism  is  not  necessarily 
materialistic;  as  witness  the  monadology  of  Leibnitz, 
which  has  an  idealist  or  spiritualist  character. 

But  here  again  we  find  the  pluralist  philosophy  betraying 
a  persistent  tendency  towards  unity.  The  monistic  con- 
ception of  the  universe  presupposes  either  a  unity  of  plan, 
i.e.,  theism,  or  else  a  unity  of  reality  or  substance,  i.e., 
pantheism. 

Other  problems  have  to  do  with  knowledge.  Under- 
lying them  are  two  which  deal  respectively  with  the  objec- 
tive value,  and  with  the  origin,  of  knowledge. 

What  is  knowledge  ?  To  this  first  question  there  are  the 
answers  of  Realism,  Idealism,  or  Phenomenalism. 

How  do  we  come  to  know  ?  To  this  second  question  we 
have  the  replies  of  empiricism,  and  rationalism. 

Lastly,  a  final  problem  is  that  of  the  moral  order.  Men's 
actions  and  feelings  have  not  all  the  same  value.  What  is 
the  supreme  rule  for  ascertaining  the  value  of  men's  actions  ? 

Teleological  ethics,  which  in  England  is  called  Utilitarian, 
regards  as  good  or  bad  what  is  favourable  or  unfavourable 
to  the  individual  or  to  the  totality  of  mankind.  Formalist 
or  intuitionalist  morality  is  represented  by  Hedonism,  and 
it  takes  pleasure  or  happiness  as  the  basis  of  morality;  or 
by  Energism,  which  makes  the  highest  good  consist  in 
turning  to  the  best  possible  account  the  highest  capacities 
of  man's  nature. — Einleitung  in  die  Philosophic,  S.  48-52. 

19 


290   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

century  might  have  done,  when  Buchner,  Moleschott, 
and  Karl  Vogt  put  materialism  upon  the  dishonoured 
altar  of  science — a  superficial  observer  might  have 
inferred  that  metaphysics  had  been  carried  away  in 
the  revolutionary  whirlwind. 

But  this  reaction  only  carried  away  what  Wundt 
called  the  "fictions"  of  metaphysical  thought. 
The  inquiry  into  the  fundamental  problems,  before 
which  particular  sciences  stop  short,  inevitably 
dominates  all  philosophic  thinking. 

The  unity  of  composition  of  natural  beings;  the 
ontological  priority  of  the  mental — i.e.,  of  a  sub- 
stratum of  appetition — over  physical  reality,  by 
means  of  the  mechanism  of  idea-forces;  the  law  of 
universal  evolution,  the  negation  of  the  transcendent ; 
idealism  as  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  knowledge ; 
the  construction  of  morals  upon  the  illusory  notion 
of  free  will:  such  is  the  metaphysics  of  Fouillee, 
either  in  the  form  of  postulate/or  by  way  of  inference . 

Experience  requires  a  complement,  writes  Wundt. 

1  When  Fouillee,  who  is  an  idealist  and  an  agnostic  in 
his  theory  of  knowledge,  reproaches  Spencer  with  the 
transcendent  character  of  the  "  unknowable,"  and  sub- 
stitutes for  it  a  radically  immanent  philosophy ;  when  he 
reproaches  the  Spencerian  evolutionism  with  leaving  behind 
it  a  dualism  between  physical  facts  and  psychic  facts,  and 
opposes  to  it  a  unity  of  composition  in  beings  and  the  bound- 
less universality  of  their  law  of  evolution,  what  is  he  doing 
but  laying  down,  in  his  turn,  the  inevitable  postulates  of 
his  metaphysics  ? 

We  say  postulates,  for,  in  reality,  where  is  the  a  posteriori 
proof  of  the  existence  of  all  beings  ?  Where  is  the  a  priori 
proof  that  all  must  be  of  the  same  nature  (Monism),  subject 
to  constant  evolution  (Evolutionism),  free  from  all  trans- 
cendent influence  (the  philosophy  of  Immanence)  ?  How 
iudicious  is  Wundt  in  likening  all  these  a  priori  fabrications 

c  poetic  fictions,  and  in  returning  to  the  solid  ground  ol 
experience  1 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          291 

The  principle  of  sufficient  reason  supported  by 
experimental  data  maintains  the  reason  in  its  ascent 
towards  the  transcendent,  and  leads  it  on  in  psycho- 
logy, cosmology,  and  ontology,  to  applying  the 
notions  of  unity  and  totality. 

And  is  not  Herbert  Spencer's  philosophy,  which  he 
appeared  to  regard  as  necessarily  a  generalization 
from  experience,  definitively  a  reaction  against 
earth-to-earth  positivism  ? 

Are  not  the  fundamental  laws  of  evolution, 
especially  the  law  of  the  "  instability  of  the  homo- 
geneous,"1 with  its  rhythmical  balance  of  associa- 
tion and  dissociation,  evolution  and  dissolution, 
and  the  law  of  the  "  polarity  of  physiological 

1  This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  Spencer's  doctrine  of 
evolution,  but  here  we  may  note  the  essentially  hypothetical 
character  of  Spencer's  "  laws."  Thus  writes  M.  Yves 
Delage,  a  French  naturalist:  "  Biology  will  never  be  able  to 
get  anything  out  of  these  grand  and  sonorous  formulae, 
such  as  the  Instability  of  the  homogeneous.  What  is  the 
meaning  of  such  a  principle  ?  That  a  homogeneous  system 
tends  to  be  upset  and  to  become  heterogeneous  through 
incidental  forces.  Very  well:  but  what  can  be  made  out 
of  that  ?  Nothing  ! 

"  Variation,  says  Spencer,  is  inevitable  because  every 
system,  even  the  homogeneous,  is  unstable.  On  the  other 
hand,  an  egg  which  is  not  fertilized  cannot  develop  because, 
being  homogeneous,  it  is  not  unstable  enough;  it  must  have 
spermatozoid  to  diversify  its  substance,  to  make  it  hetero- 
geneous, to  destroy  its  stable  equilibrium,  and  to  set  evolu- 
tion in  motion.  Thus,  in  one  instance,  the  effect  is  produced 
in  spite  of  homogeneity :  in  another,  it  cannot  occur,  because 
of  homogeneity.  Thus,  all  depends  upon  the  quantity,  the 
degree  of  homogeneity.  What  degree  is  compatible  with 
the  production  of  a  given  effect  ?  The  principle  does  not 
tell  us.  Yet  this  is  the  only  thing  that  matters.  The  cause 
of  the  variation  in  one  instance,  although  homogeneous,  and 
of  passivity  in  another  case,  because  it  is  homogeneous,  is 
quite  undiscovered,  and  has  to  be  found.  Similar  instances 
might  be  multiplied." — Delage,  La  structure  du  protoplasiaa 
et  les  theories  sur  I' heredity,  p.  438,  Paris,  Remwald,  1895. 


292   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

units,"  -1  metaphysical  hypotheses  as  to  the  origins 
of  things  ? 

Is  not  the  general  conclusion  of  First  Principles— 
"  that  there  is  an  Absolute  which  is  to  us  unknow- 
able; that  it  is  the  one  permanent  substratum  of 
movement,  change,  matter,  force,  and  conscious- 
ness " — an  attempt  to  answer  the  insistent  onto- 
logical  and  epistemological  questions,  of  which 
Paulsen  recounts  the  formulae  ? 

No  doubt  Spencer's  way  of  answering  them  seems 
at  first  sight  contradictory.  If,  as  the  English 
philosopher  tried  to  prove,  the  absolute,  matter, 
and  the  Ego,  are  notions  made  up  of  contradictory 
elements;  the  absolute,  matter*  and  the  Ego,  are 
intrinsically  impossible;  and  then  it  is  only  too 
plain  that  they  do  not  exist. 

If  thought  is  subject  to  the  law  of  relativity,  and 
the  knowledge  of  the  absolute  excludes  the  condi- 
tions of  relativity;  if  consciousness  implies  a  real 
duality  of  terms,  it  is  evident  that  a  subject  knowing 
itself,  in  its  identity,  as  object,  is  something  self- 

1  "  Polarity  simply  means  an  attractive  force  directed  in 
a  certain  manner,  Such  a  force  can  only  vary  in  strength, 
direction,  and  in  its  point  of  application.  These  three 
factors  are  incapable  of  much  variety  of  combination.  The 
variety  of  forms  of  crystals  shows  us  undoubtedly  all  that 
can  be  expected  of  them.  Suppose  that  there  intervene, 
besides,  the  form  assumed  by  the  aggregate  at  every  moment 
of  its  progressive  complexity.  Imagination  refuses  to  con- 
ceive that  here  are  to  be  found  the  elements  of  a  variety 
of  forms  equal  to  the  variety  of  organisms.  Has  Spencer 
himself  succeeded  in  representing  to  himself,  even  by 
approximate  analogy,  the  initial  difference  between  the 
units  of  two  closely-related  species,  which  are  only  distin- 
guishable from  one  another  by  a  few  very  slight  character- 
istics appearing  at  the  end  of  their  ontogenesis  ?" — Delage, 
op.  cit.,  p.  439. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          293 

contradictory,  and  the  conclusion  cannot  be  escaped : 
thought  cannot  attain  to  the  absolute  nor  to  the 
Ego. 

What  an  imperious  metaphysical  want  must  have 
been  felt  by  Spencer  to  make  him  affirm,  in  spite 
of  the  criterion  of  inconceivability  which  he  had 
made  his  norm  of  thought,  the  existence  of  the 
transcendent  Unknowable  !  And  yet  Spencer  main- 
tains that  this  transcendent  which  he  does  not  know 
is  One  ;  he  maintains  that  it  is  permanent,  and  tells 
us  that  it  is  subject  to  the  law  of  evolution  from  the 
homogeneous  to  the  heterogeneous.  And  unknow- 
able matter,  subject  to  motion ;  and  the  unknowable 
Ego,  the  subject  of  states  of  consciousness;  and 
God,  the  unknowable  substratum  of  all  religions: 
these  are  considered  to  be  identical.  Can  there  be 
anything  more  inconceivable,  and  at  the  same 
time  more  arbitrary,  than  such  an  identification  as 
this? 

Does  not  the  inward  resistance  that  Spencer  must 
have  overcome  in  order  to  maintain  the  coexistence 
in  one  and  the  same  system  of  thought,  of  so  many 
incoherent  parts,  provide  a  striking  proof  that  when 
science  is  pushed  to  its  last  generalizations,  it 
necessarily  leads  on  to  metaphysics  ? 

But  is  not  metaphysics,  even  if  possible,  even  if 
peremptorily  demanded  by  the  reason,  even  if 
inevitable  by  agnostics  who  practise  it  while  they 
deny  it,  essentially  of  a  tendency  that  runs  counter 
to  scientific  progress  ? 

M.  Comte's  three  stages  of  theology,  metaphysics, 
and  physics  are  set  before  us.  Do  they  not  follow 
the  path  of  progress  ?  In  the  lives  of  peoples,  as 


294   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

in  the  growth  of  individuals,  do  they  not  correspond 
with  childhood,  youth,  and  full-grown  manhood  ? 

Historically,  we  must  make  decided  reservations. 
It  may  be  admitted  that  at  various  historical  periods, 
the  efforts  of  man's  mind  are  more  or  less  charac- 
terized by  a  tendency  either  towards  faith,  or 
towards  metaphysics,  or  towards  sciences  of  obser- 
vation ;  but  it  is  not  true,  that  at  any  period  in  the 
historic  life  of  a  people  one  of  these  tendencies 
excludes  the  others. 

Who  dares  to  deny  that  in  Aristotle,  for  instance, 
the  most  perfect  metaphysical  intelligence  was  not 
found  robustly  combined  with  a  most  strenuous  spirit 
of  observation  ?  Did  not  a  whole  School,  the  glorious 
School  of  Alexandria,  so  remarkable  for  its  faith, 
react  strongly  against  the  unscientific  exaggerations 
of  the  African  School,  and,  in  the  persons  of  the  prin- 
cipal masters  of  the  Didascaleon,  brilliantly  combine 
the  most  analytical  knowledge  of  things  with  the 
most  abstract  conceptions  of  the  world  of  thought  ? 

Were  not  Descartes,  Leibnitz,  and  Newton,  at  the 
same  time  believers,  metaphysicians,  and  men  of 
science  ?  Nearer  to  our  own  days,  did  Kant  and 
Helmholtz  and  Wundt  cease  to  be  scientists  because 
they  were  metaphysicians  ?  No;  they  began  with 
science,  and  contrary  to  what  Comte  maintains, 
science  led  them  on  to  metaphysics. 

One  endeavours  in  vain  to  reconcile  these  facts, 
and  a  host  of  others,  with  the  three  "  historical  " 
stages  of  Auguste  Comte.  All  that  transpires  from 
the  charges  of  the  French  positivist  is,  that  he 
confused  "  unchecked  fancies  "  with  "  metaphysics," 
and  "  fetichism  "  with  "  religion." 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          295 

"  No   doubt,"   writes   one   of  our   young   philo- 
sophers,  "  with  regard  to  the  latter  confusion  of 
ideas,    both    religion    and    philosophy    presuppose 
a  belief  in  something  that  is  incomprehensible  and 
supernatural;    but    superstitious    belief    is    blind, 
arbitrary,    and   generally   inept,    and   in   manifest 
contradiction  with  the   conclusions  of  experience, 
which  reveals  a  universal  and  constant  order  in  the 
world.     On  the  contrary,  religious  belief,  of  which 
monotheism  is  the  highest  expression,  far  from  being 
repugnant  to  an  order  of  this  kind,  spontaneously 
springs   from   it.  ...     Since    religion   and   super- 
stition grow  in  inverse  proportion  to  one  another, 
it  is  clearly  a  mistake  to  confound  them  together."1 
Then,  take  the  case  of  the  individual.     No  doubt 
the  child  believes  before  it  has  had  time  for  personal 
reflection.     Education    and    faith    make    the    first 
foundation  of  knowledge.     But  does  it  follow  that 
as  soon  as  reflection  arises  it  drives  out  the  beliefs 
of   education    and   religious    faith  ?     In    order   to 
cultivate  physical  science  profitably,  must  we  begin 
by  denying  the  traditional  stock  of  metaphysical 
teaching  ?     Plainly,  No. 

What  proves  that  these  three  states  can  coexist 
without  injury  to  one  another  is,  that  they  have 
in  fact  coexisted  in  the  finest  minds  that  have  been 
an  honour  to  humanity. 

From  the  special  point  of  view  of  the  cultivation 
of  the  physical  sciences,  religious  and  metaphysical 
prepossessions  may  be  harmful.  In  science,  it  is  of 
little  use  to  appeal  to  extrinsic  and  distant  causes. 

1  Jean  Halleux,  Les  principes  du  positivisme  contemporain, 
Louvain,  Institut  superieur  de  Philosophic,  1895. 


296   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  only  means  of  proof  that  is  strictly  scientific  is 
that  which  Aristotle  calls  the  d-TroSetft?  Sion,  and 
it  consists  in  connecting  the  observed  phenomena 
with  the  alriat,  oliceiai,  the  intrinsic  and  immediate 
properties  of  the  subject. 

To  account  for  an  illness  by  the  state  of  one's 
humours  or  by  the  morbid  conditions  of  one's 
temperament  was  not  the  way  to  practise  the  science 
of  therapeutics.  To  indicate  the  bacillus  that  gives 
rise  to  an  illness,  to  describe  the  mode  of  its  para- 
sitical life,  the  chemical  reactions  that  it  produces, 
the  creation  of  toxic  matters  by  it,  and  the  mode 
of  infection  introduced  by  such  matters  into  the 
body — such  is  the  purpose  of  pathological  science. 

To  account  for  the  complexity  of  our  psycho- 
logical life  by  indeterminate  principles  concealed 
under  the  name  of  faculties  or  of  the  soul,  is  not  to 
practise  the  science  of  psychology,  but  to  be  satisfied 
with  mere  words.  It  means  barring  the  path  of 
psychology,  for  the  transitory  satisfaction  derived 
from  such  apparent  solutions  lull  the  idle  mind,  and 
hinder  the  pursuit  of  the  real  investigation  of  causes. 
To  put  God  in  the  place  of  secondary  causes,  as 
was  done  by  Malebranche,  and  by  Leibnitz  in 
psychology,  is  to  make  scientific  effort  useless  and 
to  numb  the  human  mind  with  barren  belief. 

And  when,  like  the  physicists  of  to-day,  who 
attribute  to  an  assumed  ether  or  ethers  the  physical 
manifestations  of  heat,  light,  and  electricity,  of  the 
nature  and  generating  antecedents  of  which  they 
know  nothing,  the  Scholastics  of  the  days  of  deca- 
"dence,  not  satisfied  with  using  mysterious  expressions 
to  designate  the  cause  of  which  they  knew  that  they 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM  297 

were  ignorant,  thought  they  were  doing  some  good 
by  substituting  for  the  concrete  fact  that  demanded 
an  explanation  the  very  same  fact  hidden  beneath 
some  abstract  statement,  they  blocked  the  road  to 
knowledge  and  barred  all  advance  along  it. 

Auguste  Comte  was  quite  right  in  revolting 
against  the  religious  fetichism  which  substituted 
artificial  idols  for  the  one  God  of  reason  and  of 
reasoned  faith,  and  against  the  metaphysical 
fetichism  which  arbitrarily  introduced  into  positive 
science  indeterminate  entities,  which  have  no 
connection  with  the  facts  they  have  to  explain. 
His  Cours  de  philosophic  positive  marked  a  return 
to  the  Aristotelian  conception,  which  is  such  a 
strict  one  of  science  that  it  has  never  been  surpassed 
in  accuracy— a  conception  according  to  which  science 
might  be  defined  as  "A  systematized  whole  of 
propositions,  either  immediately  or,  by  means  of 
other  propositions,  mediately  evident  and  certain, 
drawn  from  the  nature  and  distinctive  properties  of 
a  given  subject,  and  enabling  one  to  see  in  these 
properties  the  foundations  of  the  laws  that  govern 
the  observed  phenomena." 

There  you  have  science,  there  is  the  satisfaction 
sought  for  by  man's  mind.  All  investigations  that 
do  not  go  beyond  a  statement  of  the  fact,  or  its 
indirect  and  remote  causes,  do  not  get  further  than 
the  preliminaries  of  science  strictly  so  called. 

Metaphysics  itself  is  largely  one  with  science  in 
this  sense.  No  doubt  there  are  axiomatic  proposi- 
tions and  certain  general  inferences  for  the  dis- 
covery of  the  elements  of  which  the  commonest 
observation  suffices.  The  history  of  philosophy 


298   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

shows  clearly  enough  that  the  finest  minds  in  meta- 
physics have  borrowed  from  facts  within  everyone's 
reach  the  perennis  philosophia  ;  but  it  is  yet  true 
that  science  is  the  ordinary  road  to  metaphysical 
progress.  Before  assigning  to  the  universality  of 
things  their  ultimate  causes,  it  is  but  natural  to 
assign  to  the  heterogeneous  groups  which  it  includes 
their  respective  immediate  causes.  At  the  end  of 
a  period  such  as  our  own,  in  which  mechanical 
physics  and  mathematics  have  so  largely  widened 
then*  domain,  in  which  chemistry,  biology,  embryo- 
logy, and  psycho-physics  have  been  established,  and 
in  which  so  many  other  auxiliary  sciences  are 
assiduously  bringing  with  them  their  contribution 
to  thought — who  does  not  dream  of  some  genius 
coming  to  make  a  metaphysical  synthesis  of  this  vast 
sum  of  knowledge  ? 

Christian  Wolf  struck  a  mortal  blow  at  meta- 
physics when  he  shattered  the  intellectual  trilogy  that 
had  always  been  inviolably  respected  by  the  ancients. 
The  day  when  natural  science  and  mathematics 
were  divorced  from  metaphysics,  there  remained  no 
common  language  between  the  men  specially 
devoted  to  each  of  them.  Hence  ambiguities  arose ; 
the  terms  used  to  express  the  most  fundamental 
ideas,  such  as  those  of  matter,  substance,  movement, 
cause,  force,  and  energy,  and  many  others,  were  used 
in  different  senses  in  science  and  philosophy.  Thence 
arose  misunderstandings  which  isolation  accentuated, 
and  thus  men  came  to  think,  like  Auguste  Comte, 
that  science  and  metaphysics  were  incompatible, 
and  even  in  necessary  conflict  with  one  another. 
But  this  supposed  opposition  in  the  tendencies 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          299 

of  science  and  metaphysics  is  unnatural.  Particular 
sciences  are  an  integral  part  of  philosophy.  Every 
consistent  scientist  must  be  a  metaphysician  in  his 
own  department. 

There  is  only  a  superficial  divergence  between  the 
old  conception  of  metaphysics  and  the  "  great  new 
special  science  "  demanded  by  A.  Comte  for  "  the 
study  of  scientific  generalities."  "  Let  us  be  on 
our  guard,"  he  said,  "  lest  man's  mind  end  by 
getting  lost  in  works  of  detail.  Let  us  not  hide 
from  ourselves  that  this  is  essentially  the  weak 
side  on  which  the  supporters  of  theological  philo- 
sophy and  metaphysical  philosophy  may  again 
attack  positive  philosophy  with  some  hope  of  success. 
The  true  way  to  check  the  hurtful  influences  that 
seem  to  threaten  the  future  of  thought,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  too  great  specialization  of  individual 
researches,  is  evidently  not  to  revert  to  the  old 
confusion  of  labour  which  would  tend  to  make 
man's  mind  retrogress,  and  which  to-day  has  also 
happily  become  impossible.  On  the  contrary,  it 
consists  in  perfecting  the  very  division  of  labour 
itself.  It  is,  in  fact,  enough  to  make  of  the  study 
of  scientific  generalizations  one  more  great  special 
study."1 

Whence,  then,  does  the  disagreement  between  the 
older  metaphysics  and  agnostic  positivism  arise  ? 

It  depends  far  more  upon  misunderstandings  than 
upon  fundamental  differences. 

The  first  misunderstanding  comes  from  the  fact 
that  a  large  number  of  the  defenders  and  adversaries 
1  Cours  de  philosophic  positive,  t.  i.,  pp.  29,  30. 


300   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

t 

of  metaphysics  have  too  narrow  a  conception  of  it. 
They  think  that  it  is  entirely  bound  up  with  the 
reflective  method,  and  consequently  regard  it  as 
outside  of,  if  not  hostile  to,  the  methods  of  scientific 
observation. 

Descartes  and  Christian  Wolf  were  the  first 
originators  of  this  unfortunate  mistake;  but  there 
were  many  others  who  inherited  the  spirit  of  Des- 
cartes and  Leibnitz  and  Maine  de  Biran,  and  were 
entirely  taken  up  with  criticism,  and  these  made 
metaphysics  consist  mainly  in  the  analysis  of  mind 
and  of  the  thinking  subject,  and  in  an  examination 
of  criteriological  problems. 

No  doubt,  the  thoughtful  establishment  of  the 
bases  of  knowledge  is  a  task  that  no  philosopher  of 
to-day  can  escape.  Socrates,  Plato,  Aristotle,  and 
the  doctors  of  the  School,  peacefully  enjoyed  a 
scientific  dogmatism  which  no  one  thought  of  dis- 
puting, and  their  time  has  gone  by.  Since  the  days 
of  Descartes,  Hume,  Kant,  and  Hegel,  the  discussion 
of  the  problems  of  epistemology  is  indispensable, 
but  it  does  not  follow  that  the  latter  should  take 
the  place  of  ontology. 

Metaphysics  remains  the  ultimate  science  of 
reality,  and  it  includes  the  real  outside  the  Ego  as 
well  as  the  real  perceived  by  consciousness.  Epis- 
temology, the  object  of  which  is  certitude — i.e.,  a 
property  of  knowledge — is  only  a  part  of  psychology, 
and,  a  fortiori,  a  very  restricted  part  of  metaphysics.1 

1  The  Scholastics  made  psychology  a  part  of  physics  or 
of  natural  philosophy.  Then,  successively,  psychology  was 
detached  from  physics ;  next,  ideology  from  psychology,  and 
now  criteriology  itself  or  epistemology  has  not  only  become 
an  independent  philosophical  science,  but  it  tends  to  mono- 
polize metaphysics, 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          301 

A  second  misunderstanding  has  to  do  with  the 
name  to  be  given  to  the  results  of  metaphysical 
speculation.     Must  we  say  that  the  object  of  meta 
physics  is  known  to  us  ?     Or  must  we  say,  with  the 
agnostic,  that  it  is  unknown  and  unknowable  ? 

The  object  of  metaphysics  is  twofold.  First  of 
all,  it  is  being  conceived  independently  of  matter — 
i.e.,  regarded  in  as  general  a  way  as  possible,  apart 
from  sensible  properties  and  from  quantity  in  a 
mathematical  sense.  The  mind  thus  conceives 
being  and  the  attributes  that  are  corollaries  of 
being — e.g.,  the  one  and  the  manifold,  power  and 
act.1  Then,  it  is  being  really  stripped  of  matter. 
Being  conceived  as  abstracted  from  all  material 
attributes  is  the  object  of  general  metaphysics: 
positively  immaterial  being  belongs  to  special 
metaphysics. 

In  neither  of  these  two  senses  is  the  object  of 
metaphysics  intelligible  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
objects  of  the  physical  and  mathematical  sciences. 

In  the  physical  sciences,  concrete  facts  and  sensible 
images ;  in  mathematics,  definite  figures  and  symbols 
sustain  thought ;  but  they  hinder  it  in  general  meta- 
physics, and  prevent  the  mind  from  getting  down  to 
the  very  foundation  of  things. 

As  for  positively  immaterial  being,  it  only  comes 
into  contact  with  man's  mind  indirectly. 

Therefore,  if  a  physicist  or  a  mathematician  think 
it  well  to  take  his  own  particular  science  as  the  sole 
type  of  man's  knowledge,  he  will  be  led  to  conclude 

1  Ilia  scientia  est  maxime  intellectualis,  quae  circa  principia 
maxime  universalia  versatur.  Quae  quidem  sunt  ens,  et  ea 
quae  consequuntur  ens,  ut  unum  et  multa,  potenlia  et  actus. — 
St.  Thomas,  In  XII.  Lib.  Metaph.  Prooemium. 


302   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

that  a  mental  representation  of  any  other  kind  is 
not  worth  calling  knowledge.  For  them  the  object 
of  metaphysics  becomes  unknowable.  And,  in  fact, 
it  is  so  in  the  arbitrarily  restricted  sense  they  apply 
to  the  act  of  knowing. 

Thereupon  comes  a  theorist  of  knowledge  who 
attributes  knowledge  or  the  concept  to  an  efficient 
principle  (Verstand)  which  is  distinct  from  that 
(Vernunft)  which  thinks  metaphysical  ideas,  and 
states  bis  conclusion  that  substances,  the  Ego,  and 
the  absolute,  are  ideas  of  the  reason,  but  that  they 
do  not  fall  within  the  reach  of  knowledge. 

This  is  how,  with  some  slight  differences,  Kant, 
Spencer,  Wundt,  and  many  others  express  them- 
selves. Does  this  mean  that,  according  to  these 
writers,  substances,  the  Ego,  and  God,  are,  in  every 
possible  sense  of  the  word,  unknowable  ? 

Clearly,  not.  Doubtless,  we  cannot  know  them 
as  objects  of  experience,  says  Kant,  for  every  object 
of  experience  is  conditioned  by  space  and  time; 
but  we  cannot  escape  from  the  necessity  of  thinking 
that  if  there  is  a  possibly  indefinite  series  of 
conditioned  phenomena,  the  sum  of  such  phenomena 
must  itself  have  a  condition  which  is  unconditioned, 
or,  to  put  it  more  explicitly,  an  absolute  which 
conditions  the  sum  of  the  phenomena  of  inward 
experience,  another  that  conditions  the  sum  of  the 
phenomena  of  external  experience,  and  lastly,  a 
third  which  conditions  all  that  is  conditioned;  the 
soul,  the  world,  God. 

"  We  have  no  definite  consciousness  of  the  Abso- 
lute," says  Spencer;  "  but  our  ideas  of  it  are  none 
the  less  real  because  of  their  incompleteness,  real 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM  303 

in  the  sense  of  being  modes,  indisputable  and 
normal  affections  of  the  mind."1 

The  English  metaphysician  is  so  conscious  of 
being  aware  of  the  absolute  that,  while  declaring 
that  it  is  unknowable,  he  makes  it  the  fundamental 
substratum  of  matter,  force,  motion,  and  conscious- 
ness, and  says  that  it  is  One. 

Again,  Wundt  tells  us  that  the  principle  of  sufficient 
reason  has  a  universal  bearing.  We  are  quite  right  in 
using  it  to  complete  the  data  of  experience  with  the 
help  of  elements  unperceivedby  experience,  but  which 
our  inevitable  need  of  unity  forces  us  to  conceive. 

These  masters  of  contemporary  philosophy,  how- 
ever bound  they  may  be  to  agnostic  positivism, 
cannot  deny  that  they  have  their  own  way  of  repre- 
senting to  themselves  that  metaphysical  world  which 
they  elsewhere  affirm  to  be  unknowable.  Indeed, 
they  must  form  some  representation  of  it,  since  they 
argue  about  it. 

Is  this  inconsistent  on  their  part  ?  We  think  not. 
The  distinction  they  set  up  between  the  knowable  and 
the  unknowable  fundamentally  corresponds,  in  our 
opinion,  with  the  old  Scholastic  distinction  between 
Positive,  proper,  and  immediate  notions,  and  those 
that  are  negative,  analogous,  and  transcendental. 

Let  us  try  to  justify  this  comparison  between 
the  language  of  agnostic  positivism  and  that  which 
is  universally  used  by  the  Schoolmen. 

For  this  purpose,  let  us  follow  the  progress  of 
thought  from  the  first  idea,  that  of  substance,  to 
the  last  idea,  that  of  the  absolute. 

1  See  above,  p.  103. 


304   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

When  the  cerebral  system  and  the  life  of  the 
senses  which  depends  upon  it  have  attained  their 
normal  development  and  make  the  dawn  of  mental 
life  possible,  what  is  the  first  step  taken  by  the 
mind,  and  what  is  the  significance  of  that  step  ? 
At  the  outset,  the  mind  only  grasps  the  accidental 
manifestations  of  matter.  It  regards  them,  indeed, 
as  things-in-themselves.  The  resistance  encountered 
by  the  hand  on  touching  anything,  and  the  light 
perceived  by  the  eyes,  these  are  given  by  the  mind 
as  something  that  resists,  something  bright.  The 
mind  attributes  to  them  the  indeterminate  character 
of  a  being  that  is — so  to  say — "  sistent,"  aliquid 
sistens,  and  the  indefinite  stammering  of  the  infant 
who  applies  the  demonstrative  pronoun,  cela,  das, 
that,  to  all  that  strikes  its  senses,  well  reflects  the 
mode  or  perception  of  the  first  object  of  thought. 

This  first  notion  is  but  the  notion  of  an  accident, 
but  of  an  accident  grasped  as  a  sistent  thing,  or  a 
thing-in-itself.  It  is  positive  and  proper,  and  the 
corollary  attributes  of  unity,  plurality,  act,  power, 
which  belong  to  the  first  head  of  general  metaphysics, 
offer  the  same  characteristics. 

But  as  soon  as  the  mind  passes  from  this  primary 
notion  of  a  sistent  thing  to  that  of  a  sw&sistent  thing 
or  substance,  it  brings  into  play  the  indirect  pro- 
cedure of  negation  and  analogy. 

When  reality  affords  us  in  an  undivided  aggregate, 
habitually  the  same,  various  accidents,  the  sub- 
jective sensations  that  correspond  with  them  are 
also  found  to  be  habitually  associated,  and  the 
subject  of  their  action  comes  to  represent  them  to 
itself  as  a  whole  of  given  things,  as  an  object. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          305 

The  mind  spontaneously  compares  together  the 
various  elements  of  the  composite  whole.  Some  of 
them  come  and  go,  appear  and  disappear,  others 
do  not  disappear  but  remain.  Discernment  between 
the  variable  manifestations  and  the  data  invariably 
found  amongst  a  larger  or  smaller  number  of  pheno- 
mena connected  with  some  natural  instance,  is  the 
first  spontaneous  outline  of  the  work  which,  in 
scientific  language,  is  called  induction.  The  latter, 
in  fact,  is  the  logical  procedure  which  mentally 
separates  the  stable  properties  of  a  thing  from  its 
contingent  accidents. 

Induction  enables  us  to  specify  beings  according 
to  their  properties.  The  latter  form  the  basis  of 
their  regular  mode  of  action,  and  establish  the  law 
of  their  distinctive  activity. 

Nevertheless,  even  the  instances  thus  specified, 
and  the  properties  that  characterize  them  have  only 
a  relative  stability.  A  more  careful  experiment 
bears  witness  to  this.  The  chemical  reactions  that 
daily  occur  under  everyone's  eyes  in  nature,  as  well 
as  those  effected  by  the  scientist  in  his  laboratory, 
prove  the  essential  mutability  of  all  the  individuals 
that  compose  natural  species. 

Physical  properties  undergo  the  lot  of  the  chemical 
compound  which  they  affect.  "  Matter  is  mani- 
fested to  us  through  its  properties,"  writes  M. 
Armand  Gautier,  "  but  not  one  of  them  appears 
necessarily  to  belong  to  it.  Continual  changes  of 
light,  heat,  electricity,  mechanical  power,  etc., 
occur  between  material  objects,  and  impart  to  them 
brightness,  colour,  heat,  elasticity,  and  motions  that 
make  them  capable  of  being  felt,  but  the  substratum 

20 


306   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

of  which  the  material  bodies  are  formed  remains 
inert — i.e.,  incapable  of  itself  causing  either  motion, 
or  any  of  the  properties  with  which  such  bodies 
have  been  endowed.  '  Matter,'  says  Claude  Bernard, 
'  does  not  give  rise  to  the  phenomena  that  it  dis- 
plays, it  only  provides  such  phenomena  with  condi- 
tions of  manifestation.'  '5l 

This  inert  substratum,  which  the  mind  abstracts 
from  all  natural  bodies,  and  which  it  conceives  of 
as  being  pre-existent  to  their  properties,  makes  us 
double  the  corporeal  ens  sistens  which  we  started 
with,  till  it  becomes  a  sub-jectum,  sub-stratum,  sub- 
stans  (vTTotceifMvov)  on  the  one  hand,  and  accedentia 
(eTrurv/AfieftrjfcoTa),  accidentia,  on  the  other — in  a 
word,  substance,  and  accidents. 

But  what  is  our  notion  of  substance  ?  We  know 
that  it  is  ;  that,  in  the  complex  reality  in  which  it 
is  presented  to  us,  it  acts  upon  other  bodies  and 
upon  ourselves;  but  apart  from  the  indeterminate 
attributes  of  being  and  action,  conceived  of  in  the 
positive  and  distinctive  form  which  we  think  to  be 
suited  to  natural  things,  what  do  we  know  of 
corporeal  substance  in  general  ?  What  do  we  know 
of  the  different  natural  substances  ? 

When  we  oppose  substance  to  accidents,  and,  in 
order  to  get  a  fixed  idea  of  its  inner  constitution, 
try  to  understand  the  mixture  of  stability  and 
instability  in  the  material  body,  from  that  moment 
positive  reality  flies  away  from  us;  and  we  are 
driven  to  make  use  of  representations  that  no  longer 
tell  us  what  and  how  the  thing  is,  but  what  it  is  not, 

1  A.  Gautier,  Revue  des  sciences  pures  et  appliquees,  1897, 
No.  7,  p.  291. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          307 

and  wherein  it  differs  from  what  we  have  learnt 
from  reality. 

Ask  the  greatest  of  metaphysicians  what  is 
material  substance  ?  Material  substance,  replies 
Aristotle,  is  composed  of  two  constituent  parts. 
The  one,  primary  matter,  is  neither  quality  nor 
quantity,  neither  this  nor  that;  the  other  is  that 
whereby  the  primary  matter  gets  its  actualization 
and  the  body  its  essential  fulfilment  (eVreXe^eia), 
and  the  principle  of  all  its  energies. 

Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  are  known  to  us  as 
they  are,  for  mentally  we  only  know  that  which 
we  abstract  from  the  data  of  experience;  but 
direct  experience  does  not  reach  the  constituents  of 
bodies,  but  only  the  body  itself  in  its  composite 
being. 

It  matters  little  to  our  purpose  whether  the 
Aristotelian  theory  of  matter  and  form  be  here 
regarded  as  established  doctrine  or  as  an  ill-sup- 
ported hypothesis.  The  important  thing  to  bear  in 
mind  is  that,  according  to  Aristotle — and  for  many 
centuries  he  was  followed  in  this  by  the  Scholastic 
metaphysicians — man's  mind,  even  as  to  the  con- 
stitution of  corporeal  substance  in  general,  only  has 
negative  and  analogical  ideas. 

But  specific  substances  are  to  us  simply  bodies 
which  we  characterize  by  some  of  their  properties. 
Therefore,  the  metaphysical  notions  we  form  of  the 
various  specific  natural  types  also  depend  upon 
negation  and  analogy. 

Hence  even  of  material  substances  it  is  true  to 
say  that,  in  one  sense,  they  are  unknowable.  Indeed, 
they  are  not  knowable  in  a  positive  manner  according 


308   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

to  the  reality  belonging  to  them.  The  knowledge  of 
the  metaphysician  is  of  a  different  nature  from  that 
of  the  physicist  and  the  geometrician  concerning 
sensible  changes  and  quantity. 

But  the  knowledge  of  immaterial  beings  is  sub- 
ordinate in  its  turn  to  that  of  material  things. 
Our  notions  about  the  nature  of  spirits  (minds)  and 
of  the  divine  Being  are  some  of  them  positive,  others 
negative.  But  all  the  positive  content  of  the  former 
is  borrowed  from  sensible  experience,  either  outward 
or  inward,  and  therefore,  since  it  is  not  incom- 
patible with  the  conditions  of  corporeal  existence,  it 
cannot  enter  as  a  distinctive  characteristic  into  the 
definition  of  spirit  (mind) ;  it  is  only  negation  that 
draws  the  line  of  demarcation  between  the  material 
and  the  immaterial  worlds. 

Gather  together  all  the  perfections  which,  in 
virtue  of  the  principle  of  causality,  we  have  a  right 
to  attribute  to  the  First  Cause  of  the  universe; 
they  can  be  attributed  collectively  as  well  as  dis- 
tributively,  without  any  intrinsic  contradiction,  to 
a  being  which  is  within  the  bounds  of  the  finite; 
and  therefore,  neither  taken  separately  nor  as  a 
whole  do  they  form  a  positive  characteristic  belong- 
ing in  strict  propriety  to  the  divine  Being.  To 
make  of  them  a  concept  distinctive  of  the  divine 
Being,  we  must  add  mentally  that  the  purest  of 
created  perfections  must  belong  to  the  necessary 
Being  in  quite  another  manner  than  they  do  to  con- 
tingent beings.  Indeed,  they  must  be  blended  in 
a  transcendent  unity,  in  a  superexcellence  that  takes 
the  place  of  all  known  excellences,  and,  whilst  it  is 
essential  to  the  latter  that  they  should  form  a 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          309 

subject  capable  of  existence,  it  is  essential  to  the 
superexcellence  of  the  divine  Being  that  it  should 
exist.  Now,  we  have  no  positive  idea  of  a  super- 
excellence  which  it  would  be  contradictory  to  con- 
ceive of  as  purely  possible  so  far  as  existence  is 
concerned. 

It  is  then  rigorously  accurate,  under  the  reserva- 
tions we  have  made,  to  qualify  the  absolute  as 
unknowable.  As  St.  Thomas  acutely  remarks: 
'  The  very  perfection  of  the  knowledge  of  God 
consists  in  knowing  that  He  is  unknown."1 

It  is  indisputable  that  many  of  the  opponents  of 
metaphysics  wage  war  against  it  owing  to  the  mis- 
understandings arising  from  the  ambiguities  we 
have  been  endeavouring  to  dissipate.  Metaphysics, 
in  their  opinion,  is  a  system  of  subjective  ideas  that 
have  nothing  to  do  with  scientific  methods.  Its 
aims  are  unattainable,  because  the  mind  cannot 
reach  them  with  the  same  perfection  and  by  the 
same  means  as  those  whereby  the  aims  of  the 
physical  and  mathematical  sciences  are  attained. 

1  Secundum  hoc  (a  Dionysio,  Myst.  Theol.,  c.  I,  §  3) 
dicimur  in  fide  nostrae  cognitionis  Deitm  tanquam  ignotum 
cognoscere,  quia  tune  maximc  mens  in  Dei  cognitione  per- 
fectissime  invenitur,  quando  cognoscit  ejus  essentiam  esse 
supra  omne  id  quod  apprehendere  potest  in  statu  hujus  vitae. 
— St.  Thomas,  In  Boeth.  de  Trin,  prooem.,  Q.  I,  A.  2,  ad  I. 
Succumbat  humana  infirmitas  gloriae  Dei.  .  .  .  Laboremus 
sensu,  haereamus  ingenio,  deficiamus  eloquio:  bonum  est  ut 
nobis  parum  sit,  quod  etiam  recte  de  Domini  majestate  senti- 
mus. — Serm.  II.,  S.  Leonis  Papae,  De  Pass.  Domini. 

The  foregoing  analysis  gives,  we  believe,  the  key  to  the 
antinomies  Spencer  thought  he  found  in  the  notion  of  the 
Absolute.  (See  above,  pp.  98  ff.)  In  the  case  of  the  English 
psychologist,  to  know  means  to  know  the  individual  or 
specific  essence  of  a  being  by  means  of  positive  and  proper 
concepts.  That  which  is  known  only  by  way  of  negation  and 
analogy  is  to  him  the  same  as  the  unknown. 


310   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

In  this  there  are  two  unfortunate  misunderstand- 
ings. If  we  have  succeeded  in  disentangling  them, 
we  may  conclude  that  the  two  general  arguments 
appealed  to  by  agnosticism  for  denying  the  possi- 
bility of  metaphysics  miss  the  mark. 

There  is  a  third  argument  favoured  by  positivists, 
which  is  more  directly  aimed  against  special  meta- 
physics, rational  psychology. 

Positivism  objects  to  the  soul,  the  Ego,  and  the 
faculties,  and  desires  to  sweep  them  from  the  field 
of  psychology  as  being  just  so  many  vain  entities, 
which  it  is  agreed  to  label  as  "  scholastic." 

When,  going  beyond  the  facts  of  consciousness, 
psychology  lays  down  a  substantial  Ego,  and  facul- 
ties, is  it  not  simply  taking  words  for  realities  ?  We 
begin  with  emptying  substance  of  its  reality — i.e.,  of 
its  acts — writes  Taine,  and  "  by  a  sort  of  optical 
illusion  we  create  an  empty  substance  which  is  the 
Ego  taken  in  itself."1 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  "  the  Ego  is  a  web  of  occur- 
rences: it  has  in  it  nothing  but  such  occurrences 
and  their  connections."  In  the  same  way,  "  forces, 
faculties,  or  powers  are  simply  permanent  possi- 
bilities of  occurrences."2 

Taine  credits  metaphysicians  with  doctrines  which 

1  Taine,  De  I' intelligence ,  I.,  p.  345. 

"  The  forces,  faculties,  or  powers  that  belong  to  the  web 
of  which  a  being  is  woven  are  simply  the  property  that  such 
and  such  an  occurrence  in  the  web  of  being  has  of  being  con- 
stantly followed,  in  various  circumstances,  outward  or  in- 
ward, by  such  and  such  an  outward  or  inward  occurrence. 
Thus,  there  is  nothing  in  the  web,  except  occurrences  and 
their  more  or  less  remote  connections  with  one  another  or 
with  outward  occurrences;  and  the  Ego  which  is  the  web 
contains  nothing  but  these  occurrences  and  their  connec- 
tions."— Ibid.,  p.  346. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM       311 

they  are  the  first  to  repudiate.  They  do  not  main- 
tain that  consciousness  perceives,  at  any  moment 
of  our  existence,  a  self  or  Ego  free  from  occurrences, 
or  powers  without  acts.  The  substantial  Ego  is 
only  knowable  in  the  exercise  of  its  faculties,  and 
these  are  only  knowable  in  act.  These  affirmations 
concern  the  sphere  of  logic. 

But  the  ontological  connection  of  occurrences, 
which  Taine  does  not  call  an  uncontinuous  series,  but 
"  a  web  "  ;  and  the  right  to  affirm  that  the  same 
self  or  Ego,  "  this  being,"  at  different  moments, 
feels,  imagines,  thinks,  and  wills,  apparently  pre- 
supposes one  or  more  subjects  really  distinct  from  the 
acts  they  produce  and  whereby  they  are  revealed 
to  us,  one  or  more  subjects  in  existence  prior  to  the 
fleeting  acts  attributed  to  them,  and  persisting  after 
the  acts  are  over. 

No,  says  Taine.  This  supposed  subject  is  simply 
a  "  permanent  possibility  of  occurrences."  Now, 
what  is  a  possibility  of  occurrences  ?  The  possi- 
bility may  be  taken  to  be  logical,  negative,  and 
intrinsic,  or  as  real,  positive,  and  extrinsic. 

The  first  kind  of  possibility  is  simply  an  absence 
of  contradiction  between  the  various  elements  of 
one  and  the  same  concept — e.g.,  the  possibility  of 
an  infinite  multitude.  The  concept  of  an  infinite 
multitude  is  possible  (logically  possible),  since  the 
object  of  the  concept  is  not  impossible  (negatively 
possible),  and  its  elements  are  compatible  with  one 
another  (intrinsically  possible). 

The  second  kind  of  possibility  presupposes  the 
first,  but  it  also  demands  the  existence  of  a  cause 
capable  of  realizing  what  is  regarded  as  simply 


312   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

being  not  intrinsically  impossible.  Possibility  thus 
understood  relies  upon  a  reality  (real  possibility), 
apart  from  the  object  intrinsically  possible  (extrinsic 
possibility),  and  endowed  with  what  is  required  to 
make  that  which  is  declared  to  be  intrinsically 
possible  pass  from  the  sphere  of  the  ideal  to  the 
sphere  of  existence. 

Will  it  be  said  that  the  self  or  Ego  and  its  faculties 
are  the  permanent  real  and  positive  possibilities  of 
our  successive  acts,  and  the  explanatory  reason  of 
their  constant  connections  in  the  web  of  life  ?  We 
do  not  maintain  anything  else. 

But  to  try  to  make  out  of  the  Ego  and  its  faculties, 
logical,  negative,  and  intrinsic  possibilities,  to  affirm 
that  "  the  idea  oifact  or  occurrence  alone  corresponds 
with  real  things,"1  and  to  maintain  that  a  logical 
possibility  accounts  for  a  real  constant  connection, 
is  to  be  satisfied  with  mere  words.2 

"  Upon  a  hook  painted  on  the  wall,"  says  Taine 
in  an  English  quotation,  "  you  can  only  hang  a 
chain  which  is  painted  on  the  wall."  This  English 
sapience,  wittily  replies  M.  de  Craene,  should  be  a 
help  not  only  to  positivism.  There  is  a  hook,  the 
reality  of  the  Ego  and  its  faculties,  and  there  is  a 
chain  fastened  to  it,  the  facts  which  their  activity 
enables  us  to  perceive.  If  you  will  have  it  that 

1  Taine,  De  I' intelligence,  p.  350. 

2  "  What  is  the  character  of  such  words  as  possibility? 
They  plainly  signify  a  quality,  and  therefore  a  quality  of 
something.  When  we  say  a  thing  is  practicable,  we  mean  that 
it  can  be  done;  when  we  speak  of  anything  as  destructible, 
we  mean  that  it  can  be  destroyed.     Then,  if  we  want  to 
speak  of  several  things  that  are  practicable  or  destructible, 
we  can  form  new  substantives  and  adjectives,  and  speak  of 
practicableness,    destructibility,    and    the    possibility    of 
things." — Max  Muller,  The  Science  of  Thought. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          313 

these  facts  are  something  more  than  "  a  chain 
painted  on  the  wall,"  you  must  admit  that  the 
reality  upon  which  they  depend  is  something  more 
than  "  a  hook  painted  on  the  wall  "  ! 

Therefore,  a  "permanent  possibility  of  sensations  " 
is  a  meaningless  phrase,  unless  we  assume  that  there 
is  a  something  endowed  with  a  quality — i  .<2.,that  which 
is  indispensable  for  the  production  of  sensations.1 

Thus,  then,  this  much  decried  science  of  meta- 
physics is  possible. 

From  the  acts  that  consciousness  perceives  and 
the  outward  manifestations  of  which  are  matter  for 
observation,  it  is  logical  to  go  back  to  the  faculties, 
and  from  these  to  the  substantial  subject  which 
acts  by  their  means.  The  diversity  of  acts  compels 
us  to  affirm  a  diversity  of  faculties,  some  material, 
others  immaterial.  The  subject  that  possesses 
them  is,  therefore,  matter  and  mind  (spirit) ;  and  is 
nevertheless  one,  for  all  the  manifestations  of  life 
studied  in  man  by  psychology  depend  upon  one 
another,  and  show  one  and  the  same  fundamental 
principle.  Thus  matter  and  the  immaterial  soul 
form  one  and  the  same  substantial  compound,  man. 

Everyone  knows  the  Aristotelian  and  Scholastic 
interpretation  of  the  substantial  union  of  soul  and 
body.  The  body,  of  itself,  is  only  a  power,  not, 
indeed,  a  logical  power  which,  in  the  ontological 
order,  would  be  a  pure  nothingness;  but  a  real 
power;  the  act  of  the  matter  of  the  human  com- 
pound is  the  immaterial  soul,  the  substantial  form 
of  man,  and,  according  to  the  teaching  so  energeti- 

1  De  Craene,  De  la  spirituality  de  I'dme,  p.  301.    Louvain, 
Institut  Superieur  de  Philosophic,  1897. 


314   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

cally  defended  by  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  the  one  and 
only  substantial  form  of  every  human  being. 

And  if  we  would  extend  the  field  of  metaphysics 
so  as  to  connect  man  and  the  beings  around  him  with 
a  higher  unity,  in  order  to  build  up  the  one,  com- 
plete, and  unshakable  temple  of  knowledge,1  a 
building  which  can  stand  firm  of  itself,  a  system, 
<rv'TT)fjui,2  logic  leads  to  the  following  conclusions: 

That  man  and  external  beings  are  contingent— 
i.e.,  that  in  none  of  them  does  essence  imply  exist- 
ence— and  nevertheless  they  exist.  Hence  there  is 
something  which  has  brought  them  into  existence. 
If  this  cause  were  itself  contingent,  it  would  not 
altogether  resolve  the  problem  of  their  existence, 
because  it  must  have  a  cause  for  itself.  Therefore 
contingent  existence  must  have  a  cause  that  is 
itself  non-contingent  but  necessary — i.e.,  such  that 
its  essence  is  identical  with  its  existence. 

1  Metaphysics  is  nothing  else  but  the  fulfilment  of  know- 
ledge; and  it  might  take  its  motto  from  Aristotle:  Scire 
omnia  maxime.     On  this  subject  read  P.  Lemmius,  Saggio 
sintetico  della  metafisica  di  S.  Tommaso  d' Aquino,  an  essay 
published    in    the    Accademia    romana    di    san    Tommaso. 
"  What,"  he  asks,  "  is  perfect  knowledge  ?     Nothing  but 
sure  and  distinct  knowledge  of  an  adequate  truth.  ...     If 
knowledge  is  to  be  perfect,  truth  must  be  perfect  and  perfect, 
too,   must  its  possession  be.     Moreover,   since  the  mind 
possesses  its  object  in  two  ways,  by  apprehension,  and  by 
judgement,  both  apprehension  and  judgement  must  also  be 
perfect.     And  truth  is  perfect  if  it  is  adequate,  apprehension 
is  perfect  if  it  is  distinct,  and  judgement  is  perfect  if  it  is  sure. 
Therefore  this  definition  of  perfect  knowledge  is  right :  that 
it  is  distinct  and  sure  knowledge  of  an  adequate  truth. 
This  is  that  which  Aristotle  expresses  with  such  vigour  and 
brevity  in  his  Scire  omnia  maxime,  the  omnia  referring  to 
the  objective,  the  maxime  to  the  subjective  element." — 
Op.  cit.,  p.  18,  I. 

2  On  the  systemizing  of  science,  see  Tiberghien,  Intro- 
duction H  la  philosophic   et  preparation  d  la  metaphysique, 
Bruxelles,  Mayolez,  1880. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          315 

Therefore  it  is  on  the  ground  of  experience  that 
the  existence  of  a  necessary  Being  is  affirmed. 
Reason  compels  us  to  choose  between  affirming  the 
existence  of  God  and  maintaining  an  essential 
contradiction  at  the  very  heart  of  that  contingent 
being,  the  existence  of  which  we  have  ascertained. 

Besides,  the  unity  of  order  in  the  universe,  the 
finality  that  is  immanent  in  every  created  substance, 
and  the  law  of  the  subordination  of  ends,  whether 
of  the  moral  or  of  the  physical  order,  to  a  supreme 
End,  lead  reason  to  affirm  that  the  necessary  Being, 
Intelligence  and  Will,  and  Creator  of  the  universe, 
is  supreme  wisdom  and  supreme  love. 

An  analysis  of  the  concept  of  necessary  Being 
leads  of  itself  to  the  conclusion  that  God  is  one, 
perfect,  and  infinite. 

Such  in  broad  outline  is  traditional  metaphysics 
so  far  as  it  has  to  do  with  positively  immaterial 
beings,  man's  soul  and  God.  What  has  modern 
philosophy  to  set  in  opposition  to  this  traditional 
metaphysics  ?  For,  after  all,  it  is  all  very  well  to 
run  down  metaphysics,  to  say  that  it  is  in  conflict 
with  science,  and  to  declare  it  barren  or  impossible, 
but  there  is  not  a  single  thinker  who  does  not  sooner 
or  later  work  out  a  metaphysics  of  his  own. 

We  have  noted  that  there  is  a  tendency  in 
psychology  to  hitch  on  to  the  theory  of  parallelism. 
"  Hitch  on  "  is  the  word,  for  in  fact,  what  is  the 
juxtaposition  of  movement  and  thought,  body  and 
soul,  in  two  parallel  series  but  just  setting  the 
problem  that  has  to  be  solved  ?  And,  to  assume 
that  at  the  unknown  basis  of  phenomena  there  is 
one  single  substance,  analogous  to  that  imagined 


3i6   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

by  Spinoza,  with  extensio  and  cogitatio  for  its 
attributes — what  is  this  but  to  refer  to  an  arbitrarily 
assumed  subject  the  difficulty  which  one  has  ad- 
mitted one's  inability  to  solve  in  the  sphere  of  things 
that  are  known  ? 

In  the  philosophy  of  nature,  the  metaphysics  of 
to-day  may  be  broadly  summed  up,  with  the 
exception  of  a  few  details,  under  Monism  and 
Evolutionism.  Monism  stands  for  the  unity  of 
composition  hi  beings,  evolutionism  for  their  oneness 
of  origin  traced  through  an  indefinite  accumulation 
of  gradual  modifications.  Further,  oneness  of 
origin  through  an  evolutionary  process  is  the  neces- 
sary corollary  of  unity  of  nature  or  of  composition 
in  all  the  beings  of  the  universe. 

But  on  the  ground  of  what  experience  or  principle 
can  this  unity  of  composition  be  maintained  ?  It 
is  a  purely  a  priori  assumption  ! 

If  monism  rather  than  dualism  wears  a  smiling 
aspect  in  the  eyes  of  Spencer,  Fouille'e,  Wundt, 
Paulsen,  Ziehen,  Hoffding,  Ebbinghaus,  or  others, 
does  that  prove  that  nature  fits  in  with  their  way 
of  looking  at  things  ?  Wherein  is  the  supposition 
that  there  are  two  OB  more  elements,  or  forces,  or 
factors  which  cannot  be  reduced  to  one  another, 
contradictory  P1  And  is  evolution  maintained  on 
the  ground  of  fact,  or  of  principle  ? 

M.  Yves  Delage,  Professor  of  the  Sorbonne,  in  his 
great  work,  La  structure  du  protoplasma  et  les  theories 
sur  Vheredite,  sets  the  question  to  himself  explicitly 
and  answers  it  in  the  following  significant  terms : 

1  See  M.  A.  de  Margerie,  Annales  de  philosophic  chre- 
tienne,  Nouv.  s6rie,  t.  xxxv,,  No.  2,  p.  178;  La  philosophic 
de  M.  FouilUe. 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          317 

"  Of  race — taking  the  word  in  its  widest  sense — 
I  give  a  definition  implying  descent,  and  it  will  be 
asked  what  right  we  have  to  use  it  without  proving 
our  right  so  to  do. 

"  I  can  easily  admit  that  one  species  has  never 
been  seen  to  give  rise  to,  or  to  be  transformed  into, 
another,  and  that  it  cannot  be  formally  proved 
ever  to  have  done  so.  I  am  now  speaking  of 
a  true  good  species,  fixed  as  natural  species, 
and,  like  them,  maintaining  itself  without  human 
assistance. 

"  A  fortiori  is  all  this  true  of  the  genus. 

"  Nevertheless,  I  consider  descent  as  certain  a 
fact  as  if  it  were  objectively  proved,  for  without  it 
there  is  no  other  possible  hypothesis  than  that  of 
the  spontaneous  generation  of  all  species,  and  even 
of  the  higher  species,  and  that  of  their  creation  by 
some  divine  power.  These  two  hypotheses  are  both 
equally  unscientific,  and  we  shall  not  pay  them  the 
honour  of  discussing  them." 

The  above  lines  are  followed  by  this  frank  state- 
ment: 

In  the  above  passage,  "  I  make  use  of  the  first 
pei son  to  show  that  I  am  speaking  in  my  own  name 
and  not  in  that  of  the  supporters  of  transformation, 
many  of  whom  will  doubtless  be  scandalized  when 
they  read  this  declaration. 

"  I  am,  however,  absolutely  convinced  that  a 
man  supports  or  does  not  support  transformation, 
not  for  reasons  taken  from  natural  history,  but 
because  of  his  philosophical  views. 

"  If  there  were  any  other  scientific  hypothesis 
than  that  of  descent  to  explain  the  origin  of  species; 


318        CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

a  number  of  transformists  would  give  up  their 
present  opinions  as  insufficiently  proved."1 

We  record  this  avowal  of  a  natural  historian  of 
exceptional  competence.  If  the  transformation  of 
organic  species  is  acknowledged  to  be  an  unproved 
assumption,  a  fortiori  must  evolution  in  general  be 
regarded  as  hypothetical. 

Monist  and  evolutionist  philosophers  took  pleasure 
in  looking  upon  traditional  metaphysics  as  a  sub- 
jective and  decadent  system,  for  which  the  time 
had  come  to  substitute  a  "  scientific  "  philosophy, 
firmly  grounded  upon  facts,  but  now  it  finds  that  it 
can  only  appeal  to  philosophic  preferences  and  mere 
assumption  in  support  of  the  oneness  of  nature  of 
the  beings  of  the  universe,  and  evolution. 

In  1870,  Trendelenburg  wrote  thus  of  Schelling: 
"  If  this  powerful  thinker  had  only  chosen  for  his 
first  leader,  not  Fichte,  to  go  back  through  him  to 
Kant,  to  Spinoza  and  others,  but  Aristotle,  then 
Germany  would  have  witnessed  the  bursting  forth 
of  ideas  of  quite  another  character,  and  the  realiza- 
tion of  a  work  far  greater,  and  more  robust  and 
fruitful.  So  true  it  is,  that  the  tradition  of  the  great 
thinkers  of  mankind  should  not  be  broken." 

How  much  to  the  point  is  this  view  to-day,  and 
how  well-founded  the  following  conclusion  of  the 
great  promoter  of  Aristotelianism  in  Germany:  "  It 
is  high  time  to  give  up  the  common  German  pre- 
judice, which  would  have  it  that  some  new  principle 
for  the  philosophy  of  the  future  still  remains  to  be 
discovered.  The  principle  has  been  discovered. 
It  resides  in  that  organic  conception  of  things,  of 
1  Op.  cit.  Paris,  Reinwald,  1895,  P-  l%4- 


PRINCIPLES  OF  POSITIVISM          319 

which  Plato  and  Aristotle  were  the  founders,  and 
the  principles  and  various  portions  whereof  can  only 
be  more  and  more  deeply  understood  by  reflecting 
thereon,  whilst  its  permanent  connection  with  the 
sciences  of  observation  could  only  help  to  develop 
and  perfect  it."1 

Now,  it  is  this  Aristotelian  conception  which  is 
the  most  inspiring  element  in  neo-Thomism. 

1  A.  Trendelenburg,  Logische    Untersuchungen,  3    Aufl., 
Vorwort,  S.  ix. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
NEO-THOMISM 

FOR  many  centuries  it  was  commonly  thought  that, 
from  the  time  of  the  decadence  oi  the  Greek  Schools 
till  the  day  of  the  publication  of  the  Discours  de  la 
Methode,  philosophy  lay  benumbed,  and  that  it 
produced  nothing  worthy  of  attention. 

Thus,  Scholastic  philosophy  generally  appeared 
as  only  a  burlesque  parody  of  sound  philosophy, 
and  there  were  plenty  of  historians  who  did  not 
scruple  to  take  no  notice  of  it. 

The  French  Revolution  gave  a  kind  of  violent 
sanction  to  this  universal  unpopularity,  and  hence 
some  great  and  noble  works,  worthy  of  immortal 
respect,  were  swallowed  in  oblivion. 

To-day,  thanks  to  the  conscientious  philosophical 
labours  of  Haureau,1  Werner,  Stockl,  Ehrle,  Denifle,2 
Baumker,3  Picavet,4  de  Wulf,5  and  others,  and 

1  Cf.  M.  De  Wulf,  Comment  faut-il  juger  M.  Haureau  ? 
(Revue  neo-scolastique,  1901,  pp.  58-65). 

2  See  A.  Pelzer,  Le  Five  Henri  Suso  Denifle  (Revue  neo- 
scolastique,  1905,  pp.  358-374)- 

3  A  professor  of  Strasburg.     With  von  Hertling  he  edits 
the  Beitrdge  zur  Geschichte  der  Philosophic  des  Mittelalters 
(Munster  since  1891.). 

*  Writer  of  many  essays,  particularly  of  an  Esquisse 
d'une  histoire  generate  et  comparee  des  philosophies  medie- 
vales,  Paris,  1907.  Cf.  Revue  neo-scolastique,  1905,  p.  266, 
and  1907,  pp.  92  ff. 

6  Among  many  other  works  let  us  mention  L'histoire  dt 
la  philosophic  scolastique  dans  les  Pays-Bas  et  la  Princi- 

320 


NEO-THOMISM  321 

thanks  also  to  the  uncertainties  of  modern  thought 
which  make  the  need  for  taking  one's  true  bearings 
more  and  more  imperious,  people  are  beginning  to 
study  the  great  and  strong  tradition  of  the  School 
with  more  ardour  and  to  appreciate  it  more  justly. 
It  is  now  admitted  that  the  Middle  Ages  as  a 
whole  were  not  so  barren  as  their  detractors  have 
denounced  them  for  being,  but  that  the  thirteenth 
and  fourteenth  centuries  in  particular  were  an  era 
of  expansion  and  fruitfulness,  in  which  there  open  y 
flourished  the  most  varied  philosophical  systems 
the  offshoots  of  the  mind  of  Plato  and  St.  Augustine 
and  the  Fathers  of  the  Church,  as  well  as  of  Aris- 
totelianism,  which  they  made  to  bloom  afresh. 

It  is  true  that  Scholasticism  begins  to  decay  from 
the  fifteenth  century.  Philosophic  interests  became 
the  subject  of  discussion  in  an  age  of  humanism 
which  treated  the  language  of  the  Schools  as  if  it 
were  a  barbarous  and  blundering  jargon;  and  the 
doctrine  itself  could  not  escape  the  contempt  which 
fell  upon  its  expression. 

The  Renaissance  not  only  restored  the  culture 
of  pagan  literature,  it  also  revived  the  old  Greek 
philosophies;  and  the  more  it  abounded  in  neo- 
Pythagoreans,  neo-Platonists,  and  in  upholders  of 
a  new  Aristotelianism  and  a  new  Stoicism,  the  more 
it  abounded  in  opponents  of  an  enfeebled  Scholas- 
ticism. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  farther  we  get  away  from 

paute  de  Liege  (Louvain,  1895);  I' Introduction  d  la  philo- 
sophic neo-scolastique  (1904);  I'Histoire  de  la  philosophie 
inedievale  (1905).  In  1901  M.  De  Wulf  began  a  series  ol 
texts  and  studies  entitled  Les  philosophes  du  nioyen  age, 
which  has  now  run  to  three  volumes. 

21 


322       CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  period  of  Peter  Lombard,  Alexander  of  Hales, 
Albert  the  Great,  and  Thomas  Aquinas,  the  more  do 
the  inheritors  of  their  fame  go  astray  in  unimportant 
and  subtle  controversies.  They  compromise  the 
metaphysics  of  the  first  great  masters  by  involving 
it  in  unscientific  theories  of  nature  or  cosmogony,  or 
even  with  conjectures  which  the  genius  of  St.  Thomas 
had  enough  insight  to  cast  aside.1  It  is  not  at  all 
surprising  that  experimental  science,  with  all  the 
prestige  of  its  astonishing  discoveries,  should  have 
condemned  to  eclipse  theories  so  maladroitly 
supported.2 

1  Certain  assumptions  of  Aristotle  to  account  for  the 
apparent  irregularities  in  the  motions  of  the  planets  are 
questioned  by  St.   Thomas  in  the  following  well-known 
passage:  Astrologorum  suppositiones  quas  invenerunt,  non 
est  necessarium  esse  veras.     Licet  enim  talibus  suppositionibus 
factis  appareant  solvere,  non  tamen  oportet  dicere,  has  sup- 
positiones esse  veras,   quia  forte  secundum  alium  modum 
nontium  ab    hominibus   comprehension,  rapparer.tia  circa 
Stellas  salvatur.    Aristotele?.  tana  en  utitur  hujusmodi  sup- 
positionibus  ad  qualitatem  motuum  tanquam  veris. — De 
coelo  et  mundo,   Lib.   II.,   Lect.    17.     Blessed   Albert  the 
Great,  too,  put  restrictions  on  his  teaching  as  to  the  things 
of   nature:    Earum   quas   ponemus    (sententias),    quasdam 
quidem   ipsi   nos  experimento  probavimus,   quasdam  autem 
referimus  ex  dictis  eorum,  quos  comperimus   non  de  facial 
aliqua    dicere,    nisi    probata    per    experimentum.     Experi- 
tnentum  enim  solum  certificat  in   talibus,   eo  quod  de  tarn 
particularibus   naturis   syllogismus   haberi   non  potest. — De 

vegetalibus,  ed.  Jammy,  Lugduni,  1651,  V.,  p.  430.  Cf. 
Dr.  Carl  Braig,  Ueber  die  philosophische  Bedeutung  von 
Schulbuchern  (Philosophisches  Jahrbuch,  1891,  pp.  406-407). 

2  The  dispute  between  the  followers  of  Copernicus  and 
those  of  Aristotle  and  Ptolemy  is  of  capital  importance 
from  our  present  point  of  view.     It  was  specially  lively  in 
the  first  half  of  the  seventeenth  century,  after  the  famous 
astronomic  discoveries  of  Galileo.    The  latter  pulverized  the 
Aristotelian  teaching  as  to  the  incorruptibility,  intrinsic  im- 
mutability, etc.,  of  the  heavenly  bodies.   On  the  other  hand, 
the  Aristotelians  upheld  the  authority  of  the  Stagirite,  in 
rejecting  counter  arguments,  which  were  not  always  unim- 


NEO-THOMISM  323 

But  this  decadence  of  the  School  has  been  exag- 
gerated by  generalizing  it.  If  the  fifteenth  century 
is  a  period  of  unpopularity  for  Scholasticism,  there 
are  nevertheless  some  remaining  survivors  of  its 
great  traditional  teaching.  Famous  are  the  names 
of  Capreolus,  the  prince  of  Thomists,  Sylvester  of 
Ferrara,  the  most  esteemed  commentator  of  the 
Swnma  contra  Gentiles,  Gerson,  the  famous  chan- 
cellor of  the  University  of  Paris,  Denys  the  Car- 
thusian, and  above  all,  of  Thomas  del  Vio,  called 
the  Cajetan. 

In  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries,  the 
Dominican  school  of  Salamanca,  Francis  of  Vittoria 
and  his  disciples,  Dominic  Soto  and  Medina;  the 
theologians  and  philosophers  of  the  Society  of  Jesus, 
especially  Gabriel  Vasquez  and  Suarez,  the  professors 
of  the  College  of  Coimbra;  the  Carmelite  College  of 
Alcala  and  John  of  St.  Thomas:  these  always  go 
back  to  Aristotle  and  the  Doctor  of  Aquinum; 
Fenelon,  Bossuet,  and  even  Leibnitz  show  marked 
traces  of  the  influence  of  St.  Thomas,  although 
theirs  is  an  eclectic  philosophy. 

Even  in  the  eighteenth  century  the  Scholastic 
tradition  is  not  dead,  but  it  is  not  to  be  found  outside 
the  cloisters  in  which  it  has  taken  refuge ;  and  along- 
side of  it  free  play  is  given  to  the  teaching  of  the 
innovators,  which  is  neither  barred  out  nor  confined 
within  set  limits  by  tradition. 

peachable.  Many  of  them,  said  Galileo,  "  rather  than  admit 
any  change  in  the  heavens  of  Aristotle,  they  will  inconti- 
nently deny  those  they  cannot  help  seeing  in  the  heavens  of 
nature."  On  the  intricacies  of  the  dispute  in  Belgium,  read 
Mgr  G.  Monchamp,  Galilee  et  la  Belgiqite,  Saint-Trond, 
1892  Cf.  St.  Thomas,  De  coelo  et  mundo,  I.,  Lect.  6  and  7. 


324   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

At  the  beginning  of  the  latter  century,  Christian 
philosophers  found  nothing  to  set  against  French 
and  English  sensationalism  and  German  criticism 
but  a  vague  spiritualism,  derived  from  Descartes. 
Bonald,  Bautain,  and  Lammenais  rightly  thought 
that  this  was  not  enough,  but  they  were  unhappy 
in  their  attempts  to  start  a  new  philosophy.  They 
ended  in  Fideism  and  Traditionalism,  and  the 
Catholic  Church,  more  anxious  to  maintain  the 
truth  than  to  spare  her  friends — magis  arnica  veritas 
— did  not  hesitate  to  condemn  their  systems. 

Then  Christian  philosophers  took  up  classic 
spiritualism  anew,  and,  in  order  to  rejuvenate  it, 
thought  they  could  connect  it  with  Malebranche,  and, 
through  him,  with  St.  Anselm  and  St.  Augustine. 
This  was  the  age  of  ontologism,  of  which  Gerdil, 
Rosmini,  Gioberti,  Ubaghs,  and  Laforet  were  the 
principal  representatives  in  Italy,  France,  and 
Belgium.  But  again,  and  with  the  same  regret  at 
having  to  rebuke  its  devoted  and  eminent  servants, 
the  Holy  See  declared  that  salvation  was  not  to  be 
found  in  that  quarter.1 

Amidst  the  confusion  wrought  by  the  encroach- 
ments of  the  antichristian  philosophies  of  Germany 
and  England,  and  by  the  condemnation  of  efforts 
which  were  more  generous  than  intelligent  in  their 
defence  of  Christian  thought,  the  need  of  renewing 
the  old  tradition  of  the  past  became  more  and  more 
urgent.  During  the  last  thirty  years  a  medieval 
renaissance  has  sprung  up.  Gothic  architecture,  and 
pre-Rafaelite  painting  win  fresh  admiration  and 

1  See  Mgr.  d'Hulst,  philosophic  separee  et  philosophie 
chrttienne,  Namur,  1896,  p.  20.  Cf.  D.  Mercier,  Le  bilan 
philosophique  du  XIXf  sitcle  (Revue  neo-scolastique,  1900). 


NEO-THOMISM  325 

enthusiastic  emulation;  L6on  Gautier  has  revived 
the  old  French  epics,  "  which  yield  characters  of 
immensely  higher  type  than  any  of  pagan  anti- 
quity "  j1  the  political  and  economic  teaching  of 
St.  Thomas  begins  to  be  studied  afresh;  and  in  all 
the  countries  of  Europe  Scholastic  philosophy  is  in 
a  fair  way  to  recover  its  former  greatness. 

The  Dominican  Gonzalez,  de  Cepeda,  Orti  y  Lara, 
Urraburu,  Arnaiz,  Gomez  Izquierdo,  in  Spain; 
Sanseverino,  Signoriello,  Frisco,  in  Southern  Italy; 
Berberis  and  Tornatore,  in  Plaisance;  Liberatore, 
Zigliara,  Cornoldi,  de  Maria,  Schiffini,  Mattiussi, 
Talamo,  Lorenzelli,  Satolli,  in  Rome;  Kleutgen, 
Stockl,  Morgott,  Schneid,  Gutberlet,  Baumker, 
Pesch,  von  Hertling,  Schneider,  Glossner,  Meyer, 
Cathrein,  in  Germany;  Willmann,  Kaderavek,  Kiss, 
in  Austria  and  Hungary;  Kaufmann,  in  Lucerne; 
St.  George  Mivart,  Harper,  Maher,  Rickaby,  in 
England;  de  San,  Dupont,  Lepidi,  van  Wedingen, 
Dummermuth,  in  Belgium;  Grandclaude,  Vallet, 
Farges,  de  Bonniot,  d'Hulst,  Domet  de  Verges, 
Gardair,  Bulliot,  Elie  Blanc,2  Monsabre,  Coconnier, 
de  Regnon,  and,  with  slight  modifications,  Peillaube, 
Fonsegrive,  Piat,  in  France;  Pere  de  Groot  and 
Beysens,  in  Holland:  all  these  by  their  common 

1  Leon  Gautier,   La  chanson  de  Roland,    Preface  de  la 
19""  edition. 

2  M.   Elie  Blanc's  Histoire  de  la  philosophic  contains  a 
well  documented  chapter  on  the  restoration  of  Scholastic 
philosophy.     While  we  are  grateful  to  the  author  for  his 
kind  interest  in  the  Higher  Institute  of  the  University  of 
Louvain,  we  must  part  company  with  him  in  his  distrust 
of  psycho-physics  and  in  his  strictures  upon  what  we  have 
said  as  to  the  extent  of  sensations.     Let  us  remember  what 
St.  Thomas  says:  Sentire  non  est  proprium  animae  neque 
corporis,  sed  conjuncti. — Summa  Theol.,  la,  Q.  77,  A.  5. 


326   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

efforts  prove  that  Christian  philosophy  has  once 
more  come  to  its  own.1 

Furthermore,  they  have  been  encouraged  by  the 
Popes.  There  are  the  famous  letters  in  which 
Pius  IX,  writing  to  the  Archbishops  of  Breslau 
and  Munich,  expressed  his  benevolent  interest  in 
the  restoration  of  Thomism.  But  it  was  Leo  XIII 
who  imparted  to  the  neo-Thomist  movement  an  all- 
round  stimulus  and  gave  it  its  true  bearings.  When 
this  great  Pope  was  gravely  urging  the  learned 
Catholic  world  to  return  to  "  those  most  pure  waters 
of  wisdom  that  pour  forth  in  overflowing  streams 
from  the  angelic  Doctor's  fount  of  teaching,"  he 
laid  it  down  in  what  sense  that  return  should  be 
made,  so  as  to  forestall  the  objections  afterwards 
advanced.  Obsolete  subtleties  were  not  to  be 
defended,  and  full  account  was  to  be  taken  of  the 
important  discoveries  that  daily  add  to  the  increase 
of  thought  or  extend  the  field  of  natural  science 
and  observation.  '  We  declare,"  said  the  Ency- 
clical Aeterni  Patris  of  August  4,  1879, "  that  every 
wise  thought  and  every  useful  discovery,  wherever 
it  may  come  from,  should  be  gladly  and  gratefully 
welcomed."  "  If  in  the  teaching  of  the  School 
there  be  any  question  which  is  too  subtle,  any  hasty 
affirmation,  or  anything  that  does  not  accord  with 
the  established  doctrines  of  later  times,  or  that,  in 
a  word,  is  devoid  of  probability,  we  by  no  means 
desire  to  suggest  that  it  should  be  followed  in  our 
own  days."2 

1  On  the  work  done  to-day,  see  Le  mouvement  neo- 
thomiste,  in  the  Revue  neo-scolastique ,  1901  ff. 

3  Among  the  many  commentaries  on  the  Encyclical 
Aeterni  Patris,  see  Van  Weddingen,  L'ency clique ~de  S.S.  L&on 


NEO-THOMISM  327 

Pius  X  carried  on  the  work  of  Leo  XIII  in  favour 
of  Thomism.  In  the  Encyclical  Pascendi  dominici 
gregis  of  September  8,  1907  he  asked  that  "  in  the 
matter  of  studies,  the  Scholastic  philosophy  should 
form  the  basis  of  the  sacred  sciences."  After  quoting 
the  above-mentioned  passage  from  the  Encyclical 
Aeterni  Patris,  he  set  forth  his  mind  in  the  following 
words:  "  When  we  prescribe  the  Scholastic  philo- 
sophy, what  we  mean  thereby — and  this  is  of  capital 
importance — is  the  philosophy  handed  down  to  us 
by  the  angelic  Doctor.  We  therefore  declare  that 
all  that  has  been  laid  down  by  our  predecessor  on 
this  subject  remains  in  full  force,  and,  so  far  as 
may  be  required,  we  lay  it  down  afresh  and  confirm 
it,  and  order  that  it  be  rigorously  observed." 

Since  1879  the  awakening  of  appreciation  of  the 
traditional  teaching  is  becoming  more  and  more 
manifest.  There  is  Leo  XIII's  foundation  of  the 
Accademia  Romana  di  San  Tommaso,  and  the 
generously  subsidized  pontifical  edition  of  the 
Works  of  the  Angel  of  the  School,  illustrated  by  the 
commentaries  of  Cajetan  and  Sylvester  of  Ferrara; 
there  is  the  free  course  of  lectures  in  the  philosophy 
of  St.  Thomas  given  at  the  Sorbonne  by  M.  Gardair 
for  several  years;  and  another  professorship  officially 
founded  at  Amsterdam,  and  confided  to  Pere  de 
Groot.  Then  the  teaching  of  St.  Thomas  underlies 

XIII  etla  restauration  de  la  philosophic  chretienne,  Bruxelles, 
1880;  and  Schnied,  Die  Philosophic  des  hi.  Thomas  und  ihre 
Bedeutung  fur  die  Gegenwart,  Wiirzburg,  1881. 

In  the  Evening  Transcript  (July  29,  1903,  Boston, 
U.S.A.),  see  a  remarkable  study  by  Royce,  entitled  Pope 
Leo's  Philosophical  Movement  and  its  Relations  to  Modern 
Thought, 


328        CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  theological  and  philosophical  instruction  of  the 
Gregorian  University,  the  University  of  Minerva, 
the  College  of  St.  Anselm,  the  Roman  Seminary  of 
Apollinaris,  the  Faculty  of  Theology  at  Innsbruck, 
the  Catholic  Faculties  of  Paris,  Lyons,  Lille,  Angers, 
Toulouse,  the  Catholic  University  of  Washington, 
where  long  taught  a  professor  of  the  highest  class, 
M.  Bouquillon,  whose  works  on  morals  constitute  a 
judicious  and  faithful  commentary  on  the  Summa 
Theologica.  And  lastly,  there  is  the  new  University 
of  Freiburg,  where  the  teaching  of  theology  and 
philosophy  is  given  over  to  the  most  authorized 
maintainers  of  Thomism,  the  sons  of  St.  Dominic. 

Here,  too,  we  may  be  permitted  to  mention 
Leo  XIII's  foundation  of  the  Higher  Institute  of 
Philosophy  of  the  Catholic  University  of  Louvain, 
which  was  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of  combining 
in  one  the  teaching  of  the  old  metaphysics  with 
the  fruits  of  scientific  labours  of  later  date.1 

The  same  activity  that  led  to  the  founding  of 

1  Equidem  necessarium,  nedum  opportunum  esse  ducimus, 
ea  (studia)  recte  et  ordine  dispertita  sic  tradi  alumnis,  ut 
complexa  quidquid  veterum  sapientia  tulit,  et  sedula  recen- 
tiorum  adjecit  industria,  large  copioseque  eos  sint  paritura 
fructus,  qui  religioni  pariter  et  civili  societati  proficiant. — 
Letter  oi  Leo  XIII  to  the  Cardinal  Archbishop  of  Malines, 
November  8,  1889. 

For  further  information  about  the  Higher  Institute  of 
Philosophy,  see  M.  Besse,  Deux  centres  du  mouvement 
thomiste  (from  the  Revue  du  clerge  francais] ,  Louvain,  1902. 
M.  Pelzer,  L'institut  superieure  de  philosophic,  1890-1904, 
and  in  the  Revue  neo-scolastique,  under  the  heading, 
Bulletin  de  I'institut  de  philosophic. 

See  'also  Habrich,  Die  neu-scholastische  Philosophic  der 
Lowener  Schule  (Introduction  to  the  German  translation  of 
Psychology,  Kempton,  1906),  and  Coffey,  Philosophy  and  the 
Sciences  at  Louvain,  an  Appendix  to  the  English  translation 
of  De  Wulf's  Introduction  A  la  philosophic  neo-scolastique, 
Dublin,  1907. 


NEO-THOMISM  329 

chairs  of  Scholastic  Philosophy  has  also  been  shown 

in  the  starting  of  reviews  and  magazines.     Before 

1880  Catholics  scarcely  had  anything  besides  the 

.  Innales  de philosophie  chretienne  of  Paris.   Since  then 

there  have  appeared  the  following:     At  Plaisance, 

the  Divus  Thomas  (1880),  now  defunct;  in  Rome, 

the    Accadeniia   Rom-ana   di   S.    Tommaso  d' Aquino 

(1881);     at     Temesvar,     Hungary,     the     Bolcseleti 

Folyoirat  (1885);  at   Paderborn,  the   Jahrbuch  fur 

Philosophic    und    spekulative    Theologie    (1887);    at 

Fulda,    the    Philosophisches    Jahrbuch    (1888) ;    at 

Freiburg,  the  Revue  Thomiste  (1893) ;  at  Louvain, 

the    Revue   neo-scolastique    (1894);    in     Paris,    the 

Revue  de  philosophie   (1900)    and    La   pensee  con- 

temporaine  (1903) ;  at  Kain  lez-Tournai,  the  Revue 

des  sciences  philosophiques  et  theologiques  (1907). 

The  neo-Thomist  movement  has  shown  its  wide- 
spread energy  in  full  and  extensive  congresses. 
Since  the  Encyclical  there  have  been  four  Inter- 
national Congresses  held  successively  in  Paris, 
Brussels,  Freiburg,  and  Munich.  In  these  gatherings 
the  philosophical  sections  received  numerous  con- 
tributory works.  Even  in  1891,  at  Paris,  among 
the  nineteen  philosophical  contributions  several 
tended  towards  Scholasticism  or  else  were  frankly 
Thomist.1  At  Brussels,  in  1895,  "  all  the  philo- 
sophic subjects  brought  forward  .  .  .  are  chiefly 
characterized  by  a  desire  to  combat  the  Kantian 
Critique  and  its  posit ivist  supporters."2  Sixteen 

1  Cf.  Revue  des  questions  scientifiqiies ,  July,  1892,  pp.  198- 
209. 

2  Cf.  J.  Homans,  La  Philosophie  au  Congr&s  scientifique 
international  des  Catholiques  (Revue   neo-scholastique,  1896, 
PP-  84  ff). 


330   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

important  and  genuinely  Thomist  papers  covering 
the  whole  field  of  philosophical  discussion  gained 
for  their  writers  the  applause  of  the  members.  In 
1897,  at  Freiburg,  one  could  not  but  remark  how 
"  the  traditional  philosophy  is  winning  more  and 
more  influence  over  men's  minds.  Almost  all  the 
papers  claim  to  have  some  connection,  direct  or 
indirect,  with  the  fundamental  teaching  of  Aristotle ; 
and  almost  all  attempt  to  take  shelter  under  the 
great  name  of  St.  Thomas  Aquinas.  It  was  not 
always  evident  that  such  claims  were  really  justified ; 
but  the  tendency  to  try  and  avoid  conflicting  with 
the  Angel  of  the  School  is  pretty  significant."1 
Thirty  of  the  papers  read  gave  rise  to  long  discus- 
sions in  which  the  tendency  of  contemporary 
Catholics  to  break  loose  from  Cartesian  or  eclectic 
spiritualism  became  more  and  more  manifest. 
Lastly,  at  Munich,  in  1900,  forty-nine  papers  were 
sent  in  to  the  philosophic  section  presided  over  by 
M.  Willmann,  the  first  Catholic  educationist  in 
Germany,  now  devoting  the  evening  of  his  life  to 
the  elucidation  of  Christian  philosophy,  and  especi- 
ally of  Thomism.  Of  course,  many  of  the  papers 
dealt  with  matters  of  philosophic  history.  Several 
handled  Scholasticism  and  Thomism  from  that  point 
of  view.  Nevertheless  the  subsequent  discussions 
as  well  as  the  subject -essays  gave  fresh  proofs  of 
the  growing  success  of  Thomism  in  Catholic  circles. 
Thus  the  Encyclical  Aeterni  Patris  was  successful 
in  restoring  to  favour  the  philosophy  of  the  great 
masters  of  Scholasticism,  and  gave  unity  to  the 

1  Cf.  M.  P.  De  Munnynck,  La  section  de  philosophic  au 
congrds  scientifique  de  Fribourg  (Revue  nto-scholastique,  1897, 
pp.  328^). 


NEO-THOMISM  331 

teaching  of  the  Catholic  schools.  Moreover,  it 
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  learned  and  of 
thinkers  who  stood  outside  Christianity  a  world  of 
thought  generally  unknown  to  them.  Hence  it  is 
not  unusual  to  find  those  in  non-Catholic  circles 
yielding  their  meed  of  homage  to  the  superiority 
of  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  and  to  the  importance  of 
the  movement  in  the  direction  of  a  return  to  his 
teaching. 

"  In  this  second  edition,"  writes  Professor  Rudolph 
von  Ihering  of  the  University  of  Gottingen,  in  his 
famous  book,  Der  Zweck  im  Recht,  "  I  add  a  note, 
thanks  to  Father  Hohoff's  review  of  my  work  in 
the  Literarischer  Handweiscr,  twenty-third  year  of 
issue,  No.  2.  ...  He  shows  me  by  quotations 
from  St.  Thomas  Aquinas  that  that  great  thinker 
had  already  thoroughly  and  correctly  perceived  both 
the  real,  practical,  and  social,  and  the  historical 
elements  of  morals.  He  is  quite  right  in  blaming 
me  for  my  ignorance.  But  such  reproaches  are 
much  more  deservedly  addressed  to  modern  philo- 
sophers and  Protestant  theologians  who  have  failed 
to  turn  to  account  the  sublime  ideas  of  such  a  man. 
Now  that  I  know  this  vigorous  thinker,  I  ask  in 
wonder  how  it  is  that  such  truths  as  he  taught  were 
ever  allowed  to  fall  into  such  utter  oblivion  by 
learned  Protestants.  What  mistakes  would  have 
been  avoided  if  his  teaching  had  been  faithfully 
preserved  !  As  for  myself,  had  I  known  it  earlier,  I 
think  I  should  not  have  written  this  book,  because  the 
fundamental  ideas  which  I  meant  to  put  forward  were 
already  expressed  by  this  powerful  thinker  perfectly 
clearly  and  with  remarkable  fertility  of  mind, 


332   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

"  By  way  of  sample,  I  set  before  my  readers  a 
few  of  his  sayings :  Firmiter  nihil  constat  per  rationem 
practicam  nisi  per  ordinationem  ad  ultimum  finem, 
qui  est  bonum  commune — In  speculativis  est  eadem 
veritas  apud  omnes,  in  operativis  autem  non  est 
eadem  veritas  vel  rectitude  practica  apud  omnes — 
Humanae  rationi  naturale  esse  videtur,  ut  gradatim 
ab  imperfecto  ad  perfectum  veniat — Ratio  humana 
mutabilis  est  et  imperfecta  et  ideo  ejus  lex  mutabilis 
est — Finis  humanae  legis  est  utilitas  hominum. 

"  Unfortunately,  I  am  no  longer  in  a  position  to 
take  up  medieval  Scholasticism  and  contemporary 
Catholic  morals,  and  to  repair  my  neglect  of  them. 
However,  whatever  success  my  book  may  meet  with 
should  help  Protestant  scholarship  not  to  overlook 
such  help  as  it  may  secure  from  Catholic  theological 
learning."1 

Another  Protestant,  M.  Charles  Gide,  speaks  in 
a  similar  way  in  the  Revue  ^'economic  politique,  of 
which  he  is  the  editor.  In  a  review  of  M.  Brandt's 
Les  theories  economiques  au  XHIe  et  au  XlVe 
siecles  (Louvain,  1895),  he  writes  these  significant 
words:  "The  renaissance  of  Catholic  Scholasticism 
and  also  of  Thomism  makes  a  study  of  these  sup- 
posedly fossilized  doctrines  indispensable,  and  in 
unearthing  them  one  is  astonished  to  find  how 
living  they  are,  and  how  they  resemble  those  of 
to-day,  and  how  little  progress  we  have  made  after 
all  !"2 

1  Rudolph  von   Ihering,  Der  Zweck   im  Recht,  2  Aufl., 
2  Bd.,  S.  161,  Leipzig,  1886. 

2  Charles  Gide,  Revue  d'economie  politique,  1896,  pp.  514  ff. 
On  the  actuality  and  fertility  of  Aristotelian  and  Thomist 
morals  read  Mgr.  Delploige,  Le  conflit  de  la  morale  et  de  la 
sociologie,  Louvain,  1908. 


NEO-THOMISM  333 

In -Holland,  Professors  Pierson,  van  der  Wyck, 
van  der  Vlugt,  use  the  same  language. 

'  What  a  surprise,"  writes  the  latter,  "  is  in  store 
for  him  who  has  never  known  St.  Thomas  except 
through  the  hostile  accounts  of  others,  and  who 
one  fine  day  happens  to  come  into  direct  contact 
with  him  through  his  own  works  !  .  .  .  Such  a 
man  is  not  of  an  age,  but  for  all  time.  All  honour 
to  this  initiator  !  All  honour  to  his  work  I"1 

In  England,  Huxley  is  no  less  explicit :  "  Nowhere 
in  the  world  at  that  time  (the  thirteenth  century) 
was  there  such  an  encyclopaedia  of  knowledge  in 
the  three  departments  (of  theology,  philosophy, 
and  nature)  as  was  to  be  found  in  these  works. 
The  Scholastic  philosophy  is  a  prodigious  monument 
of  the  patience  and  skill  with  which  the  mind  of 
man  undertook  the  enterprise  of  building  up  a 
logical  theory  of  the  world  with  the  help  of  such 
materials  as  it  possessed.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
number  of  men  of  extraordinary  culture  and  learning 
devote  themselves  thereto  as  the  best  theory  of  things 
yet  put  forward.  And,  what  is  still  more  remark- 
able, they  are  men  who  use  the  language  of  modern 
philosophy, and  yet  think  asthe  Schoolmenthought."2 

In  1892,  1893,  and  1896,  M.  Picavet,  Professor  of 
the  School  of  Higher  Studies  of  Paris,  wrote  in  the 
Revue  philosophique  a  number  of  very  well-informed 
articles  on  Neo-Thomism.  And  this  is  how — 
perhaps  with  a  touch  of  tragedy — he  winds  up  the 
end  of  his  last  article:  "Catholics,  united  by 

1  Van  der  Vlugt,  quoted  in  the  Philosophisches  Jahrbuch, 
III.,  1890,  S.  133. 

2  T.  Huxley,  Select  Works,  p.  (233)  41,  New  York,  J.  B. 
Alden,  1886. 


334   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

Thomism,  which  they  round  off  with  an  ample 
stock  of  scientific  knowledge,  have  made  themselves 
the  masters  of  Belgium;  they  are  to  be  reckoned 
with  in  America  and  Germany;  their  influence  is 
growing  in  France,  and  even  in  Holland  and  Switzer- 
land. Statesmen  of  every  land  will  have  to  take 
account  of  them,  not  only  in  the  sphere  of  home 
policy,  but  also  in  foreign  affairs."1  Statesmen 
may  be  reassured  !  Neo-Thomism  has  nothing 
to  do  with  politics.  Its  sole  ambition  is  to  enter 
into  frank  and  friendly  relationship  with  all  who 
start  from  facts  of  experience  and  history  in  order  to 
build  up,  in  the  words  of  Huxley,  a  logically  con- 
structed and  true  theory  of  the  world. 

We  make  our  appeal  to  Plato,  Descartes,  Leibnitz, 
Kant,  Fichte,  Hegel,  and  Wunctt,  as  much,  and 
certainly  as  sincerely,  as  those  who  regard  us  as 
members  of  a  party  in  opposition  to  their  own. 
If  we  differ  from  them,  it  is  in  this,  that  we  exclude 
no  man  of  genius  from  our  study  on  the  mere  ground 
that  he  is  of  a  particular  period.  We  consider  that 
any  teaching  whatsoever,  even  were  it  of  medieval 
times  and  the  work  of  a  saint,  must  always  be 
measured  by  a  single  rule,  that  of  its  value. 

Further,  is  it.  not  the  Head  of  the  Catholic  Church 
who  has  warned  us  in  his  Encyclical,  "  that  we  must 
gladly  and  gratefully  welcome  every  wise  thought, 
from  whatever  source  it  comes  "  ?  And  the  Pope 
adds  that  we  should  welcome  in  the  same  manner 
"  every  useful  discovery."2 

1  Revue  philosophique,  XLL,  1896.    Le  nSo-thomisme  et  la 
scholastique,  pp.  77,  78. 

2  We  are  quite  of  the  same  mind  as  M.  Picavet  when  he 
blames  Neo-Thomists — of  course,  the  blame  is  only  deserved 


NEO-THOMISM  335 

Those,  indeed,  are  ill  acquainted  with  the  pro- 
gramme of  the  Thomist  philosophy  who  oppose  it 
to  "  scientific  philosophy,"  as  if  observation  were 
not  at  every  step  the  starting-point  of  the  Scholastic 
philosophy. 

And  here  it  may  be  well  to  reproduce  the  declara- 
tion with  which  we  inaugurated  in  1890  the  courses 
of  the  Higher  Institute  of  Philosophy  founded  at 
the  University  of  Louvain  under  the  auspices  of 
Leo  XIII.1  Philosophy,  we  said,  is  defined  as  the 
knowledge  of  the  universality  of  things  by  their 
highest  causes.  But  is  it  not  evident  that  before 
we  can  reach  the  highest  causes,  we  must  advance 
by  way  of  the  more  proximate  causes  which  are  the 
object  of  particular  sciences  ? 

Aristotle  was  a  man  of  learning  who  was  perhaps 
unparalleled;  Albert  the  Great,  the  master  of  St. 
Thomas  Aquinas,  has  left  us  in  his  remarkable 
works  the  results  of  his  patient  observations;2  the 


by  some  of  them — with  sometimes  crediting  their  philo- 
sopher and  considering  as  his  what  he  has  borrowed  from 
others.  (See  Revue  philosophique,  XXXV.,  p.  419.) 
Among  the  studies  which  it  is  important  to  make  of  the 
history  of  the  Schools  of  the  Middle  Ages,  there  should  be 
the  work  of  classification  or  attribution,  according  to  which 
the  place  of  each  master  should  be  determined  in  the  scheme 
of  teaching  as  a  whole.  This  work  will  be  some  day  under- 
taken, and  it  will  require  the  labours  of  several  generations. 

1  La  creation  d'une  ecole  suptrieure  de  philosophic,  p.  9. 
Le9on  d'ouverture    (extract   from    the  Science  catholique, 
December  15,  1890). 

2  In  the  same  article  of  the  Revue  philosophique  in  which 
M.  Pica  vet  opposes    "  scientific  "   philosophy   to  Scholas- 
ticism, he  gives  frequent  praise  to  the  experimental  methods 
used  by  the  Scholastics,  as  in  the  following  passages:  "  In 
the    thirteenth    century,    Aristotle    is    dominant    through 
Avicenna.     All  the  thinkers  under  his  guidance  come  to 


336   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

doctors  of  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  and  fourteenth 
centuries  knew  the  mathematical  and  other  sciences 
of  their  times:  and  must  not  those  who  boast  of 
them  as  their  masters  remain  faithful  to  the  scientific 
traditions  that  have  been  handed  down  to  them  ? 

The  field  of  science  now  extends  farther  than  the 
eye  can  see,  and  the  sciences  themselves  have 
increased  in  number.  To  observation  of  the  results 
that  follow  upon  causes,  modern  science  adds 
experiment  which  recreates  natural  conditions  to 
compel  natural  forces  to  reveal  their  effects.  The 
neo-Thomist  philosophy  is  bound  by  tradition  as- 
well  as  by  interest  to  turn  these  resources  to  good 
account. 

Doubtless,  the  progress  of  philosophy  is  not 
always  directly  proportioned  to  the  mass  of  material 
accumulated  by  experience.  Sagacity  is  of  greater 
value  than  the  piling  up  of  a  jumble  of  petty  details, 
and  he  who  knows  how  to  interrogate  and  under- 
stand nature  may  get  more  out  of  some  common 
observation  than  another  from  numerous  analyses. 
Nevertheless,  the  constant  study  of  facts  is  the 
ordinary  condition  for  the  progress  of  thought. 

Being  anxious  to  corroborate  theory  with  practice, 
the  Belgian  episcopate  established  at  the  new 
Louvain  Institute  a  course  and  a  laboratory  of 

empirical  psychology;  they  all  tend  towards  a  genetic 
psychology."  "  Albert  the  Great  depends  upon  Aristotle 
and  Avicenna;  he  increases  the  stock  of  facts,  and  presents 
them  clearly  and  in  a  more  didactic  manner:  in  his  case, 
psychology  becomes  a  natural  science."  "  Even  if  the 
Middle  Ages  knew  nothing  of  experimental  methods,  they 
used  experiments." — Revue  philosophique,  XXXV.,  1893, 
pp.  418,  419. 


NEO-THOMISM  337 

psycho-physiology  at  a  time  when,  according  to  the 
Annee  psychologique  of  MM.  Beaunis  and  Binet, 
similar  instruction  was  not  to  be  found  in  France.1 
Why,  then,  do  they  persist  in  ascribing  to  us,  in 
spite  of  our  honest  protestations  and  facts,  servility 
to  prejudice  in  favour  of  ideas  "  that  have  had 
their  day  "  ? 

In  the  Annee  psychologique,  a  few  pages  previous 
to  the  admission  we  have  quoted,  M.  Binet  welcomed 
an  invitation  by  M.  Pica  vet  to  "  a  mutual  tolerance 
between  Catholics  and  their  opponents  for  the  greater 
advantage  of  science,  and  even  of  religion,  of  philo- 
sophy and  civilization."  Why,  then,  does  he  so  far 
yield  to  prejudice  as  to  continue :  "  To  these  sensible 
remarks  let  us  add  that  when  we  take  up  our  own 
special  and  limited  standpoint  of  experimental 
psychology  for  forming  an  opinion  of  the  new 
movement,  we  are  unable  to  sanction  a  state  of  mind 
that  uses  observation  and  experiment  to  fortify 
a  preconceived  idea,  especially  when  that  idea  is 
already  many  centuries  old.  On  the  contrary,  we 
are  accustomed  to  take  observation  as  our  starting- 
point,  as  the  beginning  of  our  investigations,  and  as 
the  source  of  truth  and  the  supreme  mistress  of 
science."2 

We  give  a  sympathetic  welcome  to  the  proposal 
for  mutual  tolerance  made  by  the  two  French  writers 
in  spite  of  the  prejudices  which  they  reveal.  But 

1 'Speaking  of  the  Introduction  &  la  psycho-physiologie  in 
the  Revue  neo-scholastique  of  1895  (April),  by  M.  Thiery, 
the  Annie  psychologique,  1896,  p.  847,  wrote:  "  To  this 
course  belongs  a  laboratory,  which  makes  a  complete  teach- 
ing equipment  for  normal  psycho-physiology,  such  as  is 
not  now  to  be  found  in  France." 

8  Annie  psychologique,  1896,  p.  840. 

22 


338   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

what  do  they  mean  by  a  "  preconceived  idea  "  ? 
Must  a  man  of  science  have  no  philosophy  ?  If 
men  do  not  adopt  the  same  philosophy,  must  they 
describe  any  philosophy  they  do  not  agree  with  as 
a  "  preconceived  idea  "  ?  If  that  is  the  case,  only 
the  sceptic  will  be  above  suspicion. 

One  is  for  or  against  Aristotle  or  St.  Thomas 
just  as  one  is  for  or  against  Comte  or  Kant.  That 
is  to  say,  one  regards  this  or  that  philosophy,  taken 
as  a  whole,  as  the  most  adequate  conception  of 
true  knowledge.  But  it  does  not  mean  that  one  con- 
siders it  as  a  finished  achievement  which  the  mind 
must  adore  in  ecstatic  and  barren  contemplation; 
nor  does  it  mean  that  one  holds  it  to  be  irreformable. 

There  is  not  a  Catholic  philosopher  who  is  not 
ready  to  abandon  an  "  idea  already  many  centuries 
old  "  as  soon  as  it  is  plainly  contradicted  by  one 
observed  fact.  For  we,  too,  are  accustomed  "  to 
take  observation  as  our  starting-point,  as  the 
beginning  of  our  investigations,  as  the  source  of 
truth  and  the  supreme  mistress  of  science." 

The  moral  of  all  these  prejudices  for  us  Catholics 
is,  that  we  should  love  science  and  cultivate  it  in 
our  schools  of  philosophy  more  energetically  than 
ever.  The  Aristotelian  philosophy  lends  itself 
better  than  any  other  to  the  interpretation  of  the 
facts  of  experimental  psychology.  Let  us  recall  the 
conclusion  of  the  Grundzuge  der  physiologischen 
Psychologic  of  the  founder  of  the  laboratory  of 
Leipzig.  The  results  of  my  work,  says  Wundt, 
square  neither  with  the  materialist  hypothesis,  nor 
with  the  dualism  of  Plato  or  Descartes.  Aristotelian 
animism,  which  connects  psychology  with  biology, 


NEO-THOMISM  339 

is  the  only  plausible  metaphysical  conclusion  to  be 
drawn  from  experimental  psychology. 

Indeed,  if  the  materialists  are  right,  if  the  soul 
is  merely  a  dynamical  or  physiological  piece  of 
mechanism,  it  follows  that  physiological  psychology 
is  not  a  separate  science,  but  only  a  page  of  mechanics 
or  of  physiology. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  soul  be  nothing  but 
mind,  if  it  subsists  of  itself  independently  of  the 
living  body,  and  is  directly  and  solely  observable 
through  consciousness,  a  laboratory  of  experimental 
psychology  becomes  inconceivable,  for  it  presupposes 
a  claim  to  make  the  soul  the  subject  of  experimenta- 
tion, and  to  measure  and  weigh  it  and  test  its  forces, 
etc. — in  other  words,  it  presupposes  the  material 
character  of  the  soul.1 

But  if,  with  Aristotle  and  all  the  teachers  of  the 
School,  we  admit  that  man  is  a  composite  substance 
made  up  of  matter  and  an  immaterial  soul,  that  his 
higher  functions  are  really  dependent  upon  his 
lower  functions,  that  not  one  of  his  inward  acts  is 
without  its  physical  correlative,  not  one  of  his 
thoughts  without  its  representation,  not  one  of  his 
volitions  without  sensible  emotion,  at  once  the  con- 
crete phenomenon  presented  to  consciousness  gets 
the  note  of  a  combination  which  is  both  psycho- 
logical and  physiological.  It  depends  both  upon 
conscious  introspection  and  upon  biological  and 
physiological  observation.  In  short,  we  have  a 
clear  indication  of  the  ratson  d'etre  of  a  science  of 
psycho  -physiology . 

So  clearly  is  it  indicated  that  in  the  Aristotelian 
A.  Thi&y,  Revue  neo-scholastique,  April,  1895,  p.  182. 


340   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

philosophy  psychology  and  physiology  were  not 
two  separate,  and  much  less  opposed,  sciences,  but 
one  and  the  same  science.  Dr.  Hermann  Siebeck, 
the  historian  of  Psychology,  judiciously  observes: 
Aristotle  was  the  first  to  have  a  thorough  under- 
standing of  man's  spiritual  (mental)  acts 'through 
their  genetic  connection  with  the  bodily  functions.1 
And  M.  Boutroux,  in  a  remarkable  article  in  the 
Grande  Encyclopedic,  very  justly  remarks :  "Aristotle 
is  a  man  of  all-round  and  creative  genius.  .  .  . 
He  has  not  Plato's  elan:  with  a  mind  bent  upon 
facts,  he  regards  as  chimerical  all  that  is  not  con- 
nected with  them;  but  he  is  no  mere  empiric,  and 
in  the  sensible  he  looks  for  the  intelligible.  .  .  . 
Nor  is  this  all.  The  various  divisions  of  knowledge 
are  mutually  determined,  according  to  Aristotle,  by 
relationships  which  he  very  clearly  defines.  Gener- 
ally, the  higher  is  only  known  after  the  lower,  and 
through  the  knowledge  of  the  lower;  but  at  the 
same  time,  it  is  in  the  higher  that  the  raison  d'etre 
and  true  cause  of  the  lower  must  be  found."2 

Thus  the  Aristotelian  and  Thomist  anthropology 
wonderfully  corresponds  with  the  needs  and  en- 
deavours of  contemporary  psychology.  The  three 
distinctive  features  of  that  psychology  further 
enforce  the  same  conclusion,  either  by  their  likeness 
or  their  unlikeness  to  the  teachings  of  Aristotle. 

The  Cartesian  dualists  confine  psychological  study 
exclusively  to  inward  facts  observed  by  and  in 
consciousness.  Hence  they  logically  conclude  that 

1  Hermann  Siebeck,   Geschichte  der  Psychologic,   i  Th., 
2  Abth.,  S.  126. 

2  Boutroux,     Grande    encyclopedic,    on    Aristotle,     III, 
PP-  394-396. 


s 


NEO-THOMISM  341 


the  science  of  psycho-physiology  is  impossible  or 
impracticable.  The  anthropology  of  Aristotle  and 
St.  Thomas,  in  contradistinction  to  -this  limited 
notion  of  psychology,  relies  both  upon  inward  and 
outward  experience,  and  thereby  firmly  lays  down 
a  foundation  for  psycho-physiology. 

Metaphysics  and,  in  particular,  rational  psycho- 
logy, are  discredited  or  abandoned  outside  the 
Christian  schools  of  philosophy,  and  the  tendency 
of  metaphysics  is  generally  represented  as  being 
diametrically  opposed  to  the  tendencies  of  science.1 
The  Aristotelian  and  Scholastic  anthropology  founds 
its  rational  portion  upon  its  experimental  portion; 
it  infers  from  scientifically  observed  facts  and  facts 
of  consciousness  the  nature  and,  ultimately,  the 
origin  and  destiny  of  man.  The  application  of  the 
principle  of  sufficient  reason  to  the  various  data 
of  consciousness  and  of  outward  observation  leads 
first  to  the  distinction  of  the  faculties,  then  to  the 
composite  nature  of  man  which  is  their  first  principle. 
The  study  of  the  higher  activities  of  mind  (vovs), 
the  combined  activities  of  the  vovs  TTOLTITLKO^  and 
of  the  vov<f  8wd/j.€i,  goes  to  prove  the  immaterial 
(ajjuyi'js,  unmixed)  nature  of  the  soul;  and  that  its 
origin  should  be  attributed  to  the  action  of  an 
extra-material  cause  (e^wdev] ;  and  that  it  is  meant 
for  the  indefectible  possession  of  the  supreme 
Good. 

Now,  as  M.  Loomans  rightly  observes,  "  the 
different  parts  of  philosophy  are  all  connected  with 

1  In  Chapter  VII  we  tried  to  show  that  metaphysics 
rightly  understood  is  only  the  natural  complement  of 
science,  and  is  far  from  being  inconsistent  or  incompatible 
with  it. 


342   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  knowledge  of  oneself:  all  have  a  psychological 
starting-point."1 

Metaphysics  thus  understood  is  not  a  "  piece  of 
poetry,"  but  the  logical  crown  of  science. 

We  do  not  shrink  from  acknowledging  that  for 
a  long  time  metaphysics,  in  the  Kantian  sense— 
i.e.,  the  study  of  critical  problems — had  not  in  the 
Scholastic  philosophy  the  place  that  the  intrinsic 
bearing  and  historical  importance  of  these  problems 
should  have  given  it .  But  there  is  nothing  surprising 
in  the  fact. 

Mankind  is  naturally  dogmatic.2  The  child 
naturally  believes  in  his  father  and  mother  and  in 
those  about  him.  Your  ordinary  man  may  learn 
by  experience  to  doubt  what  others  say;  he  does 
not  doubt  his  own  senses  or  his  own  intelligence. 
When  the  physicist  and  the  philosopher  note  certain 
errors  of  the  senses,  when  they  perceive  that  they 
have  stumbled  into  fallacies  without  knowing  it, 
they  look  for  empirical  rules  to  protect  themselves, 
but  they  are  convinced  that  such  mistakes  as  they 

1  Ch.  Loomans,  De  la  connaissance  de  soi-meme,  Brussels, 
1880,    Introduction,   §   3.     He  runs   through   logic,   meta- 
physics,  moral  philosophy,  and  aesthetics,   one  after  the 
other  in  order  to  prove  that  each  of  them  rests  upon  a 
"  psychological  basis,"  and  he  finishes  his  Introduction  by 
this  wise  advice  to  the  positivist.     "  Positivists  are  taken  up 
with  the  study  of  a  great  many  things,  but  not  with  the 
fundamental  questions  of  psychology  itself.     What  it  is 
important  for  us  to  understand,   is  our  own  nature;  and 
therefore,  our  own  origin  and  destiny." 

2  We  have  gone  into  this  matter  in  a  treatise  entitled, 
Du  fondement  de  la  certitude,  Louvain,  1888,  pp.  19  ff.     Cf. 
Revue  neo-scolastique,   January,   1895,   La  theorie  des  trois 
verites  primitives.     Cf.   De  Wulf,   Archiv  f.  Geschichte  der 
Philosophie,  1897,  p.  402,   Les  lois  organiques  de  I'histoire 
de  la  psychologic. 


NEO-THOMISM  343 

have  made  are  purely  accidental.  Medieval  thinkers 
call  no  more  in  question  than  those  of  ancient 
Greece  the  natural  sincerity  of  our  cognitive  facul- 
ties, if  working  normally.  When  Sextus  Empiricus  * 
rises  up  against  the  too  confident  dogmatism  of  the 
philosophers,  he  does  it  on  the  ground  of  acknow- 
ledged aberrations  of  the  senses  or  of  the  intellect. 
He  opposes  judgement  to  judgement,  system  to 
system,  and  endeavours  to  prove  that,  amidst  all 
the  medley,  it  is  impossible  to  discern  what  is  the 
proper  use  of  reason,  but  he  has  no  doubt  as  to  the 
possibility  of  a  proper  use  of  reason.  The  distrust 
which  the  sceptics  of  ancient  times  sought  to  foster 
concerned  the  speculative  reason,  systems,  and  the 
disputes  of  the  Schools,  but  they  inferred  the  need 
of  keeping  to  practical  moral  principles,  and  thus 
indirectly  bore  witness  to  their  belief  in  the  natural 
preordination  of  the  mind  to  the  possession  of  the 
time. 

The  whole  of  the  Middle  Ages  rested  upon  such 
spontaneous  assumptions.  The  daily  sight  of  uni- 
versal order  prevented  them  from  suspecting  that 
man,  creation's  masterpiece,  was  merely  a  badly 
contrived  piece  of  machinery,  spoiling  the  general 
harmony.  The  law  that  every  being  had  its  natural 
destination,  under  the  control  of  its  own  inward 
principle  of  finality,  to  fulfil  the  part  providentially 
assigned  to  it  in  the  whole  cosmos,  protected  them 
from  the  notion  of  an  essential  disorder  at  the  root 
of  man's  mind.  In  their  commentaries  on  Aristotle's 
Analytics  or  in  their  metaphysics,  when  the  masters* 

1  Hypotyposes  Pyrrhon.,  II.,  4.  See  our  Critlriologie 
gtntrale,  5th  ed.,  pp.  53  ff.,  Le  scepticisme. 


344       CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

of  the  School  deal  with  the  knowledge  of  the  truth, 
the  height  of  their  ambition  is  to  demonstrate  in  the 
nature  of  man's  mind,  reflexively  perceived,  the  inner 
reason  of  a  faith  which  they  regard  as  indisputable.1 

The  confusion  wrought  by  the  Renaissance  in  the 
very  midst  of  the  decadence  of  Scholasticism,  and 
the  systematic  doubts  of  Descartes,  and  that  series 
of  causes  the  succession  of  which  we  have  en- 
deavoured to  describe  in  their  concatenation,2  were 
required  to  induce  Kant,  the  genius  of  modern 
scepticism,  to  lay  his  axe  of  doubt  to  the  very  root 
of  our  cognitive  faculties.  Under  the  influence  of 
the  Discours  de  la  methode  and  of  the  Kritik  der 
reinen  Vernunft,  the  question  of  criticism  is  laid 
down  in  modern  philosophy ;  and  though  it  is  stated 
in  contradictory  terms,  laid  down  it  is.  Therefore 
neo-Thomists  would  be  quite  wrong  if  they  took 
no  notice  of  it.  For  whom  are  we  philosophizing, 
unless  it  be  for  the  men  of  our  own  times  ?  And 
what  is  our  object,  unless  it  be  to  attempt  a  solution 
of  the  doubts  which  are  an  obsession  in  our  contem- 
poraries ? 

Besides,  there  is  a  large  number  of  subsidiary 
questions  to  which  the  fundamental  doubt  of  the 
Critique  has  given  rise.  They  are  questions  of  the 
highest  interest.  Let  us,  then,  gratefully  welcome, 
as  Leo  XIII  tells  us,  and  as  we  like  to  recall  now, 
"  every  wise  notion  wheresoever  it  may  come 
from  ";  men  of  genius  do  not  work  an  intellectual 
revolution  unless  their  most  fatal  errors  contain  a 
"  soul  of  truth." 

i  St.  Thomas,  De  Veritate,  Q.  I,  Art.  9. 
3  See  Ch.  II  above. 


NEO-THOMISM  345 

It  is  with  philosophy  as  it  is  with  faith.  Heresy 
is  the  commonest  occasion  of  the  definition  of 
Catholic  dogmas.  Kant's  Critique,  if  Christian 
philosophers  will  only  give  their  minds  to  it,  will  be 
the  occasion  for  a  deeper  philosophy  of  criticism, 
possible  to-day,  but  impossible  in  the  days  of  un- 
broken philosophic  faith.  And  this  is  the  first  benefit 
neo-Thomism  has  to  confer  upon  modern  philosophy. 
The  second  benefit  we  have  already  pointed  out : 
it  will  be  a  closer  application  to  scientific  observa- 
tion and  experimental  methods  in  psychology. 

We  believe  that  it  is  impossible  to  do  a  greater 
service  to  the  general  teaching  of  the   Scholastic 
psychology  than  by  putting  it  in  touch  with  the 
established   results   of   cellular   biology,    histology, 
embryogeny,  physiology,  and  philology;  by  simpli- 
fying psychic  facts  as  far  as  possible,  after  the  manner 
of  the  English  Associationists ;  by  trying  to  under- 
stand the   human  adult   by  studying  animal  and 
infantile  psychology,  the  healthy  subject  by  means 
of  the  pathological  subject,  the  moral  man  by  means 
of  the  criminal,  as  is  done  in  psychiatry  and  criminal 
anthropology,  in  which  the  minute  observation  of 
certain  exceptional  conditions  brings  out  into  greater 
relief   characters   which   are   unnoticed   in   normal 
types  in  ordinary  circumstances;  by  following  up 
any  particular  modification  or  variation  in  human 
activity  in  the  case  of  different  races,  or  at  different 
periods,  as  they  have  been  followed  up  by  Lazarus, 
Steinthal,  and  Herbert  Spencer;  and  by  submitting 
the   psychological  subject  to  that  sort   of  mental 
dissection  which  is    facilitated    by  well-conducted 
hypnotic  experiments  and  suggestions. 


346   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

But  above  all  is  it  important  that  the  neo- 
Thomists  should  take  up  a  more  prominent  position 
in  the  movement  for  psycho-physiological  investi- 
gation in  the  direction  given  to  the  experimental 
school  by  Wundt. 

Of  course,  we  have  not  to  weigh  the  mind,  nor 
to  measure  the  dimensions  of  the  soul,  as  some 
works  or  philosophical  magazines  published  by 
Christian  writers  appear  to  insinuate  at  times. 
We  have  only  to  take  the  fact  of  consciousness  as  it 
is,  in  all  its  material  and  immaterial  complexity. 
On  its  material  side  it  is  linked  with  the  external 
world,  undergoes  its  action,  and  reacts  upon  it.  The 
fact  thus  roughly  regarded  is  a  matter  of  the  most 
common  observation,  and  spontaneous  conscious- 
ness suffices  to  inform  us  generally  of  its  effects. 

But  consciousness,  if  left  to  itself,  can  hardly 
inform  us  of  the  elements  of  which  the  complex 
whole  is  composed,  as  it  appears  in  its  undivided 
state  of  spontaneous  introspection.  To  dissociate 
these  elements  in  order  to  come  to  the  simplest  of 
analytic  data,  those  technically  termed  impressions 
by  Wundt ;  to  reconstruct  synthetically  the  concrete 
complex  facts  of  spontaneous  consciousness — i.e., 
representations — and  to  determine  the  associative 
laws  of  representation :  such  is  in  brief  the  programme 
of  the  new  science  of  psychology. 

What  is  there  in  all  this  to  be  afraid  of  ?  Will 
it  be  said  that  such  a  science  is  vain  ?  Or  that  it 
does  not  matter  whether  we  discover  if  a  colour 
sensation  is  simple  or  complex ;  what  are  the  physical 
and  physiological  conditions  of  representation;  and 
on  what  principles  the  total  content  of  consciousness 
is  ultimately  composed  ? 


NEO-THOMISM  347 

Such  objections  as  these  are  irritating.  Who  can 
foretell  the  importance  or  unimportance  in  the  long 
run  of  any  discovery  ?  What  the  Omnipotent  has 
thought  fit  to  create,  and  esteems  worthy  of  His 
control,  must  surely  be  worth  the  attention  of  human 
reason.  He  little  understands  the  dignity  of  science 
who  contributes  such  prejudices  to  its  work. 

We  do  not  deny  the  benefits  of  science,  say 
others,  only  we  do  not  perceive  the  raison  d'etre 
of  psycho-physiology  in  philosophy. 

Do  the  psychologists  who  betray  such  a  distrust 
of  psycho-physiology  hesitate  to  acknowledge  that 
physics,  chemistry,  and  geology  are  auxiliaries  to 
cosmology  ?  On  the  same  ground,  psycho-physio- 
logy is  an  auxiliary  science  to  psychology  in  the 
traditional  sense  of  the  term. 

Natural  sciences,  say  others,  contribute  in  a 
practical  way  to  the  field  of  observation,  but  con- 
sciousness has  but  one  means  of  self-study,  and  that 
is  consciousness.  Hence  there  is  no  good  reason 
for  dividing  psychology  on  the  one  hand  into 
rational  psychology,  wherein  consciousness  must  be 
investigated  by  consciousness,  and  on  the  other 
hand  into  experimental  psychology,  wherein  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness  have  to  be  investigated 
by  other  recording  apparatus  than  that  of  con- 
sciousness. 

Here  we  have  a  fallacy,  as  M.  Thiery  very  rightly 
remarks.1  In  experimental  psychology,  as  in  rational 
psychology,  consciousness  is  only  observed  by  itself. 
If  the  one  is  called  experimental  psychology,  it  is 

1  A.  Thiery,  Introduction  &  la  psychologic,  in  the  Revue 
n6o-scolastique,  April,  1895,  p.  183. 


348   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

because  the  observations  of  the  inner  sense  are 
therein  investigated  not  only  by  themselves,  but 
also  with  the  help  of  recording  scientific  apparatus. 
And  this  kind  of  division  is  to  be  found  in  many 
other  sciences,  such  as  astronomy.  For  what  is 
the  use  of  astronomical  instruments  ?  The  heavens 
now  scanned  in  observatories  are  the  same  as  those 
of  the  early  shepherds  of  Chaldea,  who  dimly 
dreamt  of  contemplating  the  various  constellations. 
There  is  no  need  to  tell  us  that  telescopes  now  take 
the  place  of  eyes,  because  they  increase  our  powers 
of  vision.  And  thus  is  it  with  psychology.  The 
subject  of  investigation  in  our  laboratories  is  the 
same  human  being  that  was  investigated  by  the 
medieval  Scholastics ;  but  to  help  us  to  form  accurate 
conclusions,  we  possess  instruments  which  increase 
our  perceptive  powers  tenfold.1 

1  A.  Comte  objects  that  the  method  of  inward  observa- 
tion is  contradictory,  because  "  the  thinking  subject  cannot 
divide  himself  into  two  parts,  one  of  which  reasons  while  the 
other  looks  on  at  the  reasoning." 

If  the  observing  subject  is  an  organ  made  of  matter, 
the  objection  is  unanswerable;  but  it  misses  the  mark 
if  the  subject  is  not  material.  Thus  the  difficulty  assumes 
the  question  in  dispute  between  Comte  and  Spiritualism. 

Comte  also  commits  a  fallacy  as  to  the  object  of  intro- 
spection. He  credits  us  with  thinking  that  the  subject 
must  begin  by  creating  a  void  in  the  mind  in  order  to  know 
itself.  But  we  believe  we  have  already  proved  that  this 
supposition  is  a  contradictory  one.  The  mind  only  knows 
itself  by  means  of  its  own  activity. 

If  we  deny  the  possibility  of  inward  observation,  do  we 
not  make  all  human  knowledge  impossible  ?  After  we  have 
apprehended  external  facts  by  means  of  the  senses  and  the 
mind,  must  we  not  turn  our  observation  upon  ourselves  to 
get  an  exact  notion  of  what  we  have  apprehended  ?  Is  the 
positive  philosophy  anything  more  than  the  working  out  of 
a  notion  which  A.  Comte  claims  as  his  own  ?  And  would 
he  have  brought  it  forward  if  he  had  not  conceived  and 
apprehended  it  inwardly  before  he  gave  expression  to  it  ? 


CONCLUSION 

UNLESS  we  are  deceived,  the  fundamental  anthro- 
pological doctrines  of  Aristotle  and  of  St.  Thomas 
Aquinas  emerge  all  the  stronger  from  the  test  we 
have  applied  to  them,  by  comparing  them  with 
the  dominant  ideas  of  contemporary  psychology. 

Quite  as  much  as  hitherto,  and  even  more,  do 
we  feel  the  necessity  of  keeping  the  observed  facts 
of  consciousness  in  close  connection  with  the  facts 
of  biology,  and  of  denning  the  soul,  not  by  saying 
along  with  materialism:  the  soul  does  not  exist; 
or  that  it  is  merely  a  sum  of  the  special  properties 
belonging  to  brain-matter;  nor  by  saying  with  the 
dualistic  spiritualism  of  Descartes  that  the  soul, 
being  external  to  the  body  upon  which  it  acts  by 
an  inconceivable  point  of  the  brain,  is  an  immaterial 
substance  whose  whole  nature  consists  in  thinking — 
but,  by  taking  up  once  more  the  Aristotelian  defini- 
tion, and  by  saying  of  the  soul  in  general  that  it  is : 

vvdpei    £&>T)P    e%ovTOS.     'H 

rj  -Trpcorrj  <7w//.aro9  (pvcrixov 
The  soul  is  the  form  of  a 
physical  body  potentially  possessing  life.  The  soul 
is  the  first  act  (actuality)  of  a  natural  body  posses- 
sing life  potentially.1 

1  De  Anima,  II.,  cap.  i.,  4,  5. 

349 


350   CONTEMPORARY  PSYCHOLOGY 

And  we  shall  define  the  human  soul  as :  'H 
Se  TOVTO  <a  £«//,sz>  ical  al<rdavojj.e0a  KOI  biavoovpeffa 
Tr/acoTw? — that  whereby  we  primarily  live,  and  feel,  and 
think.1  These  definitions  sum  up  the  essential  theses 
of  anthropology,  provide  against  the  defects  and 
excesses  of  contemporary  psychology,  and  furnish  a 
solid  basis  for  the  bold  investigations  of  critical 
philosophy  and  of  psycho-physiology  to  which  Kant 
and  Wundt  each  gave  such  an  impetus. 

Thus,  as  Trendelenburg  told  his  fellow-country- 
men, the  starting-point  for  philosophy  is  no  more  to 
seek:  it  is  there.  It  only  remains  to  be  developed 
by  reflecting  upon  general  truths  and  by  diligent 
attention  to  experimental  science.  And  the  fol- 
lowers of  Aristotle,  if  only  they  keep  wide  awake 
to  the  experimental  origins  of  thought,  will  be  less 
liable  than  others  to  go  astray  in  the  fancies  of 
idealism  and  subjectivism.  They  will  be  able,  as 
the  Revue  scientifique  acknowledges,  "  to  square  with 
their  philosophy  contemporary  investigations  of 
physiology  and  of  psycho-physiology,  without 
making  any  compromise,  and  without  any  injury  to 
science."2 

If  neo-Thomism  keeps  faithful  to  this  programme, 
it  will  be  able  to  rejuvenate  the  philosophy  of  the 
School  with  fortunate  discoveries,  to  renew  its 
apparatus  in  part,  and  to  wear  in  the  eyes  of  pos- 
terity a  very  different  aspect  from  that  which  it 
presents  to-day.  Nevertheless,  those  who  would 
fathom  its  deepest  possibilities  will  again  find  in 

1  De  Anima,  II.,  cap.  ii.,  12. 

2  Revile  scientifique,  LI.,  1893,  p.  55.     See  above,  Intro 
duction,  p.  viii. 


CONCLUSION  351 

the  substructure  of  the  building  the  soundness  and 
completeness  of  the  principles  which  governed  the 
uprise  of  Western  civilization.  They  will  joyfully 
acknowledge  that  there  has  been  progress  without 
revolution,  acquisition  without  loss,  and  the  growth 
of  a  living  unity  which  has  been  constantly  enriched 
by  the  variety  of  the  contributions  made  to  it  by  all 
the  branches  of  human  knowledge.1 

1  See  Mgr.   d'Hulst,  Philosophic  sfyarte  et  philosophic 
chrttienne,  Namur,  1896,  pp.  27,  28. 


Prin'ed  in  England 


JJCSB  LIBRARY 


--     . 


)1 

1 


r 

>^_«*-       i-K^A.*.,,     ^vJ^jtLJ^ 

' A*-Vv.    l/\- — k_LJ     ''X.-A-l 

"A 000658126    8 


• 

^~^-e_Jt^ 

^Y  ^      <*^L-..U 

<U-'j^»vvlA     ^ 
*H.  -^f*1**-^*^^^     -V^t . 

•"   ' 


^w 


